

STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED
PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2015

HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED
PROGRAMS

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NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Rogers, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mrs. Lowey, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.

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STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2015

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2014.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WITNESS

HON. JOHN F. KERRY, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN GRANGER

Ms. GRANGER. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, I want to welcome you back to the subcommittee. We look forward to your testimony. During our time with you today there are many new issues that members want to address. In Ukraine, the situation continues with no resolution in sight in spite of your personal engagement to try to bring this crisis to an end. In Afghanistan, even after intense negotiations, the government refuses to sign a bilateral security agreement with the United States, putting our troop presence and diplomatic footprint in doubt and increasing the risk that extremists will return.

In Africa, new conflicts have broken out, deepening human suffering in areas that have struggled for so many years. All of these troubling developments must be addressed, yet most of the topics we discussed last year are still relevant today.

The members of this subcommittee, like you, continue to watch the situation in Egypt, even while the country is tackling significant security and economic challenges. We know Egypt is moving toward elections later this year. During this critical time, the United States must continue to work with the government of Egypt and support the Egyptian people.

The Syrian crisis continues, even though through your intense efforts last year, there was hope that the regime would give up its chemical weapons. In spite of all the work of the U.S. Government and our international partners, the efforts to remove chemical weapons have stalled, extremists are taking the upper hand, and more lives are lost every day because of the violence and blocking of humanitarian aid.

The Syrian crisis is affecting the whole region. Its neighbors are now bearing the burden of 2-1/2 million refugees. These neighboring countries continue to do all they can to help the Syrians pouring over their borders, but we must do all we can to help them. Because of the flow of refugees from Syria, Jordan's population has increased by nearly 10 percent, and Lebanon's population has increased by an estimated 20 percent.

Over the last year, you have worked with your international partners to put in place an interim agreement with Iran that allows for some sanctions relief if Iran takes steps to dismantle its nuclear program. There is no doubt that sanctions brought Iran to the table, and the United States must keep the pressure on as a final deal is negotiated. We all know too well that the security of the United States and the security of our steadfast ally Israel is at stake here.

In addition to these policy issues, we have questions about the administration's budget request. The base funding level requested for State and USAID is roughly the same as last year, but you sacrificed some of the priorities of the members of this committee to make room for the administration's initiatives. Many programs that we support in a bipartisan way have been reduced below last year's level, such as global health and democracy funding. We will be seeking additional information so we understand your proposal.

Another difficult budget issue we need to address together is embassy security. We need assurance that the proposed funding level is adequate to address the recommendations in the Benghazi Accountability Review Board report.

Next, I want to mention an issue that I know is a priority for you, and that is Middle East peace. You have made countless visits to the region to try to move the Israelis and Palestinians toward peace, and I want to be clear, achieving peace is our priority, too, and this Congress is unwavering in our bipartisan support for Israel. You and the President have recently made some strong statements about Israel's role in the peace process. You raised the issue of boycotts if a peace agreement is not reached, and the President has said that Israel needs to articulate an alternative approach if an agreement is not possible. I hope you will give us an update on peace talks during your testimony today and explain those comments to the committee.

I also want to mention an issue that is a priority for me in my own backyard and ours. Mexico is our neighbor, and we want our neighbor to be prosperous and also to be safe. This can only be achieved if we have a true partnership. I hope you will comment on the current relationship between our countries so the subcommittee knows if the funding provided is making a difference.

And finally, I want to raise a concern I know I share with you, Mr. Secretary. We must stop the international crisis of wildlife poaching and trafficking. Criminal networks are destroying species and using the funds for illegal activities around the world. I thank you for what you have done in this area since we talked about it last year, and I hope the funds in the final year, the fiscal year 2014 bill will be used to bring an end to this crisis. However, the budget materials that the committee has received so far don't reflect fiscal year 2015 funding for wildlife poaching and trafficking, and the committee expects that level of detail as soon as possible.

In closing, I want to thank you and the thousands of diplomats, development officers, and implementing partners for what you do every day to promote U.S. interests abroad. As you have said, in an increasingly interconnected world, global leadership is not a favor we do for other countries, it is a strategic imperative for the

United States of America. We all agree with you on that point and want to continue to work with you.

[The information follows:]



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

March 12, 2014

Contact: [Steve Dutton](#) | (202) 225-5071

**GRANGER OPENING STATEMENT: HEARING ON STATE
DEPARTMENT FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST**

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As you've said, "in an increasingly interconnected world, global leadership is not a favor we do for other countries, it's a strategic imperative for the United States of America".

I agree with you on this point and want to continue to work with you.

I'll now turn to my ranking member, Mrs. Lowey, for her opening remarks.

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Ms. GRANGER. I will now turn to my ranking member and partner in this, Mrs. Lowey, for her opening remarks.

OPENING STATEMENT OF MRS. LOWERY

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Madam Chair, and welcome, Secretary Kerry. I join Chairwoman Granger in welcoming you back to our subcommittee. Let me also say I know the chairwoman joins me in congratulating you on the birth of your granddaughter.

Secretary KERRY. Thank you.

Mrs. LOWEY. Our country is fortunate to have your thoughtful, effective, and respected leadership, with so many grave challenges around the world, from the crisis in Syria to the Middle East peace process, from nuclear negotiations with Iran, to human rights abuses and conflicts throughout the world, and of course, urgent concerns in Ukraine. Today we expect updates and insights into how your budget request will address these and other threats to peace, stability, and security.

Mr. Secretary, I have often hoped for Middle East peace in my lifetime, and I strongly support your efforts to facilitate a two-state agreement that ensures security for our ally Israel, understanding there are very difficult issues yet to be resolved. We look forward to your assessment of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

We all agree we must make it impossible for Iran to make a nuclear bomb, but the clock is ticking on reaching a final agreement. Do we have a set of hard requirements, a bottom line that we need in order to get to an agreement? I remain skeptical of Iran's intentions, especially given their unyielding position against any dismantlement of their nuclear infrastructure. Would any final agreement prohibit Iran from having a heavy water reactor at Arak, or advanced centrifuges that require Fordow to be closed?

Additionally, I hope you will address our relationships with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, two important allies in the Gulf. While the United States cannot compromise our principles, we must acknowledge the difficult and volatile circumstances in the region and work to ensure our actions do not alienate our long-standing strategic partners.

With regard to Syria, there seems to be a stalemate. Destruction of chemical weapons has not occurred per the agreed-upon schedule. The Assad regime continues to commit despicable atrocities against innocent civilians. Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey are burdened under the strain of refugees. Please tell us about contingency planning in light of the very real potential of a completely destabilized region and renewed sectarian violence in Iraq.

In Afghanistan, as the administration considers reducing our military footprint, I hope you can reassure us about our ability to sustain the gains in security, health, education, and women and girls empowerment so that countless lives will not have been lost in vain.

Last week, the House worked quickly to pass Chairman Rogers' and my loan guarantee bill to support Ukraine. It appears the markets are already punishing Russia, and actions by the IMF and EU may soon exacerbate the repercussions. While Russia's overarching foreign policy goals are not entirely clear, I hope to hear details on the prospects for deescalating this crisis, the future of the United

States' relationship with Russia, and the impact of these tensions on both negotiations with Iran and the situation in Syria.

Mr. Secretary, it is clear that the administration's robust diplomacy and development request is needed now more than ever before to address these challenges and countless other global priorities. Our investments in education, health, women's political participation, climate change, food security, public diplomacy, bilateral family planning assistance, and UNFPA activities, to name just a few, improve lives, expand economic opportunity, and inherently make us more secure. That is why I urge you to rectify one critical shortfall in the budget request—the failure to prioritize international basic education. I will state the obvious. Education is fundamental to all other development outcomes, and is the cornerstone of strong, stable societies. No country has reached sustained economic growth without achieving near universal primary education. Health and child survival, poverty reduction, and women's advancement all leap forward with a strong educational foundation. With 57 million primary school-age children around the world out of school, our job simply is not done.

With great respect for your wisdom, integrity, and hard work, thank you again for joining us. We look forward to your testimony.
[The information follows:]



COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

Congresswoman Nita Lowey (D-NY), Ranking Member

Opening Statement by Ranking Democrat Nita Lowey (D-NY)

Hearing on U.S. Department of State FY2015 Budget Request Secretary of State John Kerry

March 12, 2014

Secretary Kerry, I join Chairwoman Granger in welcoming you back to our Subcommittee. Let me also say congratulations on the birth of your granddaughter last week.

Our country is fortunate to have your thoughtful, effective, and respected leadership with so many grave challenges around the world, from the crisis in Syria to the Middle East Peace Process; from nuclear negotiations with Iran to human rights abuses; and, of course, urgent concerns in Ukraine. Today we expect updates and insight into how your budget request will address these and other threats to peace, stability, and security.

Mr. Secretary, I have often said ‘peace in my lifetime,’ and I strongly support your efforts to facilitate a two-state agreement that ensures security for our ally Israel. Understanding there are very difficult issues yet to be resolved, we look forward to your assessment of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

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With great respect for your wisdom, integrity, and hard work, thank you again for joining us.

Ms. GRANGER. I will now yield to the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Mr. Rogers, for his opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN ROGERS

Chairman ROGERS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. I am not sure you know what time it is, given the schedule that you are under around the world. Thank you for your service. It must be very tiring, but challenging.

Mrs. Lowey and I are determined as chairman and ranking member of the full committee to pass all 12 individual bills this year, to save you the tyranny of these continuing resolutions, which are herky-jerky, and your staff can't make proper plans on how to spend the money and the like. So we are determined to pass those 12 bills through both bodies and have them signed by the President to allow contemporary needs to be addressed rather than putting spending on automatic pilot based on last year's needs, whatever they were at that time. So it will be a challenge, but we are determined to work with Ms. Granger and all the other subcommittee chairs to get these bills out of here.

Unquestionably, the time that you are serving in in the world has got to be one of the most difficult periods we have been through, with problems seemingly on every corner, in Syria and the neighboring countries, in Iran, regional instability, challenges with the transition in Afghanistan, the need for a peace agreement in the Middle East that has eluded so many Secretaries before you, and continued drug trafficking, and violence in South and Central America. There are no easy answers to these complex international challenges. Certainly, each of these unique situations calls for strong U.S. leadership, and in particular, we are all concerned these days, of course, about Ukraine and its territorial integrity.

As Ms. Lowey has said last week, the House passed \$1 billion loan guarantee for Ukraine, and we are waiting now on the Senate, and I would hope and trust that the Senate would send back an unencumbered loan guarantee bill, as clean as we sent it to them. This is no time to try to attach riders to something of this importance, and I would hope that the Secretary would talk to his colleagues in the Senate and speak to them of the wisdom of sending a clean bill back over to us.

We will be working hard to try to figure out with you the proposed spending of the \$48.5 billion in discretionary funds in this subcommittee's jurisdiction to help you achieve these disparate goals around the world this year. We look forward to working with you to prioritize your most important needs, and we would hope that you would communicate to us that information. All of us know that this is a difficult period of time financially for our country, not to mention the difficulties you face internationally.

On a more personal note, let me take a moment to thank you and those under your charge for assisting a constituent of mine whose young daughter is a victim of international parental child abduction. This incredibly strong mother testified last week before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about how this growing challenge has impacted her family and so many others similarly situated. Last year over a thousand children were reported abducted from or retained outside the U.S., so I appreciate both your

attention and efforts by the Department to engage bilaterally and multilaterally with foreign governments to encourage the safe and timely return of American children to their homes.

We have some difficult choices ahead on our side of the bench, as do you on that side. We hope that we can move in parallel to help solve the difficulties that you face. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. GRANGER. Secretary Kerry, please proceed with your opening remarks. Your full written statement will be placed in the record, so feel free to summarize your statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SECRETARY KERRY

Secretary KERRY. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Granger and Ranking Member Lowey, Mr. Chairman Rogers of the full committee. Let me just thank all of you, first of all, for your very generous comments of understanding of the complications of the world we are living in today, but also I just want to thank you for your thoughtful and substantive consideration of all of these issues that face us. We are deeply appreciative for the leadership that this committee brings to the country.

I, as you all know, have spent a lot of time up here, 29-plus years, and in that time, I have learned that choosing to be on the Foreign Relations Committee or the Foreign Appropriations Committee, et cetera, is not necessarily automatically the easiest thing to explain at home, and it doesn't always result in some of the direct claims that you can make about ways in which you have assisted your district, but on the other hand, I think it does because you assist them by advancing the values and the interests of the country and by helping us to increase American security and stability in the world, all of which comes home to roost one way or the other, either in jobs for districts, States, for the country, but also in the safety and security that we are able to achieve as a result of that.

Let me just say that I am privileged to lead a remarkable department with men and women all over the world. We have just held our several days' conference of all of our chiefs of mission called back to Washington. Susan Rice spoke to them yesterday. I spent a fair period of time doing a sort of open meeting with them as well as other meetings we have had, and it is really intriguing to see the energy and interest and passion that they all bring to the effort to represent our country abroad, and some remarkable 70,000 people in total in various ways, civil service, foreign service, local employees, particularly local employees make a huge difference to our ability to do our job, and I want to salute all of them.

You have each, in your opening comments, focused on the complications of the world we are living in today, different from anything any of us might have imagined. Vastly different from the world as bipolar East-West, Cold War, and even different from the early years of exuberance in the fall of the Berlin Wall. Now there are sectarian, religious extremists, terrorists and other challenges released as a consequence of the fall of those countries and the changes in those countries, and so we are challenged, and I believe it is important for us to get caught trying to change things.

That is who we are in the United States. And I cannot tell you how much it has been impressed on me in all of the journeys I have

made on behalf of the President and our country how much people do look to the United States of America. I hear it again and again and again everywhere. It is our responsibility to help to make a difference in lots of different situations, and we have to be clear-eyed about the challenges, and obviously the environment has to be ripe for a breakthrough in one place or another, but particularly, for instance, in Ukraine.

Congresswoman Lowey, you mentioned the need to try to find a diplomatic solution, and our interest is in protecting the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial integrity of Ukraine with our European partners and others, and we have a responsibility to be engaged, and we are engaged. We also have to be willing to try to sit down and deescalate the situation, as you said, Congresswoman Lowey. That is why President Obama has asked me to leave tomorrow evening and fly to London to meet with Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Friday, and I will do that, and we have had previous conversations. As you know, we spoke earlier this week. The President has talked several times to President Putin.

I will make clear again, as I have throughout this crisis, that while we respect obviously that Russia has deep historical, cultural, and other kinds of interests with respect to Ukraine and particularly Crimea, nothing justifies a military intervention that the world has witnessed. There are many other legitimate ways to address Russia's concerns, and we are trying to make that very, very clear. In my discussions with Minister Lavrov I have made it clear that there are many reasons for Russia to choose a path of deescalation and of political solution here. We believe that interests can be met and that, most importantly, the desires of the people of Ukraine can be respected and that the international law can be respected. We do not seek a world in which we have to apply additional costs to the choices that have been made thus far.

We don't think anybody is more served, better served not for the interests of our efforts in Iran, not for the interest of our efforts in Syria, not for the interest of our efforts with nuclear weapons or Afghanistan or many other places by isolating Russia, but we will do what we have to do if Russia cannot find the way to make the right choices here, and our job is to try to present them with a series of options that are appropriate in order to try to respect the people of Ukraine, international law, and the interests of all concerned.

So we will offer certain choices to Foreign Minister Lavrov and to President Putin through him and to Russia with hopes, and I think the hopes of the world that we will be able to find a way forward that defuses this and finds a way to respect the integrity and sovereignty of the State of Ukraine.

It couldn't be any clearer. What you all do here and what we talk about here today really matters, and when I think about that, I can't help but recall standing in Kiev just a few days ago near the Maidan on Institutska Street right at the spot where so many were struck down by the snipers, looking at the bullet holes up and down lampposts, looking at these extraordinary memorials that people have spontaneously built, stacks of flowers, candles, photographs, and juxtaposed to the street which was filled with these ex-

traordinary barricades of bedposts and tires and all kinds of detritus, and a street that was covered in a film of the results of the fires that had been lit and the burning that had taken place and the chaos that had ensued.

What came through to me were the voices of the people I talked to on the street, telling me how much they wanted to be able to determine their own future and how grateful they were for our support and assistance and how they just wanted to be able to live like other people. One man particularly struck me, he had come back from Australia, and he said, you know, I saw how other people are living, and we just want to be able to make the same choices and live the same way. What we do is true not just for Kiev, but it is true in so many places, and some places that don't always get the headlines.

It matters in a place like South Sudan, a nation that Frank Wolf and some of you helped to give birth to, a nation that is now struggling and needs our support in order to be able to have a chance to survive its infancy. It matters in the Maghreb where the State Department is coordinating with France to take down al Qaeda, making sure that French forces have the technology and the weapons that they need. What we do matters to us in terms of what we do in central Asia, where we are working with several nations to stop the trafficking of narcotics, to keep more heroin off our streets, and to cut off financing for terrorists and extremists.

What we do matters in the Korean peninsula, where we are working with our partners from the Republic of Korea to make sure that we can meet any threat from North Korea and to continue to push for the denuclearization of North Korea. I was just in China, we can talk about that a little later if you want. But thanks to the State Department's work, the South Koreans are now making the largest financial contribution to these efforts in the peninsula in the history of our joint security agreement. What we do matters from Bosnia to Indonesia in our work with NGOs and civil society groups to defend religious freedom, protecting the universal rights of people to practice their faith freely and working to bring an end to the scourge of Anti-Semitism.

This isn't just what we do in this budget, this is an essential part of who we are as Americans. I firmly believe that in this increasingly interconnected world, global leadership isn't a favor that we do for other countries, as you mentioned, Madam Chair, it is vital to our own strength. It is vital to our security and the opportunities that we can provide for our children.

Now, I have spent enough years here to know that you shouldn't call anything that costs billions of dollars an automatic bargain, but when you consider that Americans, the American people pay just one penny of every tax dollar for the \$46.2 billion in investments in this request, I believe the American people are getting an extraordinary return on their investment.

We have kept our funding request in line with what was appropriated to the Department and USAID in fiscal year 2014 within our base request of \$40.3 billion, and the additional part of our request for OCO, Overseas Contingency Operations, totals \$5.9 billion. With OCO funding we support programs, as you know, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan as we continue to right-size those

commitments. These resources also provide the U.S., the State Department and USAID with the ability to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Syria and flexibility to meet unanticipated peace-keeping needs.

I know it is easy for some in Congress to support larger cuts in the budget, but what is impossible to calculate completely is the far greater price our country would pay for inaction on many of the things that we are facing today. It is impossible to calculate the dangers in a world without American leadership and the vacuum that that would create for extremists and ideologues to exploit, but I am telling you without any doubt more deeply than I ever believed it before when I chaired the Foreign Relations Committee, this year has impressed on me the degree to which if we aren't engaged in these things, we will pay the price somewhere down the road for the vacuum that will be created and for the dangers that will come to our country as a result.

For me it is no coincidence that the places where we face some of the greatest national security challenges are also places where governments deny basic human rights to their nation's people, and that is why development assistance, investing in our partnership with our allies, and supporting human rights and stronger civil societies is so critical. These are the surest ways to prevent the kind of tragedy that we are seeing unfold in Syria today.

Now, I know that Frank and others of you have seen these horrors firsthand, as have I. You have looked into the eyes of refugees. There is simply no way to articulate how important it is for the richest, most powerful Nation on this planet to do its part to try to make the world a safer and a better place. For the Syrian people, for Lebanon, Turkey, and for Jordan coping with how to keep their societies running and keep extremists at bay while they host millions of now refugees, our support is critical to that. We are the largest donor in the world, and that helps us because it is critical to us that Lebanon and Jordan remain stable.

With our assistance to one of our oldest allies in the Pacific as it recovers from one of the worst natural disasters in history, Typhoon Haiyan, we are also leading the way. Through an \$56 million contribution from State and USAID to the Philippines, we are working with our partners so that hundreds of thousands of people literally can put their lives back together, and I visited that devastation and saw how it just flattened that community in a matter of minutes.

With our core budget request, there is a \$1.35 billion contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the goal that President Obama has set today for an AIDS-free generation would have been absolutely unthinkable 10 years ago—it was, I am telling you—because I wrote the legislation with Bill Frist in the Senate that created the first effort on AIDS, and we got the support of Jesse Helms, and the story since then with President Bush growing it into PEPFAR and all of the things that have happened is an amazing story for the United States of America and for the world, and an accomplishment, and we are now working to transition the leadership of these life-saving programs to local hands, with Rwanda, Namibia, and South Africa, some of the first to take the reins.

Because of our leadership, children are waking up today in Sub-Saharan Africa who face a very different future from what they did only 10 years ago, and just as our partners in Asia and Europe make a transition from being recipients of American aid, 11 of the 15 countries that we used to give aid to, the biggest aid recipients, are now donor countries. Remarkable story. Korea, a donor country, was a major recipient of aid and so forth. We can be proud of this. Americans, I think we need to talk about it more. We need to get people to see the huge benefit of this one penny on the dollar investment, and part of making sure that African nations and many other emerging markets make the most of opportunities in approving reforms to the International Monetary Fund is going to be a critical part of that.

I think all of you know the IMF has been a central part of the transformation of so many countries, and it is also important to greater trade with people in our own hemisphere as well as right here at home, and particularly for trade with Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Korea, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand, all of whom once borrowed from IMF and now are some of the most powerful traders in the world.

So I will just close by saying to you that Ukraine's struggle for independence, particularly its financial independence, will depend on Congress ratifying reforms that will help Ukraine borrow through the IMF's rapid financing instrument. Our \$200 million investment and sovereign loans are needed urgently, but it is only through the IMF, a reformed IMF that Ukraine is going to receive the additional help it needs in order to stand on its own two feet.

We are doing, I think, amazing stuff out of many of our embassies, consulates around the world, and I just say to you, look at the advocacy from Embassy Lusaka that helped a New Jersey-based firm win an \$85 million contract to build 144 bridges in Zambia with the potential to grow to \$250 million contract. That is jobs at home. That is U.S. tax benefit, and strengthening of our economy.

Our consular staff in Calcutta helped bring an Illinois-based Caterpillar together with Sasan Power Limited on a \$500 million deal to develop 396 megawatt power plant. Embassy Wellington and Embassy Apia in Samoa helped TE SubCom, a company based in New Jersey, land a \$350 million contract to lay fiber optics across the Pacific. When 95 percent of the world's consumers live outside of our market and when foreign governments are out there aggressively backing their own businesses, believe me, this is the kind of advocacy that American workers need to compete, and that is why I have said since day one of becoming Secretary of State, economic policy is foreign policy, and we have just talked about that with all of our embassy chiefs and mission chiefs who come back to Washington. We have put in place a very strong economic team, and we believe that it is critical to be able to strengthen that.

So Madam Chairwoman, this budget keeps our ironclad partnership with Israel intact, \$3.1 billion in security assistance, and as we make these investments around the world, we can never eliminate every risk, especially in a world where our vital interests are not confined to secure and prosperous capitals, but we can and will mitigate these risks, and we have been in implementing the ARB and working off the lessons learned in Benghazi. This budget does

that, and it does more. It implements all of the recommendations of the independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board, and it makes additional investments that go above and beyond that.

Every week I am sitting with our team to evaluate the threats against a number of different embassies, the levels we have drawn down, we have added back, we have had authorized departures, we have had mandatory departures. It is a constant challenge, but I believe we are meeting that challenge appropriately and allocating our resources in a way that best protects the men and women serving our country.

I believe this budget strikes a balance between the needs to sustain long-term investments in American leadership and the political imperative to tighten our belts here at home. I believe the budget is a blueprint for providing the minimum our people need to be able to carry out their mission, and to enhance national security and promote global stability.

I will just close by saying to you it is never, and that is not a budget that we would like to have, this is the budget we have to have under the circumstances of the budget agreement, and that is a longer conversation. Maybe we will get into some of that today. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

[The information follows:]

**Secretary Kerry's Testimony to House Appropriations Subcommittee on State,
Foreign Operations**

March 12, 2014

I'm really pleased to be here with you for this second budget season in my time as Secretary of State. I want to thank Chairwoman Granger and Ranking Member Lowey for your leadership and the commitment of each of you to our leadership in the world.

This is an important committee. People don't acknowledge that enough. I was in Congress for 29 years, and believe me, I know that choosing to be on this committee doesn't win you any votes back home. The work you do here doesn't drive fundraising. But it matters – it really matters – and this has never been more clear to me than over the past year – when I've seen over and over again firsthand just how much the world looks to the United States on issue after issue.

Trying to bring people together and find answers to tough challenges – that's what the United States does, and if we 'get caught trying,' then we're living up to what the world expects from us and what we expect from ourselves. I think that's especially true about the crisis in Ukraine. We have to be clear-eyed about the challenges, and certainly the environment has to be ripe for a breakthrough, but our objectives are very simple: to help the people of Ukraine achieve what brought thousands upon thousands into the Maidan in the first place. Our interest is in protecting the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and with European partners, we absolutely have a responsibility to be engaged.

But we also have to be willing to sit down and try to deescalate this situation. That's why President Obama has asked me to leave tomorrow evening and fly to London to meet with Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Friday.

I will make clear again, as we have throughout, that while we respect that Russia has interests in Ukraine, particularly in Crimea, that in no way – no way - justifies the military intervention the world has witnessed. There are many other legitimate ways to address Russia's concerns.

In my discussions with Minister Lavrov I'll also make it clear that Russia has reasons to make the right choice here. The costs for Russia's violations of international law – the cost of making Russia more isolated – not just from the United States, but from the

international community – is a cost that Russia should not want to bear, and doesn't have to bear if they make a better choice.

Congress' support is going to be absolutely vital. Whether its loan guarantees to help support a free Ukraine, an assistance stream or support for additional sanctions if they're necessary, you give us the tools to accomplish our goals.

So it couldn't be any clearer, what we do here really matters. When I think about that I remember where I was last week in Kiev – standing in the spot where Ukraine's former president had snipers pick off peaceful protesters one by one. It was very moving to be there, to speak with some of the Ukrainian people and hear how much they look to us.

The same is true far from Kiev or what's in the headlines. What we do matters to South Sudan, a nation that Frank Wolf and some of you helped to give birth to – a nation that's now struggling and needs our support to have a chance of surviving beyond infancy.

What we do matters in the Maghreb, where the State Department is coordinating with France to take down al-Qaeda, making sure French forces have the technology and weapons they need.

What we do matters in Central Asia, where we're working with several nations to stop the trafficking of narcotics, to keep more heroin off our streets and cut off financing for terrorists and extremists.

What we do matters on the Korean Peninsula, where we are working with our partners from the Republic of Korea to make sure we can meet any threat from North Korea and for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Thanks to the State Department's work, the South Koreans are now making the largest financial contribution to these efforts in the history of our joint security agreement.

What we do matters from Bosnia to Indonesia in our work with NGOs and civil society groups to defend religious freedom. Protecting the universal rights of people to practice their faith freely or working to bring an end to the scourge of anti-Semitism -- this isn't just what we do in this budget; this is an essential part of who we are as Americans.

I firmly believe that in an increasingly interconnected world, global leadership isn't a favor we do for other countries, it's vital to our own strength and security and the opportunities we provide for our children.

I spent enough years in Congress to know that I shouldn't call anything that costs billions of dollars a bargain. But when you consider that the American people pay just one penny of every tax dollar for everything the \$46.2 billion in this request provides – for all it does to protect our interests and promote our values -- I believe the American people are getting an incredible return on their investment.

We've kept our funding request in line with what was appropriated to the Department and USAID in FY 2014 within our base request of \$40.3 billion. The additional part of our request, for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), totals \$5.9 billion. With OCO funding we support programs in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan as we continue to right-size our commitments. These resources also provide the State Department and USAID the ability to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Syria and the flexibility to meet some unanticipated peacekeeping needs.

I know it might be easy for some members of Congress, and maybe even some of you, to support larger cuts in this budget. What's impossible to calculate is the far greater price our country would pay for inaction. It's impossible to calculate the dangers in a world without American leadership and the vacuum that would create for extremists and ideologues to exploit.

For me it's no coincidence that the places where we face some of the greatest national security challenges are also places where governments deny basic human rights and opportunities for their people. That's why supporting human rights and stronger civil societies, development assistance, investing in our partnerships with our allies: these are the surest ways to prevent the kind of horrible human tragedy we see Syria today.

And I know Frank and others have seen these horrors first hand, as I have. When you look those refugees in the eyes or see their numbers, there is simply no way the richest and most powerful nation in the world can turn away. For both the Syrian people and for Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan, coping with how to keep their societies running and keep extremists away as they host refugees, the support we provide in this budget could not be more urgent. I believe it is both a moral and security imperative.

With our assistance to the Philippines, recovering from one of the worst natural disasters in its history, we are also leading the way. Through an \$56 million contribution from State and USAID to the Philippines, we are working with our partners so that hundreds of thousands of people can put their lives back together and so that one of oldest allies in the Pacific can get back on its path to prosperity.

Within our core budget request is also a \$1.35 billion contribution to the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. The goal that President Obama has set today for an AIDS free generation would have been absolutely unthinkable even 10 years ago but today that goal is within reach. Because of PEPFAR's incredible success, we are now working to transition the leadership of these life-saving programs to local hands with Rwanda, Namibia, and South Africa some of the first to take the reins.

Because of our leadership and commitment, children waking up today in Sub-Saharan Africa face a far different future than they did a decade ago. And just as our partners in Asia and Europe made a transition from being recipients of American aid to becoming donors in their own right, that kind of transformation is now possible in Africa.

Part of making sure African nations and many other emerging markets make the most of their opportunities is approving reforms to the International Monetary Fund. The IMF has been a central part of the transformation of so many countries and to greater trade with the United States and opportunities for our own people. Brazil, Chile, Columbia, India, Korea, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand – all of these nations once borrowed from the IMF. Now they are creditors with some of the most dynamic economies in the world.

Ukraine's struggle for independence, particularly its financial independence, depends on Congress ratifying reforms that will help Ukraine borrow through the IMF's Rapid Financing Instrument. Our \$1 billion loan guarantee is needed urgently but it's only through the IMF -- a reformed IMF -- that Ukraine will receive the additional help it needs to stand on its own two feet.

The State Department will continue to partner with the IMF to support global economic stability but we also have an obligation to be strong advocates for America's commercial interests. That's why I've charged each of Foreign Service Officers with an economic mission: to create opportunities for Americans and work with our businesses to gain a foothold or larger share of global markets.

I know there are some who are skeptical about this kind of economic diplomacy but you can't argue with some of the results. Just look at the patient advocacy from Embassy Lusaka that helped a New Jersey-based firm win an \$85 million contract to build 144 bridges in Zambia with the potential to grow to \$250 million.

Look at the work of our consular staff in Kolkata that helped bring Illinois-based Caterpillar together with Sasan Power Limited on a \$500 million deal to develop a 3,960 MW power plant.

Or look at what Embassy Wellington and Embassy Apia achieved, helping TE Subcom, a company based in New Jersey, to land a \$350 million contract to lay fiber optics across the Pacific.

When 95% of the world's consumers live outside of our market and when foreign governments are out there, aggressively backing their own businesses, this is the kind of advocacy American workers need to compete.

Telling our story where it matters most is vital to both the success of our businesses and the appeal of our values. With this budget's investments in stronger people to people ties, educational exchange and countering violent extremism, we are shaping the debate. We are keeping traditional programs like our flagship Fulbright strong, while revitalizing the way we engage through quick-impact investments to shape emerging leaders in civil society around the world.

We call some of these investments quick impact but you and I both know their lasting benefits. I can't tell you how many times foreign leaders share their experience of studying in the United States and the permanent and positive impression it made. And all

of you who have colleges and universities in your districts also see the financial impact from the \$22 billion each year that international students bring to the US economy.

This budget also strengthens our partnerships where so many of our economic and security interests converge, in the East Asia and Pacific region. With this budget we bolster our bedrock alliances with South Korea and Japan as well and develop deeper partnerships with Vietnam and the Philippines as they assume greater security roles. This budget also keeps ironclad our partnership with Israel, providing \$3.1 billion in security assistance.

As we make these investments around the world, we can never eliminate every risk—especially in a world where our vital interests are not confined to secure, prosperous capitals. But we can and will do more to mitigate risks and keep our people safe. This budget implements the recommendations of the independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB) and makes additional investments that go above and beyond.

My friends, I think it's fair to say that we are doing the best we can in a difficult budget environment. I firmly believe that this budget strikes a balance between the need to sustain long-term investments in American leadership and the political imperative to tighten our belts. I believe this budget is a blueprint for providing the minimum our people need to carry out their mission: to enhance national security, to promote global stability and prosperity, and to help the American people seize the opportunities in a changing world. Thank you.



John F. Kerry

Secretary of State

Term of Appointment: 02/01/2013 to present

On February 1, 2013, John Forbes Kerry was sworn in as the 68th Secretary of State of the United States, becoming the first sitting Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman to become Secretary in over a century.

Secretary Kerry joined the State Department after 28 years in the United States Senate, the last four as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Secretary Kerry was born on December 11, 1943, at Fitzsimons Army Hospital in Aurora, Colorado, one of four children of the late Rosemary Forbes Kerry and Richard Kerry, a Foreign Service Officer.

Shortly before he graduated from Yale University, Secretary Kerry enlisted to serve in the United States Navy, and went on to serve two tours of duty. He served in combat as a Swift Boat skipper patrolling the rivers of the Mekong Delta, returning home from Vietnam with a Silver Star, a Bronze Star with Combat V, and three Purple Hearts.

Back in the United States, Secretary Kerry began to forcefully speak out against the Vietnam War. Testifying at the invitation of Chairman J. William Fulbright before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he asked the poignant question, "How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?" He also began a lifelong fight for his fellow veterans as a co-founder of the Vietnam Veterans of America, and later as a United States Senator who fought to secure veterans' benefits, extension of the G.I. Bill for Higher Education, and improved treatment for PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder).

In 1976, Secretary Kerry received his law degree from Boston College Law School and went to work as a top prosecutor in Middlesex County, Massachusetts, where he took on

organized crime, fought for victims' rights, and created programs for rape counseling. He was elected Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts in 1982, and 2 years later, he was elected to the United States Senate where he served for 28 years.

In 2009, Secretary Kerry became Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, assuming a leadership role on key foreign policy and national security issues facing the United States, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, nuclear nonproliferation, and global climate change. His service as Chairman built on his previous Senate work that included helping to expose the Iran-Contra scandal and leadership on global AIDS.

As Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, he worked to learn the truth about American soldiers missing in Vietnam and to normalize relations with that country.

In 2010, as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Kerry was instrumental in the ratification of the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) Treaty, a vital nuclear arms reduction agreement with Russia that helps steer both countries away from dangerous nuclear confrontations.

In his 28 years on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Kerry chaired the Asia and Middle East subcommittees where he authored and passed major legislation on international drug trafficking, international money laundering, humanitarian aid, and climate change, and he helped negotiate the UN's genocide tribunal to prosecute war crimes in Cambodia.

He also held senior positions on the Finance, Commerce, and Small Business committees, as well as served as a member of the bipartisan Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction, where he worked across party lines to try and reduce the country's debt and strengthen our economy. Prior to his departure from the Senate, Secretary Kerry was the seventh-most senior Senator.

Secretary Kerry was the Democratic Party's nominee for President of the United States in 2004.

Secretary Kerry is the author of best-selling books, including *A Call to Service: My Vision for a Better America* and *This Moment on Earth*, a book on the environment which he co-authored with his wife, Teresa Heinz Kerry. Together they are proud of a blended family that includes two daughters, three sons, and three grandchildren.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you for your detailed discussion on Ukraine. This subcommittee and the Congress also understands the urgency, which is why we passed so quickly the \$1 billion loan guarantee, and we understand that the administration is also going to redirect existing funds to provide technical assistance to the government ministries. My concern I would like you to discuss first is the funding for Europe and Eurasia that is reduced in your fiscal year 2015, it goes down by 18 percent from the levels in fiscal year 2013. So how does your budget request help to support other countries in the region that may also feel threatened and want to continue to work with the United States and the western partners?

Secretary KERRY. Well, Madam Chairwoman, we actually believe the fiscal year 2015 request includes \$1.4 billion, which is 8 percent above 2013 for operations and assistance programs in the Asia-Pacific region to do a number of things: Deepen the alliances, expand and strengthen partnerships, support ongoing operations. We have had to do some trade-offs, but where we have done some trade-offs there is money we believe in the pipeline, and we are able to keep up the current efforts, so we don't believe it is a reduction in effort at all. We think it is an increase overall because of the way in which we have been able to shift additional support. So, you know, in our judgment we are positioned as powerfully as we have ever been within the region. I literally just left a meeting with our East Asia-Pacific, all of our representatives talking about how we are dealing with Japan, South Korea, China, North Korea, ASEAN, enforcing our interests with respect to the South China Sea and dealing with additional efforts.

Ms. GRANGER. My concern was Europe and Eurasia.

Secretary KERRY. Well, in Eurasia we have 217.8 million, which is 44 percent of the EUR bureau's entire request, 44 percent, and we are going to prioritize funding for Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, supporting reforms necessary for European integration and so forth.

In the Balkans we have 27 percent of the EUR entire bureau request, and our European partners represent about 10 percent of the EUR request. So I think we are targeting this to support democratic, the democratic transformation process and reforms, economic, military, justice sector. We really believe while it is a decrease, the largest dollar amount decreases are in Poland and Kosovo, where we think we have made up for it through both European presence as well as the success that has taken place there.

Ms. GRANGER. I would like to talk to you about the later also. But I will go on. The other concern has to do with Egypt and there are a lot of changes that have occurred. One of the changes that hasn't occurred is the importance of our relationship with Egypt, and the administration's policy to withhold the delivery of the military equipment has brought a lot of questions from the Egyptians to this subcommittee and certainly to me. It sent a message to the Egyptians, but they are not sure what the message is. So it has left members of this committee wondering what the policy is, especially when the peace treaty with Israel is being upheld.

In fact, the Egyptians and Israelis are communicating better, they say, than they ever have. The Egyptian military continues to cooperate with the United States and is taking actions that really

are very encouraging, destroying the smuggling tunnels in Gaza. So as this continues, I am concerned and members of the subcommittee are concerned that we have not resumed our assistance and what is happening to Egypt in the relationship, which has been so important having to do with this equipment.

Secretary KERRY. Well, Madam Chairwoman, you raise a lot of very important points about what Egypt is doing and about the importance of the relationship. We don't disagree at all about the importance of the relationship. Egypt is a very vital relationship. It is a quarter of the Arab world. It has always been sort of the hub of the region, if you will. It faces some enormous challenges right now, and we are well aware of that.

We want this interim transitional government to succeed. We are committed to try to help make that happen, but they need to help us to help them at the same time by implementing some of the reforms that we have been talking with them about with respect to inclusivity, journalists, some of the arrests and so forth. We have had these conversations. I met with the foreign minister of Egypt just this past week abroad. We had a very good conversation about it. I have had a number of telephone conversations, including with him, with foreign ministers as well as with Field Marshal Al Sisi most recently. It is our hope to be able to make that transfer providing there is a conclusion drawn by our team with respect to some of the things we have been anticipating them doing, but I can't deny that their efforts on security in the Sinai, their efforts on security in enforcing the peace, the truce with Hamas and Gaza has been very, very important, and we have a strong security relationship with them, strong military-to-military relationship. They want that to be strong, we want it to be strong, and I am hopeful that in the days ahead I can make the appropriate decision, and when I say days ahead, I mean short term.

Ms. GRANGER. So you—

Secretary KERRY. It is up to me. I have the certification, thanks to you. You all worked very hard with us on the language, we are very appreciative of the language that, the standard you have adopted, and I am very, very hopeful that in very short order we will be able to move forward.

Ms. GRANGER. So we won't wait for a new President, new parliament, we will do it before that?

Secretary KERRY. I can't absolutely say with certainty, but it is our hope to be able to do that very soon.

Ms. GRANGER. My last question, and this is also on Egypt, has to do with the extremist groups that are based in the Sinai, the level of sophistication, what is happening there. Hundreds of Egyptian police and military have been killed. So now the way we understand it is that these terrorists are also targeting tourists, which of course hurts Egypt, hurts us and hurts Egypt's progression. Can you tell me what we are doing about that or any updates on the situation?

Secretary KERRY. We are cooperating very, very closely, and I am pleased, you know, that cooperation has never changed in this process. It is security cooperation. We cooperate with Israel also on it. Israel is very engaged in also dealing with this it is a challenge for the region. The principal group there is a Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis,

which is engaged in not just attacks against interests in the Sinai itself, but there is some evidence that they are playing outside of that and into Cairo and other parts of Egypt itself.

So it is a serious threat. We all take it seriously. That is one of the reasons why we would like to be able to get the Apaches up here and meet this standard. They have some 33 Apaches, not as many are flying; unfortunately, there are very few that are flying capable right now, which is why that is a pressing issue, and they need them with respect to the prosecution of our counterterrorism efforts in that region. But we are deeply engaged providing different kinds of assistance, some of which I can talk about here and some of which we would have to talk about in a classified session.

Ms. GRANGER. You can see why it's confusing, however, we understand there is a problem, and this equipment could help the problem. Mrs. Lowey.

Secretary KERRY. I get it, and I have talked to them very directly about that. I think they understand things that need to happen here, and I think my hope is, again, that in the next days, we will be in a position to be able to move forward.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. Mrs. Lowey.

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, again, Mr. Secretary, and I particularly appreciate your activity with regard to Ukraine, but of course there are many other questions we have to ask. I would ask for you to keep us up to date on your conversations with Foreign Minister Lavrov. I can remember meeting with you in July and asking what does Russia want with regard to Syria? What does Russia want with regard to Iran? And I have a feeling we will still be asking that question, but I appreciate your actions and your positive steps.

I want to pursue some questioning on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. During many of our discussions, I have said I hope to see peace in the Middle East in my lifetime. The press reports that Israel and the Palestinians remain divided on all the major issues, including border security settlements, Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees and recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.

So first of all, I would like you to update us on the progress of renewed negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis, and in particular, is it possible for the parties to reach an outline for a final deal by April 29th? Should an extension be necessary, would an agreement to extend talks require Israeli and Palestinian signatures? I know that President Abbas is due at the White House on March 17. Abu-Mazen has stated that without an agreed framework, the PA would resume their drive to join the U.N. and other international bodies.

Do you believe that Abbas will revert to efforts to achieve member status at specialized agencies of the U.N.? Did the administration request waiver authority to continue funding on a case-by-case basis for U.N. entities such as the WHO and IAEA because you believe that Abbas will resume his U.N. campaign, and what is the administration's plan to forestall the PA's attempts to gain recognition in such organizations? Again, your energy has been extraordinary. I think 10 or probably 12 trips to that region of the world, and we appreciate your commitment. Could you discuss with us where you are and use some of these questions as a guideline?

Secretary KERRY. Sure, I would be delighted to, but I hate to say it, but you are light on the number of trips. There have been much more in the region, about 12 or 13 to actually Israel and Palestine, or Palestinian territories.

Let me answer your question. On the waiver, I want to go to the waiver just very quickly because then I will come back to the general situation. We would like a waiver, yes, we do want a waiver. We need a specific waiver, not because we feel they are going to go, but because we already, we can't vote at UNESCO. We have lost our vote, and we think that it is sort of a, you know, it is a policy that was meant to deter, but in fact, is hurting us more than it is deterring, and so has the prospect of doing that. If things were to fall apart, I can guarantee you that President Abbas will not be deterred by any consequence in terms of our loss of funding. That is not going to deter him. So our loss of vote or funding is our loss, and what happens is we actually lose our voice and our capacity to fight for Israel and to fight for other interests we have. We are stripped of that. If they act, it doesn't seem very sensible to put ourselves in that position. So we would like a waiver, and I think we will be coming to you to talk about that.

I do believe there are ways that we can reach an agreement that would see an extension of the, I hope would be able to be reached that might be able to have an extension of that. I don't want to predict with certainty, but I would hope.

Now, my bigger hope is that we can find a way forward that builds on the progress that is very hard to lay out to people, and you are just going to, I am afraid, have to take my word for it. While there are gaps, yes, and some of them very significant, yes, you have to see those gaps in the context of the negotiation. Certain narrative issues are so powerful and so difficult, that neither leader is going to definitively cede on them at an early stage of the negotiation. It is just not going to happen. They are big ticket items in the context of the trading and of the concessions that might or might not be made.

So I am not going to talk about these in any kind of detail here today except to say to you that I believe progress has been made in certain areas, while great gaps, obviously, as I just described, do remain. Our hope is we can get some kind of understanding. I am not going to describe what it would be, but some kind of understanding of the road forward. I do believe both parties are serious, both parties want to find a way forward, but each of them, you know, the level of mistrust is as large as any level of mistrust I have ever seen on both sides. Neither believes the other is really serious, neither believes that both, that the other is prepared to make some of the big choices that have to be made here.

I still believe it is possible, but difficult. And so we are going to proceed as privately as we have. I am not going to, with your understanding, I hope, and respect, lay out where the parties are or what the current tensions are over. I just don't think it serves anything. I have been the one pushing the hardest for them not to negotiate in public, and notwithstanding the best efforts, there have been huge restraints, I must say. Most of the details are not out in the marketplace of conversation, but there have been enough

public dramatic statements of one position or another that I think gets in the way of the negotiation.

So we are going to continue, President Abbas comes here this week, next week, we are looking forward to that conversation just as we looked forward to the conversation the President had with Prime Minister Netanyahu 10 days ago or so, and each of these is informative, each of them has helped to inch forward, and in this particular challenge, inches are acceptable and pretty good and helpful, and we are going to keep moving the way we are moving.

Mrs. LOWEY. I want to thank you. Because there are so many of us, I won't go on to another question, Mr. Secretary, but I just want to mention one of our very important grantees took a position with regard to the Palestinian boycott after the Soda Stream issue. I thought it was totally inappropriate, and I made it clear to them in a letter and in a public statement. It seems to me that when you have a business that is hiring 900 people in the West Bank, employing both Palestinians and Israelis, that should be supported. We are investing economic development funds, and I know you are particularly focused on investing in economic development and going out to the private sector as well to raise those dollars.

So for one of our grantees to support this boycott, divestment, and sanctions drive, I just wanted to put on the record that I thought it was outrageous. Thank you.

Secretary KERRY. Well, thank you, and I think you know our position is we strongly oppose the boycott process.

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you.

Ms. GRANGER. Chairman Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Chairwoman. Mr. Secretary, in a trip I made recently to Israel, the one thing I heard more than anything else there was the word "incitement," and it is plain, the PA especially, is teaching and preaching hatred of the Israelis, and that has got to be a major stumbling block to your efforts to bring a peace agreement about.

In the omnibus bill that we passed in January, thanks to the work of Chairwoman Granger and Ranking Member Lowey, there was the provision added that requires you to certify to the committee that the Palestinian Authority is acting to counter incitement of violence against Israelis, and is supporting activities aimed at promoting peace, coexistence and security operations with Israel.

This is an issue that is tough to deal with especially, but this, I think, gives you some ammunition to try to tamp down the incitement to violence and hatred of Israelis that has got to be a major stumbling block to the peace agreement. What do you think?

Secretary KERRY. Well, it is a problem. It is a challenge, and it is very much on the table in our discussions; and if we get some kind of understanding of how we will go forward, it will include, I believe, a joint understanding of steps that need to be taken on both sides in order to deal with the problem of incitement.

Mr. ROGERS. But the law says that you have got to certify before you can deliver the money that we appropriated to the PA, before you deliver the money, you have got to certify to us—

Secretary KERRY. It is a good lever. I appreciate it.

Mr. ROGERS. The question is, what are you going to do about it?

Secretary KERRY. Well, I am going to make the judgment appropriately obviously; and hopefully we will have movement on that in the context of what we are doing here that will permit me to. If we don't, I won't.

Mr. ROGERS. The time is upon us. It is for fiscal year 2014. No moneys can be delivered to the PA until you certify that they are fighting against incitement.

Secretary KERRY. There are steps being taken. Is it enough at this point in time? Are there still problems with textbooks and some of the teaching and some of the camps, and I have seen videos and other things that are very disturbing. We have called them to attention, and we are working on it. So I hope to be in a position to be able to do that, Mr. Chairman; but I am mindful of my responsibility to do it appropriately.

Mr. ROGERS. When can we expect that?

Secretary KERRY. Before we give them any money.

Mr. ROGERS. That is what I like to hear, but I am looking for a date.

Secretary KERRY. Let me get through the next couple weeks, and maybe I can give you a quicker answer.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, we will be watching that. This, I think very, very thoughtfully on the part of the chairwoman and Ms. Lowey, a very thoughtful process by which pressure can be brought to bear.

Secretary KERRY. Absolutely. No question. But let me say to you, it is something that is a concern within leadership. It is not always something that is controlled all the way down the chain. It is not always, you know, it is not always easily accessible. Even though one person may issue an instruction, some things don't happen. So it is a little more complicated, but we are working on it.

Mr. ROGERS. Well, but it is being taught in schools.

Secretary KERRY. No. I understand.

Mr. ROGERS. It is being taught in the schools, and it is being taught in the marketplace and on the square and every other place, and it is being done with relish, incitement; and it seems to me if you could use this provision to sell Hamas and that side of the importance of tamping down that kind of incitement, it seems to me we would be a major step forward toward a peace agreement.

Secretary KERRY. Mr. Chairman, I understand your concern, and we will address it.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Ms. GRANGER. We will now be going to members. It is a very active and involved subcommittee. I will remind the members that you have 5 minutes for your questions and that includes responses from the Secretary. If time permits, we will certainly have another round. I will now call Mr. Schiff.

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Secretary, I wanted first of all thank you for the outstanding job you are doing. I don't know how you find the energy, but we are grateful that you are as good at the job as you are; and my compliments.

I want to share a couple quick thoughts on Egypt and then ask you about Ukraine. I want to share a slightly different perspective than our chair, which always makes me nervous because our chair

is outstanding, and when we disagree, it is because I made a mistake, which I only find out about later.

But I completely concur with what Cairo has done in terms of cracking down on terrorism within its borders as well as assisting with cracking down on smuggling into Gaza and on Hamas. I think it has been outstanding; but I am gravely concerned that they are not only going after the Muslim brotherhood, but also jailing the secular opposition, jailing journalists, embarking on a campaign of deifying the new military leader; and it looks like we may be returning to the past, going back to another military government. And I think whither Egypt goes, the Arabs spring and the hopes for democracy in the Arab world go. And much as we want a relationship with Egypt and much as we don't like the Egyptians turning to our Russian, I can't say friends at the moment, nonetheless, I think that we have to make clear our strong support for democracy in the Arab world and Cairo's central role in that and the concerns that we have they are deviating from that path. Only tiny Tunisia is a ray of light at the moment.

So I would urge caution and away from alacrity in terms of assistance. I would rather be supporting Egypt in their democracy building institutions than taking any actions that will be viewed not only by Egypt, but by others in the region as condoning a crackdown. It would be a return to a policy of supporting authoritarian regimes that are friendly to us rather than the democratic aspirations of their people.

On Ukraine, I don't envy your job. Mr. Lavrov tells you they won't violate the territorial integrity of the Ukraine, and then they do. Mr. Putin says they don't have troops in Russia, and they do. They both say that they are there to protect the Russian population which is under no threat. It is clear they are going forward with a referendum and probably annexation under the barrel of a gun and that more sanctions are going to be necessary. I think it is going to be vital to impose real costs beyond the first round that the President has announced after Georgia and now Crimea.

Can you share with us a little of your thoughts on what the sanction options may be, and I know you want to carefully calibrate them and continue to offer an exit ramp; but it looks like the Russians have no interest in heading to the exits and that further costs will have been to be imposed; and if you could share a few thoughts on what that might look like and whether our European partners are willing to undertake them with us, considering it will have a bigger impact on their economies than ours.

Secretary KERRY. Thank you, Congressman Schiff, and thank you for your generous comments.

On Egypt, our best source of leverage with Egypt really has been and remains the international legitimacy that is provided by the longstanding relationship with the United States and the realities, the practical applications that come from the military-to-military relationship and our ability to act as a convener on their behalf if they are doing things that are constructive and moving down the road to democracy, our ability to bring business in the global community to the table in order to help them economically.

We are not exactly leveraging ourselves in terms of our aid. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have committed to some \$13 billion. As you

know, I talked at length with chairwoman last year about how much we could take, and I think I took \$195 million; and that is all we released. We had the power to release more, but I wasn't comfortable with what I heard and now borne out by facts, so I didn't release the additional amount, which I am very grateful to the chairwoman for granting us the authority to do had we thought it was appropriate. I didn't think it was appropriate. But \$195 million versus \$13 billion.

So it is not our economic assistance that is our lever. It is this relationship, and I think it is important for us to leverage change there. We have spoken out forcefully, publicly, and individually to members of the government about arrests, about the young activists, about one of our employees, other people. And that is why I said to the chairwoman a little while ago, I am waiting to see a couple things I am hopeful can happen. I am not going to go in with any specificity except to say that we all share those concerns. President Obama has been very clear about the unacceptability of that move.

But there is a delicate balance here. I mean, I am not excusing a delicate balance with respect to any of those things. Don't mistake that; but at the same time, they are trying to establish stability against violent acts that are purposeful to disrupt the economy, purposeful to go after tourists, purposeful to, you know, undo their ability to stabilize the situation; and it is this very complicated chicken-and-egg kind of vicious circle where you have got to get the stability to begin to attract the capital, to begin to attract the tourists; and if you can't do that, and the politics stay in turmoil, it is harder to make it work, and people who are keeping the politics in turmoil know that, so you get in a trap.

And the question is where and how do you sort of break out of that. Hopefully through good politics. Hopefully through the election, through the reforms, through the inclusivity, through the respect for freedom of the press, through the respect for the right to protest; and that will bring people together sufficiently that where there is real terrorist violence, et cetera, people can distinguish between the appropriate level of law enforcement against that versus the system that is working in other respects. That is our hope, and that is what we are trying to help structure.

I know the light is flashing. I will just go very quickly on Ukraine. I am not going to go into all of the sanctions. We have been pretty explicit about the visa sanctions, banking sanctions, targeted business sanctions, individual kinds of sanctions. I don't want to go into all of the detail except to say this: It can get ugly fast if the wrong choices are made, and it can get ugly in multiple directions.

So our hope is that, indeed, there is a way to have a reasonable outcome here. I will not be quite so definitive as you have been that it is clear they will "annex" Crimea. They may well, but they may have the referendum, have the vote and not move in the Duma to do the other things. Or now I hear talk about the potential of secession as an alternative and so forth. That obviously, in our judgment, would be contrary to the constitution of Ukraine and an illegal act; and I am not sure that it would be recognized under those circumstances.

So there are a lot of variants here, which is why it is urgent that we have this conversation with the Russians and try to figure out a way forward. We have exchanged some thoughts. We haven't had a meeting of the minds on that, but we have agreed to try to find a way through the thoughts as exchanged to see if there isn't some way to find a reasonable way forward, and we will make the best efforts to do that.

We have Prime Minister Yatsenuk, he will be here today. I will be meeting with him after this hearing, and then he will be meeting at the White House; and we will have a better sense from Ukrainians, who, after all, really are the ones who have the choice here. Not us. It is what do they feel is acceptable, and what do they feel is the way forward, and we will talk with them about that.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. Mr. Wolf.

Mr. WOLF. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your service; and, every time I see you in the paper, your time away from your family, so I want to thank you for your service in the Senate but also your service here. I think you are really working hard. You probably have the toughest, toughest, toughest job.

I have two questions. You really don't even have to answer them because I would like you to think about them rather than having an answer that gets a story and nothing happens. The first question is on Sudan. You know more about Sudan frankly than I think anybody else. You know more about Sudan than I know about it. I remember once you were over on the House floor and I came up to thank you. I think you spent a whole week there that one time. I had written a letter. I would like you to just think about bringing in the Bush Library and President Bush to work under you and under President Obama. Salva Kiir still wears the cowboy hat that President Bush gave him. There was a quote whereby the South Sudanese Ambassador in Washington welcomed the idea saying, "When you have a deadlock, you need someone to break the ice and bring the people together."

If you just think about bringing in the Bush Library or bringing in President Bush, the same way that President Obama brought in President Bush and Clinton on Haiti, because there is so much going on in the Department, and I know President Bush wouldn't engage unless you said you wanted him to and unless the President said he wants him to. I think you can make a big difference.

The second question, and, again, you don't have to answer this. I just want you to think about it. I was the author several years ago and this committee of the Iraq Study Group, the Baker-Hamilton Commission. I think they interviewed you, I read during the process. And a group of us, Mr. Schiff was one, Anna Eshoo and a group of others sent a letter asking would you engage with the Atlantic Council and/or maybe the U.S. Institute For Peace, which has been funded by this committee to look at, maybe let's call it a Syrian study group to work under you. Secretary Rice gave approval of the Iraq Study Group because you can't contract foreign policy out to an independent group. But working with you or working with Secretary Burns, who is a great guy, and bring in the best minds, bipartisan, take 3 months, people that you like, people that can come together, but with the Iraq Study Group when you had Baker and Hamilton coming together. So there are two questions

to think about. You don't have to answer it. I'm not going to put you on the spot.

Secretary KERRY. I appreciate that.

Mr. WOLF. On Sudan to bring in the Bush Library for reconciliation, for economic development, for a lot of things, working for—let me make it clear, not freelancing; working under you and President Obama, and would you consider the Atlantic Council and/or the U.S. Institute For Peace, or if you get a better group, to bring them in to do the same thing that was done on the Iraq Study Group to see if we can—we are reaching a third year, if we can do something that would help you and us. Thank you.

Secretary KERRY. Good thoughts. I appreciate them both. The only thing I would quickly say to you is that I gave Salva Kiir several cowboy hats because I thought he ought to have a Democrat hat, too; and on some days he wears that, one I am glad to say.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. It is always good to see you. Thank you for being here. Also, let me just, once again, acknowledge your tremendous commitment, focus, and hard work at the State Department as Secretary as well as those of your very dedicated staff.

I am glad you mentioned, and thank you for mentioning PEPFAR and the global fund and the real-life saving and life-affirming value of United States taxpayer dollar contributions. As you know, it was the Congressional Black Caucus here on the House side which led this effort, and we certainly never could have gotten the legislation through the Senate had it not been for your bold and brilliant leadership as well as that of Senator Frist and Senator Helms. I always remind the public that it was an example of the success of bipartisan and bicameral relationships, agreements and really a focus on the fact that we should come together to save lives and to work for an AIDS-free generation, just as this subcommittee and committee continues to do.

I am concerned, however, that PEPFAR really has been flat funded for a couple of years in your budget and that the global fund has been cut now by \$300 million. I am worried that possible donor nations will not cede a real incentive to make their hopefully significant contributions to the global fund if we are cutting our contribution. And so I would like to hear some assessment of how you see that moving forward because we are at a critical and defining moment, as you know, in the fight for an AIDS-free generation.

And secondly let me just mention the whole issue of Uganda and the LGBT laws that we are seeing in Africa and around the world. I understand that your administration is doing a review of our relationship with Uganda in light of the recent bill; but I want you to, or at least I am encouraging you to look at other countries and review other countries where we have significant global and HIV funding which also have similar laws on the books, and you will be receiving a letter from members of the Congressional Black Caucus very shortly on this.

Secretary KERRY. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. I really appreciate your passionate support for this. We wouldn't be where we are today without you and a lot of other folks who supported it. Let me just say very quickly—first of all, why don't I an-

swer the Uganda piece first. I spoke to President Museveni recently, and we had a conversation about this. We talked to him several times before the signing. We obviously opposed the signing of the bill, and he agreed to have some of our experts come over and meet with him and sit with him and listen to them and sort of reopen it; and so we are going to continue that conversation with him. But during that process, I learned that there are 80 countries that have similar types of laws, restrictions on the books, 80 countries, and we deal with all of them. So we have a big task. We are doing what you just suggested about looking at the others and figuring out the road ahead, and we have talked about it with our mission chiefs in the last few days. We need to start reaching out, and we are going to.

This will be a distinct platform of our approach with respect to rights, human rights, and the LGBT community globally will know that the United States is going to really actively, proactively, reach out and talk to those countries.

With respect to the global fund, we have \$1.38 billion in the global fund allocation, our request. And that honors the President's commitment to provide \$1 for every \$2 that are going to be provided here, and what we feel is that in the 2015 request, we are more than fully funding our pledge based on the current commitments of other countries, and we think it is adequate to the task at this point in time.

So the President's Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative, if enacted, would provide an additional \$300 million for the global fund. So this bounces back to you all as to whether or not we can get that enacted, and then we could plus it up a little bit more, but I do believe we will be able to meet the targets and meet our goals.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. Mr. Diaz-Balart.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman and Mr. Secretary again. Always good to see you, sir.

So many issues in the world, but I would like to bring it closer to home, to our hemisphere. Let me just kind of toss three issues out there, and I will throw some specific questions if possible. And the one is, when the President talked about in his first inaugural about those who cling to power through corruption and deceit, exact words, but that he would extend a hand if they are willing to unclench their fists, and yet we see in some areas in our hemisphere that that fist has been clenched even further. Let me just give you a couple examples.

In Cuba, that regime is still holding Alan Gross. He has now been serving prison time for 4 years. As we know, arrests are up, numbers of repression and arrests have increased; and recently even a ship of arms going to North Korea was intercepted in Panama. What specific consequences will the Cuban regime have to deal with because of the increased repression, because of Alan Gross's continued arrest, and now with this new issue of them even shipping arms to North Korea, point number one?

Point number two, coincidentally it was a month ago that the people, the students in Venezuela hit the streets protesting the lack of democracy and freedom and the increases of corruption in Venezuela. They have been confronted, as you have all seen in YouTube videos by arrests, by beatings, even by the way by death,

by killing. The press has been thrown out of Venezuela and censored including stations like NTN-24 that is based out of both Colombia and the United States.

In Ukraine, you mentioned some things like denying visas. A number of us sent you a letter asking if you could, and the administration could do that, unilaterally deny visas to the members of the Venezuelan regime, blocking property or freezing assets and prohibiting financial transactions to these human rights abusers. Are you going to be looking at doing something quick to confront those who are violating the rights and the human rights and arresting and beating the students in the streets; and also what specific things is the administration going to be looking at to help those who are peacefully trying to recover their democracy.

And lastly, in your confirmation hearing, Mr. Secretary, you pledged, and I was glad to hear that, that you would, quote, reiterate our serious concern about Argentina's failure to fulfill its private debt obligations to U.S. Creditors. I don't have to tell this committee about Argentina. They have worked with Iran to, Iran's responsibility for the 1994 bombing at the Jewish Center in the Buenos Aires. They have undermined global sanctions against Iran by expanding bilateral trade with Iran tenfold in 5 years.

I can go on and on, and yet the Department of State has consistently filed amicus briefs frankly siding with Argentina when they have been in court on the issue of precisely them not paying their debtors. That has been rebuffed by every court. Their lawyers, Argentina's lawyers have actually said that they don't care what court is going to do. They have criticized the U.S. courts as being just like Iran. So here is the specific question: Will the Department of State once again file an amicus brief if asked to do so siding with Argentina, which is frankly hard to believe, but that is what has happened, and there is a bunch of reasons why they say they need to do this; but the courts have been very clear that that is not accurate. Or will you, as you said—I know you are concerned about them, Mr. Secretary, too, and I thank you for that. Will at least the Department of State not side with Argentina in the courts if, in fact, they are asked to file an amicus brief?

Secretary KERRY. Well, I can just answer that very quickly. The answer is no. We are not going to.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, sir.

Secretary KERRY. And that is clear. But in addition to that, we have urged Argentina to repay its debts to the U.S. Government and to engage with creditors, public and private. I will continue to do everything that I can and the Department can do in order to recover those funds, some \$600 million in money owed to the United States. With our urging Argentina has taken some positive steps. In October, they settled a long-running investment dispute with three U.S. companies, and it implemented, in January of this year, it implemented an improved inflation index in order to address deficiencies in its IMF reporting and so forth. But we continue to urge them to fulfill their global international responsibilities, and we will do that; and as I said—

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your very direct answer. And I appreciate that. Now the other two issues—

Secretary KERRY. Venezuela and Cuba, I have been meeting repeatedly, particularly in the last few months on the Alan Gross issue. In fact, I met with his family just a couple of weeks ago. And I am not going to go into it here, but I will tell you that we are very focused on a couple of possibilities of how we might try to approach that. We really want to get him back because obviously we don't think he is that well, and he is wrongly imprisoned as far as we are concerned obviously.

So it is a major priority for us and the White House likewise. The White House has been very involved working together in initiatives to try to do this. We hit a stone wall on a couple, but we are continuing to try to do that; and I have a couple of ideas that I hope could work. We will see what happens.

Cuba continues to confound, and there are continued problems there. The Obama administration is prepared to try to have a different policy, but we haven't seen the indicators that merit that at this point in time. There are some things that we are doing that we think help in terms of remittances, the other kinds of cultural exchange and so forth. But at the moment, you are correct; there are serious problems about how the people are treated there and what the nature of that regime is.

With respect to Venezuela, we have urged the release—we have spoken out. I spent, when I was in at the OAS meeting, I purposely reached out to Foreign Minister Jaua. What was supposed to be a 10-minute meeting went for 45 minutes. We made it clear that we want to try to engage in a normal relationship if they are prepared to. But unfortunately they have been more prone to simply want to use us as a political card in their domestic efforts; and I think that has come home to roost frankly now. That is part of what is going on there, huge economic problems, unbelievable stratification within their society, polarization, young people looking for opportunity, and it is not unlike the story in many parts of the world.

We are prepared, we have urged President Maduro to use the powers of his presidency to bring peace and justice and tranquility and opportunity to the people of his country. And we have not engaged in any of these kinds of activities that he has on occasion alleged; and we believe it is time for the OAS, the regional partners, other international organizations, to assume a greater role frankly in urging the Venezuelan government to refrain from demonizing opponents, to allow for peaceful protest, and to move towards a meaningful dialogue with the opposition. That is the only way the issues are going to be resolved. Not with increased violence. Even today there are stories of the potential of that increased violence, and we would hope they would turn away from that.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. Ms. Wasserman Schultz.

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you, Madam Chair. Secretary, welcome. It is good to see you. I want to ask you three questions quickly so I can give you the bulk of my 5 minutes to respond. I am going to follow-up on Mr. Diaz-Balart's question of you on Venezuela, but I do want to acknowledge and ask you about any activities surrounding the disappearance now again of Robert Levinson, who last week sadly his family acknowledged the seventh year of anguish with his imprisonment. He is still missing, and I just urge

you to do all you can to find him and ensure his safe return to the United States because it has gone on for far too long.

On Venezuela specifically, my home town is Weston, which we affectionately like to refer to as West Venezuela; and it is home to the second largest Venezuelan population behind Doral in the United States. Can you discuss specifically, and recognizing that Maduro's regime is trying to use the United States as a distraction and an excuse for his own failings, his own oppression, and his own violation of Democratic principles, and also recognizing that the harm that could come to people who can least afford it from sanctions is part of the angst that is derived from the opposition actually.

There are some members of the opposition in Venezuela who are very concerned about the possibility of sanctions because of the disproportionate impact that it would have on people who are already poverty stricken and deprived by this regime. But this is obviously a very tragic and difficult situation. Maduro is oppressing his people. There is a tremendous amount of violence, and we expect it to get worse. So what actions specifically are we engaging in beyond discussions with the OAS and urging them to engage so that we can be sure that we can continue to be the moral leader, not just in our hemisphere, but in the world.

And then lastly, I am deeply concerned about the complete zero out of funds for the Global Agriculture and Security Program. I know that there is a request tied to the Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative, but we don't have any guarantee that Congress will agree to appropriate those funds, and given that that proposal goes over the cap and has offsets that will likely be controversial, how is that going to impact our Thousand Days Initiative that has been in place since 2010. Global food and security obviously is one of the most tremendous challenges that we face worldwide.

Secretary KERRY. Well, Congresswoman, I want to get back to you on the global agriculture and global food piece and give you more detailed answers as to how we can address that. The food security issue, you are absolutely correct, is an enormously challenging one. The bottom line is, you know, some of these budget choices are very, very tough; and that is the reality and tradeoffs. We believe we can make up for it in other ways, but let me back to you in details of it.

On the sanctions issue and the challenge of Venezuela, let me just say this: We have been in touch with surrounding neighboring countries. We are talking with them about trying to get some kind of initiative with them. They are not listening to us particularly, obviously; and we are hopeful that peer pressure, the hemisphere and the near neighbors are going to be the people who would have the greatest impact on them, but we are prepared if, we need to, to invoke the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the OAS and engage in serious ways with, as you said, sanctions otherwise.

Their economy is fragile enough right now that one might have pause about doing that for the reasons you have described. My hope is, I think the best hope right now, is that the efforts of the neighboring countries who are deeply concerned about what is happening and its impact on the region may, may, be able to encourage the kind of dialogue that could actually pave the way forward.

We have become an excuse. We are a card they play, as you say; and I regret that because we very much opened up and reached out in an effort to say it doesn't have to be this way and to offer an alternative path. We share the same concerns. We want fair distribution of the resources. We want opportunity, economic opportunity. We want to provide the health care and education and the other things that their young people are screaming for. And we believe that we can help. But up until now in the tradition of Chavez, who played that card so forcefully for years, Maduro, who is not Chavez and who has his own internal challenges, has tried to replicate it and to no avail frankly, but it hasn't made it easy for us to be able to have the impact we would like to have.

On Robert Levinson, we are—I have personally raised this in my meetings with Foreign Minister of Iran, Zarif, and we have raised it at the highest levels. It continues to be raised in all of our engagements, and we have met with them. We are doing everything possible. Again, there are three people being held, we believe, in Iran; and they are all three on the table, but we just have not had any positive return on that effort. The Swiss have been engaged with us. We have reached out to the Swiss. They are our representative with respect to that issue in Iran, and they also have not been able to get positive response on it. So there are some serious questions surrounding that disappearance. I think you know that. It is not cut and dry, and we are trying to get to the bottom of it.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. We have planned this hearing to end at 12:30. The Secretary has agreed to stay 10 more minutes. We have to make sure we hear from everyone. So we will now go to Mr. Dent.

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Secretary KERRY. If you would like, just to speed matters up, I will listen to the questions and I can get back to you. My problem is we have Prime Minister Yatsenyuk coming in, so otherwise I would stay even longer. But I can take the questions and get back to you.

Mr. DENT. Sure. Thanks, Mr. Secretary, for being here today. You mentioned in your opening remarks that economic policy is foreign policy, or good economic foreign policy assists foreign policy. I certainly agree with those comments. We obviously have pending free trade agreements with TTIP and TPP, the USCU and the Pacific agreement that would certainly cement relations between our friendly nations and economic relations and it would certainly bring about greater national security benefits I think to all involved.

In recent weeks, discussion regarding the expedited approval of lifting tight restrictions U.S. Exports of liquefied natural gas, LNG, to loosen the grip Russia has on Ukraine's energy consumption. Is the expedited approval of the LNG exports an approach the administration is taking seriously as this crisis continues to unfold? I did speak with our ambassador to Ukraine last night at the reception over at State and talked about—I know the Ukrainians and many of our friends and allies in Europe are very, very concerned about that issue, and they want to become—they want to diversify their supply, get themselves closer to us. Is the administration taking

that issue seriously, and are there specific issues that may make expediting these LNG exports difficult?

Those are some of the questions I really wanted to lay out as well as the Keystone pipeline while we are at it, too. Let's cement our relations with our good friends to the north. There are clearly benefits to that. If you would respond, I would appreciate it.

Secretary KERRY. Sure. Just very quickly on Keystone, it is my responsibility now to deliver an advisory of judgment to the President with respect to the national interests. I am engaged in that process, and, you know, I am just going to do my due diligence, and will report when it is appropriate.

With respect to the LNG, yes, of course the administration is very, very serious about that, and, in fact, to date, Department of Energy who has jurisdiction over the authority over LNG exports has conditionally approved some six LNG licenses for export, about 8.5 billion cubic feet per day that could be exported to both free trade and non-free trade countries such as Europe. That would include Ukraine. The problem is that the first project, I believe, is not expected to come on-line until sometime in 2015, so it is not going to address, if Russia cuts off the gas, we understand they have a certain amount of reserves. There will be some capacity to be able to weather that, but this is not going to have a direct impact on that. It is not going to be able to.

Mr. DENT. The only thing I would add is that—this is a long-term proposition. I do understand that, but I have heard both from the Japanese Prime Minister Abe, Chancellor Merkel and others, they very much want to diversify their supply. They very much want to get American energy.

Secretary KERRY. Believe me, there are a lot of takers and I have heard this in many meetings I have had around the world, including China, elsewhere, where there are voracious appetites. There is a counter point of view expressed by some about the effect on the price, price of oil, as well as price of gas, if you are exporting very significant amounts and what that might mean for American consumer in terms of price, so I don't know what that break point is personally.

Mr. DENT. I understand we will be producing more than we can consume just as we do with many commodities like corn. We produce more corn than we consume and we export it, and we would never tell the farmers to not export corn.

Secretary KERRY. And I believe we should be, Congressman. I think we should do some, but I think there is a legitimate question to figure out where is that break point on price and what is our strategic interest, and we need to balance it.

Mr. DENT. Just on another issue about Israel and Palestine; I think Mrs. Lowey mentioned that issue. In recent months, I have been looking into the vetting of grantees and subgrantees receiving U.S. funding focused on reconciliation in that region. These matters are obviously very sensitive. Do you believe that the vetting of these organizations is specific and careful enough to ensure that those organizations and the people associated with some of these organizations align with U.S. policy, and frankly U.S. Israeli policy because, as Mrs. Lowey pointed out, some of the groups receiving

those funds behave in ways that we find offensive and not in our interests?

Secretary KERRY. The question is whether or not the vetting is——

Mr. DENT. Yeah, some of these organizations that are receiving funding.

Secretary KERRY. I think, look, this is a new decision that I think, without going into names and things, that was made by this particular one organization and, you know, I think under those circumstances not appropriate, but so it is a first instance for me. I think we have to take a look at it. I have not been asked, nor have I reviewed the overall vetting process with respect to all the others. If there is a reason to, I will evaluate it; but I am not sure that that is necessary.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. Mr. Cuellar.

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this committee hearing. Mr. Secretary, two questions. The first question has to do with some language that Chairman Rogers and Nita Lowey helped us put into the appropriation bill this last year that calls for the head of each department and agency, as they prepare their funding request, to directly link them to their performance measures under GPRA.

So this is the first time we have done that. I would ask your folks to look at that. The problem is that when you look at the performance measures that you all have, and I don't want to embarrass anybody, but I would ask that redo those performance measures because if we put in \$1 of taxpayers' dollars, we expect to be able to measure that \$1 that we gave you; and with all due respect, the measures that you have there don't tell us that at all. So I would ask you just to have your folks to take a look at that.

Number two, I agree also with Chairwoman Granger, your budget, your proposal, is basically the same, but I think you substituted a lot of the bipartisan work that we did in this subcommittee for some of the agency's or the administration's priorities. For example, the Republic of Mexico, as you know I live on the border, and I breathe and I drink the water. I am very familiar with it. You know, we always complained about what is happening across the river and the drug cartels and as you know, they just got the godfather of all drug dealers across the world recently; but the cuts that you all did and without going to specific cuts, you all went down and made cuts to a neighbor that has a large impact. I mean, a large amount of the cocaine that comes into the U.S. will come in through that country. And with all that, I would ask you again to look at those cuts and ask you to reconsider; and I am sure the subcommittee in a bipartisan way will look at those cuts. I understand, Mexico is going through a great economic transformation, energy, education, telecommunication, finance reform, everything that President Nieto has been done. But on the security part, I just have a concern as we spend so much money on the U.S. side that I would hope to spend a little bit of money on the other side; and the more we stop on the Mexico side, the less of a burden it will be. I would ask you, and I know we are out of time and I want to be considerate.

Secretary KERRY. You need to be helpful on the time. I appreciate it. I will just take 15 seconds to answer your question. On Mexico, our request specifically reflects money in the pipeline, and it does not, in fact, translate into a reduction in any priority or effort. The same is true for Colombia. Colombia has an increased capacity to be able to do the things we have worked for in planning Colombia and the same in Mexico for the Merida plan.

So we feel very much as if there is adequate funding there; and we have the resources in the budget because of the pipeline to be able to do the things that we need to do. We are going to draw down on it. It is going to flatten out, and we won't have that ability next year. So this is the problem as we begin to draw on those—

Mr. CUELLAR. Right, and I am going to give up my time to save, but if you could send maybe Roberta Jacobson. She understands Mexico very well. I would love to sit down because I slightly disagree with your statements on that, but I would be happy to—

Secretary KERRY. Well, let's work it through. I am happy to sit with all my smart people sitting back here.

Mr. CUELLAR. All right. Include Roberta Jacobson. I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. Mr. Crenshaw.

Mr. CRENSHAW. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman; and thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here today.

I wanted to give you the opportunity to touch on a couple of things that I think are good news in the midst of all the problems that we see in the world. You talked in your opening statement a lot about foreign assistance, and you talked about it in the context of national security, which I think a lot of times people lose sight of.

When we think about national security, we think about our Defense Department, and we spend a lot of money to have the best-trained, best-equipped military in the world; but we don't often talk about diplomacy or development as you touched on; and I think that development is a key component to our long-term national security; but I think, like any other spending, we have to do it efficiently, and we have to do it effectively; and I think one of the best examples of smart development foreign assistance is through what we know as the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

And as you know, when we assist emerging nations, we ask them to do well in certain areas like rule of law, human rights, things like that; and then it is a contract. And one of the things that I was disappointed in a little bit over the years, because this is the 10th year of the Millennium Challenge contracts, the 10-year anniversary, is that the funding has been reduced, I think, disproportionately. It is a very efficient use of taxpayers' dollars to offer assistance. I was encouraged to see in the budget proposed this year that there is an increase in that spending; and I think that is positive.

And so I assume that the administration believes, and you believe, that the Millennium Challenge Corporation is working well, and I wondered if you wanted to just comment on that, on one or two successes that you have seen and your view on that forum of foreign assistance.

Secretary KERRY. Well, I have been particularly interested in the MCC, and I sit on the board; as you know, I chair the board. And I have had several meetings now. We have been able to review some 27 compacts that we have signed and 24 threshold programs. We have a tension in our debates about MCC about, you know, second rounds and third rounds because there is always a tension between trying to excite an initial investment and then get them out on their own, you know, self sufficient, versus that moment where you have got to kind of refinance and keep them going a little longer in order to do it. But I think we have an 11 percent increase in the funding this year as you know, I think. We basically have \$1 billion out of 20-some total that we put into the direct development programs through AID, et cetera.

I would like to see that ratio grow personally. I think it ought to be a little larger. Now, there is a tension here. MCC has a very specific set of metrics, and it is an evidence-based approach, much more along more traditional business investment, not just pure development lines. With a theory that we want to try to encourage really good governance, good democratic, all of the things, but it takes—let me phrase this carefully.

It is really geared to engage at a different level of development than some other moneys that we expend through USAID. I believe that is necessary. There are different stages of development, and different countries can embrace an MCC and deal with it effectively and translate its metrics into better governance, better performance. Other countries just aren't there, and they are not going to be there, but it doesn't mean that we don't have an interest in making certain that they can get there and that they develop.

So we may be more involved in education, or more involved in building an energy project or doing something in that initial stage. And the question is sort of what is the appropriate balance between this? You know, is 1 billion enough to be putting into that, particularly when you have reduced assets and so forth. But I think that, you know, you look at Power Africa as an example. We have a major initiative going where we are incentivizing change in three partner countries involved in that. It is very effective, and it is going to bring major, you know, power capacity, increase electricity, power capacity to those countries.

So all in all, I would summarize it by saying that I hope we can increase it to some degree. I think it is a terrific model, but it is not a model that can be applied everywhere. And we have to work off that as a basis.

Ms. GRANGER. I will call on Mr. Rooney and Mr. Yoder, and if you both take 5 minutes, we will be respectful of the Secretary's time.

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Mr. Secretary, I know that you are aware there will be delegations from all the parties in northern Ireland coming to Washington; and one of the things that, we, I think, as a country and administrations from the Clinton administration on forward can take the knowledge knowing that there has been some positive developments with the peace process in northern Ireland. And with that being said, Mr. Richard Haass testified before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and I think last week submitted a report talking about some develop-

ments where there may be some backtracking. I hope that that is not true, but with that being said, the administration has not put forward the international fund for Ireland budget request this year, as he hasn't for the last couple years, and maybe that is for good reason because of the success stories in the north. But being that it is one of the success stories that this country has been able to participate in since the Clinton administration on up, do you feel that that money, it may be time to revisit whether or not we don't backtrack and lose the gains that we have made and that that money is something that we should revisit spending again in the current year or future years?

Secretary KERRY. That is very possible. There has been unfortunately increased tension and some partisan events that have been unfortunate that have been a reflection of times we thought we had that completely left behind and our hope is with the meetings here and so forth, to renew everybody's commitment and sense of that.

So we haven't lost focus on it, but I do think there was a feeling that things were moving and there was a level of success. We have to evaluate that, and I am perfectly ready, based on the situation to engage in that evaluation.

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. Mr. Yoder.

Mr. YODER. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your testimony today. It is always a wonderful dialogue to talk about these issue around the globe and this committee has an important rule to ensure that we scrutinize funding and that we are spending American dollars wisely. As I am sure you know many of our constituents are worried about that fact. And so maybe to wrap things up here, I have more of a global question for you. The request is \$46.2 billion, and I think my constituents as all of ours do, have questions related to what exactly our foreign policy is today. As I am sure you are aware, as every administration, this administration comes under some criticism for its foreign policy; and I wanted to give you a chance to respond to some of the concerns that are out there that I hear from my constituents that I am sure you have heard from as well. I would start with a little bit of an undercurrent of what was Ronald Reagan's foreign policy of peace through strength, and that weakness invites aggression. I would like to highlight a few concerns that have been raised by constituents and others throughout the country, certainly in Syria where there is a feeling that we painted ourselves into a corner and we allowed Russia to become a major player in the resolution there. Concerns related to the Iranian sanctions relief and whether we are being essentially played by Iran throughout this whole process. Linger issues related to the murder of our ambassador in Benghazi. Certainly today, the Russian invasion into Ukraine. Russia sailing a ship into a harbor in Cuba, a spy ship, 90 miles off of the American border.

Some people see this as a retreat and that you spoke, I think very passionately, about a vacuum that occurs in the world if the United States doesn't play a significant role. And so I would like to ask you, you know, we are familiar with what the Bush doctrine was, we are familiar with what other President's foreign policy is. How would of categorize American foreign policy today in compari-

son to previous administrations and in relation to some of the concerns that have been brought up across the country.

And then specifically, I might just ask do you feel that the reset of relations with Putin has been effective? Do you think that the removal of missile defense from eastern Europe unilaterally, was that concession useful and would we feel that that was smart given today's relation with Russia. And then how do you look at this in context with the reduction in military spending under the President's budget, particularly given the administration's belief that government spending is critical to stimulus in the economy and that austerity is bad. Why austerity just in the military and really nowhere else at this point? And what message does that send in your role as Secretary of State, as we reduce military spending to pre World War II levels, and essentially, in relation to all those issues, what is the American foreign policy as you see it? And then finally if you have a second, speak to the Iranian sanctions issue.

Secretary KERRY. Okay. We will do that in 2 minutes or 10?

Mr. YODER. As much time as the chair would allot.

Secretary KERRY. I love it, and I am delighted to have a chance to talk about those things because there is a narrative out there that I think is completely without any basis; and I love the opportunity of defending, not just defending, but of, you know, making clear what the President's priorities are and what our policy is.

Quite simply put, we are making America stronger, at home and abroad, and making America safer by projecting American economic interests as well as by standing up for and projecting our values, which also support our interests and by taking on terror before it comes to our shores; and we are fighting terrorism in many, many different venues, in many different ways, and that is a longer conversation; but let me go specifically to this juxtaposition with, let's say Russia or reset or whatever you want to call it.

The reset with Russia was not just a pushing of the button and saying, oh, everything is going to be terrific. The reset was an effort to find those things we could cooperate on, understanding of course, that with Russia, we were going to have major philosophical and other kinds of interest differences. So we have been able to find cooperation in important things, Afghanistan, on nuclear weapons, the START reduction, on the CW program in Syria; and.

I might say, Madam Chairwoman, you asked me in the very beginning of this hearing about the time frame on that. The time frame originally in the agreement is until June. We are 30 percent out now. 30 percent is being moved out, and we are now on a 65-day program, which I believe could be reduced to 35 days. And we are pushing very hard with OPCW and others to get it out. So I want to take advantage of making that question. But in addition to CW with Syria, Iran, P5 plus 1, Russia has been an important cooperative partner in the effort to get the agreement that we got. Now, you mentioned that agreement and said are we being played by Iran.

Please, we are seeing Iran's 20 percent uranium enrichment reduced to zero. We are seeing Iran frozen in its 3.5 percent level of uranium stockpile. No new centrifuges have been put in place except for a replacement. No additional numbers over the number

that we began with when we began 2 months ago. We have seen inspectors go into Fordow. We had no inspectors at all in Fordow. We have inspectors at Natanz. We didn't have them there. We have inspectors not as frequently as the other two, but sufficiently in Iraq, in the plutonium reactor. They are not able to complete the plutonium reactor. We have cradle to grave tracking of production. We have the right to go into their storage facilities for centrifuges. In effect, Iran's program is being rolled back from where it was, and there is no way to draw any other conclusion but that the world, Israel, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, the region, are safer because of that first step agreement that has been put in place.

Now we are not sitting hearing and telling you automatically Iran is going to make the judgment to conclude the deal. I can't tell you that. President Obama and I share serious reservations about whether or not they will, in fact, make the hard choices that they need to in order to satisfy the world fully and completely that this is a peaceful program.

But the bottom line is we are putting that to test and earning the credibility of the world to know that if they don't and we have to do something else, we will have exhausted every possibility to prove to the world that we were willing to put them to that test. I think these are very important things in the conduct of foreign policy and in the potential of the use of force or any choices that you have to make.

So we are not being played. We are doing what good diplomacy requires, and we have done it in a way that expands the so-called breakout time from what was about 2 months to significantly more, and it could grow, and if we can get a final agreement, it will be even larger. So I just don't buy this notion. I don't think that—you know, I don't want to get into, particularly 2 days before I am about to sit down with Lavrov, but I think Russia has challenges of its own, and I am not sure that they need to have the kind of economic constraints that may be following depending on the decisions they make. But I also want to say at the same time we recognize Russia has interests in Crimea. You know, Ukraine was part of Russia for centuries. Khrushchev gave it to Ukraine, he came from Ukraine, but there are other reasons that he did it, and the Russian religion comes from the eastern part of Ukraine. There are battles for Russia's freedom that were fought in the eastern Ukraine.

There is a long linkage there, and we need to approach this in ways that we get Russia to be able to respect the sovereignty of the country, the integrity of international law, the rights of Ukrainian people to make decisions for themselves even as Russian speakers and Russia's interests can be appropriately met. That is really the challenge here, and I don't think that the United States—I think the United States is playing a critical role in helping to perhaps bring that about, and I can tell you all over the world, my friend, I will tell you right now, we are playing a critical role with respect to North Korea, we are playing a critical role with respect to the relationship between China, Japan, Republic of Korea, and the Republic of Korea and Japan.

We are central to our engagement with ASEAN to maintaining stability and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. We are engaged deeply in the Middle East obviously with Syria, with Iran, with Middle East peace process, with Egypt, with the others. We are engaged in the Maghreb, we are helping Tunisia, we are working on Libya. I just came from a conference where we are working with Libya for its hopeful stability and laid out a plan with more than 40 other nations in order to be able to help Libya. We are working on the transition in Afghanistan. I negotiated with Karzai that BSA. He is not seeking to change the BSA, but he is refusing to sign it until or unless there is some effort on the peace process which we don't control.

Each of the candidates for President of Afghanistan have said they will sign it. So I believe it will be signed, and I believe the United States is in Africa where we have a young leadership program, we are engaged with Power Africa, where Russ Feingold just helped negotiate a special envoy, disarming of M-23 and an effort in the Great Lakes where we have been involved in helping to provide for a ceasefire/semi-truce in South Sudan, where we are engaged with the Arctic and the Arctic Nations, we will be assuming that chairmanship in a year.

I can run a long list of economic things just alone. And TTIP, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership take 40 percent each of them, the world's economies, and put them into a system of trading which will benefit Americans and create jobs in every State in our country. That is what we are getting for this penny on the dollar, folks, and I have only begun to scratch the surface. So I thank you for the opportunity to. I would be happy to give you a longer answer when the light is not flashing and I am not abusing everybody else.

Ms. GRANGER. Secretary Kerry, thank you for your time today, thank you for the energy and the passion that you put into the job that you do. We appreciate it very much. This concludes today's hearing, and members may submit any additional questions for the record. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs stands adjourned.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kay Granger (1)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

- a) How will the outcome of the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan affect your proposed budget?
- b) How will your programs be implemented in a way that keeps U.S. personnel safe?
- c) How will you ensure a robust level of oversight if there are not as many people overseeing the projects? How will you ensure robust oversight on projects that are funded through the Afghanistan government?

Answer:

a) The President's final decision setting a U.S. troop presence beyond 2014 will underscore the importance of sustained U.S. financial support for Afghanistan. After the majority of our troops have left, it will be up to the Afghans to maintain, with our support, an effective central government – providing security, delivering basic services, and enforcing the rule of law – as the best defense against Al Qaeda being able to reestablish sanctuary in Afghanistan. Afghanistan will not be able to manage this transition if the United States decides to rapidly withdraw its security and development

support in conjunction with the troop drawdown. Indeed, it will be important for Embassy Kabul to continue to implement significant security assistance to the Afghan National Security Forces after the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces, consistent with the commitment made by the U.S. and our Allies at the Chicago NATO Summit in 2012.

We also know that effective Afghan security forces alone will not preserve the gains of the last decade. They are a necessary but not sufficient condition. The Afghan Government must also be able to continue to pay its civilian operating expenses, deliver health and education to its people, and maintain the infrastructure and institutions necessary for the economy to grow. It is vital that the gains achieved by Afghan women and girls, in particular, be preserved.

Our FY 2015 request for Afghanistan was designed to be flexible and anticipated a relatively wide range of scenarios for a continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan. As a result, we are prepared to implement our programs effectively in accordance with the President's final decision on the number of U.S. troops that will remain in Afghanistan after 2014. We are already taking steps to ensure adequate oversight after 2014. We will build on our current practice of using experienced implementing partners; regular audits; feedback from local officials, civil society and recipients; technology

solutions and independent Afghan monitors to assess performance and impact.

b) We will not compromise our security standards in the implementation of our programs in Afghanistan after 2014. Officials under Chief of Mission Authority in Afghanistan will continue to meet with government counterparts, project implementers, and recipients, with the approval of and in coordination with U.S. security staff, as they do now. Recognizing that travel for U.S. officials outside of secure areas will be limited, we have augmented our existing monitoring toolset with a number of new measures to ensure U.S. officials have the information needed to protect against fraud and to evaluate the impact of our assistance projects.

c) Though the number of U.S. officials in Afghanistan will decline in the coming months, project oversight will continue to be a top priority, and we will maintain sufficient Department of State and USAID staff in Afghanistan to ensure adequate oversight of U.S.-funded programs. In addition to our bilateral programs, we will continue to use the World Bank's Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, as appropriate, to provide support to the Government of Afghanistan, given that it has its own proven monitoring capacity. We will maintain adequate oversight of our programs by collecting information from multiple sources including site visits by U.S.

officials and reports from implementers, inspectors general, independent monitoring contractors, donor partners, local non-governmental organizations and civil society, recipients and Afghan Government officials. We will regularly review our ability to monitor U.S. funded and multilateral projects and will terminate projects where proper oversight is not possible.

Where required, we are prepared to consolidate programs in Kabul and other urban centers where U.S. officials can conduct direct monitoring and interact directly with program implementers and recipients. For instance, the Department of State maintains a centralized training facility that can host law enforcement and justice sector participants in Kabul while they receive instruction. In addition, based on experiences in Afghanistan and other difficult environments around the world, including Yemen, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan, and Colombia, USAID and the Department of State have developed and will employ special monitoring practices. Practices such as the employment of Afghan engineers and other relevant specialists to visit and assess projects, overhead imaging, crowd sourcing using mobile technology, polling of recipient communities, and GPS tagged photography will help expand the reach of oversight officials.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Kerry by
Chairwoman Kay Granger (2)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

How is the Administration engaging with the Government of Egypt on the NGO trial convictions? Are you asking for the verdicts to be overturned for the convicted Americans?

Answer:

We continue to press the Egyptian government at high levels for redress of the NGO trial verdict – and this includes pardons for all Egyptian and international staff. We continue to make clear our belief that the verdicts last June were politically motivated and that the government must overturn the sentences.

We also have taken other actions to support the four American organizations involved in the trial – the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), Freedom House, and International Center for Journalists (ICFJ) – and the individuals affected by the convictions. In response to our engagement and advocacy, INTERPOL declared the convictions as politically-motivated, not criminal in nature,

ensuring countries will not further pursue the individuals. We have also worked with the individuals to seek remedies to the personal challenges associated with the verdict, including travel and employment issues.

We also emphasize to the Egyptian government the importance of a strong civil society to Egypt's security, development of democratic institutions, and economic prosperity, and have strongly advocated for any legislation governing NGOs to meet international standards, which would help prevent these types of cases from happening again in the future.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Kerry by
Chairwoman Kay Granger (3)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

- a) How does your budget support countries in the Middle East that are being affected by the influx of Syrian refugees?

Answer:

The U.S. government is committed to continuing to help Syria's neighbors cope with refugee inflows stemming from the ongoing Syria conflict. The number of refugees from Syria has risen sharply, from 1.4 million across the region a year ago to more than 2.7 million today, with more than one million in Lebanon, nearly 600,000 in Jordan, more than 220,000 in Iraq, nearly 750,000 in Turkey, and nearly 140,000 in Egypt. Although some Syrian refugees reside in camps supported by the international community, nearly three-fourths of the Syrian refugees in neighboring countries reside in urban areas. Local governments, social services, and civic organizations are severely strained as they seek to accommodate refugees. Cities and villages face overcrowded schools, shortages of hospital beds, and an inability to stretch municipal services to accommodate the increased population.

The U.S. government provides humanitarian assistance to meet the urgent needs of refugees, and also provides assistance for the longer-term resilience and development of the host communities that have so generously received them. The United States is the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance for those affected by the Syria crisis, providing more than \$1.7 billion in humanitarian aid since the start of the crisis, including nearly \$878 million to support those inside Syria and nearly \$862 million to support refugees from Syria and host communities in the region including Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt. Humanitarian assistance in Syria and the region is delivered by trusted international and non-governmental organizations. Both our development and humanitarian funding and programs are geared to support immediate needs and help host communities through longer-term development programming. Looking ahead, the progress achieved by these programs can only be sustained through continued work with and support to host country partners, including government and civil society.

In both Lebanon and Jordan, we see that the greatest concentration of refugees overlaps with the poorest communities, and tensions between locals and refugees over resources are prevalent. In addition to providing humanitarian assistance to these countries, we have reoriented parts of our

development assistance to focus on key infrastructure, social cohesion, health, and education programming as well as the provision of essential services at the local level.

In Lebanon, where Syrians now make up almost 25 percent of the total population, the spillover effects of the crisis appear most acute. Our assistance is focused on water and education as well as a value-chain development program to advance agriculture in heavily affected areas like the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon's northeast. In addition to nearly \$341 million in humanitarian assistance, due to the Syria crisis, supporting relief efforts in Lebanon, and \$81 million in FY 2013 Economic Support Funds (ESF) supporting on-going development programs, the United States continues to work with Lebanon to identify additional ways we can help address the deteriorating economic conditions and gaps in the delivery of important services, particularly in the health and education sectors

In Jordan, U.S. development assistance has supported the construction of five new schools in northern Jordan, is expanding 67 existing schools to accommodate the influx of Syrian children and youth, and is supporting teacher training to prepare educators for the challenges of crowded classrooms and students with very different educational and psycho-social needs. Additionally, the U.S. government has expanded programs for water

conservation, water catchment and storage, and water infrastructure repair and maintenance.

In the FY 2014 Omnibus Appropriations bill, Congress generously provided more than \$2.2 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for humanitarian programs. This funding is critical to address growing humanitarian needs worldwide, including in the Syria crisis. The combined UN humanitarian appeal for Syria has nearly doubled over the last year to \$6.5 billion and is now approximately half of the 2014 total worldwide humanitarian request of \$12.9 billion. Given the significant ongoing humanitarian needs inside Syria and across the region, the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development plan to carry over some funding from FY 2014 into FY 2015 to assist in addressing the substantial needs of what the UN projects for the end of CY 2014 will be four million refugees from Syria in the region (about half of whom are children under 18 years of age) as well as refugee-hosting communities that are enduring strains on basic infrastructure and health and educational systems. Below is an up-to-date funding chart of U.S. government humanitarian assistance funding for the Syria crisis response:

USG Humanitarian Assistance Funding By Country

Country	FY12 (M)	FY 13 (M)	FY 14 (M)	Total (M)
Syria	78.9	604.4	194.7	878.0

Lebanon	10.6	243.8	86.4	340.8
Jordan	12.6	194.7	61.1	268.3
Turkey	12.8	83.4	30.7	126.9
Iraq	4.2	66.2	19.9	90.3
Egypt	0.0	15.8	12.1	27.9
Regional	0.0	5.0	2.5	7.5
TOTAL	\$ 119.1	\$ 1,213.3	\$ 407.3	\$ 1,739.7

In addition to humanitarian assistance funding, the Administration's FY 2015 request includes \$155 million to continue ongoing opposition support efforts, including support to national- and local-level opposition groups as they strive to achieve and implement a negotiated political solution. Should a transition occur, U.S. non-lethal assistance will help consolidate the political transition, support democratic processes, strengthen criminal justice institutions within Syria, and enable reconstruction and recovery efforts, in coordination with the other international donors. Some of these funds may also be used to help mitigate the economic, security, and infrastructure impacts this ongoing crisis and its refugee flows have on neighboring countries.

The United States remains committed to supporting stability in Syria's neighbors as the crisis continues to persist. For example, we have provided nearly \$1 billion in assistance to Jordan each year over the last two years. This assistance supports ongoing bilateral programs that seek to advance

Jordan's development and reform and also to mitigate the effects of the crisis in Jordanian host communities and includes additional support provided specifically to address the economic and security strains of the crisis.

As in recent years, we will continue to evaluate needs additional stemming from regional instability on top of our annual commitment levels. In Lebanon, our bilateral programs are adjusted as possible to also support needs in communities that are hosting Syrian refugees. For example, last year we committed an additional \$30 million to fund economic and development programs that help mitigate the crisis' impact on critical sectors in Lebanon like basic education services. Our FY 2015 budget request reflects our continued commitment to support Jordan and Lebanon.

Question:

- b) What are other countries in the Middle East doing to support those countries most affected by the influx of refugees?

Answer:

Countries in the Middle East that are not hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees have increasingly come forward to support the Syria humanitarian response for Syria's neighboring countries bearing the brunt of the burden, whether via the UN appeal process or in unilateral channels. We

would not expect those countries hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees to come forward to support the response. However, Iraq has committed funding to the response, most recently making a \$13 million pledge at the Second International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria in Kuwait (Kuwait II) – the only neighbor country to do so. In addition, the GOI has allocated \$22 million to support refugees in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR), where over 97% of the Syrian refugee population in Iraq has been based since the start of the crisis.

The United States has consistently urged Middle East countries to provide additional funding through UN appeals to ensure assistance is well coordinated and meets demonstrated needs. We have noted to these countries that regional leadership in the humanitarian response could pave the way for additional support from other Arab countries and send a strong message to the Syrian Arab Republic Government (SARG) that the Arab world supports the people of Syria. Additionally, we have communicated to these countries the need to demonstrate their solidarity with regional governments that are hosting large refugee populations from Syria.

The Government of Kuwait has hosted two high-level international donors pledging conferences that garnered significant international funding pledges for the Syria response. During the January 2013

International Pledging Conference for Syria, 43 states pledged \$1.5 billion toward Syria humanitarian efforts; 75 percent of these pledges have been met to date. Last year, Kuwait contributed \$300 million toward the UN appeals while other Gulf States pledged assistance to be distributed through national charitable organizations (the UAE contributed \$300 million to the response last year, at least \$10 million of which went to the operation of Mrajeeb-al-Fhood refugee camp in Jordan).

The January 2014 Second International Pledging Conference for Syria (Kuwait II) garnered nearly \$2.3 billion in funding commitments, an \$800 million increase from the 2013 pledging conference. Specifically, Kuwait contributed \$500 million, of which \$300 million was disseminated through the UN appeals. In addition, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) each pledged \$60 million in aid either through UN appeals or other channels. On April 1, UAE's Minister of International Cooperation and Development (MICAD) al Qasimi announced the UAE would disburse its \$60 million pledge via the UN appeals. Of this funding, \$50 million was allocated for inside Syria. The funding breakdown for other Middle East countries has not been made public. Below is a chart maintained by the UN Financial Tracking Services (FTS) on the status of commitments by Middle East countries made during Kuwait II, as of May 12, 2014:

Donor	Original Pledge USD	Committed Amount USD	Outstanding Pledge USD	% of pledge committed
Iraq	\$13,000,000	\$0	\$13,000,000	0%
Kuwait	\$500,000,000	\$300,000,000	\$200,000,000	60%
Oman	\$10,000,000	\$0	\$10,000,000	0%
Qatar	\$60,000,000	\$11,209,983	\$48,790,017	19%
Saudi Arabia	\$60,000,000	\$7,968,880	\$52,031,120	13%
United Arab Emirates	\$60,000,000	\$60,000,000	\$0	100%

The below chart, maintained by FTS, is reflective of the entirety of contributions of countries in the Middle East to the UN Syria appeals since 2012.

Country	USD Committed/Contributed	USD Pledged
Bahrain	\$0	\$22,000,000
Iraq	\$9,965,812	\$13,000,000
Kuwait	\$633,220,977	\$200,000,000
Oman	\$0	\$10,000,000
Qatar	\$128,294,783	\$98,790,017
Saudi Arabia	\$507,548,982	\$52,031,120
UAE	\$171,744,036	\$266,249,934

The United States has also encouraged regional multilateral organizations with strong Middle East membership, such as the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), to provide support to the UN appeals. These organizations have primarily been involved on Syria political and humanitarian diplomacy issues, rather than through direct funding for the humanitarian response. However, the LAS provided \$500,000 to the World

Health Organization for its work inside Syria, and according to reports, the LAS aimed to raise \$100 million from its member states for relief in Syria and refugee-hosting countries. The OIC has made clear that it will provide aid to Syria only if given permission to open an office inside Syria. (Note: Syria expelled the OIC in August 2012, and the OIC has been unable to gain SARG permission to open a humanitarian assistance office in Damascus.)

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State Kerry by
Chairwoman Kay Granger (# 4)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Operations
Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014 Hearing**

Question:

How does your budget implement the recommendations in the Benghazi Accountability Review Board report?

Answer:

Following the September 11, 2012, attack on U.S. government facilities in Benghazi, Libya, the independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB) on December 19, 2012, issued 29 recommendations (24 of which were unclassified) to the Department of State. The Department accepted each of the ARB's recommendations and immediately began implementation work.

Funding to implement the Benghazi ARB recommendations was largely provided by Congress in FY 2013 and FY 2014. The Department presented the Increased Security Proposal to Congress in early FY 2013, which was intended to expand the number of Marine Security Detachments worldwide, and initiate construction of New Embassy Compounds and hire 151 additional security personnel. The implementation of these ISP programs was validated by the release of the ARB later in the fiscal year.

Our FY 2015 budget request regularizes the funding needed to continue implementing the ARB recommendations.

Many of the ARB's recommendations required the Department to rethink processes and procedures, which did not require additional funding. Examples include refining existing training, re-organizing existing offices within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), and developing new risk management policies.

Other ARB recommendations required new funding or transfer authorities. For instance, the ARB recommended the Department "seek greater flexibility for Overseas Buildings Operations funding." The FY2015 Budget Request recurs Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) transfer flexibilities provided in FY 2013 and 2014, which permit transfer of D&CP and ESCM OCO appropriations.

The ARB also called for the Department to work with Congress to restore the Capital Security Cost Sharing program to full capacity, to fund and identify additional Marine Security Guard personnel and housing, and to hire additional Diplomatic Security personnel. Congress provided \$2.2 billion in FY 2014 for the Capital Security Cost Sharing program, for which we are very grateful.

The FY 2013 Continuing Appropriations Act also provided \$1.4 billion to fund the Department's Increased Security Proposal.

These funds are being used to provide facilities (office space and housing) for additional Marine Security Guard Detachments, as well as embassy construction in N'Djamena, Chad, and Nouakchott, Mauritania. We will award a design contract for a new embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, a facility whose shortcomings are well known, and undertake chancery renovation and annex construction in Amman, Jordan. The funds have also allowed us to hire an additional 151 DS personnel; 122 have already been hired.

The ARB also recommended that the Department enhance our "ongoing efforts to significantly upgrade language capacity, especially Arabic, among American employees, including Diplomatic Security." New training, funded at \$2.5 million, was included in the FY2013 D&CP full-year Operating Plan.

The Department purchased \$ 12.5 million of new personal protective gear for employees at high threat, high risk posts and upgraded security equipment in safe havens and safe areas. Finally, the Department is upgrading the surveillance cameras and monitoring capability at all high threat, high risk posts. The cost per post to upgrade is \$198,000.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kay Granger (#5a)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

- A) What is your assessment of how the United States and Mexico are working together on security priorities since this Mexican administration took office?

Answer:

The U.S. and Mexico work together effectively to address shared security priorities, and we have robust cooperation with the administration of Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto. Both governments recognize security as a vital part of our broad and complex bilateral relationship and remain committed to facing shared security challenges together.

Our presidents have repeatedly committed to continue our bilateral security cooperation, most recently during President Obama's February 2014 visit to Toluca, Mexico, in connection with the North American Leaders' Summit.

Our common goals include public security, strong economic growth and good jobs, safe and secure communities, and expanded opportunity for

the citizens of both countries. The spirit of cooperation that defines our relationship reflects the many institutional, economic, personal, and cultural ties that bind us.

Through bold efforts, Mexico has successfully disrupted drug smuggling routes, seized major amounts of illicit drugs, and jailed drug kingpins, including Mexico's February 22 capture of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman.

Working together, the United States and Mexico have trained thousands of law enforcement officers, justice sector personnel, and other government officials, as well as members of civil society and youth. Since President Pena Nieto took office in December 2012, the United States and Mexico have vetted and approved 72 new Merida Initiative project proposals, representing \$350 million in U.S. commitments. Mexican authorities have, through their own budget process, committed substantial resources, and in most cases far greater resources than has the United States.

These projects include police, forensics, and corrections training, information technology equipment to support oral hearings under the new criminal justice system, support to Mexico's immigration agency, and support for Mexico's new drug addiction treatment courts.

Our extensive and continuing collaboration has helped us make our common border more secure than ever. Our information sharing is fluid, and Mexico – in part because of our support and in larger part by its own determined efforts – now has state-of-the-art equipment and improved training at the border to confront transnational crime.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kay Granger (5b)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question

B) Do you have suggestions for how the United States and Mexico can further strengthen their economic ties?

Answer:

Our relationship with Mexico is already among the strongest and most vital we have in terms of trade and shared prosperity. We are committed to our partnership with Mexico and to expanding opportunity for our citizens .

In May 2013, President Obama and President Peña Nieto announced the formation of the U.S.-Mexico High Level Economic Dialogue (HLED) to promote economic growth in the U.S. and Mexico, create jobs for citizens on both sides of the border, and ensure our nations can compete globally. In September 2013, Vice President Biden, together with Mexican counterparts, formally launched the HLED.

Mexico and the United States developed an initial HLED work plan under three broad pillars:

- promoting competitiveness and connectivity;
- fostering economic growth, productivity, entrepreneurship, and innovation; and
- partnering for regional and global leadership.

We are also working trilaterally in many of these areas with Canada and Mexico to strengthen our joint competitiveness under the North American Leaders' Summit process.

Since September 2013, we have advanced in key areas of the HLED work plan. Our governments held the first three of six working group meetings on the Bilateral Forum for Education, Innovation, and Research and will continue to hold similar events in the coming months. Our governments signed a memorandum of intent in April on investment promotion cooperation. We held a peer exchange on traffic and freight modeling and launched two border cluster-mapping pilots to identify local industry assets and develop regional economic development strategies. We have completed five of six border master plans, designed to better coordinate

infrastructure and development in border communities, with the last one on track for completion by mid-2015.

The Mexico-U.S. Entrepreneurship and Innovation Council's seven subcommittees have developed work plans to foster cross-border entrepreneurship by strengthening the legal framework, improving access to capital, developing regional innovation clusters, expanding small business development infrastructure, facilitating technology commercialization, promoting women's entrepreneurship, and engaging the U.S.-based Latin American diaspora. Tourism officials from both governments formed the Tourism Working Group and held the first meeting in January, discussing plans for collaboration on data, joint marketing opportunities, and promoting trusted traveler programs to increase travel and tourism between our countries and attract more outside visitors.

The U.S. and Mexican governments will hold the second HLED meeting in the United States later in 2014.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kay Granger (#6)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2013**

Question:

Wildlife Trafficking

- a) Mr. Secretary, what is in the budget request to stop the international crisis of wildlife poaching and trafficking?
- b) How will the significant resources provided in the FY14 bill be used to bring an end to the crises of international wildlife poaching and trafficking?

Answer:

a) The Department of State and USAID recognize that wildlife trafficking is a highly lucrative transnational organized crime with devastating impacts on security, the rule of law, conservation, and economic development. We are committed to reversing the alarming numbers related to wildlife poaching and trafficking and will continue to prioritize programs that have the maximum impact in curbing this threat and prosecuting criminals.

To that end, we have requested \$21.8 million in FY 2015 for combating wildlife trafficking. This includes nearly \$19.0 million in Development Assistance (DA) to support programs to counter poaching and

wildlife trafficking in Africa and Asia and to support demand reduction in Asia. It also includes nearly \$2.8 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) to provide law enforcement technical assistance to build capacity to stop poaching and illegal wildlife trade, develop wildlife trafficking laws, and bring traffickers to justice.

b) We greatly appreciate the leadership that Congress has shown on this issue and the support provided to enhance our ability to combat poaching and wildlife trafficking. With FY 2014 resources, the Department of State and USAID will allocate \$54.8 million for wildlife trafficking work. This includes \$39.8 million in DA to support programs to counter poaching and wildlife trafficking in Africa and Asia and support demand reduction in Asia. Additionally, \$15.0 million in INCLE will provide technical assistance for capacity building projects in hot spots in East Asia and the Pacific, and regionally in Africa and Latin America that will strengthen legislative frameworks, build prosecutorial and judicial assistance, enhance cross-border law enforcement cooperation, and improve law enforcement and investigative functions.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kay Granger (#7)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

- a) Please provide a chart comparing the US contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria to other donors for FY11 through FY13, providing both year-to-year data and cumulative amounts.

Answer:

Please see the following chart that compares the U.S. contribution to the Global Fund to those of other donors from FY 2011 through FY 2013. While the percentage share of the U.S. contribution fluctuates on an annual basis, it does not exceed 33 percent of the cumulative contribution to the Global Fund over the life of the Fund.

Global Fund Contributions, FY 2011 - FY 2013

DONORS	2011		2012		2013		2011-2013	
	AMOUNT CONTRIBUTED	PERCENT	AMOUNT CONTRIBUTED	PERCENT	AMOUNT CONTRIBUTED	PERCENT	AMOUNT CONTRIBUTED	PERCENT
Australia	42,150,000	1.39%	62,287,176	1.74%	94,275,000	2.68%	198,712,176	1.96%
Belgium	26,867,400	0.89%	27,108,900	0.76%	15,602,895	0.44%	69,579,195	0.69%
Brunei Darussalam	100,000	0.00%		0.00%	100,000	0.00%	100,000	0.00%
Canada	176,470,588	5.83%	182,431,129	5.10%	174,086,583	4.95%	532,988,300	5.27%
Denmark	30,723,315	1.01%	25,095,623	0.70%	25,358,960	0.72%	81,177,898	0.80%
European Commission	147,131,000	4.86%	127,921,000	3.58%	142,240,150	4.05%	417,292,150	4.12%
France ¹¹	477,611,615	15.78%	462,726,473	12.94%	471,228,307	13.40%	1,411,566,395	13.95%
Germany	272,170,000	8.99%	259,425,000	7.26%	265,190,000	7.54%	796,785,000	7.87%
Ireland ⁸		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%
Japan	114,229,085	3.77%	342,876,738	9.59%	122,273,670	3.48%	579,379,493	5.73%
Netherlands	88,406,540	2.92%	30,845,000	0.86%	90,403,100	2.57%	209,654,640	2.07%
Norway	75,700,227	2.50%	75,465,848	2.11%	77,073,657	2.19%	228,239,732	2.26%
Russia	20,000,000	0.66%	20,000,000	0.56%	20,000,000	0.57%	60,000,000	0.59%
Spain		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%
Gen Catalunya/ Spain		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%
Sweden	87,168,759	2.88%	104,593,133	2.93%	106,230,484	3.02%	297,992,376	2.94%
Switzerland	8,541,533	0.28%	8,769,045	0.25%	10,624,734	0.30%	27,935,313	0.28%
United Kingdom	238,401,200	7.87%	404,514,038	11.31%	205,013,136	5.83%	847,928,374	8.38%
United States ⁶	993,549,768	32.82%	1,215,526,119	34.00%	1,470,437,469	41.87%	3,679,513,356	36.36%
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation ⁹	150,000,000	4.95%	150,000,000	4.20%	150,000,000	4.27%	450,000,000	4.45%
Debi2Health		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%
Australia realized as restricted contribution from:		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%
Indonesia	3,965,437	0.13%	4,150,973	0.12%	2,054,739	0.06%	10,171,149	0.10%
Germany		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%
realized as restricted contribution from:		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%		0.00%
Côte d'Ivoire	929,176	0.03%	1,413,315	0.04%	1,881,159	0.05%	4,223,649	0.04%
Egypt	4,807,118	0.16%		0.00%		0.00%	4,807,118	0.05%
Indonesia	7,169,194	0.24%	6,087,629	0.17%		0.00%	13,256,823	0.13%
Pakistan	7,137,089	0.24%	6,169,490	0.17%		0.00%	13,306,579	0.13%
Chevron Corporation	8,000,000	0.26%	8,000,000	0.22%	9,000,000	0.26%	25,000,000	0.25%
(PRODUCT) RED ¹⁰ and Partners	21,462,249	0.71%	18,458,225	0.52%	19,975,417	0.57%	59,895,892	0.59%
Other Private/Public Donors	24,950,285	0.82%	31,688,739	0.89%	43,341,611	1.23%	99,980,635	0.99%
TOTAL	3,027,641,579	100.00%	3,575,553,592	100.00%	3,516,291,071	100.00%	10,119,486,243	100.00%

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kay Granger (#8)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

- a) Please provide a list of all reporting requirements and provisions in the SFOPS bill that apply to PEPFAR funds in FY13 and a corresponding narrative of the Department of Health and Human Services' efforts to comply with those requirements and provisions when implementing PEPFAR funding. If authority to provide funds notwithstanding any provision of law is applied, please indicate.
- b) Please provide a chart by agency receiving PEPFAR funds (including State) in FY13 that includes the following information: total funds estimated for salaries and benefits of USG employees, the number of full-time equivalent employees, and the increase or decrease from FY12.

Answer:

a) PEPFAR funding maintains its reporting and legal requirements regardless of the agency implementing the funding. All current reporting requirements are managed by the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (S/GAC) with input from the various implementing agencies. All agencies (including HHS) provide timely and detailed information. As such, HHS has the same reporting requirements as all PEPFAR implementing agencies.

For example, in FY 2012 when Congress updated the requirements for government-to-government (G2G) assistance, S/GAC went through a process to ensure that all implementing agencies were following a similar evaluation, reporting, and contracting approach for PEPFAR resources. S/GAC did not mandate that each agency follow the exact process, allowing some flexibility for agencies to follow their own internal procedures.

b)

PEPFAR FY 2013 Salaries and Benefits, All Agencies and All Accounts								
	All Agencies			USAID	HHS	DoD	Peace Corps	State
	TOTAL	COP	HQ	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total
FY13 Salaries and Benefits (all accounts)	270,647,810	153,808,338	116,839,472	85,163,172	159,720,824	7,687,894	7,368,533	10,707,387
Total FTE	3,499	2,722	777	923	2,002	215	207	153
Difference, FY13 vs FY12 Salaries and Benefits (all accounts)	8,850,465	2,610,376	6,240,089	6,361,737	3,455,237	(798,736)	(586,561)	418,788
Total FTE	48	23	25	18	15	(18)	20	14

**Salaries and Benefits amounts include GHP-State; GHP-USAID, GAP and DHAPP accounts.

**FTE includes USG and Contract Staff

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kay Granger (9a-d)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question 9A:

What is the number of personnel in the Office of Global Health Diplomacy? Please break out by direct hire, contractor and detailee (including detailee's agency).

Answer:

The Office of the Global Health Diplomacy has eight dedicated direct-hire positions, including the Acting Special Representative, Deputy Special Representative, two advisors, office manager, and three mid-level Foreign Service officers (FSOs). In order to fulfill its mandate, S/GHD has relied upon short-term staffing solutions, including details from other agencies, contract support, and interns. There are currently seven temporary staff members at S/GHD. A detailed description of GHD current staff composition is provided below.

- Direct-hires (8)
 - 2 Senior FSOs
 - 3 Mid-level FSOs
 - 3 Mid-level Civil Service Officers (one vacant)
- Detailed direct-hires (3)
 - State (HR/ER/DRAD) – end date: June 2014
 - State Y-tour FSO – end date: August 2014

- HHS/OGA – reimbursed, end date: September 2014
- Contractors (2)
 - Senior Communications Advisor (50% time)
 - Communications Support Officer
- Pathways intern (1 at 75% time) – end date: August 2014
- Detailed contractors (1)
 - USAID – end date: May 2014

Question 9B:

What is the level of funds requested in FY15 and estimated in FY14 for the Office of Global Health Diplomacy? Are any program funds assumed? If so, at what level and from which account?

Answer:

S/GHD's budget for FY 2014 is \$519,000 in bureau-managed funds.

The FY 2015 budget request includes \$519,000 for S/GHD in bureau-managed funds. S/GHD does not assume any program funds.

Question 9C:

Please detail any funding transfers from OGAC, USAID and CDC in support of the operations of the Office of Global Health Diplomacy.

Answer:

S/GAC transferred a total of \$189,000 to hire contract staff that had an extensive knowledge of PEPFAR and HIV programs to ensure the S/GHD office had a comprehensive understanding of HIV in the context of

the broader global health agenda. S/GAC does not plan to transfer additional funds. S/GHD has not received any funds from either USAID or CDC.

Question 9D:

Please describe the accomplishments of the Office of Global Health Diplomacy to date, including any developments with respect to donor countries commitments regarding NTD control and elimination goals.

Answer:

The State Department's Office of Global Health Diplomacy (S/GHD) was launched in January 2013 to deploy the unique and additive capacities of U.S. Ambassadors, senior U.S. officials, and Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) in advancing U.S. government global health priorities. In its first year, S/GHD has focused on two primary objectives: institutionalizing health diplomacy as a core component of U.S. foreign policy, and promoting the sustainability of U.S. government health programs through a shared global responsibility.

Institutionalizing Health Diplomacy: Much of S/GHD's focus over its first year has been the "under-the-hood" work of institutionalizing health

diplomacy within the Department, with the goal of preparing senior officials, Chiefs of Mission (COMs), Deputy Chiefs of Mission (DCMs), and FSOs to raise health issues with partner governments. In pursuit of this goal, S/GHD has:

- Arranged over 50 interagency health briefings for COMs and DCMs headed to U.S. Embassies and Consulates abroad. These briefings help inform COMs and DCMs of challenges and opportunities within the partner country's health sector, identify opportunities for increased bilateral and multilateral coordination, and introduce the COMs and DCMs to key interagency partners, including USAID, Health and Human Services (HHS), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institutes of Health (NIH), Department of Defense (DoD), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and Peace Corps.
- Greatly expanded global health training at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI). S/GHD helped coordinate two 3-day global health diplomacy courses designed to raise awareness of global health issues among State Department and interagency colleagues. S/GHD also presents on global health diplomacy topics during other FSI courses, including the Africa and East Asia Pacific area studies, public diplomacy and economic

tradecraft, and development diplomacy courses, ensuring that officers are better equipped to support health diplomacy during their tours.

- Initiated a quarterly global health speaker series to elevate global health issues in Washington. To date, S/GHD has hosted three speakers: Dr. Chris Murray, lead investigator of the Global Burden of Disease study; Dr. Agnes Soucat, Global Health Lead at the African Development Bank; and Dr. Vanessa Kerry, founder of Seed Global Health, the private non-profit in the Global Health Services Partnership with the Peace Corps and PEPFAR. These events are open to the broader U.S. government and outside stakeholders, playing a vital public diplomacy role with key global health thought leaders. To date, over 300 people have attended these events.
- Coordinated the health component of the Congressionally-mandated State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan (JSP). The global health objective of the JSP guides State Department and USAID health diplomacy and programs, sets performance goals, and defines metrics to measure success.

Promoting shared responsibility: The U.S. government is the world's largest investor in global health and recognizes the need to ensure that the systems built by our investments are sustainable and that we are drawing on all available resources. Our diplomats and development professionals are well positioned to promote sustainable health systems and encourage shared responsibility for financing these health systems with partner governments, other donors, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. S/GHD has moved this agenda forward by:

- Cohosting the Africa Health Forum with the World Bank. The forum convened almost 30 ministers of health and finance from African nations and senior representatives of all major bilateral and multilateral health donors to discuss sustainable financing for health systems. The event resulted in deepened appreciation of the need for greater domestic finance for health, the economic and broader development benefits of those investments, and the need for ministers of health to increase the focus on “value for money” – sustained health impact of those increased investments. The participation of donor partners has re-emphasized the urgent need to harmonize planning and reporting processes to avoid

duplication of effort, advance country ownership, and reduce transaction costs.

- Supporting efforts to replenish the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI). S/GHD led diplomatic outreach to expand the base of donors for the Global Fund's 2014-2016 pledging conference, which took place in Washington in December 2013. While S/GAC targeted traditional donors, S/GHD targeted emerging donors, particularly the Gulf nations. Building off this success, S/GHD is currently partnering with USAID to encourage both traditional and emerging donors to give generously at the 2016-2020 GAVI replenishment conference (to be held in late 2014 or early 2015).
- Semi-annually convening the U.S. government board representatives to key multilateral health institutions (Global Fund, GAVI, WHO, UNICEF, World Bank, U.N. Population Fund, and UNAIDS) to align policy and priorities. The U.S. government invests over \$2 billion in these organizations annually and S/GHD, in collaboration with the Bureau of International Organizations, works to ensure U.S. policies and messaging

are consistent across the interagency. Our focus is also to capitalize on opportunities to reinforce administration priorities across all agencies with which we invest.

S/GHD had limited engagement on Neglected Tropical Disease control during its first year; however, we have met with the leadership of the Sabin Institute and are looking for ways to increase collaboration on this important issue in the future.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kay Granger (9e-g)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 5, 2014**

Question:

- e. In accordance with the requirements of the Cultural Property Implementation Act, please provide the Committee with a list of nations with similar import restrictions on their citizens for each of the current MOUs.
- f. I have been advised that both China and Italy have unrestricted trade in coins whose import is prohibited under current MOUs with those nations. Please explain to the Committee how such restrictions are equitable or purposeful.
- g. Please provide a tally of support or opposition to recent MOUs recorded in public comments.

Answer:

- e) Many countries have broad import restrictions on cultural property that encompass the restrictions imposed as a result of the current MOUs. Switzerland's efforts to protect cultural property are most similar to those of the United States. Like the United States, it may conclude bilateral agreements that impose import restrictions on specific categories of cultural property originating in partner countries

that are party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention. Depending on the country, the Swiss bilateral agreements embrace a much broader range than the more narrowly defined U.S. import restrictions. Most countries that are party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention implement it differently from the U.S. and Switzerland. Their efforts to protect cultural property involve comprehensive import restrictions on all cultural property subject to export restriction by another State Party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention. That is, these nations do not require bilateral agreements – as the United States does – but they do impose import restrictions that are *functionally identical to those that the United States imposes*. These import restrictions are broader (because they encompass all cultural objects) and endure perpetually. Of the other countries that are party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention that have broad, enduring import restrictions on cultural property, the countries with significant markets in antiquities include Netherlands, Canada, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Italy, and Spain. These “market countries” actively enforce the import restrictions they have imposed. For example, Canada recently seized and repatriated 18,000 coins that were illegally exported from Bulgaria under its implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. The 28 countries

of the EU also restrict the illicit movement of cultural property across their borders. This is accomplished by a directive, and special bilateral agreements are not required. Finally, a major art and antiquities market, the United Kingdom, has adopted a special law making it illegal to deal in cultural property excavated and removed contrary to law of another State Party.

- f) Through research and contact with the Governments of China and Italy, the Department understands that both China and Italy, in fact, restrict the internal trade in antiquities including ancient coins. While these countries permit the regulated trade of certain ancient coins, in particular, those with a known history of ownership, coins without histories of ownership going back to a particular date are subject to seizure by these countries on the grounds that they are likely to have been looted from an archaeological site. Similarly, the current MOUs that the United States maintains with China and Italy restrict the importation of ancient coins with an unknown history of ownership. Coins with a documented history of ownership that pre-dates the MOU can be imported into the United States (absent any other applicable restrictions under United States law). These restrictions on the importation of undocumented archaeological material aim to

reduce the incentive for further pillage of archaeological sites, the scientific value of which is destroyed when sites are subject to random digging of the kind conducted by metal detector-wielding looters. At the same time, the import restrictions allow the importation of archaeological materials that do have a known history of ownership, or provenance, including certain ancient coins from China and Italy. In both cases, the U.S. import restriction on ancient coins is limited to those coin types known to have been minted and circulated within the geographic region of that country in ancient times. Furthermore, in the case of China, the restriction is only on coins produced through the Tang Dynasty (907 A.D.) after which there was a very robust production of coins whose import is not restricted by the MOU. Similarly, in the case of Italy the restriction does not apply to Roman imperial coinage which was produced in Italy and circulated throughout the Roman Empire.

- g) The solicitation of public opinion through Federal Register Notices and public sessions of meetings are proactive opportunities for outreach taken in order to further incorporate the views and opinions of outside interested parties in the recommendation and decision-making process. Outside interested parties—be they individuals,

members of the antiquities trade, museum curators, or academics—are asked specifically for information that is relevant to the criteria that the CPIA requires Cultural Property Advisory Committee to address. For any given solicitation, the Department receives roughly 50 and 500 comments. The outside interested parties are not asked to “vote” on whether to enter into a new MOU or extend an MOU, although some lobbyists have attempted to make this call for information into a referendum. Your Committee can rest assured that both the Department and the Cultural Property Advisory Committee give due consideration to comments by outside interested parties regarding potential new MOUs or potential extensions of existing MOUs.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kay Granger (9h)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

Please provide for the Committee the annual funding levels for the Pickering and Rangel Fellowship programs for FY12 through the FY15 request.

Answer:

In FY12 the Department funded the Pickering and Rangel Fellowship programs at \$7,374,611; the annual funding level for FY13 through FY15 is \$7,275,215 per year.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kay Granger (9i)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

Has the Department of State conducted any recent reviews of the Pickering and/or Rangel Fellowship programs and have any significant changes been proposed to either program, if so, please describe?

Answer:

In February 2014, the Department completed the first ever comprehensive review of the Pickering and Rangel fellowship programs since their inception – 1992 for the Thomas R. Pickering Foreign Affairs Program and 2002 for Charles B. Rangel International Affairs Program. It concluded that these programs are important and contribute significantly to diversity and made a strong recommendation that the Department continue its support to them.

As a result of the review, a multi-bureau committee made 14 recommendations to improve the success of the programs. The Acting Director General, Ambassador Hans Klemm, approved these recommendations and the Under Secretary for Management, Patrick Kennedy, concurred with Ambassador Klemm's decisions. Among the

recommendations were standardization of services provided, establishing funding parity with regards to fellowship awards, elimination of the Pickering undergraduate program and an increase in the Rangel and Pickering graduate fellowship programs. Other recommendations focused on how internal processes can be improved for better tracking and oversight of the programs. HR/REE has already begun establishing working groups to plan the implementation of the recommendations. Many new practices will become effective with the 2015 fellowship cohorts.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (1a-b)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

- a. How big is the gap between the resources you need to respond to all the hotspots in the world and the resources provided in this budget request?
- b. What do we need to manage the threats to our security and our economy?

Answer:

The Department's budget request for FY 2015 balances our requirements to respond to various hotspots around the world and the work required to sustain long-term investments in America's security and prosperity with the significant fiscal constraints we face as a nation. The budget request enables the Department and USAID to respond to unrest and other unforeseen events throughout the world, but we can never put too large of a price on national and global security. Whether in the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, Ukraine, or our own hemisphere, American leadership is needed now more than ever. It is imperative that the Department and USAID have both the resources and the flexibility to respond to these and other extraordinary needs around the world.

I cannot stress enough the importance of OCO to meeting U.S. national security objectives.

The Department and USAID would not have been able to support critical security, diplomatic, and development efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan without OCO. Nor would we have been able to respond to the extraordinary events that have unfolded in the Middle East over the past several years, meet urgent peacekeeping needs in Africa, or implement the Benghazi Accountability Review Board recommendations to bolster security measures at medium to high risk missions. Every dollar spent on our collective security is a dollar well spent and we need to protect this critical tool in our arsenal.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (2)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

Mr. Secretary, as you know it is beyond dispute that international family planning programs lead to fewer unwanted pregnancies, fewer abortions, and fewer maternal and infant deaths. Yet, last year the House bill carried language codifying the Mexico City Policy and banning funding for the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). While the egregious language was dropped in the final 2014 Omnibus Act, I must assume that the House Republican leadership will again insist on a similar approach this year.

- a. What effect would similar restrictions that muzzle freedom of speech and interfere with the doctor-patient relationship, mean to basic – and often life-saving – health care for millions of women?
- b. What effect does the global gag rule have on the President's global health strategy?
- c. What would be the effect on high need countries in Africa and south Asia?
- d. What would a total ban on UNFPA funding do to reproductive health care?
 - o What effect would there be in the nearly 150 countries that UNFPA has programs?

Question:

- a. What effect would similar restrictions that muzzle freedom of speech and interfere with the doctor-patient relationship, mean to basic – and often life-saving – health care for millions of women?

Answer:

Restrictive policies, like the Mexico City Policy (MCP), have the potential to make it more difficult for individuals, particularly women, to access dependable sexual and reproductive health care. Providing accurate and reliable information is integral to empowering women to have control over their own fertility and sexuality. With family planning, young women and adolescents under age 18 are able to delay childbearing and older women are able to limit their childbearing when they have achieved their ideal family size. Women in the prime of their reproductive years can space their births for optimal maternal and child health outcomes. Investments in family planning can result in a substantial decrease in the percentage of births that are high-risk, thereby reducing infant and child deaths in the coming decade. Furthermore, comprehensive family planning choices ensure that all women are able to use the methods that best suit their needs and fertility preferences. This translates to fewer unintended—often high-risk—pregnancies and fewer abortions, which in the developing world are frequently performed under unsafe conditions—an unsterile environment performed by unskilled practitioners.

Every year 50 million of the 190 million women who become pregnant resort to abortions to terminate unintended pregnancies. Some 68,000 women die of unsafe abortion annually, making it one of the leading causes of maternal

mortality. Of the women who survive unsafe abortion, 5 million will suffer long-term health complications. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in Africa alone, six million unsafe abortions occur each year. As a result, an estimated 29,000 African women die each year and 1.7 million will have complications resulting in hospitalizations. Better access to health services means healthier mothers, babies, and families and pays off in greater dividends at the community, national, and global levels. The Administration will continue to oppose any effort to legislate imposition of the MCP as this would severely erode the recent progress made on maternal and child health and access to voluntary family planning services, and would hamper efforts to advance women's rights and gender equality.

Question:

- b.** What effect does the global gag rule have on the President's global health strategy?

Answer:

Since 1973, U.S. law has prohibited the use of U.S. government foreign assistance to fund abortion as a method of family planning. Therefore, enacting the Mexico City Policy (MCP) as a legal requirement is unnecessary and would damage our efforts to promote sexual and reproductive health, including family planning assistance. Imposing the policy on all U.S. foreign assistance

programs, including global health programs such as those that address HIV/AIDS, would go beyond even the MCP as enforced by previous Administrations, and force the United States to withhold critical assistance from NGOs with expertise, capacity, and proven track records to promote women's and girl's health and respond to the HIV epidemic around the globe. Access to health services, including family planning, is a necessary component to reducing poverty, advancing gender equality, and meeting our broader development goals.

Imposition of the MCP would severely erode the recent progress made on maternal and child health and access to voluntary family planning services. Global estimates indicate that by helping women space births and avoid unintended pregnancies, voluntary family planning could prevent 25 percent of maternal and child deaths in the developing world and reduce the burden on the maternal health system by serving more women effectively and efficiently in resource-poor settings. It is important to recognize that voluntary family planning is the most effective way to prevent unintended pregnancies and abortion, and studies show that the incidence of abortion decreases when women have access to contraceptives.

Question:

- c. What would be the effect on high-need countries in Africa and south Asia?

Answer:

Re-imposition of the Mexico City Policy would prevent the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) from working with some of the most experienced and qualified family planning providers and organizations around the world. Such organizations work at the grassroots level to meet the growing demand for voluntary, safe, and modern forms of contraceptives and for other critical health services. U.S. government support to these local organizations ensures U.S. government foreign assistance programs have the greatest impact and promotes sustainability of our programs, especially in countries with the highest need, which are predominantly in Africa and South Asia.

Reproductive health and voluntary family planning programs save lives, and often serve as entry points for many women to access the entire health system. By impeding access to voluntary family planning, the MCP harms women's health and weakens efforts to reduce maternal deaths worldwide. The difference in the reproductive health status of women in developed and developing countries is vast. Worldwide about 287,000 women and 3 million newborn babies die every year because of complications related to pregnancy and childbirth. Almost all of these deaths (99 percent) occur in developing countries, and one-third occur in just two countries—Nigeria and India. Most

of these deaths are potentially preventable. Getting contraceptives to more than 220 million women who want them could prevent up to 44 percent of the maternal deaths, decrease unintended pregnancy by two-thirds globally, and bring about 1.1 million fewer infant deaths each year.

Question:

- d. What would a total ban on UNFPA funding do to reproductive health care?
- What effect would there be in the nearly 150 countries that UNFPA has programs?

Answer:

The United States is one of UNFPA's largest donors. When U.S. funding for UNFPA was not provided under the previous Administration, other donors stepped in to fill a portion of the gap. However, the negative impact on the U.S. government's reputation and commitment has been difficult to overcome. The inconsistency in support of sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights sends a message to the world that the United States does not value women's health and empowerment, when in fact the opposite is true. The U.S. government must uphold our leadership position in this area through increased funding and support for programs that we know are beneficial to the women and the world and critical to reaching our development goals.

The U.S. government is the largest bilateral donor to women's health programs globally; and UNFPA, leveraging U.S. contributions, is the largest multilateral donor to programs that save women's lives. UNFPA currently has programs in nearly 150 countries and extends the reach of U.S. government support to a number of countries where USAID does not have programs.

UNFPA's programs help women survive childbirth, have healthy babies, and determine the number and spacing of their children. UNFPA is also working to end obstetric fistula through prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation. Obstetric fistula is a debilitating post-partum condition that leaves women incontinent, stigmatized, and often alienated from their families and communities; yet this condition is preventable and treatable. From 2003 – 2010, at least 20,000 women suffering from obstetric fistula have been healed through the care they received with assistance from UNFPA. Additionally, UNFPA programs also work to prevent and address child, early, and forced marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, and reduce the incidence of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections.

According to analysis by the Guttmacher Institute, every decrease of \$10 million in U.S. international family planning and reproductive health assistance would result in the following:

- 520,000 fewer women and couples would receive contraceptive services and supplies;
- 150,000 more unintended pregnancies, including 70,000 more unplanned births, would occur;
- 70,000 more abortions would take place (of which 50,000 would be unsafe);
- 400 more maternal deaths would occur;
- 2,000 more children would lose their mothers.

Continued U.S. funding for UNFPA is essential to achieving the Administration's global health goals. UNFPA's voluntary family planning and reproductive health activities are key elements of global health and contribute to the U.S. comprehensive strategy for sustainable development worldwide.

Questions for the Record Submitted to

**Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (3)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

National Security vs. Democracy, Governance & Development Activities

Our interests and challenges around the world don't generally respect country borders, but our democracy, governance and development activities are inherently country-by-country specific. Using the example of the Arab Spring and how it was different in each country, combined with the tumultuous aftermath of the 2011 revolution in Egypt, and given the recent unrest in many countries with which the United States has strong military relationships, I hope you can address how support for civil society and development versus stated national security interests is determined in the Administration.

- a. How does this intersection of priorities affect USG policy and planning in in such countries?
- b. How does the USG implement democracy programs in repressive countries while abiding by the "Brownback Amendment" which prevents foreign governments from having control or veto power over democracy assistance?
- c. In which countries has this been a challenge and how have you dealt with these cases?
- d. Is the government allowed to review democracy programming plans through prior consultation or other checkpoints?
 - o For instance could the government in countries that repress women's rights preselect or obtain or the names of participants?

e. Using the national security lens, how would results be measured and evaluated? Is focusing solely on strategic interests a detriment to human rights concerns or is it all part of interconnected policy strategy?

f. Should there be greater emphasis on supporting universal values even in closed countries with which we have strategic relationships to ensure that if there is unrest or transition, that the United States is not perceived as only having relationship with or unquestioningly supporting the authoritarian governments in charge?

Answer:

President Obama has said governments that respect human rights and reflect the will of their people are more stable, secure and prosperous over the long run, and better allies. Today, we face diverse and complex security challenges, but the promotion of human rights cannot be disconnected from other priorities because it is intrinsically linked with all of the goals we strive for at home and around the world. That is why we hold governments accountable to their obligations and commitments to respect universal human rights.

We use a wide range of tools to advance human rights and fundamental freedoms. One of the most important tools is our democracy programming. While we may engage when appropriate and possible in a dialogue with governments about democracy and our democracy assistance, we do not provide governments with information about our implementing partners,

specific programming, or program beneficiaries for prior approval. Instead, we fund programs for civil society oversight of government activities, and develop civil society capacity to further democracy and human rights. We work in repressive societies through non-governmental implementing partners, and seek to mitigate as much as possible the risk to any participants. We employ methods that protect the identity of our beneficiaries, reducing the risk of exposure to oppressive governments. We avoid doing anything that would help an authoritarian government enforce its repressive laws or policies or punish our partners. At the same time, our programs are overt and notified to Congress, and we acknowledge them publicly.

We measure activities, but the real benefit of democracy and human rights programming is that these programs strengthen the ability of civil society organizations to lobby governments on behalf of citizens, increase accountability, advocate political reform, build partnerships with public and private sectors, and promote more inclusive societies. U.S. assistance supports organizations that address freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, religious freedom, democratic governance and political participation, all forms of gender-based violence, responsible legal frameworks, and independent media reporting.

Our greatest measurable ongoing success is our Lifeline: Embattled CSOs Assistance Fund, which provides emergency assistance to civil society organizations (CSOs) when they are threatened or attacked for their work, as well as support for advocacy initiatives that address barriers to the freedoms of association and assembly. Launched in 2011, Lifeline also receives financial support from 16 other like-minded governments (Australia, Benin, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay). Lifeline's activities are implemented by a consortium of international NGOs including CIVICUS, FORUM-ASIA, Freedom House, Front Line Defenders, the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, People in Need, and the Swedish International Liberal Centre. Lifeline has assisted 354 CSOs in 79 countries and territories.

We raise publicly and privately in government-to-government discussions our concerns about new laws that restrict the work of civil society, including for example in Egypt and China.

In Egypt, we have continuously engaged with both Egyptian civil society actors and the Egyptian government on a series of restrictive NGO law drafts over the past two years. When a draft of a highly controversial demonstrations law was released, we engaged a broad spectrum of stakeholders, including

government officials, local and international civil society organizations, political party activists and labor movement on the content and potential impact of the law; when the law was decreed, we coordinated with like-minded countries to ensure a broad response to the newly-imposed harsh restrictions. We have also raised concerns about actions by the Egyptian government to close space for civil society in multilateral forums like the UN Human Rights Council and continue to urge the government at high levels to pardon the staff of American and German NGOs who were convicted in June 2013 after a politically-motivated trial. We fund a number of programs on the ground that work to reinforce human rights and democratic values, including support for election administration and monitoring, voter education, and programs to foster religious tolerance.

In China, in the face of a widening crackdown on civil society activists and on freedom of expression, we provide crucial support to civil society groups pushing for increased government transparency, working to ensure that the legal protections are enforced, and arguing for their government to protect the rights of China's most vulnerable persons.

We agree that there should be great emphasis on supporting democratic values in closed societies. Often politically sensitive, democracy assistance has a profound impact on helping citizens advocate for democratic values and

personal liberties. Democracy programs enable the U.S. to mitigate against the effects of human rights abuses, provide critical support to democracy activists when and where they most need it, open political space in struggling or nascent democracies and authoritarian regimes, and bring positive transnational change. Sometimes democracy programming is the only U.S. assistance available to citizens pushing for change their societies. We look forward to continuing our close consultation with Congress as we develop ideas on how we can be most effective in our effort to elevate human rights and assist civil society.

Questions for the Record Submitted to

**Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (4a-f)**

**Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:**Current and Possible New Sanctions**

The administration has pledged to strictly enforce existing sanctions on Iran. The president said we will come down on sanctions violators “like a ton of bricks.” The public record indicates that Iran’s oil exports are on the rise -- 1.3 million barrels in January, 1.4 million in February, well above the million barrel limit set in the Joint Plan of Action and far above the lows from 2013.

- a. Are these numbers accurate? What is the current status of overall Iranian oil exports?
 - o Specifically what are the exports to China, India and Turkey?
- b. Will you make publicly available the Department’s country-by-country estimates on Iranian oil imports?
- c. As part of the sanctions, you are responsible for determining whether foreign countries have “significantly reduced” their purchases of Iranian oil, in order to qualify for the waiver built into the law. Have you determined what qualifies as a “significant reduction?”
 - o Are we talking to China and India, both of whom are dramatically increasing their imports from Iran this year? If these trends continue, are you going to stand by your commitments and sanction these countries?
- d. If Iran cheats, backtracks, or fails to sign an acceptable long-term deal, what specific sanctions will you seek from Congress?

The President has said the odds of the Iran talks succeeding are 50-50, and that if they do not succeed, Iran will face more sanctions that Congress could pass in a day if needed. You recently said it would take 2 hours for Congress to pass new sanctions.

e. Will the administration support more rigorous sanctions?

f. Shouldn't we be working quietly – in private – now to draw up new sanctions so they can be ready to go on two hours' notice?

Answer:

The State Department would be happy to brief you in a classified setting on the consistent methodology we are using to determine Iran's current crude oil export volumes. Based on our internal analysis and our conversations with purchasing countries, the State Department remains confident that Iran's average crude oil exports for the entire JPOA period are within the target range of 1-1.1 million barrels per day. Crude oil purchases vary month to month based on seasonality, tanker deliveries, weather, and other factors. Fluctuations in oil import levels since January 20, 2014, when the Joint Plan of Action went into effect, should not be confused with the longer-term trend. Different data sources use different methodologies in their calculations and some reporting streams include other petroleum products that are not normally considered "crude oil." Lastly, the overall export levels include shipments to Syria, which have increased in 2014 and earn Iran no revenue.

To enable implementation of the Joint Plan of Action we issued narrow waivers under the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2012 (NDAA) for current purchasers of crude oil from Iran (China, India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey). We also waived specific provisions of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, and the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) to allow for purchases consistent with the Joint Plan of Action. While the Secretary is required to determine whether countries have significantly reduced their purchases of crude oil from Iran in order to grant them exceptions from sanctions under the NDAA, the waivers issued pursuant to the JPOA do not require such a determination. The State Department has discussed the import volumes permitted under these waivers with each of the governments involved. In the event that imports exceed the Joint Plan of Action targets over a sustained period, we reserve the right to revoke these waivers.

As long as negotiations are ongoing between Iran and the P5+1 to secure a comprehensive agreement, it would be premature to discuss new and expanded sanctions. Sanctions were effective in bringing Iran to the negotiating table. We will continue to work closely with Congress throughout this process.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#5a-d)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Together the Congress and this Administration have imposed the toughest-ever sanctions targeting Iran's economy, which I strongly support. Iran now faces both domestic pressure and international isolation. The United States is at a crossroads with Iran. You have said repeatedly that "verification is the key" to the success of the interim agreement between the P5+1 and Iran, which went into effect on January 20th, as well as any future final deal on Iran's nuclear program.

- a. While the pressure of sanctions and demand for a better economy was the catalyst that pushed the Supreme Leader to allow President Rouhani to be elected, do you really see any evidence that the regime is seriously interested in giving up its nuclear program?
- b. I have to wonder if this is nothing more than just a political maneuver or a façade intended to break the unity of international sanctions by Iran appearing to be cooperative. Can you share your opinion on the sincerity of the Iranian leadership?
- c. Per the interim agreement, are the inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) being allowed greater access to Iranian nuclear sites, including daily access to the Natanz and Fordow enrichment plants, access to centrifuge production facilities and uranium mines, and more frequent on-site inspections of the nuclear facility at Arak?
- d. You have said no deal is better than a bad deal. What assurances can you give us that the United States will maintain that position? What, in your view, would constitute a bad deal?

Answer a.:

It is unclear whether Iran is prepared to make the choices necessary to provide us with verifiable assurances that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. The United States is taking the necessary steps to fully test that proposition through diplomatic means before pursuing other alternatives. Testing diplomacy is an important element in sustaining broad support for our efforts among the international community.

The limited and targeted relief we have offered Iran under the Joint Plan of Action falls far short of resolving the significant economic problems Iran faces. It is in Iran's interest to negotiate a comprehensive solution that provides more comprehensive relief, which is what the Iranian people expect. Should Iran not be ready to make the critical choices to achieve this end at the negotiating table, then we will be in a much stronger position to lead the world in increasing pressure on Iran.

Answer b.:

As the President has said, these negotiations are not built on trust, they are built on verification. What matters is not what the Iranians say, but what they do. The Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) set forth intrusive and comprehensive verification and monitoring measures. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays an essential role in verifying the nuclear-related understandings contained in the JPOA, and we have commended the

Director General and the Secretariat for their objective and impartial effort in this enhanced verification role. The IAEA has verified that, to date, Iran is meeting its commitments under the JPOA.

Any long-term comprehensive solution will have to demonstrate to the international community in a meaningful and verifiable way that Iran's nuclear program will be used for exclusively peaceful purposes, and will include verification and compliance measures to prove this assurance to the international community. The relief we have offered Iran under the JPOA falls far short of resolving the significant economic problems the country faces. It is therefore in Iran's interest to negotiate a comprehensive solution that provides more comprehensive relief, which is what the Iranian people expect.

Answer c.:

The Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) represents a significant step forward in that, for the first time in close to a decade, Iran has committed to halt progress on its nuclear program and roll it back in key respects. Moreover, under the JPOA, Iran committed to provide increased transparency into its nuclear program, including through more frequent and intrusive inspections as well as expanded provision of information to the IAEA.

The IAEA is playing the essential role in verifying the JPOA's nuclear-related understandings, consistent with its ongoing monitoring and verification

role in Iran. To that end, the IAEA has confirmed that Iran is fulfilling its nuclear-related commitments under the JPOA, including by providing: daily access to the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow; more frequent inspections of and information on the IR-40 reactor at Arak; and managed access to and information on Iran's centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities, and uranium mines and mills.

Answer d:

The Administration is working with the P5+1 and EU to reach a comprehensive solution to the international community's concerns with Iran's nuclear program. Our goal remains to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and ensure that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. All of the things on which we will have to reach agreement in the course of the negotiations are addressed in the Joint Plan of Action. We are looking to ensure that we have the right combination of measures in place to ensure Iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon. This is why we agreed in the Joint Plan of Action that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed in a comprehensive solution. All members of the P5+1 must agree on any final decision, so we will be able to ensure that an agreement meets our needs.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (6a-d)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

Your Department has said that democracy programming supports our overarching Iran policy.

- a. What is our policy with regard to the Iranian regime?
- b. Freedom House ranked Iran 192nd out of 197 nations in press freedom. How does broadcasting factor into the USG approach on democracy and governance programming?
- c. How can we measure the effectiveness of democracy, governance and public diplomacy programs in Iran?
- d. What capacity does civil society have in Iran?

Answer:

- a. The Department's democracy programming directly supports our broader policy objective that Iran respects international norms and rules and abides by its international commitments. Our programming seeks to empower the citizens of Iran to engage their government and advocate for greater respect for human rights and enhanced democratic freedoms, to honor its international commitments with regards to the nuclear program, and cease its destabilizing activities in the region.

b. Broadcasting plays a relatively minor role in the State Department's democracy and governance programming. While it is true that most Iranians continue to use broadcast television as their primary source of news, the Iranian government continues to block U.S. government and western broadcasts. Therefore, while we continue to fund a few targeted broadcasting interventions, we have primarily focused on online engagement, social networking, and web-based broadcasting to facilitate contact with young Iranian audiences.

c. To improve program management, the Department of State and USAID have implemented a portfolio-wide monitoring and evaluation program tailored to the Iranian context. This effort allows for rigorous monitoring while still preserving the safety of all participants and partners. We regularly monitor the virtual spaces associated with our projects and conduct periodic analyses of the website content, design, participation levels, and tone. We also conduct interviews and surveys with beneficiaries, and in addition to regular reports receive consistent updates from implementing partner organizations. This fiscal year, investments in organizational capacity are beginning to pay off in demonstrable ways. Our indicator data shows a doubling in the number of civil society organizations that have directly benefited from our support, and more in-depth monitoring demonstrates qualitative improvements in the work of beneficiary organizations.

d. The Department assesses that there is significant civil society activity in Iran. Although subjected to a continuing and systematic crackdown on free expression and assembly, Iranian civil society continues to play a positive role

in Iran. An important example is the outpouring of civic participation in the 2013 elections that led to the surprising election of President Rouhani.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (7a-f)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

Syria

All the humanitarian money in the world is meaningless inside Syria if aid groups do not have the ability to access all areas of the country. Parties to the conflict, and particularly the Syrian regime, are currently using access as a political bargaining chip – setting a dangerous precedent and ignoring norms under international humanitarian law. The passage of Security Council resolution 2139 is a critical step toward expanding access and the ability of humanitarian groups to deliver assistance, assess needs and monitor deliveries inside Syria.

- a. What efforts has your department undertaken to uphold the conditions laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 2139?
- b. Most troubling, the Syria crisis looks endless right now. In an era of budget austerity, we must look to promote efficiencies in our response. What efforts are you taking to integrate relief and development strategies to address emerging gaps in services?
- c. Short term funding does not completely address the long-term needs of Syrian refugees that will likely be displaced for 5-10 years. PRM, OFDA, and UNHCR have committed to expanding minimum program timelines from 3-6 months to 1 year or multi-year programs. Can you outline how the State Department will – in practice – shift toward longer-term programming? How are you prioritizing longer-term programming – that can build the capacity of local municipalities to meet needs over the long-term?
- d. Is there joint program planning between the humanitarian assistance offices and development assistance offices in Lebanon and Jordan to ensure that the needs of the refugees and host communities are being met?

e. Needs in Syria, as well as in refugee hosting countries, differ by location. Localized needs will greatly benefit from decentralized responses. Are you programming funds directly to hosting governments through G2G agreements? What are you doing to ensure that bilateral funding to hosting governments trickles down to the municipal level where it is needed the most?

f. How are State and USAID ensuring that local participation and concerns of civil society are incorporated into policy structures such as the Jordan Host Communities Support Platform, the Government of Jordan's National Resilience Plan, and the Lebanon Syrian roadmap and proposed trust fund?

Answer a:

What efforts has your department undertaken to uphold the conditions laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 2139?

The United States continues to urge all parties to the conflict in Syria, in particular the Asad regime, to fully implement the demands of the Security Council in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2139, including to promptly allow rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access for UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners, including across conflict lines and across borders. We continue to urge the UN and other international partners to do as much as possible to address the humanitarian situation in Syria. The key issue is that the Asad regime continues to drop barrel bombs on its own people, to besiege villages, and to deny humanitarian – including cross-border – access to the Syrian people in complete disregard of

the UN Security Council's demands and the demands of the international community.

The UN Secretary-General's April and May status reports to the Security Council reiterated the limited progress achieved in accessing besieged and hard-to-reach areas since the February 22 adoption of UNSCR 2139. The reports mention a few one-off successes within the context of a rapidly devolving humanitarian situation where access has become more constrained and more dangerous. UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos briefed the Security Council on April 30 on the status of UNSCR 2139 implementation and urged the Council to take further steps to press all parties to the conflict, particularly the Syrian government, to facilitate humanitarian access to 3.5 million people in besieged and hard-to-reach areas of the country. The United States is talking with its Security Council colleagues and international partners about what further actions might look like to press for regime compliance with its obligations under international humanitarian law and implementation of UNSCR 2139, and how we can ensure the Council's resolution is fully implemented.

The United States plays an active role in the High-Level Group based in Geneva, a gathering of 35 member states focused on implementing the UN's seven priority areas to improve the humanitarian situation in Syria. Priority

areas include increasing access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas; ensuring that medical care - including critical vaccinations - reaches those in need; demilitarizing civilian facilities including schools and hospitals; reducing administrative hurdles and streamlining procedures for the delivery of humanitarian aid; augmenting international contributions to the UN humanitarian appeals; and supporting efforts to reach a negotiated political settlement based on the principles outlined in the Geneva Communiqué.

The United States regularly advocates with contacts in the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the Supreme Military Council to facilitate access for humanitarian convoys to areas under opposition control. We also take every opportunity to urge other states with influence over parties to the conflict to press armed groups to enable humanitarian access and to adhere to the principles of international humanitarian law. To date, the United States has provided more than \$1.7 billion in humanitarian aid to the Syria crisis response, reaching more than 4.2 million people inside Syria and more than 2.7 million refugees from Syria in neighboring countries. More needs to be done, however, to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of those increasingly affected by the conflict.

Answers b, c, d, e, f

The United States continues to implement humanitarian best practices in the Syria humanitarian crisis response, which includes working to improve local capacity and building on existing resources, skills, and coping mechanisms in host communities as part and parcel of our humanitarian assistance efforts. Effective humanitarian assistance can foster a successful long-term response; our emergency interventions are providing the immediate assistance people need, while laying the foundation for stability and longer-term recovery. However, we still must ensure that the international community works together to comprehensively address both relief and development needs.

Much of our humanitarian assistance already does this, connecting our immediate interventions with development needs down the line. In fact, all activities for our response are interwoven and mutually reinforcing building on lessons learned from prior crises. For example, the psychosocial care we fund to traumatized women and children and trainings we support for local volunteers and NGOs are a vital part of the longer-term rehabilitation of the Syrian community and an integral piece of our holistic, comprehensive disaster response.

To better coordinate assistance, a task force comprised of USAID and Department of State humanitarian assistance, transitional assistance, and development assistance teams meets weekly. The task force ensures that all

components of the response to the Syria crisis are well coordinated. U.S. Government efforts are then synchronized with other international donors and leading humanitarian organizations to ensure that the US response is effective and targeted. We are reviewing all available options to support communities hosting refugees including exploring whether new authorities might be required that would better meet the evolving needs in countries neighboring Syria.

Comprehensive Regional Strategy Framework (CRSF)

The United States is taking steps to ensure that our efforts complement and reinforce those of our partners, including members of the moderate Syrian opposition, neighboring countries, international humanitarian organizations, and other donors. One promising tool in this effort is the Comprehensive Regional Strategic Framework (CRSF), an initiative of the United Nations. The goal of the CRSF is to coordinate humanitarian, development, and macro-fiscal interventions to meet immediate protection and assistance needs; build the resilience of households, communities and systems; strengthen host-country leadership; and support regional stability. We support the UN's effort to build coherence between traditional humanitarian and development responses through the development of the CRSF. Donor coordination tools such as the CRSF, the Roadmap of Priority Interventions for Stabilization in Lebanon, and the Host Community Support Platform in Jordan are useful for making the best use of

limited U.S. government resources during a time of budget constraints and several large-scale crises occurring at one time..

Funding for the Syria Humanitarian Response

The U.S. government is the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance for those affected by the Syria crisis, providing more than \$1.7 billion in humanitarian aid since the start of the crisis, including nearly \$878 million to support those inside Syria and nearly \$862 million to support refugees from Syria and host communities in the region including Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt. Support inside Syria goes through trusted international and non-governmental organizations. Our funding and programs are geared to support both immediate needs and longer-term programming. To the maximum extent possible, we seek to have governments and civil society take ownership of programs with continued and robust international support.

In the FY 2014 Omnibus Appropriations bill, Congress generously provided more than \$2.2 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for humanitarian programs. This funding is critical to address growing humanitarian needs worldwide, including in Syria and the region, where the combined UN humanitarian appeal for Syria has nearly doubled over the last year and represents approximately half of the 2014 total worldwide humanitarian need of \$12.9 billion. The Department and USAID are

programming funds carefully in response to UN appeals and other proposals so that we can provide support when and where needed. We plan to carry over funding from FY 2014 into FY 2015 to ensure sufficient funds at the start of the fiscal year to address the substantial requirements we expect.

Support to Lebanon

According to a joint World Bank and UN assessment, 170,000 Lebanese will be pushed into poverty by the impact of the Syria crisis on the Lebanese economy. Lebanese government expenditures have increased \$1.1 billion due to the increased demand for public services, according to the assessment. Based on this assessment, the World Bank and Government of Lebanon (GOL) completed a roadmap to address the impact of the Syria crisis in Lebanon. In creating the roadmap, the GOL engaged host communities and refugees themselves in the process of determining their own needs and priority interventions, soliciting feedback on program design and implementation. The roadmap identifies short-, medium-, and long-term priority interventions to meet Lebanon's needs in a range of sectors, including health, education, water and sanitation, waste management, livelihoods, and social cohesion. The World Bank has worked closely with the UN to incorporate the most immediate needs into the Regional Response Plan (RRP6), and longer-term needs will be captured in the CRSF.

This roadmap is an excellent example of how the international community is coming together to bridge the gap between the need for immediate relief and development needs, both of which must be addressed simultaneously, rather than sequentially. These coordinated efforts aim to address the needs of overburdened refugee-hosting communities and help maintain Lebanon's stability. For example, U.S. humanitarian assistance through UN agencies and NGOs is already supporting programs in Ministry of Social Affairs Social Development Centers serving both local communities and refugees, activities identified by the Government of Lebanon in the Roadmap as a priority need. These centers, which provide primary health care, education, vocational training and activities for children of Lebanese communities, have been designated as focal points for refugee service delivery as well. Beyond serving as platforms for programs, these centers bring local residents and refugees together to build a sense of community and reduce social tensions. In September 2013, Secretary Kerry reaffirmed U.S. support for Lebanon and announced our intention to provide \$30 million in additional assistance specifically intended to help mitigate the impact of the refugee crisis on Lebanon's host communities. This funding, provided in addition to our ongoing economic and development assistance, bolsters the Lebanese

educational system, addresses societal tensions, and supports primary health care needs.

In partnership with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE), the United States provides basic education assistance by providing computer equipment and furniture to public schools, improving the English proficiency of teachers, and training school principals, in addition to increasing community and parents' involvement in their children's education, and creating extra-curricular activities for students. This U.S.-funded education program is working to strengthen school counseling and psychosocial services and improve the quality of learning for Lebanese and Syrian students. Another U.S.-funded program complements our education assistance specifically by supporting the most vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian populations by providing remedial education programs for Syrian and Lebanese students during the summer, books and other materials, additional financial resources to hire additional teachers, and bus transportation for students. In addition, U.S. assistance is also focused on water as well as a value-chain development program to advance agriculture in heavily affected areas like the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon's northeast. These programs directly address critical needs identified in the CRSF and Roadmap as part of the comprehensive international response in Lebanon.

Support to Jordan

In Jordan, the U.S. government carries out joint planning with humanitarian and development actors. The State Department includes USAID staff from both Washington and the field in its host community grant selection process, which helps to reduce duplication in our programs and harness both long-term development expertise and a keen understanding of what refugees need to make ends meet. Last year, State added a Senior Refugee Coordinator position at Embassy Amman to oversee the assistance and resettlement portfolios, including regional Syria coordination, and USAID added a second Deputy Mission Director with dedicated staff to ensure that USAID's broad portfolio of humanitarian and development efforts is coordinated and that funding opportunities reinforce both lines. The Ambassador ensures close coordination of all Syria-related assistance through weekly Syria Working Group meetings. USAID is amending its five-year Country Development Cooperation Strategy to add an additional special development objective with a goal mitigating the effects of the Syria crisis.

USAID's Community Engagement Program is linking short-term needs to long-term development in line with priorities identified in the CRSF. The project helps community members—men and women, Syrians and Jordanians—come together to determine their most pressing needs. USAID then offers support for tangible improvements, from better trash collection to

family-friendly public spaces, to improvements to youth centers. The immediate benefits, in the form of improved services that are attuned to the specific needs of each community, are clear. The longer-term benefits of cohesion and collective problem-solving are equally important, laying the groundwork for communities that coexist more peacefully for years to come. Increasingly, the project is adding support for local mayors, allowing them to strengthen their ability to deliver services to their constituents. USAID's education and youth programs contribute to ongoing rehabilitation and expansion of 20 schools in northern Jordan which serve over 11,000 Syrian and Jordanian students.

USAID's development expertise helps ensure that the humanitarian response efforts do not have an adverse effect on Jordan's long-term development. For example, USAID's water team has been helping the UN team that manages the Za'atri refugee camp implement strategies to minimize untreated waste water. This helps ensure that meeting urgent needs for shelter and protection does not come at the expense of Jordan's long-term environmental well-being. The U.S. government works to support all levels of the host governments, from ministries to municipalities. USAID implements as much of its assistance as possible through local structures. In Jordan, USAID programs a portion of its funds for construction oversight and engineering

through host country systems, and uses Jordanian NGOs and firms as much as possible.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#8)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Syrian Refugees and Jordan

The ongoing conflict in Syria has caused more than a million refugees to flee to neighboring countries. These countries are struggling to host these displaced persons. Chairwoman Granger and I pushed for and obtained an additional \$340 million for Jordan in the FY 2014 Omnibus appropriation. In Jordan, the refugee flow has caused major strains on the Kingdom.

Question:

What additional measures is the Department taking to assist Jordan in accommodating the growing numbers of Syrian refugees and to help ensure future stability in Jordan?

Answer:

Humanitarian Assistance:

The U.S. government is committed to continuing to help Syria's neighbors, including Jordan, cope with refugee inflows. The number of Syrian refugees has risen sharply, from 1.4 million across the region a year ago to more than 2.7 million today, with nearly 600,000 refugees from Syria in Jordan. Although some Syrian refugees reside in camps supported by the international

community, nearly 85 percent of the Syrian refugees in Jordan reside in communities. Local governments, social services, and civic organizations are severely strained as they seek to accommodate refugees. Cities and villages cope with overcrowded schools, shortages of hospital beds, and an inability to stretch municipal services to accommodate the increased population.

Since the start of the Syria crisis, the United States has provided more than \$268 million in humanitarian aid to international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) assisting Syrian refugees in Jordan. Of this, approximately \$259 million has been provided through multilateral organizations including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF).

As part of the international response, the 2014 UN Syria Regional Response Plan for Jordan incorporates the needs of up to 700,000 vulnerable Jordanians in communities hosting Syrian refugees. The United States has supplemented funding to international organizations in Jordan with more than \$9 million to NGOs for programs to help Syrian refugees living in Jordanian

communities as well as vulnerable Jordanians where possible. We anticipate providing additional humanitarian assistance in Jordan and the region after the UN completes its mid-year review of the Regional Response Plan.

Economic and Development Aid:

The United States is committed to providing more than \$660 million in economic and development assistance to Jordan annually as part of a Memorandum of Understanding in effect through the end of fiscal year (FY) 2014. Over the last two years, we have significantly exceeded our commitment levels, providing nearly \$1 billion in assistance in FY 2012 and FY 2013 to help Jordan address its economic challenges and address strains arising from the Syria crisis. In addition to the \$660 million in annual aid under the MOU, the US grant has provided \$300 million in budget support to Jordan to expand government services and help reduce the financial strain on the sectors directly supporting refugees; a \$1.25 billion loan guarantee to help Jordan access international capital markets and support its economic reform; and development programs to help Jordanian communities hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees.

These development programs include a \$20 million water conservation and municipal water infrastructure renovation program in the northern governorates; approximately \$11 million to fast-track expansions of up to 20

schools receiving large numbers of Syrian students and launch new remedial math and reading programs to equalize all students' basic skills; and an awareness-raising campaign to reduce early marriage, human trafficking, child labor, and gender-based violence. In addition, to the United States supports programs designed to bolster public services, such as the construction and renovation of schools, hospitals, and major water infrastructure. We also support a rapid-response community engagement project to provide family-friendly public spaces, productive opportunities for youth engagement, and improved solid waste management.

Security Assistance:

The State Department has also collaborated with the Department of Defense to enhance Jordan's border security, particularly in light of threats emanating from the Syria crisis. The three-phase Jordan border security program is designed to secure Jordan's borders with Syria and Iraq.

We will continue our robust assistance to Jordan in the future. As a demonstration of the strength of our ongoing commitment to Jordan's development and stability, in February 2014, the President announced the United States' intention to renew our Memorandum of Understanding with Jordan for another five years. The President also announced plans to provide a five-year, \$1 billion loan guarantee that follows on last year's guarantee. Our

FY 2015 budget request reflects our continued commitment to Jordan. As in recent years, we will continue to evaluate additional needs stemming from regional instability on top of our annual commitment levels.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#9a-c)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Mr. Secretary, I commend your leadership on combating HIV/AIDS through PEPFAR and the partnership with the Global Fund.

- a. Please provide an update on PEPFAR's overall treatment targets vis a vis the stated goals. What progress has been made in preventing new infections in focus countries?
- b. What is the function and key accomplishments of the Global Health Diplomacy office? What is this office's role vis a vis the other Agencies?
- c. Can you please describe the public health impact of the anti-LGBT legislation and policies in countries such as Uganda, Nigeria and Russia? How is the USG addressing this issue?

Answer a. :

Annual bilateral country targets are a core marker for measuring performance and implementing partner accountability for contributing to impactful HIV prevention and treatment programs. Annual targets are used to build implementing partner budgets, and allow for the PEPFAR country team to plan and collaborate with the host government and the Global Fund on what can be achieved in core prevention and treatment programs in a given year, and how

these targets contribute to increased levels of treatment and prevention program coverage.

PEPFAR's targets for prevention, care, and treatment have been a critical factor in enabling both Congress and the American people to understand how their investments have been saving lives in countries around the world. In addition to these annual targets, PEPFAR works jointly with local and international partners to define measurable commitments that contribute to creating an AIDS-free generation, including commitments around legal reform, supply chain improvements, and increased domestic contributions for HIV/AIDS – all areas of work that ensure that treatment and care programs maximize their impact and meet or exceed any bilateral targets that have been set.

On a semi-annual and annual basis the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) requires all implementing agencies to report core prevention and treatment achievements drawn from an established set of program indicators. At the semi-annual check-in point, the intent is to identify those countries (and implementing partners within countries) that are not on track to reach annual targets established, determine the problems, and develop a plan of corrective action. When warranted, technical support is deployed to country teams from headquarters to provide further assistance. Close

monitoring of country achievements to targets and corrected action has enabled PEPFAR to meet annual and multi-year targets in prevention, care, and treatment.

PEPFAR has seen the results of our global investments in prevention. According to data from UNAIDS, incidence dropped by over 50 percent between 2001 and 2012 in 6 of the former focus countries: Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Namibia, Nigeria and Zambia. Of the remaining focus countries – Guyana, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Vietnam – there have also been significant drops in the incidence of HIV. Evidence suggests many factors have contributed to this decline, including prevention programs and antiretroviral treatment. Overall, there has been a 38% reduction in the number of new pediatric HIV infections since the launch of the Global Plan (2009 baseline) in 21 high burden countries. This year alone, PEPFAR prevention of mother-to-child transmission programming reached over 780,000 pregnant women living with HIV with antiretroviral medications to prevent vertical transmission and improve maternal health, resulting in 95% of their babies being born HIV-free and 240,000 infant infections averted.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#9b)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Office of Global Health Diplomacy

Question:

What is the function and key accomplishments of the Global Health Diplomacy office? What is this office's role vis a vis the other Agencies?

Answer b.:

The State Department's Office of Global Health Diplomacy (S/GHD) was launched in January 2013 to deploy the unique and additive capacities of United States Ambassadors, senior U.S. officials, and Foreign Service Officers (FSO) in advancing U.S. government global health priorities. In its first year, S/GHD has focused on two primary objectives: institutionalizing health diplomacy as a core component of U.S. foreign policy, and promoting sustainability of U.S. government health programs through a shared global responsibility.

Institutionalizing Health Diplomacy: Much of S/GHD's focus over its first year has been the "under-the-hood" work of institutionalizing health diplomacy within the Department, with the goal of preparing senior officials, Chiefs of Mission (COM), Deputy Chiefs of Mission (DCM), and Foreign Service

Officers to raise health with partner governments. In pursuit of this goal, S/GHD has:

- Arranged over 50 interagency health briefings for COM and DCM headed to U.S. Embassies and Consulates abroad. These briefings help inform COMs and DCMs of challenges and opportunities within the partner country's health sector, identify opportunities for increased bilateral and multilateral coordination, and introduce the COM and DCMs to key interagency partners, including USAID, Health and Human Services (HHS), Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institutes of Health (NIH), Department of Defense (DoD), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and Peace Corps.
- Greatly expanded global health training at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI). S/GHD helped coordinate two three-day global health diplomacy courses designed to raise awareness of global health issues among State Department and interagency colleagues. S/GHD also presents on global health diplomacy during other FSI courses, including the Africa and East Asia Pacific area studies, public diplomacy and economic tradecraft, and development diplomacy courses, ensuring that officers are better equipped to support health diplomacy during their tours.

- Initiated a quarterly global health speaker series to elevate global health issues in Washington. To date, S/GHD has hosted three speakers: Dr. Chris Murray, lead investigator of the Global Burden of Disease study; Dr. Agnes Soucat, Global Health Lead at the African Development Bank; and Dr. Vanessa Kerry, founder of Seed Global Health, the private non-profit in the Global Health Services Partnership with the Peace Corps and PEPFAR. These events are open to the broader U.S. government and outside stakeholders, playing a vital public diplomacy role with key global health thought leaders. To date, over 300 people have attended these events.
- Coordinated the health component of the Congressionally-mandated State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan (JSP). The global health objective of the JSP guides State Department and USAID health diplomacy and programs, sets performance goals and defines metrics to measure success.

Promoting shared responsibility: The U.S. government is the world's largest investor in global health and recognizes the need to ensure that the systems built by our investments are sustainable and that we are drawing on all resources available to make that happen. Our diplomats and development professionals are well positioned to promote sustainable health systems and encourage shared responsibility for financing these health systems with partner governments,

other donors, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. S/GHD has moved this agenda forward by:

- Cohosting the Africa Health Forum with the World Bank. The forum convened almost 30 ministers of health and finance from African nations and senior representatives of all major bilateral and multilateral health donors to discuss sustainable financing for health systems. The event resulted in deepened appreciation of the need for greater domestic finance for health, the economic and broader development benefits of those investments, and the need for ministers of health to increase the focus on “value for money” – sustained health impact of those increased investments. The participation of donor partners has re-emphasized the urgent need to harmonize planning and reporting processes to avoid duplication of effort, advance country ownership, and reduce transaction costs.
- Supporting efforts to replenish the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI). S/GHD led diplomatic outreach to expand the base of donors for the Global Fund’s 2014-2016 pledging conference, which took place in Washington in December 2013. While S/GAC targeted traditional donors, S/GHD targeted emerging donors, particularly the Gulf nations. Building off this success,

S/GHD is currently partnering with USAID to encourage both traditional and emerging donors to give generously at the 2016-2020 GAVI replenishment conference (to be held in late 2014 or early 2015).

- Semi-annually convening the U.S. government board representatives to key multilateral health institutions (Global Fund, GAVI, WHO, UNAIDS, UNICEF, World Bank, U.N. Population Fund, and UNAIDS) to align policy and priorities. The U.S. government invests over \$2 billion in these organizations annually and S/GHD, in collaboration with the Bureau of International Organizations, works to ensure U.S. policies and messaging are consistent across the interagency. Our focus is also to capitalize on opportunities to reinforce administration priorities across all agencies with which we invest.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#9c)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

Can you please describe the public health impact of the anti-LGBT legislation and policies in countries such as Uganda, Nigeria and Russia? How is the USG addressing this issue?

Answer c. :

We share your concern about the impact of anti-LGBT legislation on the health of the people of Uganda, Nigeria and Russia, as well as on human rights of all persons, including members of the LGBT community. We continue our close work with LGBT and other human rights organizations throughout the world to advance the fundamental tenet that LGBT rights *are* human rights.

In countries where the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) operates, the principles of good public health demand that we strive to reach all affected populations with core HIV services even when facing difficult cultural contexts, severe stigma and discrimination, or challenging security environments. From a public health perspective, all forms of discrimination, harassment, and abuse – including on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity– are unacceptable and run counter to all that we

know works in effectively addressing HIV/AIDS from our nearly 35 years of experience in combating the epidemic.

We continue to look at additional steps we may take to work to protect LGBT individuals from violence and discrimination, ensure their access to HIV/AIDS and other health services, and to urge the repeal of such abhorrent laws in countries where they have been enacted.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#10a-d)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

In the 2014 bill we increased the request for the humanitarian assistance accounts due to unprecedented demand and need, yet the FY 2015 request cuts IDA by 28% and MRA by 33% from the FY 2014 enacted levels. We are still facing a protracted crisis in Syria, simmering conflict in South Sudan, a humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic and huge uncertainty in Afghanistan.

- a. The budget requests notes the State will be able to respond to the Syrian crisis with this requested level, but what about other crises around the world like the Central African Republic? Where are you going to find the necessary resources?
- b. Are you confident that there are sufficient funds to respond to a natural disaster or new emergency in FY 2015?
- c. What humanitarian contingency planning are you doing around the troop withdrawal in Afghanistan?
- d. As the world faces unprecedented crises in Syria and the Middle East, is there a cushion in the IDA and MRA budgets to respond to possible increased refugee flows that may result from growing insecurity in Afghanistan, Iraq, CAR, Sudan, etc.?

Answer a-d:

The Administration remains dedicated to providing robust support for humanitarian programs worldwide. The President's FY 2015 request includes \$2.097 billion for the Migration Refugee Assistance and the Emergency

Refugee and Migration Assistance accounts and \$1.3 billion for the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account. The Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development plan to carry over significant FY 2014 funding into FY 2015 to support humanitarian assistance needs. Taken together, we anticipate having the funds needed to support our humanitarian assistance goals in Syria, Africa, and elsewhere. The President's FY2015 request reflects the Administration's ongoing commitment to humanitarian programs, while taking into account the current constrained budget environment.

Although it is difficult to predict whether the drawdown of international troops will lead to large population movements within/outside of Afghanistan, the U.S. government is closely coordinating with its international and non-governmental partner organizations on contingency planning in the event of a general decline in security. As part of this planning, the Department of State and USAID are closely monitoring the humanitarian situation on the ground, assessing humanitarian needs in Afghanistan, as well as continuing to support our partners and the Afghan government should there be any mass displacement during this critical transition.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#11 a-c)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question 11a:

Many challenges remain in Asia regarding the state of democracy and good governance. We have recently seen a breakdown in democracy in Thailand and Bangladesh, concerns about peace in the Philippines and Nepal, and troubling efforts to control civil society in many countries, including China, Sri Lanka, and Cambodia through stricter NGO laws. Related to the Rebalance to Asia, I note that the resources requested are the smallest regional allocation aside from Europe. We are rebalancing from within. It is not new resources; it is kind of like moving the deck chairs around.

What does this say about our commitment to democracy and governance in this region?

- a. What does this say about our commitment to democracy and governance in this region?
- b. Is this still a priority for U.S. foreign policy?
- c. What are the specific accomplishments related to this foreign policy goal?
- d. Given continued concerns on violence against minorities e.g. Rohingyas and the dismal history of the Burmese military, please describe in further detail the proposed security assistance for Burma with IMET funds.
- e. What is the status of the Lower Mekong Initiative? What are key accomplishments since the launch and how long will the LMI continue?
- f. Describe further the proposed shift in assistance relationship with India? What is envisioned and will we see decreased levels in foreign assistance levels for India and a downsizing of the USAID Mission?

Answer a:

Our commitment to democracy and governance in Asia remains steadfast. While the rebalance reflects the importance the U.S. government places on our strategic and economic engagement in the Asia-Pacific, the dimension that binds the entire strategy together is our strong support for advancing democracy and human rights. Democracy and human rights give people the chance to live with dignity and to achieve a better future. Good governance is critical to reducing poverty, building rule of law, and allowing for open discussion of ideas in civil society. Open societies offer more opportunities for economic, educational, cultural, religious, and people-to-people exchanges, which are part of the foundation for peace. Strong democratic institutions increase transparency and ethics, which help to combat corruption. It is for these reasons that the U.S. government continues to place so much importance on democracy and human rights and works with governments, civil society activists, journalists, and human rights organizations around the world.

It is also important to note that the rebalance to Asia-Pacific goes beyond just words: we are dedicating more diplomatic, public diplomacy, and assistance resources to advance our objectives in the region in a way that is

commensurate with the truly comprehensive nature of our engagement. The FY 2015 budget request recently submitted to Congress, which reflects the latest iteration of our multiyear plan to resource the rebalance, provides an eight percent increase in State operations and foreign assistance resources to the East Asia and Pacific region, from nearly \$1.3 billion in FY 2013 to over \$1.4 billion in the FY 2015 request. On foreign assistance, the FY 2015 request reflects a roughly \$69.6 million (nine percent) increase over FY 2013. The increases are reflected across the board, including democracy and governance support.

Answer b:

Promoting democracy and good governance remains a U.S. foreign policy priority. Numerous examples come to mind of Asian democracies making progress in respecting human rights and good governance, such as Timor-Leste, and Taiwan, but we also recognize that there is much work to be done in Southeast Asia to ensure that all citizens enjoy basic freedoms, such as freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, and that civil society has the space to have its voice heard. Human rights issues continue to be a central element of the every bilateral relationship, including with China. The United States remains deeply concerned about the continued deterioration in the human rights situation in China, including increased censorship of the internet, the crackdown on anti-corruption and good governance activists associated with the

New Citizens Movement, and repression of ethnic Uighurs and Tibetans on cultural and religious grounds.

Answer c:

There is a significant amount of difficult work still to be done, but there are many examples of areas where we work closely with our partners in the Asia-Pacific region to promote a variety of human rights and democracy issues. We are committed to working with countries across the region to strengthen judicial systems and rule of law. In the Philippines, for example, USAID is working to help strengthen the judicial system and increase court effectiveness in conjunction with programs funded by the State Department's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau to improve police and prosecutor skills. We are also focused on protecting the rights of women and girls throughout Asia and empowering them economically and politically. In Papua New Guinea, the efforts of our regional USAID office were a crucial component of that country's successful election in July 2012, which witnessed the election of three female Members of Parliament. In Fiji, USAID and State are funding activities to educate voters as they prepare for the first democratic elections in that country since the 2006 coup. We are also proud of our participation in the Equal Futures Partnership, a multi-stakeholder initiative

developed by the White House, in which a core groups of states, civil society, and the private sector work together to identify key barriers to women's

political and economic empowerment and address them with specific new commitments.

Additionally, supporting the political and economic transition of Burma remains a key priority. With the reopening of the USAID Mission in Burma in 2012, we are expanding assistance and providing critical support to democracy, human rights, civil society, all political parties, and the media. We are also supporting electoral reform and efforts to ensure Burma has sound and credible general elections in 2015.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#11d)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question d:

Given continued concerns on violence against minorities e.g. Rohingyas and the dismal history of the Burmese military, please describe in further detail the proposed security assistance for Burma with IMET funds.”

Answer:

The Administration has long been active in pressing the Government of Burma to address the problems surrounding discrimination toward ethnic minorities, including the Rohingya. While we continue to assess that Burma’s overall reform efforts are positive, the situation in Rakhine State is deteriorating. We are greatly concerned about the risk for further violence, and are using all the tools at our disposal to try to prevent further violence.

A key tool in our efforts to address these humanitarian and human rights concerns is promoting democratic reform within what is still the strongest single political force in Burma – the Burmese military. Absent efforts to reform, the Burmese armed forces have the potential to hinder progress on a broad range of human rights issues, as well as the peace process, good

governance, a successful transition to democracy, and equitable economic growth.

U.S. engagement with Burma's military is intended to support our broader policy objectives of ensuring the success of the country's democratic transition and building appropriate institutions. Our goal is to cultivate a professional military under civilian control that operates in accordance with international law, as well as with standards of transparency and accountability; that ends the unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers; that withdraws from politics and the economy; that severs arms-related ties with the DPRK; and that supports Burma's peace process.

Through all of our bilateral engagement, we underscore the need for Burma's military to undertake meaningful reforms in order for our engagement to continue and expand over the long term.

The Department therefore proposes funding targeted, reform-focused Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) programs that promote the principles of military professionalism by building capacity and understanding in human rights, civilian control of the military, and disaster

relief. If the Department secures the authority to provide E-IMET courses, we will tailor courses specifically to address Burma's needs in these areas.

Standard E-IMET courses that may be provided include: Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights, Military Law Development, Basic Law of War, Law of Military Operations, Enhancing Civil-Military Relations, Domestic Support Operations in Democracies, Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in a Democracy, Establishing Democratic Civil-Military Relations and the Rule of Law, Leadership in Disaster Response, Public Health Emergencies, Disaster Response, Disaster Management, and Emergency Planning.

The Department envisions working with military leadership, including judge advocates general, inspectors general, first responders for humanitarian and disaster relief, and members of the junior officer corps. The Department would identify and vet appropriate recipients prior to such training.

In 2013, the Administration initiated engagement with Department of Defense Title X-funded Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) exchanges, which are not training programs. To expand this human rights engagement to include more formal training, the Administration will need to rely on the IMET authority, but will limit activities to E-IMET courses.

The military will play a central role in determining whether Burma's reforms and transition succeed. With constitutional reform, the peace process and elections all on the agenda in the next few years, we believe it is critical to engage more systematically now to encourage the military's support for reforms and its pursuit of an alternative vision as a professional force adhering to high international standards. Voices from across Burmese society – opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, ethnic minorities, and the Burmese armed forces – have informed and reinforced the U.S. position that it is critical for the Burmese military to be exposed to new models of conduct, see itself as a stakeholder in the reforms, and perceive benefits from future reform.

Targeted training opportunities will enable effective engagement with Burma's military and encourage its support for the political and economic reforms necessary to continue the country's transition. Security sector engagement will reinforce our democracy, good governance, and human rights efforts, as U.S. government capacity building programs model transparency and accountability and promote principles critical to democratic culture. The U.S. military is uniquely positioned to encourage and demonstrate for the Burmese military the importance of human rights, accountability, transparency, civilian

control, and the proper role of a professional military in a modern, democratic society.

In the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012 (Div. I, P.L. 112-74), and the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 (Div. K, P.L. 113-76), Congress provided the Department with notwithstanding authorities for use of Economic Support Funds (ESF) for assistance for Burma. For FY 2015, in addition to those authorities, we seek notwithstanding authority for use of International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds to be able to provide E-IMET assistance for Burma as described above. The Department seeks notwithstanding authority only to permit the limited subset of E-IMET courses described above, and does not seek to provide broader training under the IMET authority. The Department will not use such notwithstanding authority to overcome the Leahy Law requirements. Any training recipients would be fully vetted according to standard practices.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#11e.)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question :

What is the status of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) ? What are key accomplishments since the launch and how long will the LMI continue?

Answer:

Since LMI's launch in 2009, the Initiative has evolved into a whole-of-government approach that has become more responsive to developing country priorities, has improved opportunities for U.S. private sector engagement in the sub-region, has strengthened regional civil society, and has achieved several milestones:

- Starting in 2009, we supported regional technical coordination with member countries' ministries and U.S. departments working together around the four "pillars" or topical areas of Environment, Infrastructure, Education, and Health.
- In 2011, we launched Friends of the Lower Mekong to improve donor coordination across the sub-region.
- Burma became a member in 2012.

- In 2012 we launched two new pillars: Agriculture and Food Security, and Energy Security, in addition to reformulating the Infrastructure Pillar into the Connectivity Pillar to more closely reflect the Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity, which includes infrastructure, ICT, and people-to-people connections.
- Secretary Clinton announced a commitment of \$50 million over three years for LMI in 2012.
- We have launched several signature programs in workforce development, education, health, infrastructure development, and entrepreneurship.
- This year, we are sharpening our focus to respond to Secretary Kerry's objectives for sustainable development and climate change mitigation and adaptation on the Mekong.

We have seen significant improvement in engagement with the United States and leadership from the most active LMI Members, such as the Thai government providing financial and in-kind contributions to locally implemented projects, the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington hosting a public awareness event on LMI, and member countries proactively coming to technical meetings with proposals and ideas about how to address some of the region's most pressing challenges. With the roll-out of signature programs, we expect this collaboration will help close the development gap and facilitate ASEAN

integration in a range of areas, including health, energy, environment and water, and workforce development.

The Department of State's FY 2014 budget for LMI includes the following signature programs: a multi-year, regional project to strengthen workforce development in seven key ASEAN priority sectors; programs to improve the sustainability of infrastructure design on the Mekong River; a women's entrepreneurship project that supports women's participation in the economy; projects that improve regional infrastructure connections; a project on reducing emerging pandemic threats; and an education project that strengthens communication skills in English. In addition, programs include use of joint resources for Third Country Training Programs with Singapore to raise technical capacity in transportation, trade facilitation and investment, and road and bridge management; bio-risk, hospital management, and counterfeit medications; hydrology and water resources management in the sub-region; support for six pillars and cross-pillar areas; and other programs.

LMI builds key relationships among senior foreign affairs and line ministry officials that are necessary to promote regional stability and build confidence in tackling contentious issues such as the sustainable development and management of the Mekong River. To accomplish this, LMI employs an innovative development-policy model to address trans-national challenges that

supports a well-integrated ASEAN and advance our policy goals in the sub-region, which include strengthening regional institutions, particularly ASEAN, and unlocking new opportunities for U.S. businesses.

The Infrastructure Best Practices Exchanges (BPEs), for example, bring together regional government and private sector representatives to exchange best practices with U.S. government and private sector counterparts. BPEs cover infrastructure development across the aviation, energy, engineering, health, and information communication technology sectors. BPEs also provide an opportunity for U.S. companies to connect to regional government planners, expanding access to early-stage investment opportunities.

Given the strong demand in the region for additional U.S. engagement, strong political will by LMI member countries to tackle issues of regional import, and U.S. interests in promoting a stable, prosperous, and sustainable Mekong sub-region, we are planning to further deepen our engagement in the sub-region through LMI in the future. Programs will address the most complex trans-national development and policy challenges facing the region, such as developing a skilled labor force, creating smart infrastructure, increasing utilization of renewable energy, improving land use management, and building higher education partnerships.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#11f.)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question f:

Describe further the proposed shift in assistance relationship with India? What is envisioned and will we see decreased levels in foreign assistance levels for India and a downsizing of the USAID Mission?

Answer:

As an indispensable partner of the United States, India is a country central to U.S. interests in South Asia and a key player in the Asia Rebalance strategy. U.S. assistance will continue to play a critical role in supporting a strong U.S.-India relationship. During the past six decades of U.S.-India cooperation on development challenges, India has emerged as a regional and global power; a rapidly growing trade and investment partner; and a powerful economic engine for the region. India, working with USAID and others, has gone from a traditional aid recipient to a true peer-to-peer strategic partner able to harness its own strengths and capabilities and partner with the United States. Therefore, as supported through our current five-year Country Development Cooperation Strategy, USAID is engaged in a new approach in India centered

on sourcing and scaling their innovations to address development challenges in India and globally.

As a key element of this strategy, USAID is increasingly engaging India's vibrant private sector, and focusing on science, technology, innovation, and partnerships to extend its reach and maximize impact, while driving down costs and yielding a better return for the American taxpayer. USAID aims to foster a diverse array of high impact partnerships and alliances across various areas including clean energy; early grade reading; health (child survival, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and water and sanitation); food security; and gender equality and women's empowerment (gender-based violence). Through PEPFAR, USAID is supporting prioritized amplification and uptake of HIV/TB targeted interventions, ranging from technical support for Isoniazid Preventive Therapy (IPT) for all HIV positive people, to improving cross referrals between HIV and TB service facilities, to the scale up of airborne infection control programs at ART centers. USAID's funding and staffing levels in India will ensure that this new model of development, supported by the Agency in a wide-array of countries, can adequately support these sector priorities. The Agency's anticipated funding request over the next several years should slowly decrease as we partner with the private sector and others to leverage additional resources.

However, this new business model requires intensive staff engagement. Staffing levels will be evaluated continuously as we implement this strategy.

In the health sector, USAID partnered with India to introduce the innovative, U.S.- produced GeneXpert rapid diagnostic tuberculosis testing technology across the country. India accounts for 26 percent of global tuberculosis cases. The technology dramatically reduces the time it takes to diagnose drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis—from six weeks or more to just a couple of hours—meaning patients can start the treatment process right away, which plays an important role in preventing transmission. After USAID's initial investment of 19 machines demonstrated success, the Government of India purchased more than 200 machines to be used throughout the country to combat the spread of the fatal disease.

As a co-convenor of the Call to Action to End Preventable Maternal and Child Deaths around the world, India is looked to as a leader in rolling out an evidence-based, data driven, and health systems approach to eliminating preventable child and maternal deaths. USAID is working with India not only to reach this bold new vision, but to use India's achievements as a model for other countries to improve their health outcomes. India has the third largest

HIV/AIDS epidemic in the world, behind South Africa and Nigeria. Through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), USAID has partnered with the Government of India, the private sector, and civil society to establish a collaborative relationship focused on sharing science, data and best practices to help India address the epidemic. USAID has supported innovative interventions and technical assistance to help local partners address the epidemic across the country.

Furthermore, through the South to South HIV-AIDS Resource Exchange partnership, India's successful HIV/AIDS prevention, care, support, and treatment efforts are being shared with African countries. Such South-to-South technical assistance takes advantage of Indian local capacity.

As the world's third largest greenhouse gas emitter and with the demand for energy in India increasing significantly, USAID has a number of programs in India focused on the power sector, including clean energy, regional energy cooperation, and off-grid solutions. USAID has recently started exploring a new initiative that would seek to leverage the tremendous potential of renewable energy (RE), particularly wind and solar power, in India. One key constraint that is shared globally is how to effectively integrate RE into existing power grids

given the intermittent power supply from RE. USAID is working with the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Energy, as well as the National Renewable Energy Lab, on providing technologies and other ‘soft infrastructure’ solutions to address this challenge. USAID is also working with other donors, such as the Asian Development Bank, the United Kingdom’s Department of International Development, and the German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation, who may be able to complement these efforts with financing for hard infrastructure.

This year USAID’s Global Climate Change Office in Washington designated India as a top-priority partner in our fight against climate change, largely due to India’s aforementioned status as the world’s third largest greenhouse gas emitter after China and the United States. As such, USAID is planning to help expand the U.S. Government’s already-vibrant interagency initiative—the Partnership to Advance Clean Energy (PACE). Under PACE, the U.S. Government has already mobilized more than \$2 billion in U.S. Government, Government of India, and private sector funds since President Obama and then Prime Minister Singh launched the initiative in 2009. Specifically, USAID is in the process of developing a new assistance program to help India mainstream renewable wind and solar energy within India’s

national power grid. The initiative has the potential to help India avoid millions of tons of greenhouse gasses, and USAID is aiming to launch it within the next year.

USAID also leverages our convening power in India to bring together a wide range of traditional and nontraditional development partners to apply their combined resources and expertise toward solving the world's most vexing development challenges. USAID partnered with the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Government of India's Department of Science and Technology, the ICICI Foundation, the Netherlands' Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation, and several other public and private sector entities to launch the Millennium Alliance, a partnership to support new innovations that strengthen early-grade reading as well as increase access to clean and affordable energy, safe drinking water, quality health care, and a nutritious food supply to those most in need. As of August 2014, the Alliance has leveraged over \$40 million in financial and in-kind contributions through partnerships with leading Indian and multinational corporations, foundations and donors.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#12a-b)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

Restrictions on Russian civil society, media, and independent political groups combined with a crackdown on dissent groups after street protests in 2012 have led to heightened concerns about Russia's commitment to human rights and democracy. It has been widely reported that some Russian NGOs have become targets of police harassment, raids and forced to register as "foreign agents" if they receive foreign funding.

- a. What assistance are you providing to human rights defenders and civil society activists in Russia?
- b. How does the current level of support for these activists compare to US government support before the Russian government shut down USAID in the country?
- c. As the Russian government increases its restrictions on the internet, what are you doing in response?
- d. How many Russian officials do you expect to add this year to the visa ban and asset freeze list introduced by the Magnitsky Act? (This question will be addressed separately).

Repressing journalists and controlling access to information is a primary means for authoritarian governments to maintain power. Russia has recently denied visas to prominent American journalists.

- e. How are you dissuading them from doing this again?
- f. What are you doing to help harassed journalists and support independent media and access to information?

Answer a-b:

The U.S. Government's commitment to democracy and civil society in Russia remains firm in the face of the enactment of laws and practices in Russia that restrict fundamental freedoms and the ability of Russian NGOs to receive international support. The U.S. Government has made clear our concerns about these restrictions, conveyed our support for a legal framework that does not restrict fundamental freedoms, and underscored that democratic principles and a vibrant civil society are essential to Russia's development. We continue to support the Russian people's aspirations to live in a modern country with transparent and accountable governance, a free marketplace of ideas, free and fair elections, and the ability to exercise their universally recognized human rights without fear of retribution.

Although the traditional routes for support in these areas have been challenged, Russian organizations, universities, and individuals continue to express a desire to engage with the United States. As a result, the U.S. Government is developing new ways to increase direct interactions between Russians and Americans, including by establishing peer-to-peer and other regional programs that support exchanges of best practices on themes of mutual interest. Further opportunities for interaction include educational and cultural exchanges that provide opportunities for Russians to have firsthand experiences

in the United States or attend events with Americans that travel to Russia through U.S. Government sponsored programs.

The State Department will continue to consult key Congressional committees on further efforts and will provide more information as necessary.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (12c)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question 12 c:

As the Russian government increases its restrictions on the internet, what are you doing in response?

Answer:

We have publicly voiced our deep concern about a new set of laws that impose sweeping new restrictions on the Internet and blogging. The laws, which require bloggers to register with the Russian government and conform to Russia's increasing regulations on the mass media, are an attempt to increase state control of online content.

Because I believe so strongly in the right of all individuals to express their views, including dissenting views, I spoke out publicly about the Russian government's efforts to restrict its citizens' right to seek, receive, and impart information in my April 28 speech to the Freedom Online Coalition's (FOC) conference in Estonia and in my April 30 posting on DipNote, our Department of State blog. At the FOC conference, our delegation continued to work with partners to advance an open, interoperable, and secure Internet, to ensure that the same rights that people have offline are also protected online, and that

protection of these rights is governed by the rule of law. We engage frequently with the civil society actors who shape the future of the Internet in Russia, as well as with the private sector on issues of Internet freedom. Internationally, we work to promote multi-stakeholder Internet governance so that civil society, from Russia and around the world, can have a voice in key Internet governance conversations.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (12d)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question d:

Restrictions on Russian civil society, media, and independent political groups combined with a crackdown on dissent groups after street protests in 2012 have led to heightened concerns about Russia's commitment to human rights and democracy. It has been widely reported that some Russian NGOs have become targets of police harassment, raids and forced to register as "foreign agents" if they receive foreign funding.

How many Russian officials do you expect to add this year to the visa ban and asset freeze list introduced by the Magnitsky Act?

Answer:

State and Treasury continue to review information that could lead to additional designations under the Act. While we can't speak to the timing of any additional designations -- which are not required to occur at the same time as the annual report which is submitted in December -- the administration is determined to fully implement the Act by making further designations as appropriate.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (12e-f)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question 12e:

Repressing journalists and controlling access to information is a primary means for authoritarian governments to maintain power. Russia has recently denied visas to prominent American journalists. How are you dissuading them from doing this again?

Answer:

We have repeatedly raised our concerns about the denial of visas for journalists by the Russian government, in high-level bilateral meetings with Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives during their visits to Washington and through the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, we have pressed for a more effective accreditation process for international journalists. These incidents and other recent restrictions on independent media must be seen for what they are – an attempt to limit the free flow of information for all Russians who would question any aspect of the many policies of their government and officials.

Question 12f:

What are you doing to help harassed journalists and support independent media and access to information?

Answer:

From both Washington and our Embassy in Moscow, we routinely engage with and advocate on behalf of journalists and bloggers who have been attacked, arrested, imprisoned, or otherwise harassed for doing their work. For example, on April 25, in the context of the Department's global "Free the Press" Campaign in honor of World Press Freedom Day, we spoke out to call attention to the little-known case of Sergei Reznik, a Russian journalist who is serving an 18-month jail sentence after uncovering local corruption and abuse.

Embattled Russian journalists and media organizations are eligible to apply for emergency assistance through the Defenders Fund and the Lifeline: Embattled Civil Society Organizations (CSO) Assistance Fund, respectively. These funds were created in response to an overwhelming need to provide critical emergency assistance to human rights defenders and civil society organizations when they are threatened or attacked for their work. These programs have provided assistance to 1,774 activists and CSOs in 84 countries and territories, 25% of which were journalists or media organizations. In each case, assistance averages between \$5,000 from the Defenders Fund or \$10,000 from Lifeline, and provides, among other things, for temporary relocation, medical care, legal assistance, living expenses and dependent support, equipment replacement, and security.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (13b)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question 13b:

Over the last decade, the number of U.S. government agencies operating overseas as well as the number of personnel posted overseas has increased dramatically. Given State's resources in contingency operations, what are your concerns about the department's reliance on contractors and the ability to manage and/or oversee those contractors in hostile environments?

Answer:

The Department has a long history of using contractors for guard services and other support functions. These contractors are critical to the Department's readiness and capability to carry out American foreign policy under dangerous and uncertain security conditions. The Department has taken steps to increase the oversight of contractors in hostile environments. The Department uses the Synchronized Pre-deployment Operational Tracker (SPOT) to account for contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department will use SPOT in any future declared contingency environments. In addition, as a result of the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Department has created the Critical Environment Contract Analytics Staff (CECAS) which performs risk

assessments and risk mitigation plans on contracts in contingency environments. Among the items these risk assessments will consider are: security requirements for contractor housing; consolidated and defined medical care; security training; formal and uniform Country entry and exit procedures; use of SPOT; evacuation plans; and standard site visits to contractor compounds by Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs). CECAS is currently performing risk assessments and mitigation plans for contracts operating in Afghanistan.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#14)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

Politicization of Development Programs

The U.S. Government, through USAID, has recently released a new Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance strategy, with a prominent focus on the role of human rights in United States development assistance. Yet, it appears to some support of democracy and governance is a lower priority when related to other areas of development or our overarching national security interests.

- a. Are State and USAID achieving any real progress in avoiding a politicization of development programs by instead pursuing the advocacy of universal (i.e. not exclusively American) norms of human rights?
- b. We have seen USAID expelled from several countries threatened by its democracy and governance programming. Do USAID's activities on democracy programs put other development programs at risk by increasing the perception that everything USAID does is political in nature? For example, to what extent and which countries is USAID's democracy work risking our other foreign assistance programs in health, education, or agriculture?
 - o Isn't the State Department back in Washington a better target for a host country to point at when they say a program is politically motivated?

Answer:

As the first and the largest global, bilateral donor supporting democracy, human rights, and governance, USAID has helped millions of people in their

quest for dignity, freedom, and rights. We have done this in a way that has over time adapted to changing conditions around the world.

For example, two years ago, we stood up a new Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG) at USAID to lead this community in understanding what works, where, and why. We have enhanced our focus on innovation and 21st century technology, and the role they play in advancing DRG. Last year, USAID launched a new articulation of our overall strategy for how we support DRG around the world. And just a few months ago, USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah announced the Agency's new Mission statement, which highlights how, in our global era, poverty reduction, economic growth, democracy, and national security are inextricably intertwined: "We partner to end extreme poverty and promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity."

These two parts of our mission statement are equally important because we know that we ignore the political at our peril. We can implement food projects and provide food aid for decades to those living in extreme poverty, but if we do not also address the core democratic governance and human rights issues impeding the state from providing for its own people, millions will remain vulnerable to famine. If USAID's objective is to create lasting outcomes

in our varied development sectors, then we must embrace the growing body of evidence that suggests democracy, human rights, and governance are fundamental building blocks for sustainability.

The processes of developmental change are inherently political. Focusing solely on economic indicators of development and ignoring the broader aspirations of citizens for political dignity and empowerment will ultimately derail economic gains, as we have seen in Syria, where human development indices were rolled back 35 years in just the first two years of conflict. Our DRG work, globally, is designed to ensure that progress is sustained.

While development work is inherently political in nature, our DRG work is inherently the most political because it addresses the fundamental relationship between the state and the citizen. In all of our DRG efforts, we partner with local actors and champions of reform – journalists, activists, CSO leaders, parliamentarians, political parties, judges, and government officials. We support their desire for universal human rights and amplify their voices. Indeed, we share the committee's belief that rooting our DRG work in the

universal language of human rights provides our programs with a broader rationale and greater international support.

We firmly believe that without our DRG programmatic efforts, the progress made in other development sectors – health, education, agriculture, and economic growth – is at risk and that fundamental human rights may go unprotected. This view is sustained by leaders in regional bureaus at the State Department and USAID, as well as the Department of Defense. USAID’s democracy work – our direct grants to local civil society organizations, our support to independent trade unions and independent media, our work with elected local government officials, independent parliaments, and judges – support the underpinnings of a resilient, democratic society and the sustainable achievement of development gains. So we do not view our DRG work as a threat to our work in other sectors, but rather as an indispensable source of support to USAID’s overall portfolio.

To be clear, we recognize that democracy assistance is getting harder to implement. As new information and communication technologies allow people to self-organize and connect with each other like never before, citizens are demanding more of their governments. And as these citizen voices have grown

stronger, we are witnessing a virulent backlash by some governments. A broad crackdown on civil society – to restrict fundamental human rights of freedom of association, assembly, and expression – is real and is one of the most important challenges affecting our DRG work.

USAID's work has been fundamentally affected by this backlash; our Agency has been on the frontlines as our civil society partners have been shuttered, our U.S. funding vilified, and in some cases our Missions closed. Indeed, the distinction between "closed" countries like Iran and Cuba and "closing" countries like Azerbaijan, Zimbabwe, Cambodia, Ecuador, Uzbekistan, and Nicaragua is beginning to blur. Closed and closing political spaces are part of the same phenomenon, and a development challenge that is a growing trend in more and more countries. This trend is dangerous because without a robust civil society, there is no democracy or effective, sustainable development.

As the going gets even tougher in restrictive environments, now would be the absolute wrong time for USAID to get out of the DRG business. Now more than ever, as authoritarians find more effective ways to silence civil society and watchdog voices, the U.S. Government needs to be using all of the available

tools in its DRG toolbox. Governments are increasingly passing laws that restrict all foreign funding – they don't discriminate between USAID, the State Department, or even the National Endowment for Democracy.

USAID has a comparative advantage in DRG work that we have honed over the past 20 years. We have a strong field presence and a proven approach to implementing programs that integrate development and DRG concerns. We remain committed to monitoring progress, defining real and meaningful metrics to measure impact, and building continuous learning into our programs. We do our work even in restrictive political environments, like Venezuela, where we are supporting leading human rights organizations to document human rights abuses, and train civil society associations with diverse specializations to incorporate freedom of association and freedom of speech into their work.

Rather than retreat, we need to work more closely with other governments, particularly in the Global South, to advocate for DRG issues. We will continue to engage international partners regarding DRG issues in the post-2015 development agenda. We will also continue to play a leading role in President Obama's Stand With Civil Society agenda.

Our support to advance freedom in closed societies is a long-term endeavor. Every day, USAID works with brave colleagues who risk their lives on the front lines to advance and protect fundamental freedoms.

This work is a reflection not only of American values, but also of universal values. We are at a pivotal moment in the struggle to advance democracy and human rights around the world.

As the backlash grows, it has never been more important that we work in a coordinated manner inside the US Government as well as with like-minded governments, the private sector, and civil society partners to support local efforts to keep political space open. Congressional support is vital to continuing this work—work that is not only in our national interest, but that is fundamentally the right thing to do.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#15)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

↓ QFR #3 is a Duplicate of QFR#15

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#16)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Programs in Cuba

The Cuba policy has troubled and confounded me for all my time on this subcommittee. It has been argued by both parties, at varying times, that engagement, combined with aggressive civil society programs, with the former Soviet Union and China affected social change in those countries. Yet, with Cuba we seem to be leaving half of our diplomacy tools in the toolbox.

- a. Can United States involvement in closed societies like Cuba help in bringing democratic change?
- b. Alan Gross has now spent over four years behind bars. What are you doing to secure his safe return home?

Since 1996, Congress has appropriated \$205 million to USAID and State to support democracy assistance for Cuba.

- c. What has been accomplished with this funding?
- d. The Department's annual human rights assessment reported that in Cuba, government organized mobs continue to assault peaceful demonstrators. What, if anything, can we do to pressure the regime there to stop such reprehensible activities?

Recently, your Department has expressed concerns about operational challenges to assistance efforts in Cuba. The U.S. government has increasingly provided grants for Cuba democracy assistance to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are worldwide or regional in their focus, rather than to NGOs that are focused solely on Cuba or universities.

- e. Why has this shift taken place, and what has it meant for the effectiveness of U.S. efforts?

f. Is it possible to assess the relative success or return on investment? What can you tell us about the results of these efforts?

Question a:

Can United States involvement in closed societies like Cuba help in bringing democratic change?

Answer:

Sustained U.S. diplomatic and programmatic support of human rights and democratic principles is an essential part of our foreign policy. In repressive environments like Cuba's, our partnerships empower civil society to promote human rights and build a foundation for accountable governance. We support the efforts of civil society to build democratic institutions, support access to justice, create independent media, and document human rights abuses. Through Internet freedom programs, we fund technology to expand access, protect users, and support policy/advocacy projects. Through labor programs, we promote freedom of association and collective bargaining. Globally, our programs advance international religious freedom, labor and disability rights, and transitional justice; and our programs help populations at risk. U.S. diplomats raise the above issues in bilateral discourse, human rights dialogues, and at multilateral organizations. Thus, our assistance programs and diplomacy mutually reinforce each other and support the growth of democracy.

Question b:

Alan Gross has now spent over four years behind bars. What are you doing to secure his safe return home?

Answer:

Alan Gross has been imprisoned by Cuban authorities for more than four years for facilitating uncensored Internet access between a small religious community on the island and the rest of the world. The State Department has kept Mr. Gross' case at the forefront of discussions with the Cuban government and made clear the importance the United States places on his welfare. The President has engaged foreign leaders and other international figures to use their influence with Cuba to call for Mr. Gross' release so he can be reunited with his family. We have made abundantly clear to Cuban officials our position that Mr. Gross ought to be released immediately and will continue our diplomatic efforts. We will continue to use every opportunity to gain the support of other governments on this issue and to urge Cuban authorities to release Mr. Gross.

Question c:

Since 1996, Congress has appropriated \$205 million to USAID and State to support democracy assistance for Cuba. What has been accomplished with this funding?

Answer:

Democracy assistance supports the Cuban people's desire to freely determine their future. Our Cuba programs increase the free flow of information to, from, and within the island and increase opportunities for Cubans to exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the freedom of expression.

Our Cuba program directly contributes to the protection and expansion of a vibrant, independent civil society on the island. We strive to respond to the needs of civil society and support their efforts. Our programs promote human rights and democratic values, including independent media and free expression, digital security, discrimination against the rights of marginalized populations, human rights abuse documentation efforts, and organizational capacity strengthening. In addition, democracy assistance has funded humanitarian assistance to Cuban victims of political repression.

Cuban civil society today is far larger and more active than it was 15 years ago when we started these programs. The profile of those working for human rights on the island is noticeably more youthful than it was at that time, and independent voices in Cuba are able to communicate with each other and with the outside world in ways that were not thinkable 15 years ago. Much of this positive change is due to the Cuban people themselves, and their increasing access to new technologies. Our policies support their ability to communicate and share

information and our programs have contributed to the ability of the Cuban people to take advantage of these developments.

Question d:

The Department's annual human rights assessment reported that in Cuba, government organized mobs continue to assault peaceful demonstrators. What, if anything, can we do to pressure the regime there to stop such reprehensible activities?

Answer:

We condemn the recent surge in detentions and harassment of civil society activists and call on the Government of Cuba to allow Cuban citizens to express their opinions freely and to assemble peacefully in the exercise of that right. For decades the United States has taken the lead in pressing for international solidarity with human rights activists in Cuba, and we encourage other countries to press the Cuban government for improvements. We raise Cuba's human rights record in our public statements and officials at our Interests Section in Havana regularly meet with democracy and human rights activists.

Following the January 2013 changes that allowed most Cubans to travel abroad, many Cuban civil society activists have travelled to the United States and Department leaders have made it a point to meet with as many activists as possible when they are here. These meetings give us an opportunity to express support for their brave efforts to demand greater respect for human rights, and to hear from

those advocating for change what they need to do their jobs better. In April 2013, the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) presented Ladies in White spokeswoman Berta Soler with the 2010 Human Rights Defenders Award, which the Ladies in White had been unable to collect before the changes in travel regulations. We encourage international leaders, including leaders of international organizations, to take the opportunity to meet with members of Cuban civil society to demonstrate their support for peaceful assembly and freedom of expression on the island.

Our assistance funding supports programs to increase the capacity of civil society to engage their communities and address local issues. We provide aid and training to civil society organizations that document human rights abuses and that seek to hold the Cuban government accountable. These efforts including domestic and international awareness raising, advocacy, and the presentation of specific abuse cases before country, regional, and international bodies, including the United Nations and the Organization of American States, to balance with facts and evidence the false narrative presented by the Cuban government. We continue to support the Cuban people's desire to freely determine their future, and work to increase the free-flow of information to, from and within the island.

Question e:

Why has this shift taken place, and what has it meant for the effectiveness of U.S. efforts?

Answer:

Grant recipients are selected based on a competitive process where project proposals are ranked according to standard criteria established in the solicitation. Those criteria include consideration of an organization's previous work in closed societies, including Cuba. As a result, organizations may be selected that also implement programs in countries other than Cuba.

Question f:

Is it possible to assess the relative success or return on investment? What can you tell us about the results of these efforts?

Answer:

Monitoring and evaluating programs to promote human rights and democratic values in a repressive society like Cuba is inherently difficult, but is an integral part of the United States' support for human rights and fundamental freedoms around the world. Given the difficulty of monitoring programs in Cuba, we continue to develop alternative strategies to assess the impact of our democracy assistance programs. Our diplomatic mission in Havana is in close contact with activists and Cuban society and provides useful feedback on our policies and

programs. Likewise, members of Cuban civil society who meet with us outside of Cuba provide us with their assessments of the impact of these programs.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#17)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

In 2009, under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the United States and other developed countries jointly committed to provide \$30 billion in assistance between 2010 and 2012 and jointly committed to mobilize \$100 billion in public and private funds by 2020 for activities that aim to address the causes and impacts of climate change. Following this commitment, the United States elevated global climate change as a development priority through government-wide strategies and announced its Global Climate Change Initiative. According to GAO, in fiscal years 2010 through 2012 the United States contributed approximately \$7.5 billion for a variety of activities related to climate change.

Question:

How does the current budget request reflect the government plans to fulfill its pledge? What are the Administration's accomplishments to date? What impact does this pledge have on other development priorities such as promoting global health and food security?

Answer:

The United States and other developed countries have fulfilled the commitment to contribute \$30 billion in assistance between 2010 and 2012. The 2012 UN Framework Convention Conference of the Parties acknowledged that developed country parties fulfilled their collective commitment of \$30 billion for the 2010-2012 Fast Start Finance period, during which the United States provided \$7.5 billion in climate assistance, a

figure that includes both grant-based assistance from U.S. agencies in climate-related activities as well as clean energy projects supported by OPIC and EXIM over this period. The United States continues to work with other developed countries toward fulfilling the joint goal of mobilizing \$100 billion a year by 2020 from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral. Both public and private finance will play a critical role. Strengthening public finance continues to be vital, especially in areas where mobilizing private investment is more challenging, such as adaptation and mitigation in less developed markets. Furthermore, the variety of financing tools and policies needed to enable adaptation and mitigation is vast and the range of actors that supply the necessary financing is diverse. We therefore rely upon a range of bilateral and multilateral channels and approaches to deploy our climate assistance.

The FY 2015 request for the Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI) is \$839.0 million, of which \$348.5 million will be programmed through USAID, \$157.8 million through State, and \$332.7 million through Treasury. Programs will promote policies and support mechanisms that leverage other public and private sector funds for climate-focused investments, thus promoting progress toward the goal of mobilizing \$100 billion a year by 2020.

The GCCI advances practical, on-the-ground solutions worldwide, helping developing countries reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve resilience to the impacts of climate change. Since its launch in 2010, the GCCI has been instrumental in advancing key U.S. priorities through a pragmatic, whole-of-government approach to speed the transition to a low-carbon, climate-resilient future, by promoting clean energy solutions around the world; slowing, halting, and reversing emissions from land use; and helping the most vulnerable countries strengthen climate resilience. For example, as part of the Enhancing Capacity for Low Emission Development Strategies program, the United States is partnering with 25 developing countries around the world to help them develop policies that support emission reductions while enabling their economies to grow. From improving the ability of Bangladesh to measure its wind power potential to helping Mexico model the most efficient ways to achieve its carbon emission reduction and renewable energy goals, U.S. technical assistance is helping countries get on a low-carbon growth path for a more sustainable future. This in turn helps to promote a global solution to climate change, complementing efforts at home to move toward a cleaner energy pathway.

The FY 2015 request continues robust support for global health and food security. Efforts to meet the \$100 billion a year commitment are

expected to complement the global health and food security initiatives. Investments in climate programs help protect development gains in other sectors, including those pertaining to agriculture, water management, and health. The ability to adapt to and mitigate the adverse impacts of climate change is important to spurring and maintaining economic growth and stability in developing countries, and one that is increasingly prioritized by institutions working in international development.

Climate programming also supports other development efforts. Adverse climate impacts such as extreme weather patterns, drought, and coastal and inland flooding can affect coastal infrastructure and reduce agricultural and fishery productivity and output, severely challenging traditional agricultural and fishery livelihoods and in extreme cases causing food insecurity and contributing to famine. Improving local-level resilience to the impacts of climate change can protect and enhance agricultural production for local, regional and global benefit, and mitigate the disruptive influence of climate-related shocks. USAID is working under both the GCCI and the Feed the Future initiative to ensure that food security investments are more resilient to the impacts of current weather variability and longer-term changes in climate. Climate programs also support efforts to develop and test weather-index insurance, limit deforestation, and

improve access to water in the face of more severe droughts, which can be a driver of instability and insecurity. Additionally, climate programs can lead to outcomes that support other desired development and public health results, such as promoting clean energy as an alternative to fossil fuels, thereby contributing to improved air quality with commensurate positive health outcomes.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#18a, c, d)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Overseas Security Threats

State's policy of maintaining diplomatic facilities in locations with heightened security threats raises concerns about the safety of U.S. officials stationed at high-threat posts.

- a. What steps need to be taken to ensure that these diplomatic facilities in high-threat locations meet State's physical security requirements?
- b. Given past GAO concerns highlighting lessons learned about the transition from a military-led to a civilian-led presence in Iraq, what is your vision for a properly sized U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan that would meet U.S. foreign policy objectives and be acceptable to the Afghans?

The escalation of anti-American sentiment abroad, including terrorist attacks on the U.S. consulate in Libya and the U.S. embassy in Yemen, highlights the dangers U.S. civilian personnel face overseas. GAO has reported that civilian personnel deploying to Afghanistan for more than 6 months complied with the mandatory pre-deployment training State Department established.

- c. What could be done to monitor and ensure that all U.S. civilians deployed to high-threat posts receive and comply with required pre-deployment training?

The Accountability Review Board on the Benghazi attack discussed the critical role played by the host government in providing security assistance.

- d. To what degree do you think the host countries are meeting their responsibilities to provide security for U.S. posts overseas, and do you

think host country response units are sufficiently prepared to assist a U.S. facility in the case of attack?

Answer: A, C and D

The FY 2014 Consolidated Appropriations bill includes \$2.2 billion in funding for the Department's Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS) program, including reimbursements from other agencies and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. The CSCS program accelerates construction of new safe and secure facilities for U.S. government staff overseas. For posts not scheduled for an NEC, Congress has provided Compound Security program funding. For FY 2015, the President's Budget requests \$2.2 billion for the CSCS program including reimbursements and OCO funding. We appreciate Congress' support in these efforts.

In the fall of 2013, a working group chaired by the Executive Assistant for the Under Secretary for Management convened to discuss details of the employee assignment and Temporary Duty (TDY) processes. The mandate of the group is to discover where improvements can be made in notification, enrollment and tracking regarding FACT training. This group is also reviewing the conditions under which eligible family members should be required to complete FACT training as well as the requirements related to TDY assignment personnel. Once these matters are resolved, the

Department will distribute internal and external guidance and codify all existing and new measures accordingly.

The Department has undertaken a worldwide review of our overall security posture in light of the evolving security challenges in the Middle East and elsewhere to identify and implement additional measures to bolster the security of our facilities and personnel where necessary. As part of this review, the Department assessed the host nation's ability to respond to an attack on our facilities. Furthermore, we established a mechanism for determining which posts should be included in the high threat post designation. Critical elements for discussion in the high threat post designation include: the ability and willingness of the host nation to protect U.S. interests; known and perceived threats against the United States; the regional bureau's assessment of the political/economic situation; and the vulnerabilities of U.S. personnel, facilities, residences, and outlying structures. Regional bureaus may also request that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security review any particular post for designation. Once identified as a high threat post, the duration of the high threat post designation will be a minimum of one year.

Even with these reviews and accelerated construction, we realize that we cannot provide a 100 percent risk-free operating environment; however,

we strive to be proactive in mitigating risk to the maximum extent possible, to allow our diplomats the security and freedom to do their jobs.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#18b)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question b:

Given past GAO concerns highlighting lessons learned about the transition from a military-led to a civilian-led presence in Iraq, what is your vision for a properly sized U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan that would meet U.S. foreign policy objectives and be acceptable to the Afghans?

Answer:

The President's decision regarding the size and scope of our post-2014 military presence will influence the scale of the State Department's activities in Afghanistan and the size of the U.S. civilian presence required to accomplish the Administration's objectives post-2014. We continue to plan for the various options under consideration to ensure we are prepared for whatever option the President may choose. The Department has adjusted its footprint to correspond with each phase of the planned reduction in the overall U.S. presence. Our current diplomatic presence includes the embassy in Kabul, consulates in Herat and Mazar-e Sharif, and six other field platforms, down from a total of 49 field platforms in January 2013. There are approximately 770 direct hire employees and some 850 locally employed staff positions.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#19a-d)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Management of Diplomatic Security

Both the Independent Panel on Best Practices and the Benghazi ARB reports discussed the lack of transparency, clear lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability for security within the Department. Furthermore, the Independent Panel on Best Practices determined that the current positioning of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security under the Under Secretary for Management is not consistent with the intent of the Diplomatic Security Act of 1986.

Question:

- a. Do you plan to establish an Under Secretary for Diplomatic Security as the Panel recommended?

Answer:

The State Department has determined that creating a new position of Under Secretary for Diplomatic Security would be counter-productive to ongoing efforts to ensure that security is a shared responsibility among all State Department personnel, because it will isolate the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), which runs counter to recommendations from other independent reviews.

The ARB itself cited concerns with “stove-piping,” and observations made by the separate panel on Diplomatic Security Organization and Management, which was also convened per a Benghazi ARB recommendation, reinforce the Secretary’s decision. The DS Organization and Management panel found that stove-piping is a concern even within the current structure.

This sense of separateness would only be compounded by organizationally separating DS from the rest of the management family. Further, separating DS from its partner management bureaus would reinforce the old paradigm that DS has stand-alone responsibility for security, which we have sought to transform, rather than shared responsibility across the Department, and would likely exacerbate the problem of stove-piping.

Managing risk entails consideration of a wide range of processes, procedures, communications, medical preparedness issues, facilities, crisis management structures, policymaking and training activities conducted by multiple bureaus. DS, as a critical part of the Management family of bureaus, should remain integrated in its current structure in order to maintain a cohesive and secure diplomatic platform. Separating DS in a silo apart

from day-to-day management would actually weaken our ability to manage risk.

Secretary Kerry agreed with the Best Practices Panel recommendation that the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security should have direct access to the Secretary of State. Therefore, Secretary Kerry institutionalized this practice by revising the Foreign Affairs Manual to ensure that the Assistant Secretary for DS has direct access to the Secretary of State to share security concerns as threats and circumstances require.

Question:

b. If not, what suggestions do you have for improving the accountability for security within the Department to ensure that security requirements are properly balanced and in support of U.S. foreign policy?

Answer:

Following the Benghazi ARB, the Department began reinforcing the idea that “security is everyone’s responsibility.” On a regular basis, Diplomatic Security (DS) staff now attends regional bureau meetings, and regional bureau staff attends DS security briefings. In addition, the Department adjusted the work requirements and position descriptions for DS and regional bureau assistant secretaries and deputy assistant secretaries to

further articulate and reflect a shared responsibility for overseas security, including the need to coordinate and collaborate to mitigate risk.

The Department has developed a Security Accountability Framework, which has been approved by Secretary Kerry and is being incorporated into various training activities.

While security roles and responsibilities are clearly laid out in the Department's Foreign Affairs Manual and, in some cases, set forth in law, the Department agreed that a framework outlining roles and responsibilities would be a useful reference document and training tool, as it sets existing information forth in a new way. The framework delineates the Secretary's ultimate responsibility for security, but also sets out the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, the Deputy and Under Secretaries, and the Assistant Secretaries for regional and functional bureaus, as well as Department employees.

Given these improvements – increased communication and improved understanding among employees – we have enhanced accountability for security and ensured that security is considered accordingly.

Management of Diplomatic Security

GAO reported recently that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security has not consistently ensured that its officers overseas meet language requirements. If Diplomatic Security officers overseas cannot adequately communicate with their counterparts in local law enforcement, post security could be at risk.

Question:

c. What are you doing to ensure that Diplomatic Security officers receive the language training they need to perform their jobs?

Answer:

The Department seeks to ensure Diplomatic Security (DS) agents have sufficient time to learn the language they will need when serving overseas. In some cases, it may take up to a year or more to become proficient enough to engage in substantive or technical-level conversations with overseas counterparts. In rare instances, there are such compelling reasons for agents to reach post quickly that sufficient time for language training is simply not available.

It has only been in the last five to seven years that language requirements were added to DS Special Agent positions. Within the next five to ten years, DS will have more language-skilled personnel available to fill senior positions that require more extensive language abilities, especially in hard languages such as Arabic and Chinese.

DS has made significant strides in language training over the past several years. DS worked closely with the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) to develop Awareness, Language, and Emergency Response Training (ALERT) for DS Special Agents serving at high threat posts overseas. ALERT uses innovative “task-based” language learning concepts that put our agents in more realistic settings with native-speaking role players.

We have completed two 10-week sessions of Arabic ALERT training and one session of Urdu ALERT since October 2013. In these sessions, DS agents learn basic commands and the fundamentals of the language to better enable them to handle crisis situations. The Department’s initial assessment is that the ALERT approach is providing DS agents with the essential language and cultural cues, which both enhance agents’ situational awareness and improve security.

Based on this initial success, FSI and DS have extended the ALERT concept to French. Plans are underway for Dari ALERT training for agents who will deploy to Afghanistan. ALERT training is not a substitute for long-term language training. However, it is a promising vehicle for rapidly increasing the number of Special Agents with language skills.

Question:

- d. What are your views on these emergency response procedures, and what ways do they need to be updated, based on the lessons of Benghazi?

Answer:

The Department issued guidance to all posts on “weapons of opportunity.” This guidance has also been included in all Crisis Management Training exercises, which are conducted at all high threat, high risk posts annually and at all other posts every 2-2 ½ years. The Department constructed a smoke house to serve as a training and testing tool.

We have developed training that addresses survival in smoke and fire situations. Agents receive medical training on the effects and treatment of smoke inhalation, injuries, and treatment, and participate in exercises that require students to escape from smoke-filled buildings.

The Department continuously works with outside entities such as the U.S. Army and New York Fire Department to identify emerging threats and trends and to enhance our training.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#19 e-f)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Management of Diplomatic Security

The report by the Independent Panel on Best Practices discussed the need for State to develop and implement a Department-wide risk management model and policy to support State's ability to identify security requirements while considering the operational environment, identify unmitigated risk to personnel, and prioritize programs based on criticality and availability of security resources, among other things.

Questions e and f:

- e.** From your perspective, is it necessary for State to develop a risk management model for its security efforts?
- f.** If so, what steps need to be taken to develop a Department-wide risk management model and who should the primary stakeholders be in this type of endeavor?

Answer:

The Department has developed and is now using an institutionalized, repeatable, and transparent process, called the Vital Presence Validation Process, to make risk-managed decisions regarding the U.S. presence at high-threat locations, including whether to begin, restart, continue, or modify the current staffing footprint, or cease operations.

Beyond security, the Department is currently developing a new Risk Management policy that includes various types of risk (security, financial, contracting, medical, etc.). The primary goal of this new Risk Management policy is to articulate a general framework that can be applied to any risk management activity, regardless of the specific functional area. This framework will underpin a shared responsibility for security, and will improve the articulation of risk management strategies.

After the new Risk Management policy is finalized, it will be codified in the Foreign Affairs Manual and incorporated into existing training.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#20)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Rightsizing

In 2012, GAO found that State does not monitor the implementation of embassy rightsizing review recommendations and has not designated an office with responsibility for their implementation. State subsequently outlined a variety of steps it intended to take to address concerns about recommendation implementation and whether State could determine if rightsizing reviews are achieving their purpose of aligning overseas staffing levels with U.S. priorities.

Question:

What are you doing to ensure that overseas staffing levels align with U.S. priorities?

Answer:

On July 25, 2012, GAO released “State Has Improved the Consistency of Its Approach, but Does Not Follow Up on Its Recommendations” (GAO-12-799). GAO noted that the reviews used improved methodology but made two recommendations regarding the implementation of rightsizing review recommendations.

First, GAO recommended that the Secretary of State designate the appropriate entities to ensure that rightsizing recommendations are addressed.

- The Department designated the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation (M/PRI) as the lead office to ensure that rightsizing recommendations are addressed.

Second, GAO recommended that the Department track and report actions taken to implement the recommendations.

- In January 2013, M/PRI implemented new procedures to track rightsizing recommendations.
- Posts are now required to discuss prior rightsizing recommendations in the body of their rightsizing reports.
- For all reviews completed in CY2012 or later, M/PRI now requires a status report on recommendations 1 year from the date of the review.

Instructions were sent to all posts in August 2012 by cable and are provided to posts again when their one-year follow-ups are due.

M/PRI began collecting this data regarding implementation of its recommendations this calendar year. The data set is still too small to

perform any meaningful analysis of compliance trends. Once those trends begin to emerge, we will work with the interagency, as appropriate, to address identified shortcomings within the rightsizing process and further improve its efficacy.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#21)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

International child abduction is a difficult problem with significant impacts to the health, welfare, and well-being of the children involved. State is responsible for overseeing the terms of the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction.

a. How can the United States try to ensure that signatories to the Convention are meeting their responsibilities, and how can State gain cooperation from countries that are not signatories?

Answer:

We are constantly monitoring our current treaty partners and engaging in bilateral diplomacy to encourage them to meet their responsibilities under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Convention). We meet regularly with our Convention partners to exchange information and to advocate for effective treaty compliance. Across the board, we have achieved positive results that impact existing and future cases, increase mutual understanding, and strengthen partnerships for seeking resolution to the problem of international child abduction.

Each year, the Department of State prepares a report for Congress on Convention partner countries' compliance with the treaty. However, our engagement with Convention partner countries regarding compliance issues and long-standing cases is not done only once a year. We are in a constant dialogue with foreign governments on these issues. The report itself serves as an important tool in these discussions, and we work with foreign governments to encourage improved compliance and urge that long standing cases be resolved. We have observed that countries universally dislike being cited in the compliance report, and we have seen instances where countries – compelled by a desire to improve performance in order to be removed from the report – have improved their performance by working to address systemic problems.

One of our best examples of how diplomatic engagement can result in better Convention compliance is Mexico. We have the highest number of cases in Mexico, which has transformed over the past few years from a problematic to a productive Hague partner. This is due in part to a Department-wide effort to cultivate relationships with key Mexican government officials. Due to these efforts, in each of the past four years, more than 150 abducted children have returned from Mexico. This is significantly more than any previous year. The U.S. Embassy, including the

Ambassador, was actively engaged in these diplomatic efforts. Mexican authorities committed additional resources to their chronically understaffed Central Authority, giving them the capacity to improve case management. At the working level, we have transformed our relationship from one involving irregular formal correspondence to a cooperative relationship with country officers communicating daily with their Mexican counterparts to move cases forward.

Mexican authorities now locate more children and courts have shown marked improvement, processing Convention cases more quickly. More children are being returned to the United States by court order or voluntary arrangements than ever before. Of the children returned in the last four years, more than 200 returned by court orders in Convention cases. By contrast, during the previous four years, only 85 children returned from Mexico pursuant to a Convention court order.

With countries that have not yet become party to the Convention, or that are not yet U.S. treaty partners under the Convention, the Department of State continues to take all appropriate steps to seek the resolution of these cases. In these instances, we work closely with parents to provide information about domestic and foreign resources that may help parents to resolve their children's cases. We raise individual cases with foreign

governments, requesting, through diplomatic channels, that they help to facilitate the return of abducted children to the United States and assist parents to obtain access, confirm their children's welfare, and understand their options. We monitor legal proceedings as a case unfolds in court, attend hearings when appropriate, engage with child welfare authorities, advocate for consular and parental access, coordinate with law enforcement authorities when parents choose to pursue criminal remedies, and work day-to-day to explore all available and appropriate options for seeking abducted children's return to their countries of habitual residence.

**Question for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#22)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Millennium Challenge Corporation

Question:

The President's function 150 request includes \$1 billion in base funding for the Millennium Challenge Corporation and includes another \$350 million for MCC as part of the Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative. However, given the historic pace and size of compacts, MCC has a significant amount of unobligated funds.

- a. As Chairman of the MCC's board can you please explain the rationale for requesting such a large increase in funds for MCC?

Answer:

As you know, Congress has provided MCC with the flexibility to carry out its work with funds that are not tied to any one fiscal year. This allows the agency to commit upfront to provide all the funds needed to design and complete large-scale, complex development projects over the course of multiple years. It is necessary to have the money upfront to incentivize countries to undertake the often difficult political, economic and institutional reforms that are needed to qualify for MCC assistance and prepare for a successful investment. As of March 31st, virtually all of

MCC's "unobligated" funding has been committed for signed compacts or set aside for specific compacts under development. MCC has just over \$4 million that is not obligated, committed, or otherwise programmed.

As you note, the President requested an 11% increase for MCC's base budget for FY15. The requested increase in funding is based on the opportunity to advance U.S. global development priorities in a limited number of countries that are already demonstrating their commitment to good governance and democratic values, increasing the potential for economic growth and poverty reduction. When MCC was established in 2004, it was understood that the agency would require enough annual funding to incentivize reform, promote economic growth, and fight poverty. Achieving those goals will be difficult if the recent trend toward smaller compacts continues.

The proposed funding level would help ensure that MCC is able to achieve a more strategic and lasting impact on the economic development and public policies of countries the United States will look to as the emerging economic, political, and security partners of the 21st century. In this regard, the FY15 funds would be used for compacts that are being developed with four such partner countries -- Liberia, Niger, Morocco, and

Tanzania. Even if MCC received its full request of \$1 billion, the agency would still not have the money to fully fund its pipeline of eligible countries.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita Lowey (23a)
House Appropriations Committee/Foreign Operations
April 30, 2014**

Human Capital

Question:

- a. What is State planning to do to improve its human capital posture to ensure that positions at overseas posts will be filled by fully qualified foreign service officers?

Answer:

Since the onset of Diplomacy 3.0 in 2009, roughly 1,400 Foreign Service Generalist positions have been established, including 500 for increased training capacity. This uptick in hiring, along with the hiring of 1,474 Generalists during the 2002-2004 Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, is helping to ensure that overseas positions are filled by qualified personnel at the appropriate grade level. Our experience clearly indicates that having a sustainable, qualified workforce depends on steady hiring at sufficiently high levels to staff existing positions *and* meet growing training and strategic demands.

We no longer have a deficit at FS-01 and the deficit at FS-02 has dropped by 80 percent from 2008 and will also soon be eliminated. As

employees hired since 2008 are promoted to FS-03, that deficit will also be eliminated.

The Department recognizes that short-term staffing solutions will always be necessary to fill unexpected overseas gaps due to curtailments, training and staffing surges such as those experienced in recent years in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. To meet that need, we are capitalizing on new and existing programs for our non-FS workforces (i.e., the Civil Service and Eligible Family Members), tapping into the wealth of experience of our annuitants, and using Limited Noncareer Appointments into the Foreign Service, generally for certain short-term needs for skills not present in the Foreign Service workforce.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#23b)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

As GAO has reported, State is maintaining missions today in an increasing number of dangerous posts overseas. Such posts are resource-intensive to secure and, according to some critics, some have become "mini-fortresses" that are not well-positioned to support State's mission of diplomacy and engagement.

- In your view, and taking into consideration the resource implications of securing such posts, what is the proper balance between security and engagement?

Answer:

We fully understand that operating overseas presents unique challenges, and there is never a complete guarantee of safety - all Department of State personnel are aware of the risk. However, in order to advance U.S. foreign policy and protect critical national security interests, we must maintain a robust diplomatic and consular presence abroad. In the face of ever-evolving threats, the Department strives to provide the most secure environment possible for the conduct of America's foreign policy. Indeed, the safety and security of our personnel is among the Department's top priorities.

As part of our effort to protect our personnel and missions, the Department and interagency regularly assess our security posture to reflect rapidly changing environments and potential threats. From outside the perimeter to the hardline, we establish concentric circles of security at our missions. Our security systems are based on a systematic approach using host government resources, combined with strong physical security programs to allow time for host government and Chief of Mission security forces to respond in the event of an attack.

In addition to security programs at post, personnel must have security awareness training before they go overseas. The Department is in the process of expanding its Foreign Affairs Counter-Threat or “FACT” training. This training provides the foreign affairs community with the skills needed to operate in today’s fluid overseas environment. FACT training includes improved driving skills, firearms familiarization, first aid, security awareness, and fire safety.

The Department clearly recognizes that carrying out American foreign policy requires first hand engagement beyond our secure facilities and enabling our diplomats to move safely when outside our secure facilities. For this reason, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) has been taking a

number of measures, in some cases at an extraordinary level, to provide the protection necessary for the safe movement of our diplomats, including:

1. Well trained, supervised, and armed security professionals experienced in providing protective security in harsh, non-permissive environments.
2. Fielding highly advanced armored vehicles combined with continuing DS research to meet constantly evolving terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures.
3. Sophisticated and secure communications, electronic countermeasures, and sophisticated tracking devices.
4. Integrating strong, timely, tactical intelligence into planning for these movements.

We must also acknowledge the inherent risk of carrying out diplomacy in certain places, and for that reason, and after a careful assessment of the threat and all available intelligence and information, recommending that moves be limited or suspended at a particular location will always remain an option when necessary. Furthermore, we are prepared to expand our presence, temporarily suspend that presence, or close certain facilities as national security and our foreign policy goals require.

Because we have robust security programs, constant evaluation of the threats we face, and the acceptance that our duties often entail real risk, we have managed to stay diplomatically engaged in many highly unstable countries. Our presence today and the work we accomplish in Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and many other difficult places clearly demonstrate we are getting the balance right.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#24)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Ukraine

Questions a-c:

In light of the ongoing situation in Ukraine, the United States has made significant pledges of support to the Ukrainian government.

- a. What resources are earmarked in the budget or available for reprogramming to address U.S. pledges of economic support to the new Ukrainian government?
- b. What resources will be available to address Russian activities in the Crimea or in other parts of eastern Ukraine?

Ukraine has a proven track record of actively contributing to Euro-Atlantic security by deploying troops to work together with peacekeepers from NATO and partner countries. Currently it is the only partner country contributing actively to all ongoing NATO-led operations and missions.

- c. Given this record, what obligations, if any, does NATO have to countries like Ukraine that are part of the Partnership for Peace program?

Answer:

- a. Since the onset of the crisis, the United States has provided Ukraine with a \$1 billion loan guarantee to help the government insulate vulnerable Ukrainians from the effects of necessary economic adjustments,

such as by expanding the social safety net. We also are providing over \$218 million in other forms of assistance to Ukraine this year – including funds previously budgeted for Ukraine as well as funds redirected from other sources since the start of the crisis -- approximately \$155 million of which has been announced since Ukraine's change in government in March.

In recent months, we have committed \$76 million in crisis-response funds in support of economic reforms, anti-corruption measure, democratic elections, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, non-lethal security assistance, and humanitarian aid for Ukrainians internally displaced from Crimea and the east.

We are now coordinating with the U.S. Congress and with the Ukrainian Government and other donors to direct an additional \$61 million in support of efforts in five priority sectors. This assistance will support economic reforms and growth; constitutional reform, decentralization, and confidence-building measures that promote national unity; trade diversification and energy security; additional anti-corruption measures; and build security sector capacity. Many of these programs will concentrate on the eastern part of the country, particularly those working to strengthen

Ukraine's borders, promote economic revitalization, and enhance national unity. These targeted activities complement long-term U.S. assistance programs designed to support systemic reforms and build institutional capacity across a range of sectors.

b. We continue to condemn the Russian Federation's occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea. On March 20, we imposed sanctions on several senior officials of the Russian government, a number of other individuals who provide material support to the Russian leadership, and a bank that support these individuals. We also supported the OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, which has the authority to monitor the entirety of sovereign Ukraine, including the Crimean region. On July 17 President Obama approved a new set of sanctions on some of Russia's largest companies and financial institutions. Specifically, we froze the assets of several Russian defense companies and prohibited new long-term financing to some of Russia's most important banks and energy companies. As a result, the affected defense companies will be effectively closed out of the dollar-based global financial system, while the financial and energy companies will find their medium- and long-term financing severely limited.

c. The Alliance greatly values its long-standing and close partnership with Ukraine. Ukraine joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994. Since 1997, the NATO-Ukraine Commission has provided a forum for political dialogue and a framework for practical cooperative measures to further the professionalization of Ukraine's armed forces. Over the last 20 years, Ukraine's contributions to NATO operations have provided valuable support in a wide variety of missions and have increased interoperability between Allied and Ukrainian forces.

The PfP Framework Document states that "NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security." Since the crisis began, NATO has had several such consultations with the Ukrainian government, which will also include the upcoming April 1-2 NATO Foreign Ministerial, and will continue to consult both within the Alliance and with Ukrainian authorities.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#25 a-h)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

GAO has designated federal real property as a high-risk area due to longstanding problems with unreliable real property data and excess or underused property.

- a. Were these issues considered in preparing your FY 2015 budget request so that the State Department could accurately account for the 70 million square feet of property it manages overseas and identify and dispose of unneeded properties?

GAO has designated federal real property as a high-risk area and the State Department maintains 70 million square feet of property overseas, half of which is residential property. The space standards for assigning housing to overseas staff are based on the size of residential properties that employees with comparable salaries could afford in the Washington, DC area in the 1990s.

- b. Given the significant changes in the real estate market in the past several decades, when does the State Department plan to reassess the Washington area housing market and make appropriate adjustments to overseas housing allowances?

State's Capital Security Construction Program is providing new diplomatic facilities at 214 overseas posts to address the security vulnerabilities and poor conditions of the older facilities. However, as GAO reported, State faces challenges in providing for operations and maintenance, particularly in hiring U.S. and local staff who possess the skills to run these sophisticated new facilities.

- c.** From your perspective, what can be done to ensure that appropriate U.S. and local staff are hired?
- d.** What steps can the Department of State take to reduce or contain the costs of maintaining overseas facilities?

Over the last decade, the number of U.S. government agencies operating overseas as well as the number of personnel posted overseas has increased dramatically.

- e.** Given the current budget environment and the rising costs of maintaining Department of State facilities abroad, how can the Department of State ensure that other agencies pay the full cost of posting their personnel abroad?
- f.** Given State's resources in contingency operations, what are your concerns about the department's reliance on contractors and the ability to manage and/or oversee those contractors in hostile environments?

The U.S. government owns most all of its embassies, many of its consulates, and some of its representational residences (such as ambassadors' and consuls' general residences). In contrast, the Department of State leases the majority of U.S. diplomatic staff housing. Several thousand U.S. staff are assigned to new duty stations at approximately 250 diplomatic posts each year. The majority of employee housing overseas is provided by State through short-term lease arrangements with local landlords.

- g.** What steps would you take to evaluate whether State is appropriately using short-term and long-term lease arrangements and determine to what extent State has conducted any follow-up market analysis to demonstrate whether past purchases of staff housing have been good business decisions?
- h.** How would you take steps to ensure cost-effective policies for housing U.S. staff overseas?

Answer:

a. As the single real property manager for the Department, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) ensures the integration of stewardship, transparency, and fiduciary responsibilities in managing the Department's overseas real properties. OBO takes seriously its responsibility of maintaining accurate real property data and disposing all excess or underutilized properties. The annual budget request covers projected rental costs for all property within the Department's portfolio; all properties reasonably expected to be added to the portfolio; and those excess or underutilized properties to be disposed from the portfolio during a fiscal year. The Department has improved the accuracy of the portfolio data by linking funding directly to its property records. This requires a post to be very accurate in reporting on its properties in order to receive funding. Further, the Department has an aggressive program for identifying and disposing of real estate worldwide by reviewing its real estate data base, the Real Property Application (RPA), for properties newly classified by posts around the world as "excess." Post compliance with identifying excess property is part of the annual certification every Chief of Mission must submit to the Secretary of State attesting to the accuracy of post's RPA data. Further, the Department identifies every U.S. government-owned or leased

functional property in locations where new embassies or consulates are under construction. Property vacated as personnel move to newly constructed facilities is the single largest source of property disposals. The Department also reviews its annual Federal Real Property Profile submission in December as a quality assurance measure in the event a property was missed through the weekly RPA report on excess property.

The Department evaluates whether there are any impediments to selling an excess property and how these may be overcome. While some limitations can be removed, it may be impractical or impossible, for instance, to sell a parcel that is inside an embassy or consulate compound and surrounded by perimeter security and walls. Host governments may also block the sale of U.S. government-owned properties or restrict the sale or disposal to such an extent that a sale would not benefit the Department. In these latter circumstances, the Department will retain the property until circumstances change.

Answer:

- b.** Housing abroad policy and space standards are established pursuant to Section 156 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246). Responsibility for

managing the program is centralized in the Department of State, with responsibility delegated to OBO.

The Department's housing objective is to provide safe and secure housing that meets the requirements of U.S. mission employees. The Department has established housing standards for residential space tied to an employee's position rank and family size, adjusted for locality factors. The 15 FAM 264.2 Locality Index reflects the differences in the "quality of life" between posts; in particular, the relative amount of time families must spend in their residences adjusted for such factors as climate and security (terrorism and crime). The Locality Index provides for three space levels, beginning with Locality 1 for the least hardship and rising to Locality 3 for the greatest hardship posts. The Index is reviewed and adjusted periodically on a post-by-post basis based on local conditions. In 2013, the Department adjusted the allowances for 41 posts to reflect changes in actual living conditions. Thirty of the 41 locations resulted in adjustments that reduced the residential space authorization.

Answer:

c. The hiring criterion for new U.S. Facility Managers (FMs) has recently been revised to better reflect the need at our overseas missions. All new facility management applicants must possess a degree in Facility

Management or other appropriate related disciplines along with several years of Facility Management experience. This has resulted in a higher quality of Facility Managers with knowledge and experience in managing sophisticated building systems. Our focused recruitment at several colleges that have Facility Management degree programs has yielded multiple successful candidates.

The hiring of local staff is more complicated as many of our locations lack degreed or experienced candidates, especially in engineering or the trades. OBO is in the process of developing a training division that will be responsible for assisting in the training of locally hired staff. The working knowledge of trades such as electrical and plumbing are often rudimentary, so a curriculum is being established to train the local staff from the basics to the level required to properly operate and maintain our embassies.

Answer d:

For new construction, OBO uses a comprehensive Sustainability Study in the early phases of design to identify the cost-effective strategies to improve building performance. To benchmark the success of the project, OBO requires use of the internationally recognized industry standard, Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED®) Green Building Rating System. OBO has successfully certified 23 new embassies and

consulates and has another 30 in the pipeline. Average performance of the certified buildings includes the following reductions below respective industry targets and baselines:

- 25% reduction in energy intensity
- 35% reduction in indoor potable water use
- 76% reduction in outdoor irrigation water use
- 48% reduction in construction and non-hazardous solid waste

Furthermore, OBO operates renewable energy and Energy Savings Performance Contract (ESPC) programs. Results from this program include over 20 photovoltaic (PV) installations that will have a 6.4 megawatt capacity when completed with an estimated \$171 million return on investment after payback in 2025. One of the largest PV installations is a one megawatt array that is part of the ESPC project in Managua, Nicaragua, increasing Post's energy security and reducing Post's grid power purchase by 54 percent.

OBO also works closely with posts to comply with mandatory reporting of utility use by large buildings (over 464sm or 5,000sf). In 2007, OBO established a web portal to capture this information and has improved the portal over the years, increasing its value to the user and management

through standardized reports. We recently added a Utility Dashboard. OBO uses the system to identify and prioritize energy and water saving projects.

OBO has recently received permission to establish a regional office that will focus on providing facility management support and guidance to the field. Forward deploying a small office of experienced personnel who are readily available to support a group of posts in a geographic region will help reduce facility operating and repair costs over time. This office will focus on providing guidance and assistance to those posts that need special attention. For example, posts that are historically difficult to staff often end up with new, inexperienced officers assigned. Having a small office of experienced professionals who are readily available to assist with everything from setting up maintenance contracts to providing oversight and coordination between posts in the region and even with Washington would reduce maintenance and repair costs over time. We are in the process of establishing a regional office for the African region.

Additionally, OBO recently published a second edition to the Guide to Green Embassies, which serves as a reference to appropriate technologies and strategies to improve existing building performance. Ensuring that the equipment is properly operated and maintained is the key to reducing the possibility of equipment failure. As stated in the previous question, hiring

more technologically qualified U.S. personnel and developing a rigorous training program will ensure the systems are operating at optimal levels resulting in reduced operating expenses.

Answer e :

Since 2005, the Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS) Program has enabled OBO to effectively share the cost of building new embassies and consulates for U.S. government personnel. The Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2012 expanded CSCS to provide for the maintenance, repair, and renovation of existing facilities, resulting in the creation of the Maintenance Cost Sharing (MCS) Program.

The Department is implementing the CSCS/MCS Program under the authority of Section 604 of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999, as amended by the FY 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Division B, Public Law 108-447 (December 8, 2004). The law authorizes the Secretary of State to determine the cost share allocable to each agency to provide new, safe, secure U.S. diplomatic facilities, in consultation with these agencies. The law applies to all agencies with overseas personnel under Chief of Mission Authority. Agencies are to pay in advance and without offsets, notwithstanding any

other provision of law. The Secretary is directed to implement the CSCS/MCS Program in a manner that encourages rightsizing of each agency's overseas presence.

The CSCS/MCS Program is designed to:

1. Generate \$2.2 billion annually to accelerate the construction of new secure, safe, functional diplomatic and consular facilities to replace the most vulnerable facilities currently occupied by U. S. government personnel overseas, and up to \$450 million to fund the maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation of non-residential facilities with an inter-agency presence.

2. Provide an incentive for all Departments and agencies to rightsize their overseas personnel by taking into account the capital costs of providing facilities for their staffs.

To achieve these objectives, all agencies pay a per capita charge for their overseas positions in U.S. diplomatic facilities.

The MCS Program funds critically needed maintenance and renovation of overseas facilities, to provide adequate working conditions for multi-agency staffs, and protect the U.S. taxpayer investment. MCS:

- Addresses the growing crisis in consistently underfunded maintenance to improve facility conditions for all agencies.
- Encourages rightsizing of each agency's overseas presence.

- Equitably distributes funding requirements among agencies occupying overseas functional facilities.
- Coincides with efforts to incorporate energy and sustainability initiatives and other cost-saving measures in coordination with OMB and Federal Real Property Council guidance.
- Improves life/safety for U.S. government personnel overseas through proper adherence to OSHA standards and requirements.
- Ensures that facilities are appropriately maintained so that agencies can effectively represent the U.S. overseas and convey the diplomatic importance of our mission.
- Improves Facility Condition Index (FCI) scores.
- Complies with OMB directives and GAO/OIG recommendations.
- Improves ability to accurately plan and manage maintenance costs.

Answer f:

At present OBO has no concerns regarding its reliance on contractors to perform construction projects in hostile environments; however, such projects present issues related to the availability of labor and material, host-country access and infrastructure, and security requirements. Thus, adequate

funding for contingency operations remains a key factor in our ability to procure, manage and oversee reliable contractors who are willing to work in those hostile environments.

Answer :

- g. The Department's preference for length of a residential lease is addressed in its regulations at 15 FAM 313.2, which states:

"Posts must make every effort to retain appropriate housing under leases of 5 years or more to benefit the U.S. Government by amortizing make-ready and security upgrade costs, and facilitating negotiation of more favorable lease terms."

The Department actively encourages posts to lease staff residences for longer terms wherever the opportunity arises to avoid rental increases, as well as recurring make-ready costs when moving to new residences, i.e., security, electrical, fire and other upgrades that meet standards appropriate for U.S. employee occupancy.

The Office of Management and Budget's A-11 Circular scoring rules limit the Department's ability to secure longer term leases without being scored as a "capital lease." Capital leases require full funding of rent for the entire lease term in the first year, and this is typically not financially viable.

While the Department leases the majority of its residential properties, ownership has its advantages, such as protection from inflation and unpredictable rent escalation. The Department prefers to include a mix of leased and owned housing in its portfolio. The Department currently owns 25 percent of its staff housing.

At the present time, the Department does not receive appropriated funding for the purchase of staff residences. Without dedicated funding, it is difficult to substantially increase the percentage of owned housing. However, Congress allows the Department to sell excess properties, and retain the proceeds to fund purchases to reduce the need for leased housing. The Planning and Real Estate Directorate in OBO constantly works with posts to identify properties for purchase that are advantageous to the U.S. government. Over the past ten years, the Department has purchased over \$250 million in staff residences that has reduced our leasehold expenses and thus at least partially mitigate the natural ever-increasing costs of rents. The returns on investment have averaged about ten percent.

Answer :

- h.** The Department has in place practices and policies to ensure cost effective housing for U.S. staff overseas. For example, through the Rental Benchmark Program, the Department validates market rental

rates using a global contractor to monitor and report residential lease costs in all posts on a two year-cycle, or more frequently, if necessary. The contractor provides data on market rents for housing in different parts of cities and for different sized residences to allow OBO to measure rents paid by posts. The Department uses this information to benchmark rents and instruct posts on negotiations or to find alternative properties. Since 2007, the use of the rental benchmark program has avoided \$45.3 million in lease costs.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#26)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

In the last several years, GAO has identified potential duplication, overlap, and fragmentation in various foreign operations, including overseas administrative services, international broadcasting, and training to identify fraudulent travel documents.

- a. What steps have you taken in preparing your FY15 budget request to ensure there is no unnecessary overlap, duplication, or fragmentation of effort?

Answer:

The FY 2015 budget request for the Department of State, USAID and related agencies is very focused on our highest priority, core mission items, striking a balance between the need to sustain long-term investments in America's security and prosperity and the imperative to tighten our belts.

The FY 2015 President's budget includes funding to support the development of a modern global logistics platform (ILMS), which will eliminate duplicative systems, streamline operations, and achieve enterprise-wide integration. In the last several years, the Department has taken steps towards consolidating administrative platforms at embassies overseas, including information technology platforms to take advantage of economies of scale and facilitate communication across agencies at posts worldwide.

In March, the GAO acknowledged the Department's efforts to eliminate duplicative services, noting that the Department has addressed the need to increase the cost effectiveness of ICASS services. This item was first raised by the GAO in their 2012 Duplication report. Further details regarding the Department's response to the 2012 GAO Duplication report can be found at:

http://www.gao.gov/duplication/action_tracker/Overseas_Administrative_Services/action1#t=2

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (27a-c)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Democracy and freedom of action is under significant retrenchment in the Western Hemisphere, especially in Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and of course Cuba. Human rights abuses remain a significant concern in Honduras, Guatemala and Colombia.

Question :

- a. What, if anything, have you been able to do to programmatically to halt this backsliding?

Answer:

The Department intends to continue to provide assistance for human rights and democracy programs in the Western Hemisphere including in Ecuador, Venezuela, Cuba, Honduras, Guatemala, Bolivia and Colombia, consistent with existing legal authorities. Our programs support civil society organizations that work to improve public access to information, promote transparency, and encourage peaceful, fact-based debate. These programs are available to everyone, regardless of political affiliation. We believe U.S. assistance, including in challenging environments, advances U.S. goals to further human rights and democratic freedoms in the region.

Question:

- b. What specific steps have you taken to address the human rights concerns in these countries?

Answer:

We advocate for progress on the hemisphere's human rights challenges. We work to strengthen democratic institutions, protect and promote human rights, support vibrant civil society, and encourage democratic processes. In Colombia we support land restitution and rights to help displaced families, a key concern at the heart of the ongoing conflict. We help the Colombian Attorney General's Office defend human rights and promote victim assistance.

We reach out to civil society groups and encourage governments at the highest levels to make progress on human rights. We call on third-country partners to press countries to make progress in human rights, encouraging third countries to promote dialogue in Venezuela. We work to ensure that the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights retains a strong mandate and its independence; we are working to stand up a rapporteur on LGBTI. The annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices is an important tool for documenting human rights conditions in these countries. Through the Universal Periodic Review at the Human

Rights Council, we make specific recommendations for countries to improve their human rights records. Through our press guidance and public statements, we make clear the U.S. position on countries that fail to respect their citizens' rights. On World Press Freedom Day, we highlighted Venezuela's restrictions on freedoms of press and expression.

In some Latin American countries the centralization of executive authority threatens the democratic checks and balances that protect human rights. In these countries we raise the visibility of human rights issues through the Country Reports on Human Rights, press statements, and direct communications with governments. We support civil society organizations that defend human rights by providing incisive, systematic, and accurate documentation and reporting of human rights abuses. The work of these organizations is at the core of ongoing domestic and international pressure on governments to respect the rights of their citizens.

Question:

- c. Please explain the basis for budget decisions for such countries where democratic processes and independent groups are under assault.

Answer:

We request the resources we need to advance U.S. support for democracy, independent and vibrant civic society, and human rights in the region. In making funding decisions, we gauge the opportunities to make a positive contribution in societies where democracy and civic liberties are

under attack, taking into account the risks of endangering local organizations whose work we support.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#27d-f)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question :

- d. What measures are you taking to hold accountable Venezuelan officials responsible for recent violence against protesters there?

Answer:

The United States, along with partners in the region, is focused on the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)-led dialogue initiative with Vatican involvement, but nothing is off the table. We have publicly indicated that the Executive Branch possesses a number of authorities to deter human rights violations and acts undermining democratic governance in countries around the world, including Venezuela. Existing authorities allow for restricting visas, blocking certain assets under U.S. jurisdiction, and prohibiting U.S. individuals or entities from engaging in transactions with the Venezuelan government or business sectors.

The dialogue in Venezuela is still fragile and we want to give that process the space it needs to address the social and economic problems in Venezuela. Taking direct action, at this time, could disrupt that. We will not remain silent in the face of Venezuelan government assaults on

fundamental freedoms. We recently highlighted in our Free the Press campaign the international cable news network NTN24, which the government took off the air in the second week of the protests. But we do not want to provide the Venezuelan government any excuse to claim it is the victim of the United States. This would distract from the process and make it harder to rally other countries to support the dialogue. This is not a U.S. – Venezuela issue; it is an issue between the Venezuelan government and the Venezuelan people. We have been clear all along that the future of Venezuela is for the Venezuelan people to decide.

Our best tool is flexibility to tailor our foreign policy and engagement as the situation develops.

Question:

- e. How are you mobilizing democratic countries in Latin America to respond to the crackdown in Venezuela?

Answer:

The United States has been engaging regional and international partners to find a peaceful solution for Venezuela. We are encouraged by the UNASUR-led initiative with Vatican participation involving meetings between the government and many parties within the political opposition. Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and the Vatican are expending significant time

and effort to facilitate this dialogue. We hope this effort will lead to an end to violence and promote honest dialogue.

Based on reports of protesters being killed or severely injured by pellets fired from shot guns, rubber bullets, and tear gas projectiles, we asked foreign governments, among them several from the region, to prevent the sale of these items to Venezuela.

In statements at the UN Human Rights Council in March, we stressed the need for an authentically inclusive dialogue with third party mediation that could begin to address the Venezuelan people's legitimate grievances and guarantee respect for democratic principles and human rights. We are prepared to make further statements at the next session in June and hope regional governments will join us.

Question:

- f. What instruments of regional pressure do you think will persuade President Maduro to refrain from further violence and to work with opposition figures?

Answer:

We are encouraged by the efforts of the UNASUR and the Vatican, but, at the same time, have realistic expectations. The Venezuelan government has so far chosen not to make two demonstrations of good-will that could go a long way in helping resolve the situation peacefully:

releasing political prisoners and disarming the government-supported vigilante groups; however, opposition elements engaged in the dialogue are, for the first time in a long time, able to speak in a setting where the government listens. That will not cure all, but it could be the beginning of a genuine dialogue. It is important for us to support this effort, as we have been doing.

There is a mechanism established under the Organization of American States (OAS) to address petitions alleging specific human rights violations that might have occurred in any of the OAS member states, including Venezuela. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) analyzes and investigates petitions from individuals or NGOs and makes recommendations to member states.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (28a-c)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

The CBJ regarding U.S. assistance to South Sudan states: “South Sudan (\$36 million): FY 2015 funds will be to support the rebuilding of a fractured military and support the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) continuing efforts to transform from an oversized disintegrated rebel force to an appropriately-sized professional military that respects human rights, represents its population, is accountable to elected leadership, protects the people of South Sudan, and encourages stability in the Horn of Africa. U.S. assistance is implemented through a "dual use" approach that builds the capacity of the SPLA in areas...In doing so, PKO-funded programs will provide technical training and non-lethal equipment to the military as well as expert advisors to assist both the military and the Ministry of Defense and Veteran's Affairs in the professionalization of the defense sector. If needed (depending on the security situation), funds may also support efforts to resolve or enforce stability in South Sudan.”

Question :

- a. Can you please explain to which agencies, and under whose management, within the GoSS this support will go to; through what mechanisms; and towards what specific training activities? Does this training involve weapons use?

Answer:

Due to the ongoing conflict in South Sudan, the Department of State (DOS) has suspended all of its security sector assistance to the Sudan

People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the South Sudanese Ministry of Defense. As a matter of policy, this assistance will remain suspended until a peaceful resolution to the current conflict is achieved and a transitional government has been established. If these conditions are met, the DOS will consider reinstating this non-lethal, institutional capacity building assistance that focuses on military justice, accountability and related issues. DOS security sector reform assistance for South Sudan aims to develop a more professional force that operates under civilian control and respects the rights of the South Sudanese people.

By way of background, all Peacekeeping Operations funded assistance is managed by the Department of State through contract mechanisms, or implemented by the Department of Defense. It is all in-kind assistance and none of this funding has been or would be provided directly to the Government of South Sudan. The Department utilizes a competitive bidding process to determine which contracts will be awarded to specific implementing partners. Specific training activities are determined by State in consultation with Embassy Juba, the Department of Defense and the Government of South Sudan. While security sector reform programs may involve firearms, the U.S. government has not provided any lethal equipment to the South Sudanese military and focuses primarily on

institutional capacity building that encourages accountability and stability in the country and the region. The primary beneficiaries in South Sudan have in the past have been select vetted members and units of the Ministry of Defense and Veterans Affairs and the Sudan People's Liberation Army.

Question:

- b. Given that the SPLA has been complicit in committing abuses and mass atrocities against civilians, how can you guarantee Congress and the American taxpayers that these funds will not assist the SPLA in committing further crimes against the population that it is created to protect?

Answer:

Our processes are designed to address just this concern. State Department-supported defense sector reform assistance has been primarily focused on institutional capacity building and training to develop a more professional force that operates under civilian control and respects the rights of the civilian population. A significant portion of this assistance has been focused on the development of the military justice sector. All individuals and units receiving this assistance are Leahy vetted. We have also consistently stated that all individuals responsible

for violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law must be held accountable. Further, as noted above, security assistance is currently suspended.

Question:

- c. Finally, what are the tangible outcomes expected of this assistance?
 - o What are our benchmarks for success?
 - o What are the benchmarks for the security situation that would start the flow of funds to “efforts to resolve or enforce stability” and what types of activities and materials would be covered under “efforts to resolve or enforce stability”?

Answer:

At such time as the conditions permit resuming assistance to the Government of South Sudan, we would expect to see the Government of South Sudan establish strategies to manage military resources, downsize its military’s parade count, encourage professional behavior and hold individuals responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law accountable. We would also expect over time for the South Sudanese military to take the lead in conducting training while State slowly phases out USG supported training assistance.

Currently PKO funds are being used to assist the Intergovernmental Authority of Development (IGAD) in monitoring the cessation of hostilities agreement that was negotiated by pro-government and anti-government forces. If these activities are needed into FY 2015, these activities would likely primarily involve logistical and advisory support.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#29)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

I am deeply concerned about the decrease in U.S. foreign assistance to Sudan. Civilians should not suffer because of this brutal and oppressive regime.

a. Can you please explain the current U.S. position on assistance and engagement with Sudan?

Answer:

The FY 2015 request represents a 94 percent decrease from the FY 2013 level, as Title II and IDA emergency food assistance funding are not included; those accounts are requested centrally by the Office of Food for Peace. Setting aside Title II and IDA emergency food assistance, the FY 2015 request represents an 11percent decrease from the FY 2013 level due to bureaucratic impediments by the Government of Sudan that inhibit program implementation, although recently there have been signs of progress.

While funding has been reduced in FY 2015, the U.S. government remains the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance to the people of Sudan. In Fiscal Year 2013, the United States provided more than \$259

million in humanitarian assistance to the people of Sudan. This assistance goes directly to populations in need, providing beneficiaries with healthcare, water, sanitation, hygiene, shelter, food, and protection programs to meet their needs. Consistent with the sanctions regime, the U.S. government does not provide any direct support to the Government of Sudan.

U.S. government policy in Sudan is focused on meeting the urgent humanitarian needs of the population affected by conflict, while promoting a Sudan at peace internally and with its neighbors. U.S. government assistance supports the successful implementation of peace agreements and the prevention and mitigation of conflict in Darfur, Abyei, and the Two Areas of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. U.S. government assistance in Sudan focuses on engaging civil society, mitigating conflict, improving Sudanese access to information, and providing life-saving humanitarian assistance. Additionally, to assist the people of Sudan, we work with the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) as well as AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Joint Special Representative Mohamed ibn Chambas and all parties, including opposition groups, to support efforts to end the conflicts in Sudan and bring about political reform. The U.S. government engages with representatives of the Government of Sudan to urge them to end the conflicts, allow unfettered humanitarian access to

conflict areas, and develop an inclusive and representative political system and constitutional reform process. We continue to press the Government of Sudan to halt the unlawful use of force against its citizens and the continued disregard of human rights, underscoring that U.S.-Sudan relations cannot improve until there is a fundamental change in the way the Government of Sudan treats its own people.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (30)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

DRC

Question:

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is now entering the 20th year of one of the gravest humanitarian emergencies the world has ever known. Billions of dollars have been spent to try to address the crisis, and yet, it persists. This begs the question: is the international response to massive and protracted displacements, weak governance and economic stagnation in the DRC adapting to the needs of the populations and accountable to the communities it seeks to serve?

- a. Can you reflect on how the US plans to use our assistance smarter in order to more appropriately and sustainably address the integrated and dynamic challenges facing DRC?

Answer:

The challenges in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are many and complex, including a government that lacks the capacity to extend services across the entire country, woefully deficient infrastructure that hampers development, and numerous armed groups that continue to prey upon the population, particularly in the East. Despite these challenges, the DRC has taken critical steps in the past year to address security threats, and

the next few years could provide an opportunity to consolidate peace, security, and democracy in this conflict-plagued country.

To consolidate recent security gains and strengthen the DRC's process of democratization, U.S. programmatic support for the DRC will be focused on three priority areas: stabilization, elections, and security sector reform.

I. Stabilization

To consolidate the recent gains made in neutralizing the M23 and other armed groups, and to prevent the territory previously held by the M23 from falling into the hands of other armed groups, the Department will support stabilization efforts in eastern Congo that include returning and expanding state authority to areas previously held by armed groups. Program priorities include: community development livelihoods promotion; peacebuilding and reconciliation; restoration of state authority and stronger local governance in newly-recaptured or vulnerable areas; reintegration of ex-combatants; fighting sexual and gender-based violence; improvement of law enforcement and judicial capacity; and addressing the illicit trade in conflict minerals that fuels the conflict.

II. Elections

The DRC is expected to hold local, provincial, and national elections before the end of 2016. Local elections have never been held in post-independence DRC and will be a logistical challenge. Ensuring that all these elections are credible, peaceful, and timely is critical to the long-term stability of the country. U.S. financial assistance will focus on civic and voter education, training in electoral dispute resolution, election observation, building the electoral commission's technical capacity, and elections security. The heavy focus on the first three items is in recognition of the need to bolster Congolese citizens' and institutions' ability to hold the government accountable for conducting free and fair elections.

III. Security Sector Reform

Security sector reform (SSR) will continue to be a top U.S. priority in the DRC. The FARDC's performance against the M23 rebel group was an improvement over previous years, but SSR is necessary to ensure that the country has the capacity to protect its own borders and population and to eventually to enable MONUSCO to hand over its peacekeeping responsibilities to the DRC military and police. U.S. financial assistance will continue to focus on the professionalization and training of the FARDC and the police, including capacity building in the areas of military justice,

human rights, logistics, strategy development, and enhancing relations between the security forces and the population. The United States, in conjunction with MONUSCO and other international partners, will also continue to underscore the importance of a timely and effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program to militate against armed groups in the DRC's eastern region.

The ultimate results in these critical areas will be up to the Congolese, but active U.S. programmatic support will provide impetus to the people of the DRC to implement needed reforms, bolster our regional diplomatic efforts, and spur other donors to contribute.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#31 a-b)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

I am concerned about the apparent inconsistency in policy with respect to Rwanda. Rwanda has been deemed complicit in exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in DRC and supporting the M23 rebels. Yet USAID and PEPFAR have been working with the Government of Rwanda on large U.S. bilateral Government to Government foreign assistance agreements.

Question a:

Is this not undermining U.S. mediation efforts in the Great Lakes region by rewarding the Government of Rwanda with large sums of direct government to government assistance for development?

Answer:

The vast majority of U.S. assistance to Rwanda is directed toward the health and welfare of the Rwandan people, including by preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS and malaria; reducing food insecurity and chronic malnutrition; and improving the quality of primary education. Our development assistance is geared toward assisting the people of Rwanda, nearly half of whom live on less than \$1.25 per day. We are committed to providing U.S. foreign assistance effectively. USAID and PEPFAR, through CDC as the U.S. government implementing agency, select its implementing mechanisms based on what will best achieve development outcomes. In

Rwanda, we continue to conduct due diligence on specific projects to ensure development outcomes are realized, funds are used effectively, and overall goals of peace and development in the region are not undermined. Our development assistance has not affected our continuous engagement with Rwanda on regional security and democracy and governance.

Question :

b. How will you address the new FY14 provisions for G2G in your programming for Rwanda?

Answer:

USAID and PEPFAR, through CDC, are aware of the new requirements for G2G programming in Section 7031(a)(1) in the FY 2014 Appropriations Act. We will evaluate how best to proceed in consultation with Congress as part of the official notification process.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#32)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question

What is USG's long term assistance strategy with respect to CAR? Is the goal only to provide limited humanitarian assistance until the political situation stabilizes or is a longer term presence and development assistance strategy envisioned?

Answer:

Our first priority is to stem the extreme levels of violence and lawlessness in the Central African Republic (CAR). Although the December 2012 Seleka rebellion did not begin as a religiously-based movement, the increasing religious cast of the violence between the Christian self-defense militia and the largely Muslim Seleka rebels threatens the long-term viability of the state. The administration's goal is to help prevent further violence in CAR. Department's current actions – taken in conjunction with the NSC and broader interagency process – are intended to prevent further atrocities in CAR. Our strategy includes humanitarian assistance, support for peace and reconciliation efforts, and the promotion of longer-term efforts of supporting justice and accountability for victims of atrocities and supporting

the interim CAR government as it brings the country to elections and a peaceful political transition.

In an effort to end the violence in CAR, the United States has supported both regional and international peacekeeping efforts to end the violence and protect civilians there. On April 10, the United States voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2149, which established a multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation, the UN Integrated Mission in CAR (MINUSCA), comprised of both military and civilian components. MINUSCA's civilian component became effective immediately while the military component, consisting of 10,000 military personnel and 1,800 police, will be deployed in September. We are also in close contact with the UN, EU, and France to effectively coordinate our efforts to address the significant capacity gaps found in the CAR's law enforcement, judicial, and correctional systems. In addition, we are in close contact with the World Bank and IMF on humanitarian, economic, and financial assistance in CAR.

In the interim, we will continue to support the African Union and French forces already on the ground. The United States has committed up to \$100 million to support their efforts to establish security and stability in

CAR. This assistance has been instrumental in providing airlift for over 1,700 Rwandan and Burundian troops who deployed to Bangui in January. U.S. support also includes provision of non-lethal equipment, to include the recent delivery of 37 trucks, as well as procurement of approximately 200 additional vehicles to increase troop mobility.

The United States continues urgently to address the suffering of the CAR population. On April 10, we announced an additional \$22 million in humanitarian aid for the people of CAR, bringing our total in FY 2014 to \$67 million in humanitarian assistance. The newly-announced aid included \$8.8 million in health funds, \$8.5 million for the World Food Program and UNICEF, and \$4.6 million for assistance to refugees and conflict victims.

The United States has also committed \$7.5 million to address the immediate need to support conflict mitigation and peace building efforts in CAR. These efforts include programs to sponsor community radio and a network of human rights journalists to help dispel rumors and provide reliable information to the population, as well as working with communities to develop strategies for protection, income-generating projects, and rebuilding social cohesion. In our ongoing effort to support sustained

reconciliation efforts in CAR, on April 8, the U.S. Special Envoy to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Department of State's Senior Advisor on CAR led an interfaith delegation of leaders from the United States to demonstrate solidarity among religious communities and promote reconciliation in CAR.

The United States stands with Interim CAR President Catherine Samba-Panza as she moves forward in bringing parties together to end the violence and foster reconciliation, as well as lay the groundwork for justice and accountability. Unfortunately, the CAR transitional government will continue to need medium –and long-term external support – political, institutional, and financial – to establish governing institutions and provide basic services. The government is currently bankrupt and unable to pay civil servants' or military salaries. We are actively engaging other donors and the international community to ensure sustained and coordinated attention to halting the violence and laying a stronger foundation for CAR's future. The United States continues to work with members of the international community to address this issue and we are pleased that several international donors, including the World Bank and the EU, have come forward to help pay for salaries and support medium – and long-term alternative work

programs that will help revive the CAR economy and put CAR citizens back to work.

We strongly believe that any strategy to mitigate the risk of mass atrocities must include a longer-term goal of supporting a political transition, which together with the peacekeeping mission will establish a more stable political environment. Under UNSCR 2149, MINUSCA has among its mandated responsibilities the task of assisting CAR transitional authorities with election preparations. We look forward to continuing to work with the CAR's transitional authorities, as well as regional and other international partners, to facilitate CAR's return to constitutional government. We welcome further engagement with Congress on how to ensure sustained U.S. support for the people of CAR.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#33)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

USAID has asked some of its operational partners to cease development operations in the Lower Omo Valley, despite the fact that this region is home to among the poorest and most marginalized among all Ethiopians live. Meanwhile, the State Department continues to provide robust military assistance to the government of Ethiopia. I am concerned that cutting off assistance to the most vulnerable and most politically marginalized is not only immoral but will prove an ineffective use of conditionality that will not motivate the Government of Ethiopia to support free speech, human rights and inclusive democracy.

Question:

Can you please explain the rationale behind what appears to me as contradictory and misguided uses of US foreign assistance?

Answer:

USAID has not made any changes to current assistance programs in lower Omo, which are notable, but represent only a small fraction of the U.S. commitment in Ethiopia. Assistance programs in lower Omo support maternal and child health projects, improved access to basic health care, and early-grade education in remote communities.

USAID's investments are concentrated in the populous heart of the country, in regions striving to boost farm productivity, improve water access, expand education, spark business formation, and bring health services to every household.

USAID remains committed to helping ensure that communities across the map - especially those emerging from extreme poverty - are resilient enough to prosper, giving their children a more hopeful future.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#34 a-d)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Health Care Workers in Danger

Question:

- a. Health care workers and facilities in conflict situations have faced a record number of attacks and threats. This is hampering efforts to get lifesaving assistance to wounded and vulnerable populations.

How have the Department of State, USAID, and contractors' operations been affected by this trend?

Answer:

Each situation in which State, USAID and contractor operations are faced with threats and attacks is handled according to the unique circumstances involved. In nearly all situations the RSO (Regional Security Office) conducts a thorough examination of the situation on the ground to ascertain the risk to workers and vulnerable populations alike. Based on this assessment, a security plan for the Government as a whole is typically developed and implemented. Creating and participating in this assessment and necessary follow-up actions adds to operational workloads for USAID and the contractors.

USAID typically works with the RSO teams to develop comprehensive security plans that cover USAID employees and contractors. This plan often directly impacts the ability of USAID staff and contractors to perform in the field involving substantial time, effort, resources, and expense, as a plan for the safety of the workers and populations has to be developed, staff trained, equipment procured, programs reconfigured, and contracts renegotiated. In conflict situations, USAID operations are also sometimes affected by having to make programmatic realignments. This may further entail a complete re-evaluation of all program components and personnel used, contract actions and terms, and performance plans and may result in a full or partial evacuation. Again, cost of time, effort, realignment and scale back/rebuilding can be significant, but the safety of our people is paramount.

Question:

- b. Do the Department and USAID monitor and report incidents of violence or obstacles to access of services?

Answer:

Embassies monitor local environment and security conditions. In most cases, aid and humanitarian organizations operating in any country are

funded from a broad range of international, U.S. and non-U.S. affiliated sources, including other foreign governments and private organizations, not all of whom report threats and attacks to the Embassy. The best source of information for attacks against health workers is the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD), which is a project of Humanitarian Outcomes.

Question:

- c. How with [will] the Department of State and USAID respond to these actions?

Answer :

USAID implementing partners are responsible for providing security for their staff. USAID's Office of Security (SEC) strongly supports our contractors/grantees to help them operate safely overseas. At certain high threat Missions, SEC's Critical and Emerging Threat Support (CETS) Branch actively promotes the establishment of a Partner Liaison Security Office (PLSO). USAID Missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mexico, Nigeria, Jordan (in the process of filling the position) and Pakistan have a PSLO. PSLOs provide continuous security support to the Agency's Implementing Partners (IP) overseas in their respective countries. Services include the release of timely information regarding critical security and life safety issues by phone, email, short message service (SMS), and site visits. PSLO

positions also provide Agency IPs an avenue for indirect security incident reporting/security threat updates to the Embassy. CETS has designed and oversees the delivery of a four-day course called Security Awareness for Everyone (SAFE). The training was designed to provide the Agency's IPs a level of area specific training commensurate with what is provided to Chief Of Mission personnel deploying to hostile areas. To date, more than 500 people deployed to more than 10 countries have attended SAFE training.

Additionally, CETS developed five training DVD's (Operations Security, Information Integrity, Weapons Safety and Risk Management, Tactical Driving, and Staff Care) that are available to the Agency's IPs to provide baseline information, or reinforce the training they received at SAFE. To date more than 150 sets have been distributed to USAID's IPs.

Question :

- d. Is there a comprehensive U.S. policy addressing health care workers and facilities in conflict situations and efforts to get lifesaving assistance to wounded and vulnerable populations? If so, what?

Answer:

USAID has several policies within the Automated Directive System (ADS) that address the safety of workers and contractors overseas which align with Department of State security provisions. These policies include

ADS Chapter 561- *Security Responsibilities*; ADS Chapter 562 - *Physical Security Programs (Overseas)*; and ADS Chapter 568- *National Security Information Program*.

Regarding a comprehensive U.S. policy, USAID policies addressing overseas security provisions fall under PUBLIC LAW 99-399, also called the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, which states in summary:

“The Secretary of State shall provide for the security of United States Government operations that includes protection of all United States Government personnel on official duty abroad (other than those personnel under the command of a United States area military commander) and their accompanying dependents; establishment and operation of security functions at all United States Government missions abroad (other than facilities or installations subject to the control of a United States area military commander); and protection of foreign missions, international organizations, and foreign officials and other foreign persons in the United States, as authorized by law.”

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#35 a-b)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Pakistan

In January, when you reopened the U.S.-Pakistan strategic dialogue with Sartaj Aziz, Pakistan's foreign minister, you stated that you have been working toward a "true partnership" with Pakistan since taking office. You also praised the reform efforts of Prime Minister Sharif and his cabinet, saying, "The United States has no doubt that Prime Minister Sharif's policies will put Pakistan on a path towards a more prosperous future, and we fully support his goal of making Pakistan's marketplace a tiger economy for the 21st century."

Question :

- **a.** How would you describe our current relationship with Pakistan, and what are our priorities for Pakistan?
- **b.** The FY 2015 request for Pakistan is 15 percent lower than the 2014 request. Is this sufficient to accomplish our goals?

Answer a-b:

The United States and Pakistan share a wide range of interests, and we are working together to build a strong, enduring relationship based on trust and respect. Indeed, we have a shared interest in a stable, democratic, and prosperous Pakistan. Looking to FY 2015 and beyond, Pakistan will continue to be a critical player in the region's future stability, security, and growth. The U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue Ministerial in January, which

I co-chaired with my Pakistani counterpart, highlighted the positive trajectory of our bilateral relationship and reaffirmed our commitment to partner together to address shared interests, such as economic growth, increased trade, regional stability, and countering extremism and terrorism.

Prime Minister Sharif ran on a platform of revitalizing Pakistan's economy. Attracting more trade and investment requires Pakistan to make progress on economic reforms, improve security, and address its energy crisis. While Pakistan is making progress on macroeconomic stability, energy and privatization, Pakistan must continue to advance economic reforms and transparency, improve the business climate, and promote efficient regulation. Expanding regional economic integration will also be important to Pakistan's economic growth. We are exploring ways to advance the economic side of our own bilateral relationship; for instance, during the October 2013 meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister Sharif, they tasked a joint U.S.-Pakistan action plan to expand bilateral trade and investment over five years. U.S. assistance plays a very important role in helping Pakistan realize those objectives.

The decline in our FY 2015 budget request from prior years is a reflection of the fiscal pressures faced by the Department, and is not meant

to signal a decrease in the importance we place on our engagement with Pakistan. As was stated in the FY 2015 budget request for Pakistan, as the United States reduces and realigns troops from Afghanistan, it is critical that the U.S. funding levels in FY 2015 reflect a continuation of robust engagement with Pakistan in recognition of its role in the stability and prosperity of the region. We believe the resources we have requested are sufficient to accomplish this goal.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#36a-c)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

International Organizations/Peacekeeping

Question:

- a. To what extent is the significant jump in requested funding for FY2015 in the Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account a one-time request? Should the Congress anticipate that this represents a “new normal” funding level for this account?

Answer:

The FY 2015 CIPA request of \$2.5 billion will provide resources for the U.S. share of assessed expenses for United Nations peacekeeping operations, including 13 ongoing missions, three war crimes tribunals, assessments arising from the UN logistical support package for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and \$100,000 for State personnel to monitor mission effectiveness through systematic oversight. The funding required for each mission is based on our assessed rate for calendar year 2014 of 28.36 percent, while current law limits the use of appropriated funds to 27.14 percent.

The Department recognizes that this request represents an increase of \$753 million (or 42.6 percent) over the FY 2014 enacted level.

Peacekeeping missions are critical tools to maintain international peace and security, and advance U.S. interests around the world in places like Somalia, South Sudan, the DRC, Mali and Haiti. Given such enormous challenges, the Department does not expect the FY 2015 increase to be a “one-time” cost. Future budgets will need to incorporate these ongoing missions and costs for the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which was not included in the FY 2015 CIPA request due to the timing of the UN authorization (April 2014). Nevertheless, international peacekeeping efforts are cost-effective means for countries to work together toward the same ends, resolve conflicts, contribute to regional stability, and mitigate humanitarian crises. We continue to regularly review missions to determine where we may be able to downsize, close, or transition them to a peacebuilding arrangement, as well as encourage the UN to further pursue cost saving measures and efficiencies.

Question:

- b.** What office or bureau will implement the new Peacekeeping Response Mechanism? Is it expected to become an ongoing program and, if so, would funding then become part of the enduring budget, rather than OCO funds?

Answer:

The purpose of the Peacekeeping Response Mechanism (PKRM) is to ensure that the United States has the ability to respond rapidly to unanticipated, changing peacekeeping requirements without endangering Department resources for ongoing, planned peacekeeping activities. The FY 2015 budget seeks no year authority for PKRM funds based on the assumption that the full amount of funding would not necessarily be used every year.

The Department intends to use the PKRM in cases where other resources cannot reasonably be reprogrammed or transferred to cover unanticipated requirements. Future requests for PKRM would depend on the usage rate and the amount of funding remaining from prior years.

Funds appropriated to the PKRM account would be managed by the Bureau of Budget and Planning, in coordination with the Office of U.S Foreign Assistance Resources. Subject to approval of the Secretary and notification to Congress, funds would ultimately be transferred to either the Peacekeeping Operations Account (PKO) or the Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account, depending on

whether the unanticipated need is comprised of assessed costs, voluntary costs or some combination of the two. Obligation and expenditure of those resources would then be subject to the normal authorities for each account. OCO funding is appropriate, given the contingency nature of such missions, which support our broader national security strategy. There is precedent for direct OCO funding for PKO, as well as OCO transfers into PKO from other accounts.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#36c)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

- c. The United States is currently withholding funding to UNESCO due to member states' 2011 decision to admit "Palestine" as a member. In November 2013, as a result of the financial withholding, the United States lost its vote in the UNESCO General Conference, the organization's main decision-making body. Please describe the impact of the U.S. withholding on UNESCO activities.
- How, if at all, has it impacted U.S. influence within the organization?
 - Describe the rationale for waiving the legislative restrictions prohibiting funding to UNESCO.

Answer:

The cutoff of U.S. funding for UNESCO has left a crippling 22 percent hole in the organization's budget, and led to the loss of our vote at the November 2013 General Conference. This has had, and will continue to have, a profoundly negative impact not only on UNESCO's programs, but on the level of U.S. influence at UNESCO. Our ability to drive UNESCO's agenda on key U.S. priorities, including defending Israel, women's and girls' education, science diplomacy, media freedom, budget development, and management reform – is greatly hampered.

By withholding our contributions, we cut off support for important UNESCO programs that promote our national interests, serve our commercial interests, and support and further fundamental American values. In doing so, we weaken our ability to promote U.S. priorities and effectively empower others to determine how and when America engages. Other countries including China and Saudi Arabia have stepped in to fill the funding gap, thereby increasing both their credibility and their ability to drive UNESCO's agenda to suit their own interests.

The Administration is seeking a waiver to allow the discretion necessary to continue to provide contributions that enable us to maintain our vote and influence within the UN and its specialized agencies, if the President determines that doing so is important to our national interests, and to remove from the Palestinians or their allies any ability to force a contribution cut-off and diminish our influence within these agencies.

Without a national interest waiver our ability to conduct multilateral diplomacy and pursue U.S. objectives will be eroded, and our standing and position in critical UN agencies will be harmed. As a result, our ability to defend Israel from unfair and biased attacks in the UN will also be greatly damaged.

Multilateral organizations are an important forum for advancing the interests of the United States and its closest partners across the full spectrum of policy goals. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) manages the key global early warning systems for pandemics; the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) plays a central role in ensuring food safety globally; and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) combats nuclear proliferation.

The most effective way to wield U.S. influence in international organizations is from within. It was under the leadership of George W. Bush that the United States rejoined UNESCO in 2003 following a prolonged absence. In a bipartisan effort, President Bush and the late Representative Tom Lantos led the charge in convincing members on both sides of the aisle in Congress that the United States is far better off being at the table at UNESCO. In the ten years since our re-engagement, we have used the UNESCO platform to make progress in a number of priority areas, including promoting literacy for women and girls; supporting Holocaust education as a means to combat anti-Semitism and prevent future atrocities; advancing freedom of the press and safety for journalists globally; and promoting World Heritage sites in the United States, the designation of which creates jobs and brings tourism revenue to the local economy.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (37a)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question :

- a. Discuss the benefits and drawbacks of this “pledge conference” approach to leveraging and coordinating assistance. In what circumstances do partnerships provide value beyond what U.S. bilateral assistance can achieve?

Answer:

High level pledges help strengthen U.S. partnerships and bring greater value beyond what U.S. bilateral assistance can achieve by catalyzing resources and aligning the efforts of our development partners working to address pervasive development challenges. Pledges help ensure the engagement of all relevant stakeholders in the discussion and enhanced levels of coordinated policy, and have been an important enabler of the overall success of U.S. foreign assistance. The pledge conference approach allows the U.S. Government to leverage its human and financial resources with other donors’ resources, including the private sector, and helps stimulate scalable and transformational impact not otherwise achievable through bilateral assistance.

The high profile nature of pledge conferences brings public and political attention to the issue and provides incentive to mobilize additional resources. Hosts often make special efforts to mobilize maximum amounts. In addition, the pledge conference offers the opportunity to use matches and other peer influencing mechanisms to catalyze additional giving. Lastly, pledge conferences often lead to accountability mechanisms to ensure follow-through and a focus on results.

Some of the drawbacks of participation in international forums and other large international efforts include the additional time spent on coordination and logistics, which reduce the attention paid to other issues. However, the added time and effort spent are necessary investments towards achieving greater impact. Another potential drawback of the pledge conference approach is the risk that other donor partners either may not make sufficient funding commitments at the time of the conference, or honor their commitments following the conference. However, this potential drawback would be a risk with or without a formal pledge conference.

Tropical Forest Alliance 2020

Pledges can also help to increase the engagement of other important stakeholders; for instance the Tropical Forest Alliance 2020 has grown out of the shared goals of the private company members of the Consumer Goods Forum that have committed to removing tropical deforestation from their supply chains and the USG commitment to help developing countries reduce emissions from deforestation. This alliance is helping to focus private sector investment on reducing tropical deforestation by creating better business models that address the largest drivers of deforestation, namely the sourcing of commodities such as palm oil, soy, beef, and paper and pulp.

Global Fund

The U.S. Government hosted the Global Fund's Fourth Voluntary Replenishment Conference in Washington, D.C., on December 2-3, 2013, which generated pledges of \$12 billion to support HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs in 2014-2016. This amount includes the U.S. Government's commitment to seek from Congress at least \$4 billion over FY 2014-16. The U.S. Government also committed to match \$1 for every \$2 contributed through September 2014 in order to encourage additional contributions after the Replenishment conference. Moreover, the U.S.

Government's HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs are intrinsically linked with the Global Fund programs at the policy, planning, and implementation stages.

Within the Global Fund context, the pledge conference approach allows the U.S. Government to leverage its bilateral resources with other donor resources, including the private sector, such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. For example, at the recent pledge conference, the offer to match \$1 for every \$2 resulted in the UK, Germany, and Switzerland increasing their original pledge offers. With these combined resources, the Global Fund was then on solid ground to fully implement its new funding cycle that started in March 2014. The combined efforts of leveraging resources and coordinating fiscal inputs enables the Global Fund to best forecast and allocate grant funding over multiple years, thereby allowing countries to implement programs with the security of knowing that funding will be available to provide lifesaving prevention, care, and treatment interventions across the three diseases.

GAVI

USAID has greatly benefited from participating in the GAVI Alliance's pledging conferences, which allows us to leverage the GAVI platform – with its extensive network of engagement and coordination of donors, development partners and technical partners – that results in more lives saved. USAID leverages its investment in the GAVI Alliance in four primary ways. First, USAID has been engaged in the development and implementation of GAVI strategy, program and policy through the GAVI Board since its inception in 2001. Second, USAID consistently coordinates with the other major donors of the GAVI Alliance, which include the United Kingdom, Norway, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, as well as the UN agencies providing support to GAVI-eligible countries. Third, within each country the Interagency Coordination Committee includes the Minister of Health, USAID, other in-country donors and stakeholders who work to ensure harmonization of activities. This work then becomes part of the country Donor Coordination Committee and the government's Health Sector Strategic Plan. Fourth, USAID is increasing its focus on the incorporation of new vaccines into GAVI-eligible country programs, reaching more children through strengthened immunization programs, which could include various elements like supply chains, data quality and use, service delivery,

integration and surveillance. In addition, recently, by working closely with our GAVI donor and UN partners, USAID has been able to leverage our global polio eradication contributions and our GAVI contributions to create greater program alignment and convergence. Strong support for GAVI and the provision of technical support is one way that USAID ensures children do not die from vaccine-preventable diseases. Since 2000, an additional 440 million children have been immunized against leading vaccine-preventable diseases in the world's poorest countries with GAVI support, preventing approximately six million deaths.

For the upcoming replenishment, USAID will again play a central role in the multi-agency U.S. Government outreach effort targeting countries the donors believe can and should increase their contributions or join the ranks of contributors. USAID will engage those countries through multiple channels. Additionally, it should be noted that in 2013, the cumulative USAID contribution to GAVI exceeded \$1 billion, and that our annual contribution has since increased. GAVI is the single largest health investment USAID makes, and the FY 2015 request includes a \$200 million contribution.

GAVI's new strategy will now focus increasingly on strengthening country systems for routine immunization, and USAID provides complementary support assistance, predominantly through strengthening of immunization and health systems local capacity to vaccinate effectively at the national scale. GAVI's results are tremendously impressive and USAID is proud to have been an important part of this success – not only through financial contributions, but as a technical agency as well. It is important to remember that the level of engagement and coordination by donor and development partners, and technical partners has been an important enabler in the overall success of the GAVI Alliance, as we continue to work together while challenging each other on the key support roles each agency is best suited to play.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (37b-1)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Trade Africa:

Please outline the main goals and program approaches under Trade Africa.

Trade Africa will initially focus on the member states of the East African Community (EAC): Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The EAC is an economic success story and represents a market with significant opportunity for U.S. exports and investment. The five EAC countries, with a population of more than 130 million people, have increasingly implemented stable and pro-business regulations. They are home to promising local enterprises that are forming creative partnerships with multinational companies. Moreover, EAC countries are benefiting from the emergence of an educated middle-class. Intra-EAC trade has doubled in the past five years, and the region's gross domestic product (GDP) has risen to more than \$80 billion – quadrupling in only 10 years.

In its initial phase, Trade Africa aims to help double intra-regional trade in the region, increase EAC exports to the United States by 40%, reduce by 15% the average time needed to import or export a container from the ports of Mombasa or Dar es Salaam to land-locked Burundi and Rwanda, and decrease by 30% the average time a truck takes to transit selected borders. The United States also hopes to expand its collaboration with other regional economic communities in Africa, including in cooperation with other partner nations.

Question:

- b. What kind of reporting to Congress regarding Power Africa and Trade Africa does the Administration propose to provide, and how frequently?

Answer:

Power Africa will follow a robust monitoring and evaluation process, and will provide Congress with regular briefings and updates as needed or as major developments arise. Significantly, the interagency Power Africa team has released an annual report which provides tangible progress of Power Africa's efforts towards the twin goals of adding 10,000 MW of additional generation capacity to the grid and access to 20 million households and businesses. The administration will provide updates on Trade Africa in the President's Trade Policy Agenda and annual report of the President on the Trade Agreements Program.

Question:

- c. What benchmarks and metrics are set out to guide and evaluate Power Africa and Trade Africa?

Answer:

Power Africa has developed an interagency monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework to track progress toward the 10,000 MW and 20 million connections goals. Through the Interagency Power Africa Working Group (PAWG), an M&E sub-working group has been established with representatives from each of the Power Africa participating agencies. A defined set of indicators is being finalized to provide reporting for benchmark and progress.

Metrics for Trade Africa to guide and evaluate the impact of the activities are also being finalized and will include a focus on increasing exports, policy harmonization and implementation, overcoming technical barriers to trade, regional integration, implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement and reducing transit time and costs, among other factors.

Question:

d. How has the private sector responded to these initiatives?

Answer:

There has been an overwhelmingly positive response by the private sector to the Power Africa initiative. Since Power Africa is a private sector driven model, effective engagement with key developers, financial institutions, energy companies and suppliers is critical to achieving the 10,000 MW of additional generation capacity and access to 20 million households and businesses. We are engaging on specific power projects to help facilitate critical investments by identifying and addressing specific impediments to the financing and completion of these projects using the tools and capabilities of the 12 U.S. Government agencies engaged on Power Africa. Through the PAWG and the Power Africa Secretariat at USAID, the U.S. Government is able to engage the private sector in a more coordinated

way, providing an integrated approach on key policy, capacity and business issues with Power Africa governments and with potential investors.

The private sector has also responded favorably to Trade Africa. One example is the textile and apparel sector, which is critical to East Africa growth and employment, accounting for 90% of all non-oil exports from East Africa to the U.S. As a result of Trade Africa, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between USAID, the American Apparel & Footwear Association (AAFA), and the African Cotton & Textile Industries Federation (ACTIF) was signed in December 2013.

Further indication of private sector response to Trade Africa is the U.S.-EAC Commercial Dialogue (CD), co-chaired by the Secretary of Commerce, which was established in October 2012 at the EAC Heads of State Summit as a priority under the U.S.-EAC Trade and Investment Partnership (TIP).

The TIP was eventually integrated into the Trade Africa Initiative that President Obama launched at a Business Leaders Forum in Tanzania in July 2013. The CD is also a key focus of the President's Doing Business in Africa Campaign (DBIA).

In February 2014, the private sector, led by the Corporate Council on Africa (CCA) and the East African Business Council (EABC), created strong

momentum for substantive action and business-to-business exchanges under the CD as a result of their meeting in Kenya. At the meeting, the two groups designated trade facilitation as their primary area of focus under the CD and are currently in the process of developing a short-list of priorities under trade facilitation to share with the governments. Other areas of private sector interest include agribusiness, supply chain development, power and transportation infrastructure.

In support of the Trade Africa Initiative, CCA also regularly convenes a working group on East Africa for member and non-member companies and has attracted over 25 interested companies. Company engagement is also supported by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Council for International Understanding. Likewise, U.S. AmChams in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are beginning to organize themselves along regional interests and will hold their first regionally focused conference this fall. Commerce has been working through major DBIA events] and has also held smaller events through U.S. Export Assistance Centers throughout the United States.

Power Africa What defines a project as a project?

Although individual agencies may have slight differences in terms of how they evaluate projects for assistance, Power Africa will review a project using the following criteria:

- primary impact (MW, access, efficiency, reliability)
- catalytic impact (enabling future projects and markets, potential for replicability)
- private sector leadership and interest (global, local, US partner)
- clean energy resources
- project viability (affordability, bankability, environmental and social impact, etc.)
- political and policy impacts and government support

Power Africa prioritizes renewable and cleaner energy projects, and those that will help to advance policies and institutions as well as build local capacity to enable future energy systems expansion. More than two-thirds of transactions are renewable, clean energy projects. In many cases, large generation projects are not the focus because on a continent that remains largely rural, national grids neither extend to rural areas nor have sufficient generation capacity to fill the energy access gap. However, increasing access to reliable and affordable electricity through both grid-based and off-grid solutions is essential for poverty eradication and economic growth, and therefore options are not predetermined or restricted to a particular solution.

Question:

- e. How does the U.S. government interagency Power Africa Working Group (PAWG) operates?

Answer:

In coordination with USG agencies, USAID Missions, and the Coordinator's Office overseas, the Power Africa Working Group (PAWG) identifies and prioritizes power projects in focus countries and coordinate appropriate whole-of-government assistance to help expedite power projects and advance related policy reform and capacity building efforts. The

PAWG acts as a single U.S. point of contact (one stop shop) for private sector partners, host government institutions and other donors (e.g. the World Bank, the African Development Bank, DFID, JICA) charged with coordinating the Initiative's assistance to on-grid, mini-grid and off-grid power projects, drawing upon the financing, technical assistance and training and diplomatic tools and resources across the U.S. Government to expedite implementation of priority projects. The PAWG adopts an incentive-based approach to more directly tie expected investment in power projects to substantive host government policy reform commitments and implementation.

This coordination occurs through formal meetings every other week, regular sub-working group meetings on policy, off-grid and mini-grid work and communications and ad hoc meetings as needed. At the biweekly PAWG meetings, partner U.S. agencies and country teams provide updates on potential priority power projects, updates on policy and institutional reform progress and appropriate finance and technical assistance actions as well as social and environmental impact considerations. Each agency implements activities to support Power Africa consistent with its own legislative authorities, policies, and procedures, while the PAWG serves to

ensure that the information sharing and engagement with Power Africa partners is more closely integrated and coordinated.

Question:

- f. What total level of investment is appropriate to meet the Power Africa goal of universal access to power in Africa?

Answer:

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), sub-Saharan Africa will require more than \$300 billion (roughly \$19 billion per year) in investment to achieve universal electricity access by 2030. There are other estimates that exceed the IEA's; however, the key point of Power Africa is to use the resources generated by the initiative, both from the U.S. Government and the Power Africa private sector partners, to facilitate the institutional and regulatory framework so the private sector investment fills this gap.

Question:

- g. How were the initial \$14.7 billion in initial Power Africa projects—about \$9 billion of which existed on the day the initiative was announced—chosen?

Answer:

For the first, five-year phase through 2018, the U.S. Government has committed more than \$7 billion in financial support and loan guarantees, in

addition to the coordinated support and expertise of 12 U.S. Government Agencies. Power Africa is also working closely with development finance partners, such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank (WB), to enhance the availability of energy sector resources in Africa.

Thus far, each dollar that the U.S. Government has committed to Power Africa has leveraged two dollars in private sector investment. Power Africa has reached out to energy organizations with experience in sub-Saharan Africa, introducing them to the initiative and its goals. Greater awareness and outreach will continue to expand the number of private companies that look to invest by providing financing through direct loans, guarantee facilities, and equity investments to meet the goals of Power Africa.

Question:

h. How are Power Africa projects to be proposed going forward?

Answer:

Power Africa projects can be proposed by private sector actors, host governments, or other entities both in small and large scale project planning. Members of the PAWG will propose priority transactions based on various project selection processes (OPIC, Ex-Im, USTDA, USAID). The PAWG

coordinates on these projects, with members working together to engage the most appropriate tool, service and/or resource to review, advance, stop or accelerate the project.

Question :

I. Is there any sort of competitive bidding process for gaining Power Africa transactional or other types of assistance?

Answer:

A significant amount of Power Africa transactional and other types of assistance is driven by the needs identified by private sector and government partners. Generally, assistance may include, but is not limited to, helping governments negotiate Power Purchase Agreements or other key agreements, helping private sector partners identify and secure all or part of financing for projects, helping government institutions work through key regulatory or capacity issues to help accommodate greater use of renewable generation sources, as well as strengthening governance within a country's power sector in order to reduce financial and technical losses and improve the overall availability of power. While the transactions help to focus more intensive and comprehensive engagement by Power Africa on certain transactions, these services are still available to companies through OPIC,

Ex-Im, USTDA and Commerce through each of these agencies standing procedures.

For other types of assistance, Power Africa will provide assistance following a competitive grant process or similar mechanisms. One example is the U.S. ADF Off-Grid Energy challenge grants in Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania. Under this program, interested companies compete for grants of up to \$100,000 each to African companies and organizations providing off-grid solutions that deploy renewable resources and power local economic activities (see link for more information <http://www.adf.gov/USADFOffGridChallenge.html>).

Another mechanism for companies and organizations to apply for support from Power Africa is from the Power Africa Global Development Alliance (GDA) Annual Program Statement Addendum (GDA APS). The Power Africa GDA APS Addendum is designed to catalyze, facilitate and support such collaboration with the private sector and other key development partners which will further Power Africa's goals. The GDAs formed as a result of this Addendum are envisioned to be inclusive of multiple partners, i.e., businesses, universities, NGOs, government

institutions, foundations, who are working within the subject area. (see this link for more information

http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1880/Power%20Africa%20APS_Addendum_Mar_2014.pdf)

Power Africa also has a great deal of direct inquiries from private sector companies who are interested in engaging with Power Africa. While these companies range in size, sophistication and experience, Power Africa serves as a single point of contact to help direct these inquiries to the most appropriate U.S. Government agencies and respective points of contact within the agencies, depending on needs. From there, each agency has its respective policies and process for evaluating whether any of their services are appropriate for the particular company and project.

Question:

j. Some suggest that a recent congressionally-mandated limitation on U.S. support for large hydroelectric dams abroad may constrain the potential of Power Africa to increase access to electricity in Africa? Do you agree with this assessment? Why or why not?

Answer:

While hydroelectricity can be an important source of less expensive and renewable energy, Power Africa priority efforts are engaged on projects that utilize a wide range of generation sources, including, but not limited to

geothermal, solar, wind, gas. Where the hydro resource exists, large hydro generation plants can often generate electricity at rates that are equal to or below coal and gas fired generation. Countries such as Mozambique, Cameroon and DRC have large potential hydro generation resources that could supply low cost energy to large numbers of citizens both within and outside their countries. Many countries in the world rely on low cost hydro generation for a large share of their national electricity supply. The limitation on large hydro constrains opportunities for Power Africa on some projects where U.S. engagement could play a constructive role.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (37k-m)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

International Climate Change Contributions: How do we determine what our “fair share” of funding for international climate change programs should be?

Answer:

The U.S. budget for international climate change programs is designed to advance U.S. interests and leadership in addressing global climate change in a way that takes advantage of opportunities to promote low-emission, climate-resilient development in developing countries within the broader foreign assistance budget. In 2008, under the Bush administration, the United States pledged \$2 billion to the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) out of an initial \$6.1 billion in pledges. At present, fourteen contributor countries have pledged a total of \$7.6 billion to the CIFs, which is expected to leverage an additional \$57 billion from other sources. Over the course of the Fast Start Finance period (2010-2012), during which developed countries achieved their collective goal of providing

\$30 billion in public climate finance, the U.S. committed \$7.5 billion from Congressionally Appropriated direct and indirect funding, development finance, and export credit. Separately, the United States recently pledged \$3 billion to the Green Climate Fund, a new multilateral climate fund that has secured roughly \$10.2 billion in pledges towards its initial capitalization from a range of developed and developing countries.

Question:

I. What diplomatic implications, if any, stem from U.S. financial contributions and leadership on climate issues?

Answer:

U.S. financial contributions and leadership on climate issues are essential to strengthening ties with key partners that share our commitment to tackling climate change and view it as a top global priority. Under the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, developed countries committed to collectively provide resources approaching \$30 billion in the period 2010-2012 to support developing countries in their efforts to adapt to and mitigate climate change. The fulfillment of that commitment was recognized by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) parties and has played an invaluable role in advancing multilateral negotiations and enhancing U.S. leadership on climate action. The United States provided \$7.5 billion during the 2010-2012 “fast start finance” period. The three-year

total consists of more than \$2.7 billion from U.S. development finance and credit export agencies.

The United States and other developed countries also committed to the collective goal of mobilizing \$100 billion per year in public and private climate finance by 2020 to promote meaningful mitigation and transparency in implementation. The provision of U.S. climate assistance further demonstrates our ongoing commitment to this goal. A top priority for the United States is for developing countries – particularly major economies – to take on real commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. U.S. follow-through on existing financial commitments would help to encourage such commitments. Our efforts also help demonstrate the need for countries to prioritize climate issues in a manner that allows for increased investment, growth and development opportunities while also reducing climate impacts. The absence of U.S. leadership and financial contributions on climate change would have negative diplomatic implications, especially the willingness of developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Question:

m. What type of climate change intervention do you believe provides the greatest return on our investment?

Answer:

With regard to U.S. foreign assistance, we do not think that a singular climate change intervention will provide the greatest return. The strategic investments the Department makes through the Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCCI) to help achieve a low carbon future are organized around three pillars – Clean Energy, Sustainable Landscapes, and Adaptation – each of which provides important returns on our investment.

The GCCCI, which draws on expertise from across the U.S. government to design and implement tightly-focused programs that promote low-carbon, climate-resilient development, is building lower and middle income countries' capabilities to plan for and respond to a changing climate. Our portfolio of projects is designed to be complimentary of each other, transform developing countries' institutions, and improve their policy and regulatory frameworks in order to catalyze private and public sector investment. Our projects do this, in part, by engaging and strengthening civil society participation in identifying and implementing climate change mitigation and adaptation actions. The GCCCI demonstrates U.S. leadership on a high-profile international issue of great importance to emerging economies and developing countries worldwide.

Working in partnership with national and local governments, companies, and other non-governmental groups, USAID, the Department of State, and the Department of Treasury target GCCI investments where they can make the biggest impact on climate mitigation and adaptation:

Promoting Clean Energy: U.S. investments accelerate the development and deployment of renewable and advanced clean energy technologies as well as promote the adoption of energy efficient technology and conservation practices. Our efforts in this area focus on building the local capacity to reform the energy markets through policy and regulatory changes. Our investments reduce greenhouse gas emissions, increase energy security by developing domestic energy sources, and expand access to clean energy.

Conserving Forests and Promoting Sustainable Land Use (Sustainable Landscapes): Sustainable Landscapes' programs reduce greenhouse gas emissions from land use and improve economic development through better land use and natural resource management decisions. Activities include mitigation in forests, as well as in non-forested landscapes such as peatlands, wetlands, abandoned and degraded lands, grasslands, and agricultural lands that promote livelihoods.

Building Resilience to Climate Change (Adaptation): By building resilience in key sectors like agriculture, clean water and sanitation, natural resources management, infrastructure, disaster preparedness, and human health, U.S. programs help ensure that climate-vulnerable countries can better cope with increasing climate and weather-related risks and integrate climate resilience into their development – protecting and enhancing U.S. investments in developing countries.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#38a-b)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)

Question:

Requested OCO funding is declining significantly in the frontline states of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

- a. Given all the possible scenarios for the future in these countries, how do you expect to handle any unexpected urgent needs that may arise?

Question :

While OCO funding of humanitarian accounts are critical to responding to humanitarian crises worldwide, there is concern that OCO will end in the future, putting humanitarian funding levels at risk.

- b. How does the administration plan to incrementally move future OCO funding into the base international affairs budget, particularly for the MRA and IDA budgets?

Answer a-b:

Because of its unique flexibility, OCO is an indispensable component of our efforts to ensure U.S. national security. The Department and USAID would not have been able to support critical security, diplomatic, and development efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan without OCO. Nor

would we have been able to respond to the extraordinary events that have unfolded in the Middle East over the past several years, including addressing the humanitarian needs in Syria and its neighboring countries; meet urgent peacekeeping needs in Africa; or implement the Benghazi Accountability Review Board recommendations to bolster security measures at medium to high risk missions. The flexibility and resources requested in the OCO budget are designed to enable the Department and USAID to respond to emerging needs and pivot to different scenarios in the year of execution, including in the Frontline States bordering countries in crisis, should policy and program needs require a different course of action.

The OCO request for humanitarian needs in Syria (\$1.1 billion) is consistent with appropriations since FY 2012, which have included significant amounts of OCO for humanitarian expenses and enabled us to respond appropriately to crises worldwide, including in and around Syria. The entire \$4.8 billion humanitarian assistance request – base and OCO – will allow us to respond to the unprecedented Syria crisis and other humanitarian needs around the world. The Administration will continue to seek the necessary flexibility to enable the most appropriate U.S. response to these and other crises.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#39)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

The Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative

The Administration is requesting a total of \$759.9 million in additional money for foreign affairs activities under this initiative, as well as some unspecified funds.

How will the Department of State prioritize allocating these funds if they do not become available all at once? What notification process will you conduct with Congress and what oversight role will Congress have?

Answer:

The Budget adheres to the 2015 spending levels agreed to in the Bipartisan Budget Act and shows the choices the President would make at those levels. But it also shows how to build on this progress to realize the nation's full potential with a fully paid for \$56 billion Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative. The budget outlines a specific set of mandatory spending reforms and tax loophole closers that would fully offset the cost of the Initiative.

Should Congress appropriate additional funds for important investments in international affairs that are part of the Initiative we would prioritize efforts to end extreme poverty, improve global health, establish agriculture and food security, and focus on accelerating progress toward development goals through outcome driven, measurable interventions. Specifically, if enacted, the Initiative would provide an additional \$300 million for the Global Fund, maximizing our leverage with other donors; expand access to and the quality of proven interventions that address major causes of child and maternal deaths; expand programs that reduce recurrent food crises; and scale up the U.S. Global Development Lab's innovative efforts to solve development challenges faster and cheaper.

Unless otherwise specified in the appropriations bill, 15-day standard notification requirements would apply to additional funds appropriated specifically for the Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#40a)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question a:

At the 2012 UN General Assembly, Secretary Clinton announced a pledge by InterAction members to spend \$1 billion in private funds from 2013 to 2015 to improve food security and nutrition worldwide. InterAction is the largest alliance of U.S.-based international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), with more than 180 members working in every developing country and focusing on the world's most poor and vulnerable populations. Collectively, U.S. non-profits spend over \$14 billion in privately funded resources per year in developing countries. However, USAID's traditional procurement mechanisms are not designed to leverage the private dollars, technical expertise, innovations, or relationships that U.S. non-profits and universities bring to the table. There is no mechanism for a non-profit to align its private funds with USAID programs, or to invite USAID to support an existing initiative that is funded by the American people and contributes to U.S. foreign assistance objectives. As a result, USAID and U.S. non-profits and universities are often working separately on the same issues, rather than partnering to increase their collective impact.

How can the State Department, USAID, and other U.S. government agencies, better partner with U.S. NGOs and universities to ensure coordination of efforts and leverage their expertise in international development and humanitarian assistance?

Answer:

USAID works closely across an array of partners, including NGOs, universities, the private sector, and others, to ensure effective coordination of efforts. To support these coordination efforts, USAID receives advice and guidance from three important bodies: the Advisory Committee on

Voluntary and Foreign Aid (ACVFA), the Board for International Food and Agricultural Development (BIFAD), and the Global Development Council.

- ACVFA has been a longstanding partner in helping USAID to further integrate programs and strategies with the broader development community, and is well represented by NGO leaders.
- The BIFAD, whose mission is to ensure the success of U.S. agricultural programs with tertiary agricultural institutions, is also mandated to reflect the integration of our NGO partners, who are critical to achieving our agricultural development priorities.
- The Global Development Council provides independent insight and analysis to the President, and aims – through consultations with concerned individuals from government, the NGO community, universities, business, foundations, and think tanks – to bring new voices, new ideas, and new perspectives to the table, with particular emphasis on identifying successful approaches to inclusive and sustainable development.

In establishing the U.S. Global Development Lab, USAID is expanding its reach to partners of all types, including NGOs and higher education institutions. With the objective of increasing coordination and collaboration to discover breakthroughs in development and scale proven solutions to help hundreds of millions of people lift themselves out of poverty, USAID is working to increase open dialogue around jointly defining development problems, co-creating knowledge and solutions, utilizing data sets to better understand critical development challenges, collaborating on possible interventions, and assessing our success.

Understanding the changing nature of development, USAID has long encouraged its grantees to build and integrate a network of partners into their operations, which include NGOs, universities and the private sector.

As an example of this type of coordination, the Higher Education Solutions Network (HESN) is an international partnership between USAID and seven top universities, both in the United States and abroad. HESN harnesses the ingenuity and passion of university students, researchers and faculty to incubate, catalyze and scale new science and technology-based solutions to the world's most challenging development problems. Through a

series of 5-year cooperative agreements, HESN has established a network of eight Development Labs. These labs tap into the intellectual power of the universities' brightest minds. Beyond the seven universities hosting Development Labs, the network extends to collaborators at more than 100 partner institutions spanning academia, NGOs, private sector, civil society, and governments across more than 38 countries.

Through Grand Challenges and Prizes for Development programs, USAID works with partners to define a specific problem, identify constraints, and provide evidence based analysis to engage the world in the quest for solutions with the potential to instigate break-through progress. In developing Grand Challenges and Prizes, USAID seeks to partner with organizations of all types – including NGOs and universities-- who wish to invest private funds in sourcing break-through solutions to our greatest development challenges.

As an example of this type of collaboration, the All Children Reading Grand Challenge is a partnership between USAID, AusAID and World Vision that seeks to catalyze global action towards the enduring development challenge of child illiteracy, which has not been solved through

traditional approaches. Each founding partner has contributed funds to a \$20 million pool, which is being used to pilot innovations across the world—drawing on science, technology and 21st century infrastructure—to dramatically improve early grade reading outcomes. Through this partnership, World Vision has committed to contribute a maximum of \$5m over three years.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#40b)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

How can the State Department/USAID leverage the \$14 billion that U.S. NGOs spend in developing countries each year and the \$1 billion food security pledge to support U.S. foreign assistance objectives? Are there new procurement mechanisms or new ways of working together that could allow U.S. NGOs and the State Department/USAID to partner more effectively and increase our collective impact?

Answer:

The \$1 billion of private, non-governmental funds pledged to support food security and nutrition by U.S. non-governmental organizations (NGOs) over three years, October 2012 to September 2015, at a UN General Assembly event in September 2012 reflects the importance that U.S.-based civil society organizations assign to food security, and the crucial role each organization plays in the effort to end world hunger. Efforts of U.S. and partner governments can be multiplied with the contributions and expertise of NGOs. We will continue to work with InterAction and their member organizations to meet this commitment and to align our efforts behind shared, country-led objectives.

NGOs serve as implementing partners in many Feed the Future programs, and they help advance food security objectives as a result of their local ties. They are able to reach communities that can be challenging to access and understand local needs on the ground. This expertise helps to ensure programs are tailored to specific communities and can achieve maximum impact.

The USAID Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA) plays a critical role in shaping and implementing the USAID push towards the goal of ending world hunger and extreme poverty. Last year, a series of discussions between government agencies implementing Feed the Future projects and U.S. civil society leaders focused on how the U.S. government's flagship food security initiative could be strengthened through increased engagement of civil society. All of these discussions culminated in a set of recommendations provided by the Feed the Future working group under ACVFA. These recommendations have served as critical inputs into the Feed the Future Civil Society Action Plan.

The Feed the Future Civil Society Action Plan - which is expected to address many of these issues - will be released later this year. Activities

that target nutrition, reform food aid and assistance, implement agricultural development programs, or make private investments into food system transformations will be made more robust and more effective as they are grounded in a dedicated, more effective partnership with civil society.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey(40c)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

How will you prioritize, in coordination with USAID/State Department, State Department/USAID engagement with and support for local civil society organizations to ensure that their voices can be heard by governments to improve feed the Future and other development and humanitarian programming?

Answer:

Feed the Future remains deeply committed to ongoing engagement with our local and international NGO and civil society partners as we strive to achieve our key objectives: reducing poverty and undernutrition.

Feed the Future activities aim to strengthen the skills of civil society and non-state actor groups to lead, manage, and implement activities and deliver services to their membership base. We provide support to help them work with their governments and others to build effective partnerships to advance their shared vision in agriculture, nutrition and food security development efforts. In FY 2013, Feed the Future provided assistance to nearly 35,000 local organizations, including producer organizations,

women's groups, trade and business associations, and community-based organizations.

In 2013, USAID and the Department of State officials held a series of discussions with U.S. civil society leaders and a special working group of the USAID Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid on how the Feed the Future Initiative could be strengthened through increased engagement of civil society. These discussions helped USAID and the Department of State to design the Feed the Future Civil Society Action Plan. This plan, which will be released later this year, will encourage broad-based dialogue; foster the creation of new partnerships among civil society, donors, the private sector, and partner governments; intensify diplomatic engagement in support of civil society's valuable role; and promote best practices.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#40 d)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question :

Collaboration with Civil Society

d. How will you balance diplomatic engagement with foreign national governments and local populations and civil society organizations to ensure that all voices are heard in the formation of U.S. foreign policy?

Answer:

President Obama and Secretary Kerry have repeatedly affirmed that the strength and vibrancy of nations depend on active engagement between governments and civil society. Last September, President Obama and Secretary Kerry joined more than 20 international partners on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly to launch the *Stand with Civil Society* agenda, an unprecedented global campaign to support, defend, and sustain the work of civil society organizations (CSOs) worldwide. As part of this effort, the United States and other governments are working to: 1) improve the domestic environment for civil society in countries around the world; 2) coordinate diplomatic action when civil society is threatened; and 3) develop new tools and platforms to support the work of CSOs. The Administration

is leveraging the Community of Democracies, the Open Government Partnership, the Lifeline: Embattled Civil Society Organizations Assistance Fund, and our bilateral diplomacy to advance this agenda and remains committed to our long-standing policy of engaging with civil society around the world.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart (#1)
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
March 13, 2014**

Question:

Venezuelan students began peacefully protesting legitimate economic and political concerns facing their country, including rampant corruption, rising inflation, employment, shortages of everyday products, an increasing crime rate, and the erosion of human rights and political dissent. In response to these protests, Mr. Maduro has orchestrated the violent repression of peaceful demonstrators with the help of the Venezuelan National Guard and groups of armed militias. When will this Administration, using existing authorities, impose targeted sanctions, revoke and deny the visas, and freeze assets of Venezuelan government officials and their families who have committed, planned, or are planning human rights abuses and other forms of deplorable violence in Venezuela? Can you give us a time frame when this Administration will make a determination? Does your budget recommendation contain any specific funding to rebuild civil society, promote democracy building, and support human rights in Venezuela?

Answer:

The Administration is deeply concerned about developments in Venezuela. President Obama, Vice President Biden, and I have repeatedly called for an end to the violence, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, release of incarcerated members of the opposition, and a genuine, inclusive dialogue among Venezuelans.

We continue to call for an authentically-inclusive dialogue mediated by a trusted third-party. Dialogue can only take place in an atmosphere of respect for democratic governance, fundamental freedoms and human rights. We join the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, and countries in the region, in encouraging an end to the violence.

We continue to monitor closely the situation in Venezuela and to examine the options available to us. Clearly, sanctions could become an important tool to pressure the Venezuelan government if it fails to engage critics in a structured dialogue of the type described above. In terms of additional economic and diplomatic measures, we believe it important to retain flexibility as we tailor our foreign policy and engagement to the situation develops.

The U.S. government supports a wide range of civil society organizations that promote and defend fundamental freedoms, democratic processes, and non-violent advocacy. Civil society organizations play an important role in the promotion and effective exercise of democracy. We

will continue to respond to the needs of Venezuelan citizens and civil society, and will stay in close touch with Congress moving forward.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart (#2)
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
March 13, 2013**

Question:

There are numerous reports that detail the close relationship between the Cuban and Venezuelan regimes. Cuba has had as many as 35,000 medics in Venezuela at one time, and Venezuela in turn pays the Cuban dictatorship for their work. Venezuela sends an estimated 130,000 barrels of oil to Cuba a day. Combined, Venezuela provides an estimated \$10 billion annually to the Cuban dictatorship. Some reports indicate that Cuban intelligence has helped Maduro's thugs oppress the Venezuelan people. Recently, students marched to the Cuban Embassy in Caracas to protest the Cuban regime's infiltration into the Venezuelan government and military. What do you see as the role of the Cuban dictatorship in Venezuela? What is the State Department doing to assist the pro-democracy opposition?

Answer:

President Maduro pledged to continue what he calls a "strategic" and "historic" alliance between the two countries. Cuban officials travel to Venezuela, some for extensive periods to live and work.

The Cuban government has deployed thousands of technical and military advisers to Venezuela. According to Venezuelan government-

associated media sources, there are an estimated 40,000 Cuban advisers and aid workers in Venezuela, including doctors, teachers, and a large contingent of Cuban military personnel. Venezuelan military officers train in Cuba. The Venezuelan government severely limits freedoms of assembly and expression for Venezuelan citizens.

The government has harassed and closed independent media outlets, censored free speech, refused to protect or defend peaceful protestors, persecuted civil society organizations, and publicly threatened and stigmatized human rights defenders. High levels of crime and impunity and a lack of governmental transparency and accountability increase safety concerns for many citizens.

We are engaged on several fronts: The U.S. government supports a wide range of civil society organizations that promote and defend fundamental freedoms, democratic processes, and non-violent advocacy. Civil society organizations play an important role in the promotion and effective exercise of democracy. We continue to call for an authentically-inclusive dialogue mediated by a trusted third-party. Dialogue can only take place in an atmosphere of respect for democratic governance, fundamental freedoms and human rights. We join the UN High Commissioner for

Human Rights, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, and countries in the region, in encouraging an end to the violence.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart (#3)
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
March 13, 2014**

Question:

Last November, President Obama met with King Mohammed VI of Morocco in the White House and agreed in a joint communiqué to a “shared commitment” to improving the quality of life for those living in Western Sahara. The Committee has long considered this to be an important issue and is committed to working with you to see that this is enacted. It is the strong view of this Committee, as has been expressed in the last three appropriations bills and included in the text of the FY 2014 bill, that it is time for the USG to use development assistance designated for Morocco to help improve the lives of those living in the region. The language in the legislation requests a report due 90 days after enactment on this issue as well as USG efforts to support the longstanding US policy to resolve this issue based on a formula of local autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. Will you commit to working with and consulting with me and this committee as the State Department prepares the report to Congress?

Answer:

The United States remains committed to supporting efforts to find a peaceful, sustainable, and mutually-agreed solution to the Western Sahara conflict. As the President and King Mohammed VI agreed to during the

King's visit we remain committed to the improvement of the lives of the people of the Western Sahara and to working together to continue to protect and promote human rights in the territory. We welcome your interest in this important and difficult issue and will continue to consult with Congress as we work to achieve a solution to the status of the territory.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart (4)
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
March 13, 2013**

Question:

Malnutrition is one of the world's most serious development challenges, contributing to the preventable death of nearly 3 million children under the age of 5 each year; stunting the cognitive and physical development of millions more children; and resulting in lost economic productivity and an increased health burden on already poor countries. There is growing evidence about the importance of early nutrition on individual and national economic growth. How will the State Department ensure that U.S. leadership continues to catalyze global nutrition action?

Answer:

The U.S. government has been a global leader on nutrition, working across sectors with a diverse set of partners to elevate nutrition on policy agendas and promoting smart investments on nutrition. We recognize our goals of reducing extreme poverty and hunger cannot be met without addressing nutrition during the critical 1000 day window, from a mother's pregnancy to her child's second birthday, and also by reaching women with nutrition interventions even before they become pregnant.

In 2010, on the margins of the UN General Assembly, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and then Irish Foreign Minister Micheál Martin launched the 1,000 Days Partnership, which brings together governments, civil society and the private sector to promote targeted action and investment to improve nutrition for mothers and children in the 1,000 days between a woman's pregnancy and her child's 2nd birthday.

Since the launch of the 1,000 Days Partnership, we have made tremendous progress in raising global awareness, catalyzing partnerships among different sectors to scale-up efforts to reduce malnutrition, mobilizing stakeholders to support country-led nutrition strategies and increase nutrition investments, and supporting other global nutrition mechanisms, particularly the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement. Partner countries Zambia, Guatemala, Rwanda, Tanzania, India and Malawi have established 1,000 Days Initiatives, and last year the partnership renewed focus on action on maternal nutrition, exclusive breastfeeding in the first six months of life, and the appropriate introduction of complementary food from six months to two years.

The U.S. government also supports the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement (SUN) launched in 2010 as a partnership between the United Nations and governments, donors, civil society and the private sector by serving as a donor-convenor through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in six countries, and by playing a leadership role at the global level, particularly as a member of the SUN Lead Group.

Feed the Future, the U.S. global hunger and food security initiative, is the first Presidential Initiative to address nutrition at the global level. Feed the Future's goal is to reduce stunting by 20% in Feed the Future zones of through improving access to nutrition services and by supporting agriculture value chain activities that include nutrient-dense crops. In 2013 alone, Feed the Future reached 12.5 million children with nutrition interventions.

In June 2013, on the margins of the G8, the Governments of the United Kingdom and Brazil, hosted a nutrition summit, encouraging G8 donor governments, partner country governments, civil society, and the private sector to make funding commitments towards the new Nutrition for Growth Compact.

At the summit, the U.S. government was able to announce that from 2012 to 2014, we will provide more than \$1 billion for nutrition-specific interventions and nearly \$9 billion for nutrition-sensitive activities. This will

translate into a 20% reduction in stunting in the areas where we work over five years – resulting in 2 million fewer stunted children.

To reinforce all of these efforts, USAID is in the final stages of developing a multi-sector nutrition strategy, which will improve the integration and effectiveness of nutrition programming across bureaus and missions. This strategy will also inform a broader U.S. government global Nutrition Coordination Plan, which will bring together all of the U.S. government agencies working in global nutrition. The purpose of the plan will be to maximize U.S. Government global nutrition investments through better coordination.

The U.S. government is making meaningful contributions toward achieving global nutrition commitments, such as the World Health Assembly 2025 nutrition targets. With the continued leadership of the State Department, particularly in focusing on the importance of early nutrition on individual and national economic growth, we will make progress on reducing under-nutrition worldwide.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart (5)
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
March 13, 2014**

Question:

The Administration has said that as part of a final deal with Iran, a significant portion of its nuclear infrastructure will have to be dismantled. Meanwhile, Iran is saying no to any dismantlement. How do you envision this being resolved? Do we have a set of hard requirements – a bottom line – that we need to see to get to an agreement? What can you tell us about our minimum requirements? Will we insist that Iran cannot have a heavy water reactor? Do we have a figure in mind for the number of centrifuges Iran can maintain? Can they have any advanced centrifuges? Do you envision the elimination of their stocks of enriched uranium?

Answer:

We are focused on achieving a long-term comprehensive solution that resolves the international community's concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program and verifiably ensures that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. We will continue to approach the negotiations in good faith and with the intent to reach a long-term comprehensive solution in the six-month timeframe set out in the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). We acknowledge this will not be an easy task.

The JPOA specifies that the comprehensive solution would involve a "mutually defined enrichment programme with practical limits and

transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the programme.”

Moreover, Iran would need to satisfactorily resolve concerns regarding the IR-40 reactor at Arak, among other issues. Iran would also be subject to enhanced transparency and monitoring measures to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program under any long-term comprehensive solution.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart(6)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 13, 2013**

Question:

The administration has pledged to strictly enforce existing sanctions on Iran. Media records indicate that Iran's oil exports are on the rise. 1.3 million barrels in January, 1.4 million in February, well above the one million barrel limit set in the Joint Plan of Action and far above the lows from 2013. Are these numbers accurate? Will you make publicly available the Department's country by country estimates on Iranian oil imports? Are we talking to China and India, both of whom are dramatically increasing their imports from Iran this year? If these trends continue, are you going to stand by your commitments and sanction these countries?

Answer:

The Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) came into effect on January 20, 2014. February was the first full month of JPOA implementation. We've seen the same press reports and assess that they reflect normal seasonal fluctuations, include exports to Syria, and also count other petroleum liquids, such as gas condensates, in addition to crude oil. Overall Iran's crude oil exports remain in the range we expected of roughly 1 to 1.1 million bpd.

Our assessments of volumes are informed by both public data and classified information.

During the JPOA period, we are pausing efforts to bring about further reductions in oil purchases for current customers. This means current customers can hold steady at their current level, but they cannot increase their purchases. The deal does not offer relief from sanctions for any increases in Iranian oil purchases by existing customers or for sales to new customers. Under the JPOA only five countries (China, India, Japan, South Korea, Turkey) and Taiwan are permitted to purchase oil from Iran at current volumes, and they are not permitted to increase their purchases. We are in discussions with all six economies and have shared our understanding of what this will mean in practice so that there will be no misunderstandings as to the definition of current levels.

The JPOA specifies an average volume over the duration of the agreement. On a daily, weekly, and monthly basis, we expect this number to fluctuate. That being said, we are committed to ensuring that the purchasers do not increase volumes over the course of the implementation period of the JPOA. The waivers extended under the JPOA can be revoked immediately if Iran does not meet its commitments.

Question for the Record
Submitted by Congressman Mario Diaz-Balart
to Secretary John Kerry (7)
House Appropriations Committee,
Foreign Operations Subcommittee
March 18, 2014

Question:

Most reports now indicate that the Assad regime is no longer fully cooperating with the agreement on removing their chemical weapons, certainly doing the barest minimum of compliance. Could you update this Committee on the status of this agreement and its implementation? What consequences will the Syrian regime face for not living up to the agreement?

Answer:

As of March 18, just over 45 percent of all declared chemicals have been removed from Syria, and 93 percent of the regime's stockpile of isopropanol has been destroyed in country. In addition, the OPCW has verified the functional destruction of Syria's chemical weapons production, mixing, and filling equipment. Still, much work remains to be done. We continue to work with the international community to maintain pressure on the regime to deliver all of the remaining chemicals as urgently as possible. We believe the Syrians are fully capable of fulfilling their obligation to complete the removal effort by late April, and, if they do, we believe the

June 30 target date for the complete elimination of the program remains achievable.

We continue to closely monitor the regime's compliance with its CW-related obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, UNSCR 2118, and related OPCW Executive Council decisions. Syria's obligations are clear, and we will continue to underscore the importance of the Asad regime's continued cooperation. The Security Council decided in UNSCR 2118 to impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in the event of non-compliance with the resolution.

[Note: Since March 18, there have been two additional shipments of CW materials to Latakia on March 20 and April 4. As of April 8, 54.2 percent of all declared chemicals have been removed from Syria and 58 percent of the most dangerous Priority 1 chemicals remain in Syria.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Charles W. Dent (#1a -#1b)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2013**

Question:

As recently as 2011, the Colombian commercial truck market neared 12,000 units annually and American brands captured market share exceeding 90%. The sales of those trucks, valued at nearly \$1 billion, support thousands of manufacturing jobs across the United States and in my congressional district. Those jobs, however, are threatened by the adoption of a restrictive series of decrees regarding the scrapping and registration of commercial vehicles. These regulations appear to violate both the spirit and letter of Colombia's obligations under the bilateral Trade Promotion Agreement, the World Trade Organization, and the free market principles of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, to which Colombia aspires to join.

I (Congressman Dent) signed on to a December 2 letter with 12 of my colleagues urging President Obama to raise this issue at the highest levels of the Colombian Government.

- What steps has the State Department taken to restore American truck exports to Colombia?
- Is the Department satisfied with the Colombian response to date? What additional actions will the Department undertake to resolve this dispute?

Answer:

The State Department takes very seriously the concerns of U.S. truck manufacturers and has met with their representatives in Washington and

Colombia to learn more. The Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, Colombia raised the issue of trade restrictions imposed by Colombia’s truck scrapping regulations with the office of Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and the Ministries of Trade and Transportation during meetings on November 6, 2013, and December 12, 2013. The U.S. Embassy also coordinated with the embassies of other like-minded countries to jointly raise our concerns with the appropriate Colombian authorities. In response to U.S. and industry efforts, Colombia created a task force in February in the Ministry of Transportation to process industry requests for scrapping exchange certificates and revised its regulations to allow U.S. exporters to purchase a broader supply of vehicles to comply with Colombia’s scrapping exchange program.

Additionally, in coordination with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the State Department instructed U.S. delegates to note Colombia’s lack of industry consultation at the OECD Trade Committee’s pre-accession Market Openness Review of Colombia on November 5-6, 2013. Subsequently, the U.S. delegation at the OECD Trade Committee submitted written questions regarding the law and its effects on Colombia’s international trade obligations for Colombia’s response at the Trade Committee review scheduled for May 26-28.

The State Department will continue to advocate for resolution and help U.S. companies engage directly with senior Colombian government officials in Bogota and Washington.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kevin Yoder (#1)
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
March 12, 2013**

Question:

We have been searching for powerful tools to respond to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. I am certain you are keen to employ America's robust soft power. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are renowned for their ability to shape environments like this while affirming America's commitment to democratic processes, human rights and the rule of law. They have built up strong networks of supporters on the ground in Kiev and Moscow, as well as across the Russian Federation. Can you tell us how you might use these tools effectively, including beefing them up for a longer competitive challenge from Mr. Putin?

Answer:

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Voice of America, both of which are overseen by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), provide vital news and information programs to key audiences in Ukraine, Russia, and other countries. The Department of State has already been working with the Broadcasting Board of Governors to strengthen their capabilities, including expanding domestic distribution in Ukraine and increasing Russian-language content, and we will continue to explore other options to support their efforts.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kevin Yoder (#2)
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
March 12, 2013**

Question:

Events in Ukraine will certainly resonate throughout the former Soviet space, particularly in the Baltic States, but also in the Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia generally. As a member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, can you give us your thinking on what information we wish to communicate to these non-Russian regions of the former Soviet empire, and how and where we should invest to do so?

Answer:

Countries in the region and around the world are closely following events in Ukraine, as you have noted. We are committed to providing audiences in these regions with the truth about U.S. policies and actions, and with accurate information on what is happening in Ukraine. The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is an integral component of this effort, through the content provided by their media organizations via television, radio, and digital platforms. The BBG Board is exploring a range of alternatives to strengthen their efforts in these areas, and we are actively involved in those efforts.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kevin Yoder (3)
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
March 12, 2013**

Question:

Does Mr. Putin's outlandish explanation of what has happened in Ukraine and why—for example the alleged roles of fascists, terrorists and anti-Semites—and the apparent acceptance of these explanations by a large part of Russia's population cause you concern? How should we in the West address these preposterous accusations? Do they suggest that despite all that has taken place in the past 25 years Russia's people are still far from understanding the West's values and intentions? How do we address this long-term problem?

Answer:

We have not seen credible evidence to support Russia's outrageous claims.

On the contrary, following his visit to Ukraine, UN Assistant Secretary for Human Rights Ivan Simonovic reported the following: "There was no sign of human rights violations of such a proportion, of such widespread intensity that would require any military measures." Simonovic also added that the current Ukrainian authorities demonstrate a "willingness to break with past injustices and to elaborate a new vision based on good governance and the rule of law."

Many countries around the world face questions about their borders and ethnic minorities abroad, about sovereignty and self-determination. These are

difficult issues, and it is precisely because these questions are hard that they must be addressed through constitutional means and international laws so that majorities cannot simply suppress minorities, and big countries cannot simply bully the small.

With time, so long as we remain united, Russia will recognize that it cannot achieve security, prosperity and the status that it seeks through brute force. We have combined our substantial pressure on the Russian government with an open door for diplomacy. Since the end of the Cold War, successive administrations have sustained public diplomacy, educational and cultural programming directed at a broader Russian audience. People-to-people ties with Russia hold out the prospect of furthering mutual understanding between our nations. We want the Russian people to live in security, prosperity and dignity like everyone else.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kevin Yoder (#4)
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
March 12, 2013**

Question:

We have been frustrated by the lack of U.S. options to effectively respond to the Russian invasion of the Crimea. Russia has spent and is expected to continue to spend substantial monies to control the media in the Ukraine, as well as in other former Soviet republics and former Soviet allies, in order to decide which news and information the populations in these areas is provided. Much of the news and information is simply propaganda supporting Russian policy. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are valuable resources that provide unbiased news and information to its audience promoting Western values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Given the scale of Russia's efforts to dominate the media in the Ukraine and other countries, what can be done to strengthen the presence and effectiveness of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in these regions? What other efforts should be undertaken to counter Russian media control in the Ukraine, the other former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe?

Answer:

There is no doubt that Russia is using broadcast media and digital channels to present a distinct (often inaccurate) perspective to audiences in these countries. Long before the current crisis, the Department of State and USAID were providing assistance to help Ukrainian media outlets (in both the Ukrainian and Russian languages) develop high standards of professionalism and journalistic independence, as well as to encourage ordinary citizens and civil society groups to make their voices heard through social media and other innovative methods. These

programs proved invaluable during the recent Maidan protests, when independent Ukrainian media were able to broadcast unfiltered news to Ukrainians and – via social media – the world, without being censored or shut down by the Yanukovych government. At the same time, they were complemented by RFE/RL’s Radio Svoboda, whose multimedia webpage was a “go to” source of up-to-date and accurate information in Ukraine and internationally, and by VOA’s efforts to provide timely and accurate coverage of U.S. policies, statements, and actions to audiences in Ukraine and Russia.

Since the current Russian propaganda campaign began, the Department of State has taken a series of steps to highlight and confront these distortions and falsehoods, including creation of our Ukraine Communications Task Force, which uses social media and other tools to aggressively counter Russian propaganda, advocate with global audiences for our Ukraine policy positions, and demonstrate our steadfast commitment to the people and legitimate government of Ukraine. The Department of State has also launched a Russian-language Twitter Account (@UkrProgress), LiveJournal blog, and YouTube channel to promote messaging in support of Ukraine. In addition, we have provided direct support to strengthen the capabilities of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America to reach audiences in Ukraine, including more Russian-language content targeted to

Russian speakers in Crimea and elsewhere in Ukraine. More needs to be done, and we will continue working with the Broadcasting Board of Governors and others to identify ways to do this.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kevin Yoder (#5)
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
March 12, 2013**

Question:

The Russian invasion of the Crimea will alarm the populations of the other former Soviet republics and former Soviet satellites. This region and its people will carefully monitor the actions of the United States in responding to the invasion to determine US resolve. Given the mission and symbolism of US taxpayer supported media services, and their historical importance during the Cold War of providing unbiased news and information to offer hope to people subjected to Soviet repression, can you confirm that these valuable services will be maintained at least the their current levels and that these services will continue with the same local presence in Russia, the Czech Republic and other countries where these services are located?

Answer:

Russia's actions constitute a clear violation of international law and threaten the core principles upon which the international system is built. We are committed to mobilizing the international community in support of Ukraine and helping the Ukrainian people build the stable, democratic and prosperous country they so richly deserve. The international media entities under the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) play an important role by providing accurate news and information to audiences in the nations you mentioned, and in other critical regions across the globe. The BBG chairman and governors are working closely with their

media entities on this effort, and I know they are committed to providing the best services possible with the funding provided to them.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kevin Yoder (#6)
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
March 12, 2013**

Question:

Self determination is a choice which goes hand in hand with a free and vigorous media. Given the limited efficacy of sanctions, how can we effectively use the other tools we have to positively influence events on the ground? Should we consider a surge in funding the US taxpayer supported media services to counter the billion dollars plus now being spent by Russia, China and Iran in sponsoring their respective media?

Answer:

We need to use the full range of tools available to us to advance our views and policies, including the strengths of U.S.-funded civilian international media. I am confident that the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and their media organizations will work hard to make the best use of the resources provided to them, on behalf of our nation and the international audiences they serve.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kevin Yoder (#7)
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
March 12, 2013**

Question:

In addition to hot spots in the Middle East North Africa region, there are a number of security-related concerns arising in Central Africa. These include increased piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, Foreign Terrorist Organizations Boko Haram and Ansaru's potential spread from Nigeria to neighboring nations, illegal wildlife poaching and ivory sales, and the potential destabilizing impacts to the region from the crisis in The Central African Republic. Can you describe how the United States is working with countries in the region, such as Cameroon, to address these issues; and how the President's FY 2015 Budget proposal supports those efforts?

Answer:

The U.S. government employs a range of activities to build the capacity of African partners to address security challenges in the Central African region. Efforts include training, equipping, and providing logistics support and strategic airlift to African peacekeepers deploying to peacekeeping missions, such as to the African Union Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (French acronym, MISCA); providing training and equipment to security forces to combat illegal wildlife poaching in Cameroon, Chad, and Gabon; advising, training and equipping members of the Economic Community for Central African States (ECCAS) to develop regional mechanisms and strategies to address maritime threats off the Gulf of Guinea; and engaging with partner militaries, such as in

Cameroon, to enhance their capacity to fight against Foreign Terrorist Organizations, such as Boko Haram. The United States is concerned by the increasing regional threat posed by Boko Haram and we have recently added Cameroon as a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Through TSCTP and related efforts, the United States is building the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across West and North Africa to counter terrorism and violent extremism.

The President's FY2015 budget request includes critical funding that will enable us to continue and enhance these counterterrorism capacity-building efforts, as well as enhance the capabilities of African partners to address other security threats in Central Africa.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kevin Yoder (8)
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
March 12, 2104**

Question:

Seaboard's most recent conversations with the U.S. Embassy in Cotonou, Benin focused on steps regarding how Seaboard can best recoup the money it is rightfully owed from Mr. Kouassi and Mrs. Vianou. During this conversation the U.S. Embassy informed Seaboard that the Government of Benin, specifically President Yayi Boni, is very eager and willing to assist Seaboard in their collection efforts. While the U.S. Embassy informed Seaboard of the Government of Benin's awareness and willingness to help resolve Seaboard's collection issues, a comprehensive plan was not formulated.

Instead, Seaboard was advised to continue to rely upon the Courts of Benin for help in accruing payments. Seaboard has been relying upon the Court system of Benin for roughly 5 years, the beginning of these disputes, to no avail. What mechanisms do you see available to the U.S. Embassy in Benin, and U.S. State Department as a whole, that can help ensure the successful reimbursement of the internationally sanctioned arbitration awards on Seaboard's behalf?

Answer:

U.S. Embassy Cotonou continues to provide support to Seaboard, engaging regularly with the Government of Benin at the highest levels. The Embassy's efforts resulted in President Yayi's personal mediation of the disputes, which in turn resulted in significant progress toward resolving both disputes. This progress includes partial payments to Seaboard by both parties, a signed repayment

agreement from one party, and pursuit by the other party of a negotiated settlement with Seaboard. Our U.S. Ambassador in Benin continues to raise this issue with Beninese President Boni Yayi, both to apprise him of progress towards repayment of the debts and to stress the negative consequences the protracted dispute risks for Benin's business climate and reputation.

In its most recent communication with our Ambassador, Seaboard advised that its lawyers are taking steps to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement with one party and to pursue a negotiated settlement with the other. Embassy Cotonou remains ready to provide further support to Seaboard if their planned interventions are unsuccessful.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kevin Yoder (9)
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
March 12, 2104**

Question:

Amid continued concerns over the U.S. deficit, and the growing need from developing nations for U.S. foreign development aid dollars, should the U.S. State Department attempt to direct these limited U.S. development aid dollars to governments that have shown a commitment to creating a sustainable economic environment?

Answer:

The United States supports the consolidation of democracy and economic development in Benin. The United States has been an important partner to Benin since the country transitioned to a democratic government in the early 1990s, becoming an important example for a region that continues to face democratic challenge and upheaval. In the years since then, Benin has demonstrated the ability to hold free and peaceful elections with strong citizen participation and robust press freedom while also creating an open environment for economic investment. These commitments have been catalogued over the last several years of the Millennium Challenge Corporation Scorecards for Benin.

Despite Benin's successes, poor health care, low quality of public education, and insufficiently transparent governance persist as obstacles to national development for this small nation. The United States supports efforts to improve the health of Beninese families by reducing the malaria disease burden, improving the health of mothers and young children, and strengthening the health system. U.S. assistance also provides support to Benin's defense and military capacity enhancement, enabling the country to maintain domestic peace and security while contributing to regional stability.

In October 2011, Benin successfully completed its five-year, \$304 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact focused on improvements at the Port of Cotonou and justice sector reform. Following completion, a second compact proposal was developed. In December 2013, however, the MCC Board decided not to vote on Benin's eligibility following Benin's marginal drop, and resulting failing grade, in MCC's key Control of Corruption indicator. The Board also indicated that it expects countries to pass the control of corruption indicator before it would approve a new compact.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kevin Yoder (10)
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
March 12, 2104**

Question:

If this is the case, should governments receiving U.S. development aid dollars be those governments that have shown a strong commitment to maintaining both the high standards associated with Democratic Rule of Law and those associated with Control of Corruption?

Answer:

MCC's annual scorecards rely on third-party data to measure a country's commitment to ruling justly, investing in its people and encouraging economic freedom. The MCC Board decides each December whether to select new compact and threshold partner countries, and whether to re-select previously selected countries that are currently developing proposals for MCC investments.

For FY 2014, Benin demonstrated sustained performance in the Rule of Law indicators but fell marginally below the acceptable threshold for the Control of Corruption indicator. Taking note of Benin's commitment to addressing corruption, the MCC Board decided not to reselect Benin for compact eligibility and encouraged the Government of Benin's focused efforts to improve scorecard

performance. The MCC Board expects Benin to pass the control of corruption indicator before it would approve a new compact.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kevin Yoder (11)
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
March 12, 2104**

Question:

With the MCC decision on second compact eligibility for Benin approaching, what specific examples have you received from the Government of Benin that show the Government has taken concrete steps to address concerns regarding corruption?

Answer:

Benin has made significant progress towards controlling corruption leading up to the December 2013 MCC Board meeting and redoubled its efforts to address the problem since the board's decision. Benin has initiated more than 30 corruption cases against officials over the past two years, including three former ministers, the general manager of the parastatal oil company, and the head of the Ministry of Finance's public procurement office. Benin also created an offsite customs clearance one-stop shop that has reduced bribery and fraud that hindered economic development.

Since the Board's decision in December, the Government of Benin tasked the National Anti- Corruption Authority (ANLC) to serve as the focal point of its anti-corruption campaign. The ANLC was created in May 2013 to crack down on

corruption in the public and private sectors, exercising financial and administrative independence. The ANLC worked with civil society leaders to develop an anti-corruption action plan that was forwarded to Benin's Cabinet for approval in March 2014.

President Yayi and all members of his cabinet have submitted asset disclosure statements to the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 3 of Benin's Anti-Corruption Act. The Government of Benin also urged the ANLC and the Supreme Court to press former ministers and other high level officials to submit asset disclosure information in an effort to create a culture of transparency.

Finally, Benin's first MCC compact had a significantly reduced corruption at the Port of Cotonou, one of the most corrupt parts of the economy. If the MCC Board were to approve a second compact in FY 2015 or later, it can build on those gains by improving efficiencies in the tax regime and transport system.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Kevin Yoder (12)
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
March 12, 2104**

Question:

If certain steps have been or are being implemented by the Government of Benin to address the concerns about corruption, do you believe that these actions will increase Benin's Control of Corruption Index on MCC's Eligibility Scorecard?

Answer:

We believe that Government of Benin attempts to control corruption are genuine but addressing this pernicious challenge requires constant and continued attention. The U.S. Government will continue to support Benin's anti-corruption efforts. USAID provided a grant to the National Anti- Corruption Authority (ANLC) in February 2014 to support its anti-corruption and anti-transnational organized crime activities. While we are optimistic that these efforts should make a tangible difference to address corruption, it is premature to speculate how these efforts will impact the third country data collections and subsequently Benin's future MCC scorecards.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (1)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

It has been encouraging to see the positive political steps Tunisia has taken lately, including the bold decision to enshrine the rights of secularists and other minorities in its new constitution. Unlike Egypt, the Tunisian leadership appears to have looked over the precipice and taken a collective decision to walk back from the brink of civil war.

1. What can we do now as a country and through Congress to help invigorate Tunisia's economy, which could prove essential to ensuring democracy has a chance to take hold in the country and perhaps across the region. And what assistance are we offering to Tunis in terms of technical assistance and in the area of good governance?

Answer:

We are working closely with the Tunisians to support their transition and help them become a stable and prosperous democracy. I agreed with Prime Minister Jomaa on February 18 in Tunis to hold the first-ever U.S.-Tunisia Strategic Dialogue, scheduled for April 3 in Washington, to discuss the bilateral relationship and our strategic priorities over the next year. We plan to discuss concrete ways in which the United States can partner with Tunisia to support its economy and generate new opportunities. The White House has announced that President Obama and Tunisian Prime Minister Jomaa will meet on April 4 in Washington and further these discussions.

The Tunisian government is taking steps to implement economic reforms, stay on track with its International Monetary Fund program, and improve Tunisia's prospects for long-term economic stability. To respond to Tunisia's near-term economic challenges and support this reform agenda, the Administration expects to announce our intention to provide Tunisia with a second loan guarantee allowing the government to raise approximately \$500 million from international capital markets at favorable rates.

As an integral part of supporting Tunisia's transition, the United States and Tunisia seek to broaden and deepen bilateral trade and business relations. To that end, the bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) Council is scheduled to meet in June in Tunis. The Council plans to address specific issues aimed at facilitating trade and investment, including in the areas of market access, entrepreneurship, information and communication technology services, and intellectual property. We will also discuss how to build a more robust bilateral trade and investment relationship and liberalize the exchange of goods and services.

We are also working to support an array of science, technology and education initiatives to connect Tunisia to the high-tech, globalized economy. We are working to reopen negotiations with the Tunisians on a Science and Technology Agreement and build education program initiatives, train English teachers, increase English language programs outside of the capital, explore professional and citizen exchanges in Science and Technology disciplines, and develop curricula to include entrepreneurship and self-employment.

The United States supports a variety of programs to assist Tunisia in furthering its good governance efforts. To support the political transition, U.S. assistance to Tunisia bolsters its political processes, furthers our partnership with Tunisian civil society, and advances the rule of law and human rights. For example, the United States is working with the Ministries of Interior and Justice to support Tunisian efforts to reorient their missions to one focused on serving Tunisian citizens. We remain actively engaged with Tunisian civil society and are providing capacity building and civic engagement trainings. U.S.-funded programs also educate political parties on transparency and public outreach. Over the next year, we plan to provide assistance to support Tunisia's upcoming presidential and parliamentary

elections. U.S.-funded activities will include nonpartisan domestic election observation and parallel vote tabulation, as well as international observation conducted through our partners the National Democratic Institute and International Republic Institute.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (2)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

We appreciate your outspoken efforts in condemning recent and ongoing attacks against journalists in countries such as Egypt, Syria, and Ukraine. How might we in Congress be of assistance toward making tangible improvements in protecting the rights and security of foreign media so they can perform their critical jobs during crises in these and other countries?

Answer:

We share your concern about violence against journalists and welcome your willingness to be of assistance in the areas of journalist security and freedom of expression. The Department's Country Reports on Human Rights for 2013 highlighted the growing restrictions around the world on free expression and press freedom. The Department has heard from journalists around the world – through our outreach to journalists, our exchange and assistance programs, and our annual Free the Press campaign – that it is helpful to them personally and to the issue at large when the Department speaks out in support of them and the universal right to freedom of expression. When Members of Congress also speak out, it strengthens the U.S. voice and impact.

Professional exchanges, such as the Edward R. Murrow Program for Journalists, which has brought more than 1,000 foreign journalists to the United States since 2006, offer journalists the opportunity to interact with their U.S. peers, improve journalistic skills, and learn best practices for maintaining their safety while working in difficult environments.

Thanks to Congress's support of the Democracy Fund (DF), our DRL bureau supports programs that train journalists on how to be more secure in their work, through our global Internet freedom programs and our country-specific programs, including in Burma, Mexico, and Sri Lanka. DF also supports the SAFE Initiative which provides state-of-the-art trainings to journalists on physical and digital security and psychosocial care through centers in El Salvador, Georgia, and Kenya which serve journalists in their regions.

We have learned that we need to be able to respond to journalists' security needs as they themselves are responding to breaking and evolving crises. Training journalists on how to most safely and securely conduct their work – in many different kinds of environments, including in conflict zones and during protests, and under constant surveillance either by state or non-state actors – is more important now than ever before. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, 1,054 journalists have been killed since

1992, 617 with impunity. Fourteen journalists have been killed so far in 2014, and 211 were jailed in 2013. As such, through SAFE, we are piloting a “mobile hub” in Turkey that will support journalists working in Syria. Our goal is to not only assist these journalists so that they can work as safely as possible but to also develop best practices for opening similar mobile hubs when other crises arise.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (3)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

The scale of the Syria crisis continues to increase exponentially. Nine million Syrians, approaching half of the country's pre-war population, have fled their homes. Six and a half million people are internally displaced and nearly 2.5 million have sought refuge in neighboring countries. The suffering of Syrian civilians is alarming and overwhelming, with women and children disproportionately vulnerable to the violence and the effects of the war. The UN humanitarian appeal for Syria in 2014 is \$6.5 billion. Despite the continued expansion of humanitarian need, the President's FY15 budget proposal requests less money in the Overseas Contingency operations account for humanitarian programs (International Disaster Assistance and Migration and Refugee Assistance) than Congress provided in the FY14 Omnibus Appropriations bill. How can the Administration's proposed budget ensure that the US continues to provide its fair share of contributions to UN agencies and non-governmental organizations seeking to respond to the Syria crisis in light of growing humanitarian needs?

Answer:

Thanks to the support of the Congress, the U.S. government is the single-largest donor of humanitarian assistance for those affected by the Syria crisis, providing more than \$1.7 billion in humanitarian aid – nearly \$878 million to aid those inside Syria, and nearly \$862 million to support refugees fleeing from Syria and to help host communities in neighboring countries.

In the FY14 Omnibus Appropriations bill, Congress generously provided additional Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for humanitarian programs. This funding is critical to address growing humanitarian needs worldwide, including the Syria crisis. The UN humanitarian appeal for Syria nearly doubled over the last year. It represents half of the 2014 total worldwide humanitarian need of \$12.9 billion. Given the significant and continuing humanitarian needs inside Syria and across the region, the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development plan to carry over several hundred million dollars from FY 2014 into FY 2015. This carryover will be used to help address the substantial needs of the projected 11 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside Syria, and five million refugees from Syria in the region, as well as communities in countries that are experiencing strains on their health and educational systems and the services they provide the public as a result of hosting so many refugees.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (4)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

Natural resources form the foundation of economic prosperity in the developing world. As scarcity and competition increase for natural resources U.S. national security interests are put at risk. We are already witnessing this with elephant poaching, illegal logging and unsustainable fisheries. The Congress continues to invest in international conservation programs in the US budget for these reasons. The Administration recently released a National Strategy to Combat Wildlife Trafficking.

- Why have the USAID Biodiversity Program and wildlife poaching and trafficking accounts not been included in the FY15 Budget Request?

While the FY15 Budget Request doesn't include a cross-cut for anti-poaching and wildlife trafficking, I request an analysis of the entire budget that demonstrates the whole of government investments in combating wildlife trafficking consistent with the National Strategy to Combat Wildlife Trafficking.

Answer:

Details on biodiversity programs are included in the FY 2015 Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) Annex, which is now available online. The FY 2015 request includes \$93.0 million for biodiversity programs. These programs focus on conserving the most biologically diverse places in the world, addressing the wildlife trafficking crisis, and

protecting the natural systems that can help alleviate extreme poverty and provide a foundation for development.

The FY 2015 request includes \$21.8 million specifically to address wildlife trafficking. This amount includes \$19.0 million in Development Assistance (DA) funding, which also contributes towards biodiversity goals, and \$2.8 million International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance.

The wildlife funding for State and USAID in the FY 2015 request will advance all three strategic priorities identified in the National Strategy to Combat Wildlife Trafficking. It will strengthen enforcement globally by facilitating the development of effective regional Wildlife Enforcement Networks, supporting the development of technological tools to combat wildlife trafficking, and providing technical assistance to governments to build the capacity to stop poaching and illegal wildlife trade, develop wildlife trafficking laws, and bring traffickers to justice. It will reduce demand for illegally traded wildlife by supporting campaigns to reduce consumption of wildlife and wildlife parts in Asia and raise awareness of the impact of the illegal trade in wildlife on the environment and the local communities. It will expand international diplomacy and cooperation by engaging the broader foreign policy community at the highest levels through

multilateral, regional, and bilateral venues, and supporting community-based wildlife conservation through working with local communities to develop and sustain anti-poaching efforts, encourage alternative livelihoods, and create support for community-based economically-viable wildlife conservation.

The State and USAID programming would address the three strategic priorities identified in the National Strategy in accordance with the guiding principles identified by the strategy. For example, programming will strengthen partnerships with governments that have an interest in countering wildlife trafficking as well as with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector. USAID's wildlife trafficking "tech challenge" will engage private sector partners to develop new technologies in areas such as transit and forensics, in addition to other partnership with NGOs working in these areas, such as TRAFFIC.

Programming will improve the quality of information available on wildlife trafficking by developing innovative and science-based tools to gather and share information needed to fight wildlife trafficking and to assess and improve our and our partners' efforts. For example, USAID is working to improve knowledge on the complexity and criminology of the illegal trade in elephant ivory, rhino horn, abalone, tigers, and snow

leopards. USAID is building on the results of these analyses to work with governments to intervene to disrupt wildlife trade at key intervention points, while also assessing and building their capacity to address trafficking.

Additionally, other agencies invest complementary resources and bring their technical expertise to the trafficking crisis. For example, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service also invests in conservation of key species such as elephants, tigers, and rhinos.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (5)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

Mr. Secretary, I have heard reports that the Department routinely denies tourist visas to young Israelis who want to travel to the United States after their military service but before they resume university studies. The problem has gotten so bad that many are simply not applying because they believe they will be turned down.

Mr. Secretary, would you tell the committee what the denial rate is for tourist visas for young Israelis between the age of 21-27? I'd be grateful if you would tell the Committee both the number who applied and the number of those who received a visa and not simply the percentage of applications that were approved.

Answer:

In FY 2013, 18,562 Israelis in the age range of 21-27 applied for a B1/B2 (tourist) visa in Tel Aviv, and 12,307 of them received their visa. More than 66 percent of individuals in this group received a visa.

Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) imposes the presumption of intending immigration on all nonimmigrant visa applicants. Younger applicants generally tend to be less likely than their elders to have the strong ties needed to overcome the statutory presumption

of immigrant intent, particularly if they are not working or enrolled in school. This situation is not unique to Israel.

Question:

Would you also tell the Committee whether there is a policy in place to preemptively deny this group of Israelis the opportunity to travel to the United States?

Answer:

I am deeply concerned that there appears to be a serious misunderstanding about the U.S. visa adjudication process in Israel. The United States does not have a policy of denying Israelis visas.

More than 90 percent of all Israeli applicants qualify for visas, and more than 80 percent of young Israeli applicants (ages 21-30) receive visas. There is an age disparity, but this is typical for visa applicants worldwide. Section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) imposes the presumption of intending immigration on all nonimmigrant visa applicants. Younger applicants generally tend to be less likely than their elders to have the strong ties needed to overcome the statutory presumption of immigrant intent, particularly if they are not working or enrolled in school.

Worldwide, we also see a desire among some young people who have not yet begun their university studies or launched careers to spend an

extended period of time traveling abroad. A subset of these applicants, which is by no means confined to Israel, seeks to finance their travels through overseas employment. We welcome those who choose to do so within the correct visa categories, and our issuance rate for J-1 working visas for young Israelis was more than 95 percent in FY 2013. Unfortunately, we find that a subset of visa applicants worldwide fail to understand that it is not permissible to work on a B1/B2 visitor visa. An officer may suspect that an applicant intends to work if the applicant is unable to articulate clearly what he or she intends to do during their visit or how they will fund an extended stay in the United States. Consular officers evaluate such applicants individually, as they do all visa applications, and on a case-by-case basis determine whether the applicant overcomes the presumption of immigrant intent and intends to abide by the terms of the visitor visa category.

Our posts throughout the world, including those in Israel, actively engage in outreach to enhance understanding of what activities are permissible on a visitor visa. Embassy Tel Aviv has engaged in extensive efforts to educate young Israelis regarding which activities are permissible on a B1/B2 visa, and how they can pursue other visas should their goal be to work while in the United States. The Embassy has engaged directly with the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to improve

Israeli awareness of the requirements and restrictions on visitor visas, including collaborating on YouTube videos posted on the Embassy's website. Embassy personnel have worked with the organizers of IDF job fairs to exclude illegal recruiters and have engaged with the Jewish Agency and World Zionist Organization to highlight opportunities for young Israelis to come to the United States as camp counselors. Ambassador Shapiro appears in an Embassy video speaking of his past experiences with Israeli camp counselors together with current summer camp counselors telling their own stories of cultural exchange and enrichment. Israeli media have covered these efforts extensively. Recently, Yediot, Israel's largest daily newspaper, published a two-page article about the Embassy's new webpage and Facebook campaign to publicize Summer-Work Travel opportunities, which are underused in Israel.

I hope this information allays your concerns. We welcome Israeli visitors of all ages, and are hopeful that through our ongoing education efforts overseas we will continue to dispel misunderstandings about the visa process.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (6)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

President Obama has identified genocide prevention as a "core national security interest and core moral responsibility" of the United States. Can you foresee any circumstances in which you, or any official of the U.S. government, should be anything less than fully honest and forthright in condemning any known instance of genocide, including the Armenian Genocide?

Answer:

The U.S. government clearly acknowledges as historical fact and mourns that 1.5 million Armenians were massacred or marched to their deaths in the final days of the Ottoman Empire. These horrific events resulted in one of the worst atrocities of the 20th century, and the United States recognizes that they remain a great source of pain for the people of Armenia and of Armenian descent, as they do for all of us who share basic universal values. As the President has emphasized in his April 24th Remembrance Day statements, the achievement of a full, frank, and just acknowledgement of the facts of what occurred in 1915 is in all our interests.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (7)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

President Obama has repeatedly stated that "I have consistently stated my own view of what occurred in 1915." These views include an extensive public record of documents and statements, including the following:

- 1) "Nearly 2 million Armenians were deported during the Armenian Genocide, which was carried out by the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923, and approximately 1.5 million of those deported were killed." (Senator Obama, Question for the Record to Ambassador-designate Yovanovitch, June 19, 2008.)
- 2) "The occurrence of the Armenian genocide is a widely documented fact supported by an overwhelming collection of historical evidence." (Senator Obama, statement commemorating the Armenian Genocide, April 28, 2008.)
- 3) "[T]he Armenian Genocide is not an allegation, a personal opinion, or a point of view, but rather a widely documented fact supported by an overwhelming body of historical evidence." (Barack Obama on the Importance of US-Armenia Relations, January 19, 2008.)

Do you dispute or disagree with any of the above statements? If so, which statements and why?

Answer:

As the President has emphasized in his April 24th Remembrance Day statements, the achievement of a full, frank, and just acknowledgement of the facts of what occurred in 1915 is in all our interests. I support the President's policy.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (8)
House Appropriations Committee
March 12, 2014**

Question:

In light of the priority that the President has attached to moving Turkey toward an honest reckoning with its past, will any representatives from the State Department be participating in any commemorations of the Armenian Genocide that will be taking place in either Washington, DC or Turkey? If not, please explain your reasons for not doing so.

Answer:

A senior representative from our Consulate in Istanbul attended last year's April 24 commemoration event in Istanbul; the Consulate is planning to send an official to this year's commemoration as well. This is typically the largest and most public event held in Turkey on Remembrance Day itself, and Istanbul is where the vast majority of Armenian citizens live in Turkey. In addition, Ambassador Heffern will participate in a Remembrance Day event in Yerevan.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (9)
House Appropriations Committee
March 12, 2014**

Question :

Please provide the Committee with references to and copies of any and all public expressions of support that the State Department has made, regarding individuals and groups within Turkey who are calling upon their government to openly recognize the Armenian Genocide.

Answer:

Over the last several years, the Department of State has supported civil society and people-to-people initiatives to encourage Turkey-Armenia reconciliation, including programs that would support the President's call for "a full, frank, and just acknowledgement of the facts" regarding events in 1915. For example, our embassy in Turkey provided a grant in 2013 to the Istanbul-based Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) to enhance dialogue with the Armenian diaspora in the United States.

The August 2011 decree by Turkey to create a process for the return of stolen church properties did not allow for the return of the vast majority of stolen church properties which were confiscated during the Armenian Genocide.

We recognize religious minority groups continue to face challenges in Turkey. We are encouraged by concrete steps the government of Turkey has taken over the past year to return properties to religious communities, including the return of the Mor Gabriel Monastery and 47 acres of property surrounding Halki Seminary. The State Department regularly engages at all levels with Turkish officials regarding the importance of religious freedom, including the reopening of Halki Seminary, legal reforms aimed at lifting restrictions on religious groups, property restitution, and specific cases of religious discrimination. We continue to encourage the government of Turkey to follow through on the return of religious minority properties and to take additional steps to promote religious freedom, such as allowing more religious communities to own property, register their places of worship, and train their clergy.

**Question for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (10)
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

In August 2012, Azerbaijan's President pardoned, praised, and promoted a confessed axe-murderer Ramil Safarov, who was convicted of killing a sleeping Armenian at a 2005 NATO English language training program in Hungary? President Obama quickly condemned the release and you, as a Senator, rightfully quickly condemned Azerbaijan by stating, "I am shocked and appalled that Azerbaijan not only welcomed Safarov home, but pardoned, promoted, and treated him as a hero."

Moreover, Azerbaijan continues to reject the international community's and Armenia's calls to pull back snipers and President Aliyev has repeatedly stated that "only [the] first stage" of the war is over, that Azerbaijan is prepared to attack Nagorno Karabakh, and that "Our main enemies are Armenians of the world"

In light of Azerbaijan's public acts and threats of aggression, what are you doing to urge Azerbaijan to re-incarcerate Ramil Safarov? Why does the Administration support allocating military assistance to Azerbaijan, when it continues such belligerent and provocative policies?

Azerbaijan has threatened to shoot down civilian aircraft that fly into the Nagorno Karabakh airport. What warnings have we given Baku about threats against civilian airliners, and what consequence would Azerbaijan face if it were to shoot down civilian aircraft?

Answer:

As a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States continues working to help the sides reach a just and peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. We condemn any action or rhetoric that fuels tensions in the region, as well as steps by any side that serve only to diminish trust or threaten to damage the peace process. I have discussed the issue of civil flights to Nagorno-Karabakh with the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan at the highest levels. The Minsk Group Co-Chairs are working to help the sides find a means of resolving this issue diplomatically, and have received assurances from the sides that they reject any threat or use of force against civil aircraft. Similarly, we expressed our deep concern over the 2012 pardon of Ramil Safarov, and continue working to urge the sides to work toward, not against, a just, lasting and fair settlement.

Security assistance for Azerbaijan is carefully reviewed to ensure it does not undermine efforts for a peaceful settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh. Such assistance is focused on counterterrorism and maritime security.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (#11)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

What steps are being taken to ensure that our diplomats and locally engaged personnel serving in embassies overseas are being adequately protected to conduct their missions? What progress has been made toward fully implementing the Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB) recommendations, particularly those focusing on employee security awareness?

Answer:

The State Department maintains a robust global presence at 275 locations, many in challenging security environments where U.S. national security interests are at stake. Every day we work to protect our people and missions by constantly assessing our security posture in view of rapidly changing environments and the threats they present. We realize that we can never provide a 100 percent risk-free operating environment; however, we constantly strive to mitigate risk to the maximum extent possible.

Following the attacks in Benghazi, Libya, the independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB) on December 19, 2012, issued 29 recommendations to the Department of State. The Department accepted

each of the ARB's recommendations and is committed to implementing them. While all ARB-related tasks are being addressed, full implementation of certain tasks will require additional time and reforming the organization in critical ways. Over the past year, significant progress has been made to implement these recommendations. The Department:

- Created a new Deputy Assistant Secretary for High Threat Posts who is responsible for ensuring that such posts receive focused attention;
- Ensured Diplomatic Security (DS) staff attend regular regional bureau meetings, and regional bureau staff attend DS daily briefings to communicate on security issues;
- Adjusted the work requirements and position descriptions for senior-level staff to reflect their specific responsibility for overseas security;
- With Congressional support, the Department created 151 new Diplomatic Security positions. 113 employees, including 75 new DS agents, were hired in 2013. The remaining 38 employees will be hired in FY 2014.
- Revised the Memorandum of Agreement with the Marine Corps, re-defining the role of Marine Security Guards (MSG), and increasing the emphasis placed on protecting our personnel (in addition to classified information);

- Reviewed and revised guidance on tripwires; developed a new application for tripwire reporting and awareness;
- Revised high-threat DS training, refined Chief of Mission protective detail training; and raised standards for passing the High Threat Tactical Course;
- Working with the Department of Defense, we are accelerating the deployment of 35 new MSG detachments to U.S. diplomatic facilities. Eight detachments were established in 2013 and another one just came on-line. Thirteen new detachments are expected to be in place by the end of 2014 and we will continue to work with the Department of Defense to deploy the remaining thirteen detachments;
- The Marine Corps also established the Marine Security Augmentation Unit (MSAU) in Quantico, Virginia, which will be able to provide MSGs on short notice at the request of Chiefs of Mission. These Marines are drawn primarily from combat arms specialties, and have extra training in close-quarters battle, trauma, and weapons and tactics. Nine MSAU squads were established in January 2014;
- Convened two panels of outside experts, one to assess DS organization and management, and the other to identify best security practices and evaluate U.S. security platforms at High-Threat Posts.

We recognize our work will never be done. The Department continues to reinforce that security is everyone's responsibility. While risk can never be completely eliminated from our diplomatic and development duties, together, we must always work to minimize it.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (#12)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

The U.S. continues to support the democratic and economic development of Georgia - both through strong levels of economic assistance and a second Millennium Challenge Corporation compact with that country. What efforts are being made to ensure that U.S. assistance reaches all communities and regions in Georgia equally, including the impoverished region of Samtskhe-Javakheti, which is predominantly populated by Armenians?

Answer:

The United States has focused and continues to focus significant assistance resources toward programs that benefit the Samtskhe-Javakheti region of Georgia. The largest U.S. assistance investment in that area has been the over \$200 million for the first Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact effort that rehabilitated approximately 222 kilometers of a main road linking Tbilisi with Samtskhe-Javakheti to foster economic development in the region by increasing exports of agricultural products.

The United States also provides grants and technical assistance directly to individuals in Samtskhe-Javakheti. U.S. agricultural development activities have included cattle farming, trout farming, potato production, dairy

processing, feed production and beekeeping in the region. Our programs also target social sector development. For example, U.S. assistance rehabilitated three public hospitals in the region, and a primary education project includes teaching Georgian-language in schools in Samtskhe-Javakheti to improve the children's ability to participate in the Georgian economy and political life.

More generally, USAID's Social Infrastructure Renovation Program provides short-term employment opportunities to residents of selected communities and targets areas predominately populated by non-Georgian ethnic minorities who have often felt bypassed by the economic and social progress enjoyed in more economically developed areas of Georgia. U.S. programming also supports efforts that work to safeguard minority rights. One example is a State Department project implemented by Project Harmony International that teaches students in the Armenian language about their rights and responsibilities as Georgian citizens. U.S. humanitarian and social recovery programs target vulnerable populations such as ethnic Armenians. These programs have included housing assistance, humanitarian demining, and access to government benefits and healthcare. These programs have helped the Government of Georgia provide primary health

care for citizens in minority regions and remote communities through the provision of commodities such as donated pharmaceuticals.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (#13)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

On December 13, 2011, the House overwhelmingly passed a resolution calling on Turkey to return confiscated Christian churches and properties (H. Res. 306). The resolution calls on the Secretary of State "in all official contacts with Turkish leaders and other Turkish officials . . . [to] emphasize that Turkey should (1) end all forms of religious discrimination . . . (2) allow the rightful church and lay owners of Christian church properties, without hindrance or restriction, to organize and administer prayer services . . . (3) return to their rightful owners all Christian churches and other places of worship, monasteries, schools, hospitals, monuments, relics, holy sites, and other religious properties." The August 2011 decree by Turkey to create a process for the return of stolen church properties did not allow for the return of the vast majority of stolen church properties which were confiscated during the Armenian Genocide. What is the State Department doing to ensure Turkey's return of all Armenian, Greek, Assyrian, and Christian minority properties?

Answer:

We recognize religious minority groups continue to face challenges in Turkey. We are encouraged by concrete steps the government of Turkey has taken over the past year to return properties to religious communities, including the return of the Mor Gabriel Monastery and 47 acres of property surrounding Halki Seminary. The State Department regularly engages at all levels with Turkish officials regarding the importance of religious freedom,

including the reopening of Halki Seminary, legal reforms aimed at lifting restrictions on religious groups, property restitution, and specific cases of religious discrimination. We continue to encourage the government of Turkey to follow through on the return of religious minority properties and to take additional steps to promote religious freedom, such as allowing more religious communities to own property, register their places of worship, and train their clergy.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (14-15)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Program
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

Can you give us an update on efforts to protect Armenian and other minority populations in Syria?

Out of all the countries that have accepted refugees from Syria, Armenia has the least amount of resources to provide for them. Would the Administration be willing to provide funds to Armenia to help manage this humanitarian burden?

Answer:

The State Department is deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian situation inside Syria, including the status of minority populations. As the single-largest donor of humanitarian assistance for those affected by the Syria crisis, the U.S. government is providing more than \$1.7 billion in humanitarian aid—nearly \$878 million to support those inside Syria, and nearly \$862 million to support refugees fleeing from Syria and host communities in neighboring countries.

Helping in Armenia:

The U.S. government provides funding to United Nations agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and non-governmental organizations to help meet the humanitarian needs of all those affected by the Syria crisis. These agencies are leaders of the international humanitarian response system.

In 2014, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) increased its funding for Armenia by \$940,000, nearly doubling the operational budget of UNHCR in Armenia, to provide humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable Syrian-Armenians who fled the crisis in Syria over the past two years. [Most of the Syrians who have fled to Armenia are not considered refugees since they are Armenian citizens; however, UNHCR considers them to be in a “refugee-like” situation.] Humanitarian assistance includes rental subsidies, income-generating activities (such as microcredit loans), medical services, and food assistance for the most vulnerable. To date in FY 2014, PRM is contributing \$88.3 million towards UNHCR’s \$1.35 billion Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP) appeal requirements.

Helping Inside Syria:

The U.S. government is engaged in intense diplomatic efforts to press for increased access for UN and other humanitarian organizations inside Syria to reach all those in need, including the 220,000 residing in besieged communities. It is unacceptable and a violation of humanitarian principles for the Syrian Arab Republic Government (SARG) to deny this access.

The United States deplores threats against minorities in Syria, who have been increasingly targeted by extremists. The Syrian people have a long history of tolerance and co-existence, but both the SARG and violent extremist groups have been fueling sectarian strife. We continue to seek and receive assurances from the moderate opposition regarding their respect for the rights of all Syrians, regardless of ethnicity, gender, or religion. In addition to humanitarian relief, the U.S. government is providing more than \$260 million in funding for non-lethal assistance to support Syria's moderate opposition, some of which promotes cross-sectarian conflict mitigation and reconciliation through coalition-building and conflict prevention training at the local level. Despite these ongoing protection efforts, the only way to definitively end threats to minorities in Syria is to end the fighting.

**Question for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (#16-19)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

The Nagorno Karabakh Republic was one of the three parties to negotiate and sign the cease fire agreement, which stopped the war in 1993 and they were full parties to the Minsk Group negotiations until 1998, when Azerbaijan succeeded in excluding them. Do you support the reinstatement of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic as a full participant in all aspects of the Minsk Group peace process? If yes, what is the Administration doing to reinstate Karabakh into the negotiations?

Please provide all needs assessments that AID or other agencies have conducted in Nagorno Karabakh, including the one AID conducted in December 2007. [AID conducted a needs assessment in 1998 that is public, but has not made public a needs assessment it finished in December 2007.]

Please provide an accounting of the Administration's distribution of aid in Nagorno Karabakh for FY13 and FY14, which includes:

- 1) Name of project and purpose
- 2) Institution(s) receiving funds
- 3) Total funding disbursement
- 4) Locations where each project is conducted
- 5) Years funded
- 6) Assessment of goals achieved

Are there any official, written restrictions or guidelines on communication, contacts, travel, or other interactions between U.S. and Nagorno Karabakh government officials? If so, please provide them.

Answer:

As a Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group along with Russia and France, the United States remains committed to helping the sides find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As part of that effort, the Co-Chairs routinely meet with senior officials from the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments and travel regularly to Nagorno-Karabakh to consult with the de facto authorities there. The United States, Russia, and France are actively working to help the sides reach agreement on a way forward.

Since 1998, the U.S. Government has provided approximately \$43.0 million in humanitarian assistance to victims of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including food, shelter, emergency and medical supplies, access to quality healthcare and water, as well as assisting with demining of land. U.S. assistance in Nagorno-Karabakh currently supports humanitarian demining, with the potable water project having been fully funded as of FY 2012.

The United States has funded the HALO Trust to conduct humanitarian demining within the Soviet-era boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh since 2001. This program is focused on clearing mines and returning lands to rural population for agricultural use in territory within the

former Soviet boundary. To date, the U.S. has provided \$10.7 million to HALO Trust for this effort. The demining project has thus far cleared 94 percent of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines and 71 percent of the battle area. The United States provided \$2.0 million in support of this program in FY 2013 funds.

From FY 2009 to FY 2012, the United States also provided approximately \$4.0 million to support the Potable Water to the Rural NK project. This program, implemented by CESCO Ltd., focused on the rehabilitation and provision of potable water supply systems in seven villages (Taghavard, Qert, Shekher, Machkalashen, Spitakashen, Herher and Kaghartsi) in the Martuni region of NK. The population of these seven villages is about 4,200 people, all of whom are beneficiaries. The main purpose of the project was to ensure safe and reliable continuous water supply in those villages. The activities included construction of daily regulating reservoirs, renovation work at the sources, provision of a village-level distribution network and observation regulating chambers, as well as water meters for households. All construction work was completed as of mid-December 2013, and a post-completion monitoring site visit is scheduled for April 2014. The project was fully funded upon receiving its FY 2011 and FY 2012 funds.

U.S. Government officials generally do not travel to Nagorno-Karabakh due to the ongoing conflict, with the exception of individuals traveling under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (20)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

With an eye toward developing and retaining the most competitive diplomatic corps possible, what is being done to reverse the present disincentive to serve overseas, resulting from those doing so receiving only 2/3 of Washington, DC, base pay, while colleagues in some non-foreign affairs agencies receive the full amount? Given your authority as Secretary to implement OCP adjustments, what obstacles are preventing the permanent authorization and appropriation of the third tranche of Overseas Comparability Pay for the Foreign Service?

Answer:

Overseas Comparability Pay (OCP) is not a pay raise, nor is it an additional allowance or benefit. It corrects a 20-year-old unintended inequity in the worldwide Foreign Service pay schedule.

OCP is a significant component in the Department's efforts to reestablish its competitiveness in the workplace. The Department must continually recruit, develop, and retain the best and brightest Foreign Service Officers and Specialists as it competes with not only other international agencies across the globe where Foreign Service employees are located, but also U.S. corporations based in Washington, DC.

The pay disparity between Washington, DC and overseas Foreign Service employees has long-lasting effects on an employee's compensation and benefits that compound over the course of an employee's career. For example, the Department mandates contributions to employee Federal Thrift Savings Plans (TSP) that are solely based on an employee's basic pay, inclusive of locality pay, and have a definitive effect on retirement options.

The authority contained in the FY 2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-32) for OCP is not permanent, but has been renewed each year through appropriations bills or continuing resolutions. The Department supports permanent authorization for OCP, as we do not believe this authority to provide a basic component of pay should have to be continually renewed by Congress. Until permanent authority for OCP is enacted, the Department must continue to seek extension of authorization for OCP each year, and recent appropriations have limited the authority to approximately two-thirds of the DC locality rate. Unfortunately, the FY 2014 appropriation bill included revised language that would unintentionally reduce OCP by 0.4 percent. We are seeking a technical correction to this provision so that we are not forced to further cut the pay of Foreign Service personnel serving overseas.

In developing the FY 2015 President's Budget, the Administration grappled with many difficult tradeoffs among competing priorities for the Department of State and other agencies. As recent appropriation legislation has indicated that full authority for OCP is contingent upon action by the appropriate authorizing committees, funding in the FY 2015 Budget was sustained at the Phase I and II levels, equivalent to 16.52 percent. The Department continues to support the full implementation of OCP at the full Washington DC locality rate, and will prioritize resources for that purpose once the authority is enacted.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (21)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

Given the importance of our diplomats communicating effectively overseas, what steps are being taken to improve language training for Foreign Service Officers, which lags behind other U.S. Government agencies? What progress has been made on the ARB recommendations to improve language training for FSOs, including providing better instructors at the Foreign Service Institute to improve the low rates of success in several critical languages?

Answer:

The Department has always attached great importance to ensuring that American diplomatic personnel have the foreign language skills needed to advance U.S. policy objectives. Annually, more than 1,500 members of the Foreign Service (as well as employees of the foreign affairs agencies) take long-term language training at the Foreign Service Institute's (FSI) School of Language Studies. Study takes place at the George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center in Arlington, VA and at FSI's overseas field schools and regional programs. Courses range from 24 weeks for Spanish to 88 weeks for the four "super-hard" languages (Arabic, Mandarin Chinese, Japanese, and Korean). FSI's School of Language Studies is staffed by

well-qualified linguists and specialists in adult second language acquisition, educational technology, curriculum development, program management, and related functions.

Most Foreign Service members in training at FSI have a proficiency goal in speaking and reading that corresponds to the requirements of the Language Designated Position as measured on the Government-wide Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) scale. The ILR scale measures proficiency from Level 1 – Elementary Proficiency, to Level 5 – Functionally Native Proficiency. About 65 percent of the Department’s Language Designated Positions are set at the Speaking-3/Reading-3 level, General Professional Proficiency. In FY 2013, the “success rate” (the number of FSI students who achieved the training goal) was 87 percent, which is consistent with training results over recent years.

FSI is committed to playing a leadership role in the language training community, which requires continuous improvements to training methodologies. Recent improvements include:

- Limiting class sizes in French and Spanish, our two largest programs.
- Rigorous monitoring and tracking of student progress.

- Piloting innovative learning style assessments developed by the Center for Advanced Study of Languages (CASL) at the University of Maryland.
- With the Director General of the Foreign Service, we are developing programs aimed at advanced language mastery (“Beyond 3”).
- Enhanced professional development for staff.

FSI is convinced that these measures will enable it to continue to stay in the vanguard of the professional language training community.

FSI has responded to recommendations in the Independent Accountability Review Board on Benghazi by working with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) to develop an innovative “task-based” approach to training for DS personnel. The “ALERT” (Awareness, Language, and Emergency Response Training) approach gives DS personnel assigned to high-threat posts essential job-based language skills and enhanced situational awareness. FSI is currently conducting its second session of Arabic ALERT training, and its first session of Urdu ALERT; the first session of French ALERT will commence June 30. FSI and DS will assess the results of ALERT training and incorporate the results of that assessment into further course offerings.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (22)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question:

Currently, the Department of State, through the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, places assignment restrictions on certain individuals when initially granting a security clearance and may also restrict employees from serving at a particular post that they bid on through the “pass-through” program. Asian Americans are one group of new hire and current employees disparately impacted by these practices. Why is there no appeals mechanism for individuals who are placed on an assignment restriction at the time of entry or subsequently? [If a security clearance is suspended or revoked there is an appeals mechanism.] What is the Department’s position on creating an appeals process to challenge these restrictions?

With respect to the pass-through process, there currently exists only a review of the decision made by the same office originally denying the assignment. What is the Department’s position on creating a more robust appeals process that would, for example, establish a level of appeal of such a decision to a more senior official within the Department?

Answer:

The Foreign Service Act requires that Foreign Service Officers maintain a Top Secret security clearance and be worldwide available for assignment as a condition of employment. An assignment restriction is a condition placed on the security clearance, most often due to the presence of significant foreign influence or foreign preference concerns present in an

individual's background as defined in the Government-wide Adjudicative Guidelines. Employees are currently restricted from service in over 40 countries. These assignment restrictions are reviewed at each periodic re-investigation, normally every five years, or upon request of the employee, if an employee believes that the factor(s) leading to the restriction have changed. While these condition-based decisions have no separate appeal channel, individuals are informed of the security concerns, and often are provided individual briefings on the issues in their background that led to the condition on their clearance.

Pass-thru decisions are recommendations made to the Director General for Human Resources (DGHR) by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) in anticipation of an employee's assignment to a critical intelligence threat post. All Department personnel assigned to any critical intelligence threat country are reviewed as part of the pass-thru process. The pass-thru restrictions are valid only for the country in question for that proposed assignment. The pass-thru restriction is not associated with an individual's security clearance. It is specific to an assignment.

The pass-thru process is designed to review changes in an employee's background which may have occurred since their last investigation, capturing changes such as marriage/divorce, investments, or group

affiliations. These changes are reevaluated under the Government-wide adjudicative guidelines.

Currently, if an individual wishes to appeal DS's pass-thru recommendation, they may contact the DGHR, who ultimately decides whether they serve in the proposed assignment. Given that the DGHR is a Senate confirmed position, the Department does not believe raising this to another senior official is necessary.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Secretary of State John F. Kerry by
Representative Adam Schiff (23)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
March 12, 2014**

Question :

What steps are the State Department taking to help alleviate the bureaucratic logjam that has prevented thousands of Iraqis who risked their lives helping the United States in the Iraq war from receiving the special visas they were guaranteed, including more than 2/3 of the 25,000 visas created for Iraqi interpreters? Likewise, what is being done to fix a similar problem faced by Afghans who supported U.S. forces in the Afghanistan war, including the processing of just 1,000 of the 7,500 visas created for interpreters and others in a refugee program that is set to expire this September?

Answer:

The State Department and the other U.S. government departments and agencies involved in the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) process have the highest respect for the men and women who take enormous risks supporting our military and civilian personnel. We are committed to helping those who

– at great personal risk – have helped us. Over the past year, we improved processing times, expanded outreach to current and former employees who may be eligible, and issued more SIVs (in Iraq and Afghanistan combined) than in any previous year.

In the first half of FY 2014, we have issued more SIVs to Afghans and their dependents than in all of FY 2013 and surpassed the total number of Afghan principal applicants issued in FY 2013 (651). As of April 1, we have issued 3,547 SIVs to Afghans and their dependents, including 1,239 SIVs to Afghan principal applicants, in FY 2014. All approvable Iraqi principal applicants were issued prior to the program's temporary end on September 30, 2013. As of April 1, we have issued an additional 895 SIVs to Iraqis and their dependents, with 214 of these SIVs to Iraqi principal applicants, in FY 2014. The relatively low number of issuances to date in FY 2014 for Iraqis reflects the success of the surge at the end of FY 2013.

We have done this while maintaining the highest standards of security for the SIV program. We also have a responsibility to the American people to ensure that all those who enter the United States, including SIV recipients, do not pose a threat.

The majority of processing time for Iraqi and Afghan SIV applications correlates to the Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) process. Enhancements

to this process have resulted in an increased rate of vetted cases, which translated directly to an increase in SIV issuances. Further information on these process enhancements will be provided to Congressional committees in the reports on the status of the Iraqi and Afghan SIV programs, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2014.

The Afghan SIV program under section 602(b) of the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, as amended, authorized 3,000 visas for FY 2014 with carryover of any unused numbers to FY 2015. The deadline to submit a Chief of Mission (COM) application is September 30, 2014. Applicants must have one year of qualifying employment between October 7, 2001, and December 31, 2014.

TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2014.

**UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT**

WITNESS

**DR. RAJIV SHAH, ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN GRANGER

Ms. GRANGER. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs will come to order.

I want to welcome the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, Dr. Raj Shah. We always look forward to hearing your testimony and particularly on the fiscal year 2015 budget request for USAID.

The details of the administration proposal are slowly coming in, but I already see a few troubling issues from the information I have. The administration prioritizes its initiatives at the expense of congressional priorities. For example, it is difficult to justify the proposal to reduce humanitarian accounts by 25 percent at a time when significant needs remain, particularly in Syria and Africa.

USAID is doing good work to improve the health of millions of people around the world, yet there is a decrease overall for many of the lifesaving global health programs. You also propose a dramatic reduction in biodiversity programs that support important conservation activities and critical efforts to combat wildlife poaching and trafficking. I hope we can work together on these and many other budget issues.

Next I want to raise some concerns about how USAID does business. Since I joined the subcommittee 5 years ago, I have heard that the United States must do more to address aid effectiveness. Of course, this is an important goal, but not when aid effectiveness is translated as providing more assistance directly to developing countries and organizations that may not have the capacity to program the funds.

In many of these places, corruption is also a serious issue. I have concerns about this and other elements of your USAID Forward initiative. I question the assumption that foreign governments and local organizations are more effective implementers than U.S. organizations. I am also wary about their ability to manage U.S. taxpayer dollars.

That is why the fiscal year 2014 State, Foreign Operations bill strengthened standards and requirements to ensure proper oversight. I appreciate the work we have done together to increase oversight of direct assistance to foreign governments since I began, including conditions in the fiscal year 2012 bill, and I hope we can do the same for local organizations.

Dr. Shah, these are just a few of the issues I hope we will get to discuss today. I want to close by thanking you and the men and women of USAID who are committed to solving some of the most difficult global development issues around the world. All of us on this subcommittee understand and appreciate your work and their work.

I will now turn to my ranking member, Mrs. Lowey, for her opening remarks.

OPENING STATEMENT OF MRS. LOWEY

Mrs. LOWEY. Welcome, Administrator Shah, and I want to thank you for your leadership and tireless work improving the lives of vulnerable people throughout the world.

In deference to my chair and friend, I will be brief. Dr. Shah, you may recall my support for development assistance, yet I was disappointed to hear that the fiscal year 2015 budget request again underfunds basic education at \$534 million, which is unacceptable. I expect to see a much higher level of commitment than the administration has demonstrated to date.

Additionally, I am still anxiously awaiting the official budget figures for several programs, particularly family planning. As you know, family planning programs reduce maternal mortality, promote women's rights, and contribute to the stability of communities across the globe.

It is impossible to achieve food security, build democratic institutions, or sustain health outcomes without basic literacy and communication skills. In my opinion, the administration routinely underfunds education, impacting the sustainability of our development dollars. I hope you will provide greater details on our family planning and education budgets.

I am concerned about the reduction in the budget for drug-resistant tuberculosis. Drug-resistant TB is a highly contagious airborne disease that respects no borders, and threatens the health and safety of the United States. Why would you slash funds for TB control when reports indicate that new treatments, vaccines, and diagnostics are all necessary?

Finally, the press reports from last week on the "Cuba Twitter" program highlight my longstanding concerns on the potential politicization of development activities that place both USAID programs and people at risk. It is important that you clarify for this committee the nature and risks of these kinds of activities.

USAID should be using its resources, which are generously made available by the American people, to respond to current challenges overseas like we did with the Asian flu, HIV/AIDS, food insecurity, and so much more.

I look forward to hearing your testimony and ask unanimous consent to place my full statement in the record. And I yield back.

Ms. GRANGER. Without objection.

[The information follows:]

Statement of Nita M. Lowey
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs
Hearing: FY15 Budget Request for US Agency for International Development
(USAID)
April 8, 2014

Welcome Administrator Shah. Thank you for your leadership and tireless work improving the lives of vulnerable people throughout the world.

In deference to my friend and Chair, I will be brief. Dr. Shah you may recall my support for development assistance. Yet, I was disappointed to hear that the FY 2015 budget request again underfunds basic education at \$534 million, which is unacceptable. I expect to see a much higher level of commitment than the Administration has demonstrated to date.

Additionally, I am still anxiously awaiting the official budget figures for several programs, particularly family planning. As you know, family planning programs reduce maternal mortality, promote women's rights, and contribute to the stability of communities across the globe. And it is impossible to achieve food security, build democratic institutions, or sustain health outcomes without basic literacy and communication skills. In my opinion, the Administration routinely underfunds education, impacting the sustainability of our development dollars.

I hope you will provide greater details on our family planning and education budgets.

I am concerned about the reduction in the budget for drug resistant tuberculosis (TB). Drug resistant TB is a highly contagious airborne disease that respects no borders and threatens the health and safety of the United States. Why would you slash TB control when reports indicate that new treatments, vaccines, and diagnostics are all necessary?

Finally, the press reports from last week on the Cuba program highlight my long-standing concerns on the potential politicization of development activities that place both the programs and people at USAID at risk. It is important that you clarify for this Committee the nature and risks of these kinds of activities. USAID should be using its resources, which are generously made available by the American people, to respond to current challenges overseas like we did with the Asian flu, HIV/AIDS, and food insecurity.

I look forward to hearing your testimony and ask unanimous consent to place my full statement in the record.

I am very pleased you are at the helm of USAID and appreciate your leadership, as well as the tireless efforts of your colleagues at USAID. The strength of USAID is, and always has been, its dedicated public servants from the top down. As a result of the continued generosity of the American people, USAID remains on the frontlines helping reduce poverty, hunger, and disease while making targeted investments to advance democracy, education, and health.

These programs are cost-effective investments that tackle the root causes of conflict and extremism, and help save American lives by ensuring that a military response is used as the last resort. With so many global hotspots and the need for U.S. leadership greater than ever, the modest investments we make in USAID's budget are fundamental to building a better, safer world. USAID's mission is therefore critical to our own national security--forging stable, peaceful, and ultimately self-sufficient international partners. Development is as important to our nation's foreign policy as diplomacy and defense. It is also vital to building new markets for U.S. goods and services and creating good jobs and opportunities for those here at home.

These efforts require sustained funding, and I hope to learn how this year's budget request supports our goals of ending extreme poverty and promoting free and peaceful societies. I also hope you will address how this year's budget attempts to respond to today's difficult challenges, particularly the crises in Central African Republic, Syria, South Sudan, and Ukraine.

I would like to raise a number of additional issues.

First, I was disappointed to hear that the FY 2015 budget request again underfunds basic education. Education is the essential foundation for health, economic development, gender equality and long-term security. With the growing "Youth Bulge" in the developing world, children must be given the opportunity to become productive contributors to their societies – and access to education is the first, vital step in this process. I know we both agree that basic education is the key to our success in every other important development goal. Therefore, I must ask why the Administration is not investing more resources in this sector. How is USAID partnering with the Global Partnership for Education at the country level and at the global strategic level? I understand the difficulties of tradeoffs and competing priorities; nevertheless I expect to see a much higher level of commitment than the Administration has demonstrated to date.

Second, climate change is a significant priority in this budget, though this initiative is primarily funded through climate funds at the Department of Treasury. Successful programs have maximum impact when efforts are well coordinated, so I hope you will share USAID's plans to coordinate with multilateral funds and the State Department.

Third, there is irrefutable evidence that international family planning programs lead to fewer unwanted pregnancies, fewer abortions, and fewer maternal and infant deaths. When women have knowledge and access to contraceptive methods, they will have healthier pregnancies and infants, contribute to their family and communities' economic stability, and their children are more likely to go to school. Family planning programs save lives – period. We know there is

room for improvement in contraceptive technology and uninterrupted access for women living in underserved remote areas. Throughout the years, USAID has played an important role in the development of new contraceptive methods, especially those that can be used in low-resource countries. Does this year's budget support additional research in this area? By impeding access to family planning, the Global Gag Rule harms women's health and weakens efforts to reduce maternal deaths worldwide. Unfortunately, I expect the House Republican leadership to try again this year to codify the Mexico City Policy and ban funding for the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).

Fourth, you recently rolled out the Global Development Lab and have requested \$151.3 million for this initiative. I think this is an exciting idea with great potential, but I do have a few concerns. Is there "buy-in" from all the stake holders at USAID? How will the Lab leverage and coordinate investments with the other technical offices and initiatives such as the Food Security, Power Africa and Global Health? These offices also have resident scientists, engineers and physicians with years of experience and knowledge in research and technology. I recall that it took the Department of Defense's DARPA years to find partners. How will you work with private partners to produce cutting-edge research that will lead to tangible results? Can you give us examples of such innovations and how they will have a day-to-day impact on the developing world?

Fifth, the budget requests \$1 billion in USAID funding – Development Assistance and ESF – for food security and agricultural development in support of the "Feed the Future" strategy. I hope you will address how USAID is coordinating with other private and multilateral efforts in this arena. Will current Millennium Challenge Corporation investments in agriculture be adjusted to ensure that the core principles of this initiative are incorporated in their programs? How does this request promote public-private partnerships in the 19 focus countries? What new countries would this budget request support?

Sixth, in my years on this subcommittee I have seen firsthand how electric shortages remain an impediment to economic growth. Power Africa is a presidential initiative in the FY 2015 budget that envisions doubling the access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa. I hope you will elaborate on how this year's funding will support the goals of Power Africa, help promote a regional power policy, and facilitate private investments into sub-Saharan Africa.

Seventh, reports indicate that there is a shortage of 7.2 million frontline health workers - doctors, nurses and midwives – worldwide. The regions with the most severe shortages also suffer from high child and maternal mortality as well as disease prevalence. How does this year's request strengthen our commitment – as well as that of our partners – to addressing the need for skilled and equipped health workers to reach the most vulnerable communities?

Eighth, the Development Leadership Initiative of 2008 sought to double the size of the USAID Foreign Service to 2,400. I am disappointed that we have not yet accomplished this objective, which would allow USAID to decrease its reliance on contractors, reduce the size of contracts and grants, and increase direct oversight of these grants and contracts - leading to better performance and outcomes throughout the Agency. I understand USAID has lost many seasoned foreign and civil service staff to retirement, so I hope you will describe how USAID

will maintain sufficient technical and managerial expertise to carry out the Administration's and Congress' programmatic priorities going forward.

Ninth, it has been over four years since the devastating earthquake struck Haiti. President Martelly was in Washington earlier this year asking for our continued assistance to his country. Please elaborate on our long-term reconstruction and development efforts, particularly as we approach the 5th anniversary of the earthquake.

Lastly, I was very pleased to see the Obama Administration affirm that "gay rights are human rights and human rights are gay rights." Yet the increase in discriminatory and draconian legislation against LGBT persons around the world is appalling. What is the public health impact of such laws and please describe USAID's efforts to promote rights for gays and lesbians abroad.

Thank you again for your remarkable efforts on behalf of our nation. I look forward to hearing your testimony.

Ms. GRANGER. And thank you. We are trying to get through—this is a good attendance, particularly when we have multiple subcommittee hearings today, and so we are trying to get through before votes.

Thank you.

Dr. Shah, please proceed with your opening remarks. I would strongly encourage you to summarize your remarks so we leave enough time for questions and answers. Your full written statement will be placed in the record.

OPENING STATEMENT OF DR. SHAH

Dr. SHAH. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Congresswoman Lowey and members of the committee.

I am very enthusiastic to be here to discuss with you President Obama's fiscal year 2015 budget request for USAID. You know, USAID's mission is very clearly to focus and partner with all types of organizations and all parts of society to help end extreme poverty and its consequences around the world and to promote resilient democratic societies.

Your efforts to support USAID over the last 4 or 5 years have helped us do some extraordinary things together. You have helped us rebuild our staff by more than 1,000 people. You have helped us rebuild our budget and policy operations and to put in place a monitoring and evaluation system that allows us to be accountable and sophisticated in how we pursue our mission.

Your support has enabled us to launch the U.S. Global Development Lab, which will help to elevate the role of science, technology, and innovation in helping to accelerate the goals we hope to achieve. And your approach has helped us lead around the world a series of public-private partnerships that leverage our investments with private sector resources to stretch American taxpayer dollars and get better results.

This year's budget, which is presented in the context of overall fiscal constraint at the top line for the 150 account and in particular for foreign assistance given some of the major security investments that have been proposed, still maintains a commitment to core and important priorities.

These include a nearly \$1 billion investment in Feed the Future, which has helped to now reach 7 million farmers and is moving 12.5 million children out of a condition of being chronically hungry and helping them achieve self-sufficiency.

It includes nearly \$2.7 billion for child survival, which I continue to believe is the most efficient return on investment we make as the U.S. Government, when it comes to serving the needs of the world's most vulnerable.

And it includes significant investments in education, water, and energy, all of which are the subject of new, comprehensive strategies that govern our work and new ways to evaluate results and report back to Congress and the American people on what their generosity is achieving.

I also look forward to discussing the pressures created by three Level-3 emergencies this year—Syria, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan—and note that our teams are involved in leading global humanitarian responses in each of those settings.

Given the shortness of time, I look forward to the discussion of the topics that were raised in your opening statements, and I would like to conclude just by noting that this year, I had the opportunity to present some thoughts at the National Prayer Breakfast.

And I remain convinced that if we can continue to build a broad tent of public support for America's efforts to lead development, health, and humanitarian efforts around the world, and if we can continue to pursue what are sometimes difficult reforms to ensure that we are using our money wisely, reporting on results, and improving the cost effectiveness of our investments, that America still has the capacity to lead the world in ending extreme poverty and serving the needs of the world's most vulnerable. And that that, over time, will continue to make us safer, more secure, and more admired.

Thank you.

**Testimony of
Dr. Rajiv Shah
Administrator
U.S. Agency for International Development
Before
House Appropriations Subcommittee
on State, Foreign Operations
FY 2015 Budget
April 8, 2014**

Thank you Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Lowey, and members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to join you to discuss the President's fiscal year 2015 budget request for the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Four years ago, President Obama set forth a new vision of a results-driven USAID that would lead the world in development. We have since risen to this challenge, pioneering a new model of development that brings a greater emphasis on partnerships, innovation, and results. We are guided in these efforts by a new mission statement: we partner to end extreme poverty and promote resilient democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity.

Although these goals are not new, they reflect a unique moment in development today when exciting opportunities are emerging to change what is possible. In a time of fiscal restraint, we are applying the new model to seize this moment and reach more people, save more lives, and leverage more private investment than ever before—delivering results for the American people and those in greatest need around the world.

The President's fiscal year 2015 budget responds to unprecedented development challenges, including some of the most significant events unfolding on the world stage today.

When Typhoon Haiyan swept across the Philippines, we swung into action, leading and coordinating the U.S. Government civilian and military humanitarian response and distributing life-saving aid, including highly-nutritious food products to feed hungry children and adults. In Ukraine, we remain committed to helping citizens realize the democratic aspirations that many spent months on the Maidan demanding. For nearly 20 years, we have stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the people of Ukraine, putting 1.8 million land titles into the hands of farmers and helping civil society leaders develop recommendations, including on anti-corruption, in an comprehensive reform package for the government. Many of the recommendations are being implemented through new and revised legislation.

In South Sudan, as citizens face a looming humanitarian catastrophe that will leave half the country on the brink of famine, we are racing against the clock to save lives. And as we saw just a few days ago, citizens in Afghanistan voted for a new president

to lead them towards a brighter, more stable future. In support of the Afghan-owned election process, USAID provided extensive guidance on how to prevent electoral fraud, as well as capacity building support for independent domestic observers, civil society, media, and political parties to help ensure a transparent electoral process.

The budget enables us to respond effectively to these events and address the underlying causes of extreme poverty through President Obama's Feed the Future, Global Health, Global Climate Change, and Power Africa initiatives. It advances our national security by building linkages to emerging markets, strengthening democracy and human rights, and promoting broad-based economic growth. It helps vulnerable communities strengthen their resilience to crises and natural disasters. It facilitates strategic engagement in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as across the Asia-Pacific and Latin America. It also focuses our activities in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, ensuring that we sustain the gains we have made.

Even though we work far from home, our work continues to realize benefits for our home: for opportunities we open for American businesses, the skills of our young people we help build, and the threats to our security that we help prevent. For less than one percent of the federal budget, we are delivering results that shape a more secure and prosperous future for the American people and the world.

A NEW MODEL FOR DEVELOPMENT

The FY 2015 budget request for USAID managed or partially managed accounts is \$20.1 billion, one percent below the total enacted FY 2014 funding for these accounts. In this constrained budget environment, USAID is focused on maximizing the value of every dollar. Over the past five years, we have made difficult choices about where our work will have the greatest impact, shifting resources and personnel to better advance our mission of ending extreme poverty around the world.

Since 2010, regional bureaus have reduced program areas by 34 percent; USAID global health program areas have been phased out of 23 countries; and Feed the Future agriculture programs have been phased out of 26 countries. We are reducing programs in countries that have turned a corner, like Mongolia, and transitioning Missions to Offices. We are shifting resources to countries in critical need and where our work has the widest impact.

Over the past three years, the USAID Forward reform agenda has touched upon every part of our Agency. We've revamped our budget to include more rigorous performance monitoring and impact evaluation, expanded the use of science, technology, and public-private partnerships, and improved talent management. In each area of reform, we set aspirational targets that have established a common language for success, challenged our partners, and encouraged us to step out of our comfort zone.

Taken together, these reforms have formed the foundation of a new model of development that defines the way we work around the world. With this new model,

we are backing cutting-edge innovation, taking advantage of fast-moving technology, and harnessing the vast potential of the development community to achieve unprecedented results.

Today, all our major programs are independently evaluated, and those evaluations are available right now on an iPhone app—an unprecedented level of transparency. The quality of our evaluations has improved significantly, which is an important sign that we are increasingly grounding our work in evidence and data. Missions are reporting dozens of different ways that these evaluations are strengthening our programs in the field. Through an evaluation in Benin, we learned that community health programs naturally favored men in their hiring, which limited our ability to provide care to women. So we're redesigning our recruitment to help more women become community health workers.

Working closely with local leaders, governments, and organizations, we are strengthening the capacity of our partner countries to create stronger communities and brighter futures without our assistance. In 2013 alone, our emphasis on local solutions enabled us to support 1,150 local organizations in 74 countries. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for instance, we have worked with 12 local governments to improve their tax collection, so they can afford to pay the salaries of teachers and health workers. As a result, they have increased revenues by 95 percent since 2009.

We are also mobilizing a new generation of innovators and scientists to advance our mission. Launched last week, the U.S. Global Development Lab represents an historic investment in the power of science and technology to bend the curve of development. With \$151 million in funding, it will generate and scale breakthrough solutions to complex development challenges, while attracting private sector investment to improve the sustainability of our solutions. Already, it has generated cutting-edge inventions—including the bubble CPAP, a device from Texas that can resuscitate newborns at a fraction of the price of existing machines.

To maximize the impact of the Lab, we seek new authorities from Congress. These include the ability to hire a diverse range of staff; to use development assistance funding programmed for science, technology, and innovation for all development purposes, including health; and to use a “pay-for-success” model to incentivize the best solutions from innovators around the world—all of which will help us catalyze a wave of innovation that solves the toughest development challenges on the planet.

We are increasingly focused on engaging a wide array of partners, from our long-standing partners in the development community, to faith organizations, to multinational corporations. Through our Development Credit Authority (DCA), we unlocked a record \$1.02 billion over the last two years alone in commercial capital to empower entrepreneurs around the world. Earlier this year, we partnered with GE and Kenya Commercial Bank to help health care providers buy life-saving healthcare equipment, including portable ultrasound devices and MRI machines. For the first time ever, our private sector partner is covering the cost of the loan

guarantee—making this program virtually costless for the American taxpayer. To build on this success, the request seeks to increase the annual cap on loans under DCA guarantees from \$1.5 billion to \$2 billion, a measure that will enable us to ramp up high-impact projects, particularly through Power Africa.

CORE PRIORITIES

Under the leadership of President Obama, we are applying the new model to deliver unprecedented results across our work, from expanding access to mobile money to empowering women and girls to strengthening land tenure rights to safeguarding the world's biodiversity.

FEED THE FUTURE

In this request, \$1 billion is devoted to Feed the Future, President Obama's global food security initiative. After several years, Feed the Future has hit its stride—delivering results that are changing the face of poverty and hunger for some of the world's poorest families.

In 2012, we reached 12 million children with programs to strengthen their nutrition and helped more than 7 million farmers increase their yields through new technologies and management practices. Reported incremental sales of farmers working with Feed the Future programs worldwide increased their sales from \$100 million in 2012 to over \$130 million in 2013. These results are grounded in a robust management system for gathering timely, accurate data that measures everything from household income to the participation of women to the prevalence of stunting. Just as the Demographic and Health Surveys helped dramatically expand monitoring capabilities in global health, Feed the Future's new open data platform is transforming our knowledge and informing cutting-edge approaches.

This year's budget request builds on these results with an integrated nutrition approach to reduce stunting by 20 percent—a target that will prevent two million children from suffering from this devastating condition over the next five years.

In Kenya, the reported gross margin of livestock farmers receiving training on improved management practices and support to partner with cooperatives increased over 45% from 2012 to 2013, from \$371 to \$541 per cow. Feed the Future activities in Kenya support rural smallholders who account for over 80 percent of the country's raw milk production. Farmers in Bangladesh using new fertilizer technologies more than doubled the production of rice from 2011 to 2013. New technologies and management practices such as this also contributed to increases in the rice farmers' gross margin per hectare from \$431 in 2012 to \$587 in 2013. Across Central America, Feed the Future is helping trading unions to meet international standards and maintain access to agricultural markets in the United States.

Two years ago, President Obama led global food security efforts to the next stage, introducing the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition. Today, it is a \$3.75

billion public-private partnership that is enabling reforms from ten African governments and commitments from more than 140 global and local companies. For instance, Ghana Nuts—an agricultural business that was once an aid recipient—is now a multi-million dollar company employing 500 people. Under the New Alliance, it has committed to strengthening local supply chains, reaching 27,000 smallholder farmers with more than \$4 million in investments.

At the same time, the governments we work with through the New Alliance have committed to significant market-oriented policy reforms. Recently, Burkina Faso launched an electronic platform that increases the transparency and speed of their customs processes. Last summer, Mozambique, Cote d'Ivoire, and other New Alliance nations committed to policy reforms that will foster private sector investment in smallholder farmers, particularly women.

GLOBAL HEALTH

With strong bipartisan support, we are providing critical health assistance more efficiently than ever before. We have narrowed our focus on maternal and child health to the 24 countries that represent more than 70 percent of maternal and child deaths in the developing world. Through the \$2.7 billion request for USAID Global Health Programs—along with State Department Global Health Programs for \$5.4 billion—we will work towards ending the tragedy of preventable child and maternal death, creating an AIDS-free generation, and protecting communities from infectious diseases.

Around the world, we are seeing real results of global partnerships to accelerate progress towards these goals. Since 2010, 15 of our 24 priority countries have rolled out the pneumonia vaccine with GAVI support; and since 2011, 8 have introduced rotavirus vaccines against diarrheal diseases. In 2013, the President's Malaria Initiative protected over 45 million people with a prevention measure. Since 2006, all the original 15 PMI focus countries have had reductions in childhood mortality rates, ranging from 16 to 50 percent.

In 2013, Saving Mothers Giving Life, a USAID-led public-private partnership, contributed to a 30 percent decline in the maternal mortality ratio in target districts of Uganda and a 35 percent reduction of maternal deaths in target facilities in Zambia.

Since 2006, our support for neglected tropical diseases has expanded to reach 25 countries. In the countries where we work, nearly 35.8 million people no longer require treatment for blinding trachoma, and 52.4 million people no longer require treatment for lymphatic filariasis.

Since USAID's 2012 Child Survival Call to Action, nearly a dozen countries, representing those with the highest global rates of child death, have launched their own local calls to action, set national targets, and are creating evidence-based business plans to focus resources in acutely vulnerable regions.

We will continue to make cost-effective interventions that save lives—from preventing the spread of disease, to providing nutrition to millions of hungry children around the world.

CLIMATE CHANGE

Of the President's \$506.3 million request for the Global Climate Change Initiative implemented in partnership with the Department of State, USAID implements approximately \$348.5 million and invests in developing countries best suited to accelerate transitions to climate-resilient, low-emission economic growth. In FY 2013, USAID helped over 600,000 stakeholders implement risk-reducing practices or use climate information in decision-making. These stakeholders are impact multipliers, including meteorologists, agricultural extension workers, and disaster planners who use this information to improve the climate resilience of millions of people in their countries and regions.

Across the world, we are harnessing innovation, evidence, and technology to help vulnerable communities anticipate and take action to reduce the impacts of climate change. Today, a joint venture between USAID and NASA—called SERVIR—provides communities in 29 countries with global satellite-based climate information, including sending frost alerts to tea growers in Kenya and fire alerts to forest officials in Nepal.

USAID is pioneering a new approach that puts people on a path from dependency to resilience, while expanding broad-based economic growth. From small farming collectives to multi-national corporations, our partners are pursuing climate-resilient, low-emission development. In support of the Tropical Forest Alliance 2020, we recently helped launch the Global Forest Watch, a forest alert system that utilizes real-time satellite data to help countries reduce tropical deforestation and enable companies to monitor their supply chains.

The Global Climate Change Initiative advances practical, on-the-ground solutions to help developing countries contribute to the global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions while achieving development goals. Since 2010, USAID and the State Department have established 25 bilateral agreements with partner countries to develop and implement for low emissions development strategies. This support is helping advance the transition to lower carbon energy systems by creating enabling environments for public and private investments in efficient, clean energy sources, and sustainably reduce emissions from land use such as deforestation and agriculture.

POWER AFRICA

The FY 2015 request advances our nation's commitments to Africa with initiatives like Trade Africa and Power Africa. With \$77 million requested in this budget, Power Africa represents a bipartisan approach to use public-private partnerships to double access to power on the continent and connect American investors and entrepreneurs to business opportunities abroad. Less than a year since launching,

more than 5,500 mega-watts of power projects have been planned—putting us more than halfway towards our goal of expanding electricity to 20 million people and businesses. For every dollar that the U.S. Government has committed, the private sector has committed two—over \$14 billion so far.

With an initial set of six partner countries, Power Africa focuses on completing projects quickly and efficiently, while encouraging countries to make energy sector reforms critical to their success. In Ethiopia, for example, Power Africa is supporting the first independent power producer geothermal plant in the country, a project that will pave the way for future private sector investment and provide enough power to reach tens of thousands of people. In Kenya, Power Africa is enabling the construction of the largest privately-owned wind farm in Sub-Saharan Africa—helping millions leapfrog dirtier, unhealthier phases of development and join a global low-carbon economy.

EDUCATION

Education remains a critical focus for the Agency. Our request for Basic Education is \$534.3 million, an increase of 6.6 percent over our FY 2014 request.

Through the “Room to Learn” program, we are intensifying our efforts in six countries—including Nigeria and Afghanistan—where endemic poverty and conflict conspire to rob children of their futures. In the Katanga Province in Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the schools we support, we have seen a 40 percent decrease in students repeating a grade from 2010 to 2013. The drop-out rate was also 65 percent lower than in 2010.

From Kenya to Afghanistan, we’re seeing reading skills develop and enrollment—especially for girls—jump. Our strategic shift to improving primary grade reading for tens of millions of kids brings with it a commitment to measuring results through student learning achievements. In Malawi, we used early grade reading assessments to evaluate students’ foundation skills—giving their parents and teachers a way to measure their progress. Today, second graders who receive interventions like these have comprehension levels four times those in control groups.

By maintaining our focus on global education as a core development objective, we can brighten the future for millions of vulnerable children, including children in crisis environments. With widespread illiteracy estimated to cost the global economy more than one trillion dollars this year alone, these programs are not only advancing America’s standing as the world’s development leader in education, but are also energizing the global economy.

WATER

While the world has seen tremendous progress on expanding access to safe drinking water—halving the proportion of people without sustainable access since 1990—a lot of work remains. This budget request continues the implementation of our first-

ever Water and Development Strategy, which outlines a goal to save lives and advance development through improvements in water for health and water for food. The Strategy sets explicit targets of sustainably providing 10 million people with access to improved water supply and 6 million people with access to improved sanitation over the next five years.

Through our Development Innovation Ventures fund, we're partnering with the Gates Foundation to help bring safe drinking water to at least 4 million of the world's poor. Called WASH for Life, this initiative will source and rigorously test great ideas to improve access to water and sanitation service. Last year, in Kenya, we leveraged a Development Credit Authority guarantee to extend piped water supply in Kisumu for over 1,500 piped water connections to benefit over 8,500 individuals.

The request for WASH funding is \$231 million in this budget. Budget requests for WASH programs have typically been about \$230 million, and because of the number of program areas we engage in with water investments—from OFDA's emergency response work, to resilience programs in regions of chronic crisis like the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, to Feed the Future agricultural infrastructure support—our actual programming for all water activities has grown to over \$500 million, and we expect similar levels in the year ahead.

SUPPORTING REGIONAL PRIORITIES AND STRENGTHENING NATIONAL SECURITY

This budget also maintains our nation's tremendous leadership in humanitarian response with \$4.8 billion requested in State and USAID funding. In the last year, we have responded to unprecedented need around the world—saving lives from the Philippines to South Sudan.

In Syria, we currently provide life-saving aid for 4.2 million people in all 14 governorates across the country, as well as more than 2 million people who have fled the violence into neighboring countries. At the same time, we are supporting neighboring Jordan and Lebanon to manage the overwhelming influx of refugees from Syria. We have worked with local school systems to accommodate Syrian children, and in some areas, helped them adjust their schedules so that local children can learn in the morning and Syrian kids in the afternoon.

Thanks to strong bipartisan support, we have begun reforms that mainly address our development food aid programs, allowing us to reach an additional 800,000 hungry people every year with the same resources. The need for this flexibility grows more urgent every day, as crises deepen from Syria to the Central African Republic to South Sudan. That is why this budget calls for reforms to be extended to emergency food assistance. We are seeking the flexibility to use up to 25 percent of Title II resources for life-saving tools, like vouchers and local procurement—allowing us to reach two million more people in crises with our existing resources.

While we remain the world's leader in humanitarian response, we are increasingly focused on ensuring communities can better withstand and bounce back from shocks—like droughts, floods, and conflict—that push the most vulnerable people into crisis again and again. In the Horn of Africa, which suffered a devastating drought two years ago, we're deploying mapping technology to help farming communities find new sources of water. In the Sahel, we're partnering with U.S. Special Operations Command to conduct detailed analysis and geo-spatial mapping of the region. These efforts have given U.S. development and military professionals a deeper understanding of both the drivers of conflict and ways to build resilience.

We are working effectively to both protect and manage the environment that supports us. In addition, we are harnessing innovation, evidence, and technology to reduce consumer demand for endangered species and stop wildlife trafficking. For instance, no tigers or rhinos were poached in Nepal in 2013 due to our sustained investments in community-based conservation. This past January, USAID partners convened 28 African and Asian countries to participate in an enforcement operation that resulted in more than 400 arrests and the seizure of three metric tons of ivory, 10,000 turtles, and 1,000 skins of protected species.

We're pioneering a new approach that puts people on a path from dependency to resilience, while expanding broad-based economic growth.

USAID and State Department are requesting \$2 billion globally in the Development Assistance and Economic Support Fund accounts to strengthen democracy, human rights, and governance. Thanks to USAID's rapid-response capability on civil society laws, we were able to take advantage of political openings in Libya, Tunisia and Burma to encourage early reformers to adopt consultative government-civil society processes that have led to much-improved civil society legislation, which in turn will pave the way for further political opening.

In FY 2015, the State Department and USAID have requested nearly \$1.5 billion to support democratic transitions and respond to emerging crises in the Middle East and North Africa. For example, in Tunisia, we worked with civil society and the government to implement some of the most progressive NGO laws in the region. The new law passed as a result of a consultative government-civil society process and is now considered a model for the region; the new Libyan draft civil society organization law is based on peer consultations with Tunisians on their law.

Of the President's \$2.8 billion assistance request for the Frontline States, USAID implements \$1.8 billion for long-term development assistance, continuing to work closely with interagency partners—including the State and Defense departments—to move toward long-term stability, promote economic growth, and support governance reforms, including the rights of women.

This request is tailored to support our three-fold transition strategy in Afghanistan, including maintaining gains in health, education, and the empowerment of women; promoting economic growth; and improving stability by supporting more

accountable and effective Afghan governance, which is especially critical in the first year after the 2014 presidential election.

Our assistance in Afghanistan has helped deliver incredible gains. Today, 77,000 university students—a *nine-fold increase* from 2001—will form a new generation of leaders. The wait time for goods crossing the border with Pakistan has fallen from eight days to 3.5 hours—saving \$38 million every year and opening access to new markets for farmers and entrepreneurs. The rapid expansion of mobile technology across the country is empowering Afghan women to demand an equal stake in their nation’s future.

Building on our strong legacy of progress in Latin America and the Caribbean, we’re focusing on spurring economic growth and strengthening democracy by tackling the biggest drivers of instability, from drug trafficking to climate change. Today, for example, we work with a range of partners, including Nike Foundation and PepsiCo, to train thousands of at-risk youth in 18 countries of the region. The program has had an extremely high success rate, with 65 percent of graduates getting jobs, returning to school, or starting their own business within one year of graduation.

In Colombia, we’ve partnered with Starbucks to improve yields for 25,000 coffee-farmers, giving them a shot at the global market and a reason to invest in their land after decades of conflict. In Peru, our partnership with the government of San Martin has helped reduced poverty by more than 67 percent and cut coca production from 22,000 hectares to around 1,200.

We’re also investing in the future innovators, doctors, and entrepreneurs throughout Latin America. For instance, in Honduras, we partnered with a telecom company to connect our network of 40 youth outreach centers—providing internet access, online education and virtual job training to more than 17,000 people. On the whole, these investments produce immense gains in literacy, stability, and long-term economic growth.

From empowering small businesses in Burma to helping eradicate extreme poverty in Nepal, we are supporting the Administration’s Asia-Pacific Rebalance, renewing U.S. leadership, deepening economic ties, and promoting democratic and universal values. Today, we are bolstering regional cooperation around shared solutions to complex challenges through deepened engagement in ASEAN and the Lower Mekong Initiative. In March, we signed an agreement with the US-ASEAN Business Council to help link small-and medium-sized enterprises across Asia to regional and global value chains.

USAID OPERATING EXPENSES

In recognition of development’s centrality to U.S. national security, the President’s National Security Strategy calls for investing in development capabilities and institutions. The FY 2015 USAID Operating Expenses account request for \$1.4 billion will provide that investment—advancing U.S. interests, enhancing national security, and reaffirming our global development leadership. The request will enable USAID

to maintain core operations, and to continue USAID Forward reforms—as well as better collaborate with partner countries and local institutions—to maximize the value of each dollar.

Although an increase from FY 2014, the request represents the minimum level of resources necessary to preserve our agency's current services and operations and support the existing workforce to meet U.S. foreign policy objectives and global development needs. The requested funding will allow our agency to offset the projected decrease in other funding sources, such as recoveries, reimbursements, and trust funds that support operations. At the same time, it will restore the new obligation authority needed to maintain its current level of operations into FY 2015.

The request reflects our agency's focus on working through a more efficient, high-impact approach. We are continuing to reform operations to improve management processes and generate significant cost savings for FY 2015, like real property disposals and space optimization. In addition, our agency restructured its overseas presence to strengthen its ability to meet its foreign policy and national security mission.

CONCLUSION

Today, for the first time in history, we have new tools and approaches that enable us to envision a world without extreme poverty.

This is an unprecedented moment for our nation—one where we can again lead the world in achieving goals once deemed too ambitious, too dangerous, or too complex. In doing so, we can protect our national security and spur economic growth. But above all, we can express the generosity and goodwill that unite us as a people.

As President Obama said in the 2013 State of the Union address, “We also know that progress in the most impoverished parts of our world enriches us all—not only because it creates new markets, more stable order in certain regions of the world, but also because it’s the right thing to do.”

As we step forward to answer the President’s call with renewed energy and focus, we remain committed to engaging the American people and serving their interests by leading the world to end extreme poverty.

Thank you.

RAJIV SHAH



ADMINISTRATOR

Dr. Rajiv Shah serves as the 16th Administrator of USAID and leads the efforts of more than 9,600 professionals in 80 missions around the world.

Since being sworn in on Dec. 31, 2009, Shah managed the U.S. Government's response to the devastating 2010 earthquake in Port-au-Prince, Haiti; co-chaired the State Department's first review of American diplomacy and development operations; and now spearheads President Barack Obama's landmark Feed the Future food security initiative. He is also leading "USAID Forward," an extensive set of reforms to USAID's business model focusing on seven key areas, including procurement, science & technology, and monitoring & evaluation.

Before becoming USAID's Administrator, Shah served as undersecretary for research, education and economics, and as chief scientist at the U.S. Department of Agriculture. At USDA, he launched the National Institute of Food and Agriculture, which significantly elevated the status and funding of agricultural research.

Prior to joining the Obama administration, Shah served for seven years with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, including as director of agricultural development in the Global Development Program, and as director of strategic opportunities.

Originally from Detroit, Shah earned his medical degree from the University of Pennsylvania Medical School and his master's in health economics from the Wharton School of Business. He attended the London School of Economics and is a graduate of the University of Michigan.

Shah is married to Shivam Mallick Shah and is the father of three children. He lives in Washington, D.C.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you, Dr. Shah. I think the people on this subcommittee believe the same thing or they wouldn't be serving. And so, we just have questions on how that occurs.

I just have one question, one topic, and that has to do with Afghanistan. And watching the elections with millions turning out, that is really a testament to what has been done. It was a very good thing to watch.

We don't know if the new president will sign the Bilateral Security Agreement. That remains to be seen. We have made important gains in health, education, women's rights, things that Mrs. Lowey was talking about.

So, while the staffing plan in Afghanistan is decreasing, the administration's request for assistance to Afghanistan is increasing. Of the few questions I have, in light of the ongoing security challenges and corruption issues, what kinds of programs are you going to support with these funds in Afghanistan?

Also, how do you also hope to have the level of oversight this committee expects when there is less staff planned for 2015, and how can these programs be implemented to keep U.S. personnel and our development partners safe? Their safety is our greatest concern.

Thank you.

Dr. SHAH. Thank you, Chairwoman.

And I just want to highlight that for 2 to 3 percent of the cost of this war, USAID development investments have helped ensure that 8 million kids go to school, including 3 million girls, have helped to generate the most rapid reductions in child death and maternal death anywhere in the world, have helped to build out 2,200 kilometers of road infrastructure that creates economic connectivity that gives the Afghan people a chance to have a brighter future, and have helped to both build the independent election commission and support the election processes that we saw this weekend, which were a powerful demonstration of a more optimistic future taken on by Afghans themselves.

We will continue, even in a more challenging security environment, to make the investments that we believe are required to help Afghanistan achieve peace, security, and some degree of prosperity and social justice, with a priority of focusing on women and the important gains that have been made and sustaining those gains. But also with a priority of—and we have carefully reviewed, through a sustainability review, all of our programs.

We are going to continue the agricultural programs that make a big difference for the rural economy, which is still 60 percent of total employment in Afghanistan. We will continue support for schools and higher education because that is central to girls having opportunity. We will continue our health programs.

We are looking at our larger infrastructure projects, and we want to make sure that we can both get eyes on those projects and that they can be sustained as well, some of which requires other partners picking up a bigger component of those efforts.

And overall, I was with the team this morning by video-conference, with the Ambassador and our mission director. You know, they are committed to visiting projects and programs, to maybe paying the higher costs it will take operationally to have the

security and capacity to get out there. But we are going to have an evaluation system that allows us to get American eyes on most major efforts where that is required and supplemented by all kinds of third-party data, including satellite imagery on crop yields to local Afghan partners reviewing and visiting projects and programs regularly.

The Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan initiative we set up 3 or 4 years ago has been successful at improving accountability for aid and assistance in Afghanistan, and we intend to continue that effort, although adapting it a bit to highlight the safety concerns you have raised.

Ms. GRANGER. And the last had to do with how do you keep the people that are there safe? If there is not a Bilateral Security Agreement, then what do we need to do about security?

Dr. SHAH. Well, a Bilateral Security Agreement is very important, and our team contributes to the larger security team that is trying to pull that together, and we will see what happens after the election.

Assuming that Afghan security forces have the kinds of abilities they just proved that they have over the past weekend, we are confident that we, with all of the supplementary efforts, can have our people visiting projects and programs in a safe manner. We are not going to take undue personal risks.

We have already been challenged as an agency and a government in losing key members of our team who went out to visit projects and programs and were attacked and lost their lives. We are not going to put our people at undue risk. But all of our people out there are taking some degree of risk already because they believe in and know this is work that is critical to our national security.

And after the conduct of a highly costly war over more than a decade, I certainly hope that USAID and our country and our Congress can continue to support the efforts, like keeping girls in school, getting women into civil service, helping different parts of the country have economic opportunity, and supporting agriculture that is going to be critical for the next decade.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mrs. Lowey.

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you.

Both our interests and challenges around the world do not generally respect country borders. Yet our democracy, governance, and development activities are inherently country-by-country specific. As we witnessed during the Arab Spring, events transpire differently in each country, particularly the tumultuous aftermath of the 2011 revolution in Egypt.

Given recent unrest in many countries with which the United States has strong military relationships, I hope you can address how support for civil society and development versus stated national security interests is determined in the administration and specifically in USAID programs. I will follow up with a couple of quick questions so that you can discuss the issue, which I think is so important today.

How does the USAID implement democracy programs in repressive countries while abiding by the Brownback amendment, which prevents foreign governments from having control or veto power

over democracy assistance? In which countries has this been a particular challenge, and how have you dealt with these cases?

Is a foreign government allowed to review U.S. democracy programming plans through prior consultation or other checkpoints? For instance, could the government in countries that repress women's rights preselect or obtain the names of participants in your programs?

Using a national security lens, how would results be measured and evaluated? Is focusing solely on strategic interests a detriment to human rights concerns, or is it all part of our interconnected policy strategy?

And I would appreciate it, given so much of the news today, if you could put this in the context of one of the programs that has been on the news' front pages, ZunZuneo. Who is responsible for developing this program, and do USAID's activities in democracy programs put other development programs at risk by increasing the perception that everything USAID does is political in nature?

If you could also share with us in which countries does USAID's democracy work pose the greatest risk to our other programs in health, education, or agriculture? If you can clarify, I think it would be very helpful.

Dr. SHAH. Congresswoman, thank you for those comprehensive questions, and I look forward to the opportunity to address them.

First, on civil society. The United States is deeply concerned about the closing of civil society space in country after country. Secretary Clinton and Secretary Kerry have both started and pursued a strategic dialogue on civil society of which USAID is a part. And in nearly every country we work in, we support civil society actors, whether it is small women's cooperatives that are part of our Feed the Future program or whether it is the Ukrainian organizations that documented human rights violations that took place during the protest period that we are all acutely aware of.

The history of that type of support, which has been ongoing around the world, has been an important part of how America provides assistance and partnership. So that even when we were in Senegal, the President met specifically with the civil society groups we supported to hear their stories of how they were able to leverage our support to build a culture and a process that allowed for real democratic presidential transition there, when it didn't look like it was going to happen.

America is proud of that. USAID is proud of that part of our portfolio, and it is an integrated and integral part of how we provide assistance around the world.

With respect to the democratic governance portfolio, the Brownback amendment, and your references about foreign government review, we disclose all of our programs publicly. The program with respect to Cuba is one example. But we notify Congress of all of these programs. In country, we have these transactions publicly available on foreignassistance.gov, on our Web site, and through the grantees, there is no covert activity that takes place.

That said, we don't share the participation data with governments. Governments may sometimes express displeasure, but we don't give them the capacity to shut down our programs by cherry-

picking one or two that are promoting civil society or democratic governance that they insist be shut down.

I was thinking about that in the context of what is going on in Uganda, where a new law, criminalizes certain activity that we pursue to treat patients with HIV/AIDS that are gay or lesbian. And you know, we work with governments, but we don't program funds through them in large amounts, and we don't give them veto power over specific projects and programs.

With respect to Cuba, I appreciate you asking the question. The purpose of this program, like the purpose of other similar programs, was to support civil society and to provide platforms to communicate amongst the Cuban people. Any representation that the purpose of the program is different from that is inaccurate.

We have programs like this in Africa, in Asia, in Latin America, throughout the world, and they are conducted and consistent with the manner of the law. The GAO report on the Cuba program specifically highlighted the improved management practices at USAID and complimented our execution of this program, and that was after a thorough review not just of the program overall, but of a specific contractor and a specific subproject with Mobile Accord.

With respect to your question about whether those programs put at risk other efforts in health and hunger and those types of issues, that is obviously not a critical issue in Cuba because we don't have, per the Helms-Burton amendment, the capacity to do those types of other programs there. But with respect to other parts of the world, we have just said, and the President said this, the Secretary of State has said this, and the prior administration has said this, that when America engages around the world, we are going to project through that engagement some basic values.

We are doing that right now in Uganda with respect to the antiretroviral treatment of people who are gay or lesbian. We can't disassociate our values from our work, and one of the core elements of our values is to support civil society, is to allow freedom of expression, is to connect with those who are vulnerable, and to ensure that the benefits of our overall aid and assistance reaches the most vulnerable within society.

Mrs. LOWEY. If I could just follow up with one other question? Alan Gross has now spent more than 4 years in jail in Cuba after trying to broaden access to the Internet there. Could you respond to that situation?

Dr. SHAH. Yes. Alan's incarceration in Cuba is wrong. It is inappropriate. It is inexcusable. The Secretary of State; Wendy Sherman, our Under Secretary of State; the President himself have all engaged on this issue, and I know that there have been a broad range of activities that the State Department has pursued to secure Alan's release. Wendy can brief on that in a secure setting and in a classified setting.

I will say on our end, I think about the Gross family all the time. And sometimes we must be discreet in how we do our work, whether it is to save lives in Syria when we are tending to medical treatments of victims or whether it is in the execution of this program, precisely because we want to protect our people from being exposed to those types of risks.

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you.

Ms. GRANGER. I will call on Members, alternating between majority and minority based on seniority of those present when the hearing was called to order. I want to remind Members that you have 5 minutes for your questions and responses from the witness. A yellow light on your timer will appear when you have 2 minutes remaining.

If time permits, we will have a second round of questions. However, we know that votes are going to be called during the time that is allotted to this. So I would ask you to be particularly careful about your time.

I know we all have multiple subcommittees, I do as well. So I am going to call on Mr. Rooney, and then turn the chair over to Congressman Dent.

Thank you.

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Dr. Shah, I want to talk about Jordan and the Economic Support Fund, which we have learned a lot about this year not only from the king's visit, but with all the intelligence and news that we have seen about the refugees going from Syria into Jordan and with the challenges that Jordan is having to deal with, with regard to that. And specifically, one of the programs that I think is important, what I would like you to comment on and sort of give us an update, deals with the fact that some 36 percent of those refugees are or going to be of school age, 5 to 17 years old, which accounts for almost 150,000 boys and 131,000 girls.

So this program, which goes to Jordan to help with educating those kids, is something that I think will certainly help Jordan and help deal with the issues that they are going through right now. But can you talk about it, talk about the successes, some of the challenges, and also specifically with regard to how it is working to counter or try to educate children out of the whole terrorist realm? Hopefully, you know, that is one of the end goals of that program.

Dr. SHAH. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate you asking about Jordan.

Over the last several years, the United States has provided \$1.7 billion in support to Syrians and Syrian refugees who are at critical vulnerability with respect to the crisis that has been ongoing there. In addition to that, we have had our ongoing program with Jordan, and that has been supplemented with a major loan guarantee effort and then accelerated investments in areas like education to help deal with the flood of refugees.

There have been more than 2.5 million refugees coming out of Syria, and Jordan and Lebanon I think in particular have been the two countries that have taken by far the highest number and percentage of Syrian refugees. As you point out, 40 to 45 percent are school-aged children; and we have large education programs in both Jordan and Lebanon. So, in both settings, we have worked to help create opportunities for Syrian kids to go to school while also maintaining access to the same schools, of course, for the host community children.

You can imagine this is very difficult. If any of us had kids in school and all of a sudden class sizes were going to double or triple

overnight because of a refugee crisis, that would be a tough sell in the United States.

So we have launched an effort that we call No Lost Generation, and we have worked with a host of international partners from the Gulf states as well as with other donors to try to get more resources for education in Jordan and Lebanon, to try to create a double shift system where Syrian kids can go to school in the afternoons in those schools and try to make sure that we don't lose a whole generation of kids to strife and poverty, where a lack of education would be devastating in an environment where there is a high risk that these kids go the wrong way should they not have any meaningful opportunity in life.

I hope the American people can take pride in the fact that the United States and USAID have been by far the largest and the global leader providing humanitarian assistance throughout the region, now reaching more than 7 or 8 million people.

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. DENT [presiding]. Thank you.

At this time, I would like to recognize the gentlelady from California, Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good to see you, Dr. Shah. And you know I have got to follow up with you on the Cuba question. This Cuba Twitter program was instituted, I guess, shortly after Alan Gross was arrested.

Now I have visited Alan Gross twice. For the last 3 or 4 years, I have been very involved in the discussions between our own Government and the Cuban government, and quite frankly, there have been maybe five or six individuals on our side that I have talked with. This is the first day that I have heard or learned that Wendy Sherman is part of that.

And I just want to ask you, first of all, who is the lead negotiator or person that we should work with on our side?

Secondly, you say that we don't engage in covert activity. Okay, we may not, but some of us believe that you do and that the whole goal is regime change. And you know, we just happen to disagree when you say this is just to promote discourse among civil society. But it is, in effect, most of the time the goal is regime change.

And thirdly, with regard to Alan Gross, and we have talked about this over and over and over again, he was a subcontractor. Now whether you agree or not, Cuba has certain laws, just like we have certain laws in our own country. If, in fact, a U.S. contractor or subcontractor violates the law of another country, they are subject to whatever follows, whatever laws, you know, require in terms of prosecution.

I don't agree with what has taken place, and I think it is inexcusable about Alan Gross, but to say that we weren't part of this in terms of allowing Alan Gross to be—to work on a project and you didn't disclose in the contract that he could be subject to arrest based on the laws of another country I think is outrageous. If a person is going to subcontract work under these democracy programs, they should know what risks they are taking.

Now Alan is on a hunger strike. We don't know where that is going to lead. And so, some of us really want to try to move this

process forward so that we can get him out. And so, I am asking you once again. One, who is the point person?

Two, have you all revised some of these contracts so that the contractors and subcontractors know when they are engaged in these democracy programs that they could be subject to arrest based on the country in which their laws—in which they are violating their laws?

And thirdly, you know, for the life of me, I don't quite understand your not seeing as covert activity and regime change, and I would like to hear why you don't see that.

Dr. SHAH. Sure. Thank you, Congresswoman, and I just want to on other topics, but on this one as well thank you for your engagement and your support, and I have appreciated the chance to learn from you and work with you.

On this in particular, let me say a few things. First, we care about Alan, about his family, about Judy. What they have had to go through is extraordinarily wrong.

Wendy Sherman is the lead on this. She may have a team, obviously, the State Department is a big place, but she is the Under Secretary that I have worked with, and I know that she would be willing to and able to articulate to you our efforts and our strategy. Efforts obviously have been unsuccessful to date, and as you know, they include specific actions taken recently by the highest levels of our Government.

The second is with respect to is the program covert? This program has been notified in congressional notifications and congressional budget justifications every year since 2008. The fact that we are discussing it in this forum and that it is an unclassified program illustrates that this is not a covert effort.

Ms. LEE. Well, I think they did reveal that. It may not—okay.

Dr. SHAH. The GAO reviewed this project and made a judgment that it was consistent with the law.

Ms. LEE. The GAO, yes, but that took a little bit of pushing.

Dr. SHAH. And we are discreet.

Ms. LEE. Which it is.

Dr. SHAH. And we are discreet. Thank you. We are discreet with the implementation of a range of things, not just in the democratic governance space. But we have provided 250,000 medical procedures and surgeries inside of Syria over the last 3 years, some provided by Syrian-American doctors. We are not waving the American flag at those posts, since they are already targets, and many have already lost their lives doing that work.

So we have to balance and conduct this work in a manner where we are making some effort to protect those who carry it out. And that is why we do some of these things discreetly.

I do want to address your point about how we think about this in broad terms.

Ms. LEE. And the contracts. Why you would subject a U.S. citizen to arrest and not disclose they are subject to arrest.

Dr. SHAH. Right. So we do inform and clearly communicate the context, the risks, and the personal responsibility.

Ms. LEE. No, but Dr. Shah, you don't communicate the laws of the other country that they could be in violation of.

Dr. SHAH. We highlight the risks, and that requires describing that.

Ms. LEE. But you don't say that you could be subject to arrest if you engage in these activities.

Dr. SHAH. Well, no, we do. We describe the context. It was not done in Alan's case. I agree with that. That was in 2008. It was before I arrived.

Ms. LEE. And we have worked with you to try to get this straight since then.

Dr. SHAH. Yes, and we have improved the management of this. But I do want to say one thing about that. Right now, we have people providing antiretroviral drugs to gay and lesbian patients inside of Uganda that are also taking new risks, given the criminalization of providing services in that context, and it is tough. I am not prepared to tell them to cut those folks off from receiving life-saving assistance.

Ms. LEE. No, but that is not what I am talking about, Dr. Shah. I am talking about——

Mr. DENT. The time is expired.

Ms. LEE[continuing]. Those engaged in these programs, knowing that they are violating the country's other laws, and they could be subject, just so they know.

Dr. SHAH. Yes. Okay. I appreciate that. I think that is right. I think we should be communicating the risks to our implementing partners, and we do. Now we do with our partners. Absolutely.

Ms. LEE. Now you do. But not when Alan was arrested, and that has got to be part of the discussion.

Dr. SHAH. But we have since I got there, yes.

Mr. DENT. Thank you. I recognize myself for 5 minutes at this time.

Good afternoon, Dr. Shah.

The fiscal year 2015 request includes a \$90 million cut to USAID's global health programs relative to enacted levels. This includes a \$10 million cut to maternal and child health programs. Yet within that line item is a \$25 million increase for the U.S. contribution to the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations, or GAVI.

I am just concerned about how—where the administration plans to offset the increase for GAVI. Could you provide information on which maternal and child health programs you are proposing to cut?

Dr. SHAH. Yes. Thank you, and thank you for your support and your leadership.

I will say on the global health budget, our fiscal year 2015 budget is a small increase compared to the request we made in 2014. And I thank Congress for its generosity in 2014, and I continue to believe that our investments in global health and child survival are amongst the most cost-effective investments we make around the world.

This year's budget environment overall has been very challenging, with the top line coming down on the 150 account and a shift in resources to pay for major security investments around the world.

That said, within this portfolio, we will make the \$200 million investment, if we have the support of Congress, in GAVI. We believe GAVI is highly effective at getting low-cost vaccines and new vaccines to kids who critically need them. And then we will have the resources to work on a supplemental basis to make sure that we are reaching those same kids with a whole range of other interventions from supplementary feeding to malaria bed nets to chlorhexidine and other new products and technologies we have helped develop.

I can have my team follow up on precisely where the redirections will come from, but in general, we believe over the next few years, we will be able to accelerate dramatically the achievement of results in child survival. And this budget will enable that.

Mr. DENT. Thank you. I look forward to receiving that information from your staff.

On the issue of PEPFAR, the use of the antiretroviral drugs is critical to both treating and preventing HIV infection. The double impact of the antiretroviral treatment is also reflected in the new WHO guidelines, which recognize that earlier treatment can result in fewer transmissions and prolong life.

In recent years, PEPFAR spending on antiretroviral drugs has decreased and totals much less than 10 percent of all PEPFAR spending, despite millions of people in need of and not receiving antiretroviral drugs in PEPFAR-supported countries.

What actions will the Federal Government take to reverse this trend and ensure that PEPFAR meets the statutory requirement of spending more than half of the program's appropriations on treatment and is targeting its spending to maximize the cost-effective impact of antiretroviral therapies?

Dr. SHAH. Thank you. I want to make a few points on this.

First, the President laid out a clear goal of 6 million patients on antiretroviral therapy, and as of December this year, we had achieved well beyond that goal. I believe it is 6.3 million in that context.

The second is we share the treatment burden and the cost with countries themselves and with the Global Fund, and a number of other partners, but really countries themselves and the Global Fund. And what we have seen over the last 5 years is a shift of resources where countries are putting more of their own resources in, and Global Fund is putting more directed resources in as well.

The third is the cost of the antiretrovirals have come down dramatically. So as a total—as a proportion, the antiretroviral itself is a lower cost. What is—what we now know is required to have a high-quality program that is preventing deaths at an optimized rate is having effective treatment initiation earlier and having effective adherence efforts over the long term.

So the all-in, more comprehensive treatment costs should clearly meet the statutory requirements. I can follow up with more specific detail on that, but that has been—those have been the major trends in PEPFAR. And I believe they offer the opportunity to create an AIDS-free generation consistent with the blueprint we have published with our colleagues at the State Department.

Mr. DENT. I have a series of seven questions, which I will submit for the record, except for one. I will ask you to respond, your staff to respond to those at a later date.

But worldwide, deaths of children under 5 years of age, mainly from preventable infectious diseases, has dropped from about 12.6 million per year in 1990 to 6.6 million per year in 2012. That is probably one of the greatest stories in the history of human health. What more can the U.S. do beyond what it is already doing to help prevent the deaths of the next 6 million?

Dr. SHAH. Well, thank you, sir, for your question.

And the reality is the opportunity to end preventable child death is, I think, the most profound and most cost-effective opportunity we have in global development. Two years ago, we brought together more than 80 countries, civil society, faith-based institutions, and got everyone to sign a commitment to end preventable child death by 2035.

And we have set targets and goals. We created country strategies and measurement plans. We are now in the process of reviewing 24 country programs and restructuring and redefining the investment portfolio in those programs to accelerate lives saved over the next 3 years.

At the end of June we will be unveiling the new investment plan in those 24 countries and trying to bring many more of our partners, including countries themselves, to that task.

A final thing I will say about this is that the most important trend in this space has been getting countries themselves to take more ownership, direct more of their resources, and focus with more business-like, results-oriented investment on ending preventable child death. And countries like Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, South Africa have taken that on and are leading that charge.

And that is why our investments in child survival are now 15 percent of the total global investment, and we want to continue to get others to do more.

Mr. DENT. Thank you. My time has expired.

At this time, I recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Cuellar, for 5 minutes.

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Shah, good seeing you again.

Let me talk to you about your OEs, your operating expenses. From the present estimate to the request for 2015, you all had a \$243,000 decrease. I haven't seen all the countries, but I can look at the Republic of Mexico, and I know when we had Secretary Kerry, I had asked him why he had reduced his 2015, and he told me he didn't. And he was wrong.

His staff a week later sent me some information, and actually, they had gone from \$227 million to \$115 million, a 49 percent decrease from the prior year. From there, also under one of the accounts that you handle, we had specifically increased Mexico from \$35 million to \$45 million, and then again, it got reduced again on the request.

Dr. SHAH. Well, thank you, Congressman.

Let me just say we have a very strong program in Mexico that delivers really important results, particularly on justice sector re-

form and support with implementation of crime management policies. One of the things that --

Mr. CUELLAR. I don't mean to interrupt. I apologize.

Dr. SHAH. Yes. Sure.

Mr. CUELLAR. You hear a lot from Members of Congress about the violence and the border and this and at. Why would you all decrease money, especially when we had just increased it by \$10 million, and you all came back and decreased it by \$10 million?

And again, if you are addressing violence, and everybody talks about the violence that we have to our third most important neighbor, why would you decrease this in Mexico?

Dr. SHAH. Well, sir, overall, the budgets are very, very tight this year. And the larger narrative on the budget is that there has been a big shift to security investment that puts downward pressure on foreign assistance. Within that, we have tried to maintain core priorities.

And in the context of Mexico, the fiscal year 2015 request is \$47.5 million, and my team can follow up on the numbers. But I think it is \$47.5 million. That is higher than the \$45 million requested in fiscal year 2014.

So we are trying to maintain support for this effort. We are trying to focus the effort on the Merida program and the efforts to support citizen security.

Mr. CUELLAR. America's funding was cut by 49 percent. That is why I started off with your OEs. You only reduced it by 243,000. Actually, in Washington, DC., your Washington operation is—about \$425 million. This is for USAID. For central support, that is another \$248 million.

So I can understand there is pressure, but when you only reduce your administration costs by \$243—it gets us to think about this.

Let me ask you, because I have got about a minute and a half, a question I have been asking and I think Senator Tom Harkin has been asking you all. And I believe he still hasn't got an answer for over a year, and I haven't got an answer for a year also.

The Scholarships for Education and Economic Development, or SEED program. I know you all are looking at another plan, but we still haven't got any details on that plan. I think the Senator asked you about a 1-year extension so you can develop something. In June of this year, in a couple of months, some of those programs are going to lapse, but there is still no plan from you all out there.

Could you tell us what your plan is for the SEED program and whether you are willing to delay at least some of those lapses so we can at least get an idea of what you are planning to do? And anything you want to tell me about the President's initiative, what your direction is for the Small Business Network of America?

Dr. SHAH. Thank you, sir.

On SEED, let me just say this has been a highly successful 25-year program to bring students, as you know, from the Latin-America-Caribbean region to the United States, and it can cost up to \$45,000 per student per year.

And so, as we have looked at the program going forward, in consultation with community college partners, we are constructing a new vision of it where more of the education takes place in country and where the community colleges are engaged in partnerships

with host institutions in country to upgrade their skills and to allow for some connectivity.

What I have talked about with Senator Harkin and others is there was a miscommunication or there was a perception that we were abruptly ending the program before the new one comes into place. That is not going to happen. There is no student that is here on a 2-year program that is going to be sent back after a year. All of the existing program is going to be fully transitioned before we go forward with a new program.

Mr. CUELLAR. So, for the record—for the record, on June, if a program lapsed, that is going to be extended?

Dr. SHAH. No student that is currently in a program is not going to have the opportunity to live out the full commitment, they currently have and that I think is the right decision and consistent with your guidance and the Senator's.

But let me also note that Christie Vilsack, our special coordinator for education, has been consulting widely with the community colleges themselves, has been on the Hill a bit, but would be eager to follow up with you to describe what we are thinking to get your feedback to ensure that current program partners are excited about the new program. I think it is an opportunity to increase the number of kids we touch and support and also build stronger ties between American institutions and those in the region in a manner that will get all the program partners enthusiastic with essentially the same amount of resources going forward.

So it is an effort to just modernize what has been a very successful effort. We don't want anyone to lose out in the transition, and we want to work with you to make it a great program again.

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, sir.

Dr. SHAH. Thank you.

Mr. DENT. Thank you.

At this time, I recognize the gentleman from Florida for 5 minutes, Mr. Diaz-Balart.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Shah, how are you, sir?

Just two questions. Before that, one quick point on the issue of Twitter so that Cubans could use Twitter in a country that access to the Internet is, frankly, forbidden.

I know I keep hearing a lot of folks talking about that it was a strange, covert, you know, NSA program. And yet if you look at the President's budget when it was created, they talk about exactly what it was about. And a lot of the outrage coming from particularly one member of the Senate, and yet that same member of the Senate put language in the Senate bill, appropriations bill last year asking USAID to do, frankly, a similar program in Iran.

So, again, I just keep hearing all these things, and I was a little bit shocked by the story from AP. I don't tend to criticize the press, but trying to come up as if this was some covert, strange operation when, in fact, it has been in print. It has been looked at, reviewed by everyone, including GAO.

My only concern there is I hope that we are able to continue to do that because it was a huge success for a while, and then obviously, it became too big too quick and, all of a sudden, kind of like outdid its funding. I am just hoping, Dr. Shah, that we look at op-

tions like that and things like that not only for Cuba, but other places where we need to try to break that Internet and communication blockade.

That is not for you to answer, just I am hoping that you are looking at the success of that and that we can hopefully try to replicate that.

Two points. I was recently, Dr. Shah, in Haiti with a couple of my colleagues. And we visited a USAID housing project, the Haut Damier—and I know I am not pronouncing that right—housing site. It was subject to a GAO report.

I am not going to get into what we saw there about the GAO report. I am just going to bring out another little issue. We all know that Haiti has an issue with the fact that they have cut down a lot of the trees just to cook, charcoal. And so, there is an initiative, which I think is meritorious, to see if you can get people off of charcoal onto gas.

What we noticed, however, right away, because gas is more expensive than just buying—you can buy a couple of chunks of charcoal. And we noticed right away that some of the gas stoves had been provided by programs were, frankly, just used as shelves. And we saw the charcoal stoves right next door.

So this is the question. Have studies been done as to where that kind of program—I am assuming there are other places where we have had similar issues. Where it has worked, where it hasn't worked? Why it has worked where it has worked? Why it hasn't worked where it has worked?

I would imagine that there would be some things that you could kind of just pull off different studies before you attempt one. I fear that the one in Haiti, which is very well intentioned, may not have the desired effect. And that is—if you want to just address that first?

Dr. SHAH. Sure. Thank you, Congressman.

On that specific effort, it is important that over time, Haitians stop cutting down trees and using them for charcoal. That is just—and there has been a huge amount of evidence to demonstrate how disastrous that is for their core productive agricultural economy, for example.

So as part of reconstruction effort and in providing 65,000 families with housing after the earthquake and in the reconstruction period, we have had some of these pilot efforts to do community conversion to LNG gas cook stoves. And what we have learned from prior efforts is that training for food vendors, for schools, for households is critically important. Initial subsidy for the LNG canisters is critical to get the new system up and running.

That ongoing kind of household-level community effort to help people talk to each other and kind of move en masse both creates a market, and it creates enough social infrastructure so that people can see their neighbors using it and be more comfortable with that practice. Some of the efforts in this regard have been successful in Haiti. Others have not.

And so, we are in the process of evaluating all of these, learning and adapting the programs. But it is something we have got to keep trying to do, and you are right to direct us to look at best practices, which are pretty prevalent in many other parts of the

world where people have successfully made this transition, and try to adapt those learnings to Haiti.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Sure. I don't mean to interrupt you, but I am glad that you are aware of that. There are areas where, obviously, it is not going to work and where you have to make it work. You are absolutely right. I am just concerned that we are making sure that it is the best practices.

One other thing, Dr. Shah, we visited a hospital, which is where Project Medishare is, Bernard Mevs Hospital. And incredible amount of volunteers, including Americans, were there—I know they are experiencing some electrical issues, some power issues. I don't know if your folks have had an opportunity to look at that, but it is a crucial—it is a hospital that, obviously, is very important to Haiti. And I can get you some more information.

And lastly— well, I am out of time, Mr. Chairman. So maybe we will have a second round to talk a little bit about Venezuela.

Dr. SHAH. Okay, thanks.

Mr. DENT. At this time, I recognize the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Wasserman Schultz, for 5 minutes.

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Shah, it is good to see you, and thank you for your commitment. And I enjoyed talking with you in my office a couple of weeks ago.

Just so that we are clear that Cuba is not a partisan issue, let me echo the comments of my colleague from Florida, Mr. Diaz-Balart. We have fought hard in a bipartisan way for funding for civil society programs and also fought equally as hard in a bipartisan way to ensure that through GAO review that accountability was a part of those programs so that we weren't just throwing money into a black hole and not really seeing any results.

And for a while, we did have concerns that the civil society programs that we were funding were just going to organizations with not a lot to show for it. It is pretty clear that this particular program—for lack of a better term, Cuban Twitter—did have results and did connect Cubans to one another and showed promise.

So, you know, I really—while I don't want to endorse regime change here in this subcommittee, I think there is no question that the United States position is and should be that human rights be something that we stand up for as a nation, that we use our vast resources and influence to help people who are being persecuted, and that there is no question that that persecution and human rights violations are ongoing in a nation just 90 miles from our shore.

So just saying. And I would appreciate if you have anything to add.

But I wanted to ask you specifically about faith-based organizations and support for family planning. You know, we often hear from opponents of access to family planning that their opposition stems from religious beliefs. But I know I hear all the time from religious organizations across all religions, I might add, from the Jews to the Methodists -- even in Afghanistan, there are some religious leaders who are realizing that family planning has become critical for the health and economic well-being of that country, as well as in a variety of African countries as well.

So can you talk about what USAID is doing to work with faith-based organizations in the field to deliver reproductive health services? Also what more can we do to support those efforts and get the word out but that not only is family planning not incompatible with faith, but that the two are, in fact, mutually reinforcing? Because I think there is a disconnect here inside the beltway between those that seem to condemn family planning as somehow being not in line with faith-based values.

Dr. SHAH. Thank you, Congresswoman, for your tremendous leadership on these issues. I appreciate the question, and I may save Cuba for perhaps later in the hearing and speak to the family planning issue first.

As you know, our programs in family planning are entirely voluntary, that we have very strict controls to ensure that we do not fund abortion, that we are the world's largest supporter of voluntary family planning for very poor communities, and it is a critical element of empowering women to take control of their own lives in settings where they otherwise may not have that opportunity.

We know that the Obama administration, relative to the previous administration has increased the commitment to family planning on the order of 40 percent and sustained that over the course of a very difficult budget environment. And we know that we actually have built partnerships with AusAID and the UK and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to bring others into a really results-oriented approach that can take advantage of the two big realities of these family planning programs.

The first is that this is one of the most cost-effective ways to save mothers' lives during child birth. And in places where child birth is still highly risky in terms of mortality, that is critical. And second, that it is about the most cost-effective way to save a child's life as well, with proper birth spacing contributing not just to reductions in infant and child mortality, but also to investments that families make in kids' education.

So we have been pretty effective, I think, in our family planning programs around the world. They are done under, as you know, careful scrutiny. But we have been proud of these efforts, and we have been proud of the fact that we have gotten so many other partners, including the Gates Foundation and the UK and Australia and countries themselves, to take ownership of many of these and increase their resources considerably through an initiative we all call Family Planning 2020, I believe.

Mr. DENT. Thank you.

At this time, I recognize the gentlemen from Kansas, Mr. Yoder. Five minutes.

Mr. YODER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Shah, thanks for joining us. It is good to see you again.

We have discussed this issue before. I wanted to just go back to a topic related to the Food for Peace program and how it affects American, Kansas farm producers all across our districts who are part of producing grain and other products, meat products, et cetera, that are sent around the world to help deal with world hunger.

It has been sort of a two-part relationship. One, we are helping feed hungry people, and two, we are putting American producers to work. These products come with a label saying furnished by the American people or being furnished by the people of the United States of America. It is a source of pride, I think, for our country when we see those bags of grain with our label on them go to the right places.

The President's budget would allow 25 percent of that aid, as I am sure you are well aware, which is the equivalent of \$282 million, to go to cash assistance, as opposed to food assistance. In light of the farm bill debate in which Congress had a chance to litigate this issue and determined to keep the food aid programs the way they are and the status quo, is the administration going to continue to move forward with this budget request, as opposed to changing the underlying law, but to use the appropriations process to change how we administer the dollars?

Do you agree with my concerns related to less Kansas, less American farmers being helped? What are your thoughts on that? And I am very concerned about it.

And are you concerned about an erosion of public support for the program if more of the dollars are direct aid dollars, as opposed to dollars that are coming back to pay farmers and producers in the country?

Dr. SHAH. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.

I appreciate the points that you raise, and the reason President Obama put forth the proposal last year and this year to reform and modernize this program is because we are facing an acute crisis in terms of humanitarian needs in a number of places that strip our current ability to provide humanitarian services.

And we have a proud Food for Peace history. We have reached more than 3 billion people over more than 50 years. But frankly, the value and the size and the consequence of the program has been diminishing over time because of the higher cost structure of a model of assistance where we buy food here, put it on American ships, send it into communities, sometimes sell it in communities to raise cash that we then give to NGOs.

That is not as efficient as it used to be, and we believe that a modest incremental reform will allow us this year to reach 2 million additional hungry kids in Syria, Central African Republic, and South Sudan, not cost America anything additional, and continue to support farmers.

And here is why I think the reform proposal will continue to support farmers. This whole program is only 0.56 percent of total agricultural exports by value. Most of the major partners we have in the program will continue to be partners and will continue to be partners at a very large scale. We are talking about 25 percent of a \$1.4 billion program.

Second, we are now moving the product mix that we are sending from America into more specially designed medical foods, whether it is peanut paste or nutributter, and those higher-value products are appropriate for the American food system, which, as you know, is the best and most advanced in the world.

And so, I think America is always going to have a huge role to play. But I think our farm partners in particular understand the

challenges here. The National Farmers Union has expressed support for the President's reforms, as has Cargill and a number of companies that people might have thought would not.

And over time, I think we will build a broad enough tent to continue to allow America to actually be the leader we need to be in these humanitarian settings, and we would appreciate your support for these modest reforms that will continue to make sure people see that American contributions are what are fueling these strong responses in the Philippines and South Sudan and Syria.

Mr. YODER. Well, in light of our efforts around the globe, whether it is the Food for Peace or food aid programs or whatever it may be, as we add more money into the system, the potential for fraud and corruption and misuse grows. Dollars are easier to probably fraud the Government out of than a bag of grain, although that happens as well and in many cases as significantly.

So I worry as we move it to dollars, as opposed to grain, that that might become more troublesome. There have been lots and lots of accounts—media reports, IG reports—about fraud and waste in Afghanistan aid. Malaria drugs being sold on the black market that were not going to the intended recipients.

I am sure you have been well aware of many of these situations. Could you outline for us where our biggest fraud risks are? What percent of our food aid and our foreign aid as part of USAID is being frauded or not getting to the right recipients based upon your analysis? And what are we doing to cure that?

Dr. SHAH. Thank you.

You know, we have, I think, a very strong program in place to oversee how we spend resources and mitigate the risks of fraud, waste, and abuse. I would say war zones of all kind increase the risks. So active conflict environments in Afghanistan, providing and trucking food around Somalia through al-Shabaab controlled areas a couple of years ago. Those are the kinds of environments that have the highest risks for waste, fraud, and abuse.

The reality is most of our program, the great majority are not provided in those contexts and under those terms. And we have a very strong oversight system that includes the Inspector General. It includes very clear reporting. For any resources we provide directly to local partners or countries in particular, we provide them on a receipt basis. So we evaluate the receipts and the costs they have incurred and then reimburse them for incurred expenses.

I have worked at the Gates Foundation. I now work at USAID. I understand accountability is critical, and we have increased our accountability systems very significantly in places like Afghanistan. In general, we don't overinvest in it, but we do create a lot of bureaucracy to track every penny. I understand why that is important. But I think we are covered in terms of having a very, very strong accountability system when it comes to waste, fraud, and abuse.

And as it relates to your last comment, I will just say that we have now been, since the Bush administration, implementing local and regional purchase in food aid, and we have not only found no higher rate of waste, fraud, and abuse there, we have actually found it brings the cost down, gets the food faster to people in need,

and often is the more appropriate mix of products that they need, like in the Philippines response.

Mr. YODER. Well, I look forward to working with you to ensure that we improve the integrity of these programs. I think nothing probably angers our constituents more than seeing American dollars wasted on a program where it is not intended to be overseas.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SHAH. Thank you.

Mr. DENT. Time has expired.

I recognize Mrs. Lowey for a moment.

Mrs. LOWEY. I just want to apologize. Unfortunately, there are four hearings at the same time so I have to leave. I wanted to make two quick points, and I know we will have the opportunity to continue this discussion.

First of all, as you know, I am not very happy with the basic education dollars. I think it is absolutely essential that we raise that number and continue to invest in basic education.

Secondly, I referred to the situation in Cuba before. As you well know, we had a problem in Pakistan where immunization workers were perceived as being helpful in tracking down Osama bin Laden, and this caused a decrease in immunizations because the general population did not trust them.

So I think as we proceed, and I understand that everything that has happened is all on the record and notices were given, et cetera, but I think we have to constantly weigh the investment in development programs and how they can be sabotaged by some of the work that may be perceived as very noble in democracy programs. Whether it is in Cuba or other countries, this is an important priority, and we have to continue to discuss the impact of one on the other.

So I thank you again for clarifying the actions of USAID, but I don't think we have resolved the challenges that we have before us.

Thank you.

Dr. SHAH. Should I respond?

Mr. DENT. You may respond.

Dr. SHAH. Well, I would just say thank you, Congresswoman.

I would say briefly on education, we have had the chance to discuss this, and I just want to say on the record how much I value your leadership and admire what you have done to help our country lead on this issue all around the world.

The two things I will say on that is our fiscal year 2015 request is higher than the fiscal year 2014 request.

Mrs. LOWEY. Not as high as it should be. [Laughter.]

Dr. SHAH. Not as high as it should be. And as you well know, through our Room to Learn initiative, the partnership model we have with some other funders is really helping us get leverage and better results, and I am very appreciative of your support.

And I take your comments on Cuba and Pakistan and look forward to future discussion.

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you.

Mr. DENT. I recognize the gentleman, Mr. Schiff, for 5 minutes.

When we go to the second round, we will do 3 minutes of questions. Thanks.

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Director, welcome. It is great to see you again, and I apologize if this is the subject of an earlier question, but I wanted to raise Syria with you.

According to USAID figures, well more than 9 million people are now in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria due to the devastating civil war there, including over 6.5 million internally displaced persons. I understand and appreciate that the United States is continuing to work through all possible channels to deliver aid to those in need in Syria, including through United Nations, international and nongovernmental organizations, and local Syrian organizations.

I am also encouraged to see in your testimony that USAID is providing lifesaving aid to more than 4 million people across the country. While all of Syria's people have suffered, its minority populations and especially Syrian Christians are most at risk. These are some of the oldest Christian communities in the world, dating back to the first decades after the death of Christ.

About 2 weeks ago, the town of Kassab, which is predominantly Armenian Christian, was attacked by al-Qaeda linked fighters who crossed over from Turkey, resulting in the town being emptied. Many of its residents were descendants of the survivors of the Armenian genocide, and this attack has greatly increased the apprehension of all of us concerned about Syria's minority communities.

Can you tell us what efforts USAID is making to identify and provide for Syrian minority communities? Many of them, I understand, resist seeking refuge in UNHCR and other NGO facilities out of fear for their safety and, thus, are more likely to be internally displaced persons.

Dr. SHAH. Thank you, Congressman.

I appreciate your laying out the consequences of this horrific situation, and the reality is while we are reaching more than 4 million people inside of Syria, there are still 3.5 million that are not being reached by anybody because they are inaccessible because of the conflict.

Two hundred twenty thousand of them are literally in besieged areas where food and water are used as a weapon of war, and we saw what they looked like when they left homes a few weekends ago.

With respect to minority communities, especially in the north, most of our services to those communities are provided through NGOs and international partners, not primarily U.N. agencies, and are provided through cross-border activities. That allows those communities to be reached, and it allows more effective access, and the U.N. only started some of those cross-border activities very recently in the last few weeks, especially across the Turkish border.

Expanding cross-border humanitarian support is a critical part of the U.N. Security Council resolution. I would just note that Valerie Amos of the U.N. reported on the first month of the resolution's implementation and said that the Syrian regime had not lived up to the standards of access on what we call cross-line inside of Syria and cross-border across neighboring countries access issues. And so, we continue to work through that with the Syrians, with others to make sure we are doing as much as we can.

But it is insufficient by definition, and I am very sorry to hear about the communities in Kassab, and we will ask our teams to specifically follow up on that.

Mr. SCHIFF. If you would, I would appreciate it. If you could let me know in particular what you are able to find out about the refugees from Kasab. Some of them have taken shelter in Latakia. Others in—I understand some of the elderly across the border in Turkey. If you could let us know what can be done to help provide for them?

It is, admittedly, a very small subset of Christians in Syria who are being targeted because they are Christian, which is, in turn, a very subset of the humanitarian disaster in Syria. But I have a great many constituents who are deeply concerned about this. As we approach the genocide, Armenian genocide anniversary, it is particularly painful to see yet another Armenian community ethnically cleansed from its homes.

[The information follows:]

Dr. SHAH. We continue to monitor and respond to needs of recently displaced Christian Syrian-Armenians from the Syrian village of Kassab. USAID partner the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has conducted several monitoring missions to displacement sites within Syria, including sites with populations displaced from Kassab, to identify humanitarian needs and to negotiate with local authorities for protection and assistance to displaced civilians.

UN partners report the majority of displaced Syrian-Armenians from Kassab have been registered as internally displaced persons and are receiving assistance through local Red Crescent Society organizations. In addition to being housed with extended family or renting apartments in urban centers, displaced families have received food assistance, basic household items and hygiene supplies.

In addition to the internally displaced population, twenty-one Syrian-Armenians from Kassab were met at the Turkish border by local authorities, where they were provided initial medical exams and then escorted to Turkish-Armenian communities for assistance. The US Consulate in Adana, Turkey visited the refugees and confirmed their immediate needs, including food, medicine, clothing and housing were being met through local community and Red Crescent organizations. Turkish authorities also provided a doctor to assist the refugees who required specialized medical care and prescription medications.

The US Consulate in Adana has verified that while the Syrian-Armenian refugees from Kassab are eager to return home and reunite with families if their safety can be assured, they described being safe and comfortable in Turkish communities of refuge.

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.

Mr. DENT. Thank you.

At this time, we will move to a second round of questioning, but for 3 minutes only. First, I recognize Mr. Diaz-Balart for 3 minutes.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Shah, just very quickly about Venezuela, if we may? I don't have to tell anybody here about what is going on there, where you have folks hitting the streets, trying to -- mostly students, trying to regain their freedom and their democracy. You have some of the main opposition leaders in prison for over a month. You have mayors thrown in prison. You have the press being censored.

But specifically to your budget request, I believe it includes \$5 million ESF funds. My understanding is the budget request of the last few years for Venezuela has actually been seeing a gradual reduction in democracy and civil society programs, despite the reality on the ground in Venezuela.

And since the congressional budget justification has not been released yet, as far as I know, well, a couple of things. First place, because of what is going on in Venezuela, do you expect an increase above the \$5 million figure, number one? And number two is since the CBJ has not been released, if you can provide us with some additional details as to your request for democracy programs throughout our hemisphere and specifically for Venezuela?

And Mr. Chairman, in time. You see that?

Dr. SHAH. Thank you, Congressman.

As Secretary Kerry recently noted about the Venezuelan government, they have severely limited freedoms of assembly and expression precisely as you articulate. USAID supports Venezuelan organizations, and civil society broadly to support citizen advocacy pushing for public accountability.

In fact, over the last 45 days, those partners have done quite a lot to identify, document, and report on human rights violations, as our partners have done in Ukraine and in some other parts of the world.

The \$5 million request for FY2015 is consistent with the fiscal year 2014 request.

And throughout the region, we will continue to support these programs. Again, we have had a long conversation about this in this session, but we do think that investing in democracy rights and governance, support for civil society precisely in those places where civil society is harassed and prevented from operating is particularly important.

These are longer-term investments that don't often yield very strong and immediately recognizable short-term results. But having seen the long-term efforts pay off in many parts of the world, I think it continues to be a modest, but critical part of how America presents itself in the context of USAID programs.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you.

Mr. DENT. At this time, I recognize the gentlelady from California for 3 minutes. Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much.

Back to Cuba again. I am equally as committed to the promotion of human rights everywhere in the world, just as my colleagues are, whether it is in the 70 countries that criminalize those with HIV or AIDS or here in our own country, where we should really be ashamed of the mass incarceration of African-American men.

What many of us don't agree with is an embargo against countries like Cuba, 90 miles away, which prevents normal foreign and economic relations where our Government and our own citizens, mind you, cannot travel nor engage in dialogue to address many of these issues. That is the point.

I assume the taxpayers believe that the Cuban Twitter program, given our fiscal constraints, was in the best interests of our national security, given that Cuba is on the state-sponsored list of terrorists, or terrorism. It is one of the state sponsors that you guys continue to say, you know, we need to deal with as such.

So I just want to see how many money could you lay out the taxpayers paid for this, given that I am sure it is also in our national security interests?

Secondly, trying to get a better understanding of how USAID works with the United Nations as it relates to Haiti, in terms of the fight against the cholera epidemic and how you prioritize the funding for cholera, addressing cholera in Haiti?

Finally, your cut, I think, in the tuberculosis funding, I believe it is 19 percent from last year. And so, I would like to get a handle on why you are proposing to cut the TB budget, particularly in light of the strong relationship between HIV and AIDS and TB as it relates to it being an opportunistic disease?

Thank you again.

Dr. SHAH. Thank you, Congresswoman.

On Cuba, I will just acknowledge your perspective, and I understand the point you make about the embargo. My priority has been taking the law, implementing it and ensuring that our implementation of it was well managed. And the GAO report was important at validating that approach, and I will leave it at that.

Ms. LEE. How much did the taxpayer—

Dr. SHAH. The program you are referring to—and there were a number of inaccuracies in the AP story so we can share with you the point-by-point rebuttal that we put out publicly—was \$1.3 million over a number of years. And for that, about 68,000 Cubans were able to be part of a text messaging communication system.

In terms of the U.N. and cholera, you know, cholera has been a priority for our health and water and sanitation programs in Haiti. Our rural health programs there have been extraordinarily effective at reducing the rate of child mortality related to cholera to under the 1 percent WHO target, and we have done that hand-in-glove with the U.N.

And so, we will continue to make those investments. We have also tried to do that in a way that builds out a proper health system, so it is not just going and putting out a fire. But it is rather making sure that clinics are well stocked, making sure that the full range of child health interventions are available to kids, especially in rural Haiti.

And in some of the districts, we have even invested in secondary care maternity hospitals to help improve maternal health outcomes and to do that in a way that is tied back to some of the higher-order hospitals that were mentioned earlier in the hearing.

In terms of TB, this has been a success story. We have had a 50 percent reduction in TB mortality. The United States has three primary accounts for supporting this. The first is USAID's bilateral account. The largest is PEPFAR's bilateral account, which, at \$180 million or \$190 million, is a significant investment. And the other one is our resource gift to the Global Fund for AIDS, TB, and Malaria.

In addition to significantly increasing our Global Fund commitments over the past several years, we just helped the Global Fund board increase its allocation within its fund responsibilities to tuberculosis from 14 to 18 percent, or something along those lines. So we could get you more details on it, but I want to assure you, having worked on this issue, visited programs, built partnerships with local private sector companies and the countries like Brazil, China, India, and Russia, that account for a lot of existing TB mortality, getting them to do more and recognizing that those are middle-in-

come countries that should take more responsibility has been part of our.

Mr. DENT. Thank you.

At this time, I recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Cuellar, for 3 minutes.

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Shah, again, maybe we can set up a phone call with Senator Harkin and I because the way you answered the question about the SEED program still doesn't say if it finishes in June whether that is it for that program. So I would like to follow up because I don't want to take up my time on that.

Dr. SHAH. Okay.

Mr. CUELLAR. But I am going to talk to Senator Harkin and follow up. There are two community colleges in Texas. One is in El Paso. The other one is in San Antonio. I represent part of San Antonio. I would like to follow up.

The second thing is if you can also follow up later the \$10 million that we increased and you all decreased——

Dr. SHAH. Yes.

Mr. CUELLAR.[continuing].If you can specifically tell us what you are looking at doing with that?

And then my question for right now is your Central Asia regional for \$16.9 million, you are going to continue that cross-border training for the new silk road initiatives. Can you just quickly tell me what countries are included in the silk road initiative?

Dr. SHAH. Yes. So let me—on SEED, I will commit to that call, and I would be eager to do it. I think both those community colleges have been consulted by our team, but we would be eager to do that.

On Mexico, I would just suggest, and we will follow up with the numbers, I have that in our fiscal year 2014 request, we had \$45 million total, of which the \$10 million in DA. And in our fiscal year 2015 request, we had \$47.5 million, of which \$12.5 million is DA and \$35 million is ESf. So those, maybe those are different from what you have, but we will work that through, and I will make sure my teams are clear about that.

Either way, we have carefully reviewed this program. And the investments are, as you know, part of Merida. We believe and we rebid a new project that is focused on justice sector reform, and the results from the effort are quite extraordinary. In communities where we work versus don't work, we are seeing very, very strong quantified, evaluated results—speeding up trials, speeding up getting the process moving, and making criminal justice more effective.

So I would appreciate the chance, to go into this in more detail.

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes, I would like to do that because, again, what we got from folks at the department were different numbers. So I would like to make sure we are on the same page.

Dr. SHAH. Okay. And with respect to the new silk road, this is, part of an effort we called the Almaty Consensus, but it is an effort to have Afghanistan and its neighbors work on more regional integration, trade, and energy partnerships. Recently we just concluded an agreement that will help Afghanistan get access to about 1,300

megawatts of energy that will be sold from Tajikistan and other places.

The initiative is defined to include the region broadly,

"but specifically includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India."

And then, there are specific priorities in energy, in trade transit, in customs clearance times, and in improving infrastructure and connectivity.

Mr. CUELLAR. If you can follow up on this? I have the "stans" countries, and I have Azerbaijan and Georgia. But if you all can follow up on those just to make sure we are on the same initiative.

Dr. SHAH. We would be happy to. Thank you, sir.

Mr. CUELLAR. We have some proposed language, and we want to make sure we are on the same page as yours.

Dr. SHAH. Good. Thank you.

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you so much, Doctor. Appreciate your good work.

Dr. SHAH. Thank you.

Mr. DENT. Thank you.

I recognize the gentlelady from Florida for 3 minutes. Ms. Wasserman Schultz.

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DENT. Before you begin, somebody has got a computer too close to the microphone. Thanks.

Okay. There you go. [Laughter.]

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. That would be me.

Mr. DENT. Restart the clock.

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Way too much technology going on here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to focus for a minute on nutrition and just the concerns that I know a number of people have expressed on some of the proposed cuts in the budget in nutrition programs. Congressman Diaz-Balart and I have worked together on the 1,000 Days resolution, and we think, obviously, addressing child hunger and nutrition worldwide is critically important, and I know you do as well.

So can you give us an update on the new nutrition initiative, which I think isn't very well understood, and how that proposes to address our priorities around nutrition and child hunger in the face of what seems like cuts to programs that are designed to be effective?

Dr. SHAH. Thank you. And thank you for your leadership on 1,000 Days. It is one of my favorite examples of bringing updated science and knowledge of what works to a field that has been of ongoing for a long time, but now has an opportunity to dramatically reduce stunting in particular.

In May, we will launch a new USAID strategy on nutrition that will effectively serve as an investment plan to back up a series of commitments the Obama administration made in the G-8 last year. And the most important commitment was that we would spend almost \$1 billion over a 3-year period in nutrition-specific interventions from agriculture, health, and core supplemental feeding in that 1,000-day window.

What we will articulate in the new strategy are the countries we are prioritizing, the specific stunting targets we hope to achieve with the effort, the need to use and leverage resources from our Feed the Future programs in those countries to ensure that we are tackling agriculture and nutrition together.

I have had the chance to discuss with the NGO community quite a lot about this effort, and I think it is very important because it starts to bring together health, agriculture, nutrition, against a common goal, which is ensuring that children in particular are not debilitated and stunted over the course of their lives because of a lack of access to adequate nutrition in the first 1,000 days.

This has personal significance to me because I come from a long history of Indian Americans, many of whom are stunted in past generations. But when you are like 2 feet taller than your grandmother, it hits home.

So we have an opportunity to actually do this well. It will be, I think, a strong effort, and I think what is in the budget is 101 million on the nutrition line item. But that is just one component of what an integrated nutrition strategy can accomplish.

America leads the world in this area, and so it is appropriate that we have a strategy and a target and a goal and the ability to report on what we are doing.

Mr. DENT. I will recognize myself for 3 minutes.

Dr. Shah, is USAID deploying any new technologies beyond the monitoring and evaluation to ensure that when problems are discovered in the M&E process, reasonable steps are being taken to actually resolve those problems, not just learn from them for the future? And do you need any other—do you need any further specific support or flexibility to ensure that you are able to watch projects, even after completion, and take reasonable steps to resolve the problems once identified?

Dr. SHAH. Well, thank you, Congressman.

We have put in place a very aggressive monitoring and evaluation strategy. It was actually recognized by the American Evaluation Association as a best practice. As a result of that effort, relative to 4 or 5 years ago when we produced maybe 10 or 20 coherent evaluations on an annual basis, we now do about 280 a year.

They are all available on an iPhone app that you can go to the app store, download the app, and then you would be the 15th person to use it. And I love it. It is great if you have long flights.

But the reality is we know that 50 percent of our evaluations are used for midcourse program corrections, and we are also doing post program evaluations in certain cases as well. You know, I support the efforts you have made and others, like Congressman Poe, to really put forth a vision that all of our major programs should be coherently evaluated, and we should learn from them. And I think USAID leads the charge in terms of getting that done and making that data publicly available.

In terms of using new technology for that work, in many cases, we have third-party evaluations, which is a best practice in the industry. And in many cases, we do use technology, whether it is SMS data from program participants to make sure teachers are showing up at the schools or satellite imagery to track crop yields,

as I just saw we are doing in Nepal through a partnership with NASA.

But in general, the goal is to be cost effective in how we do the evaluations.

Mr. DENT. Thank you.

In the interest of time, I will submit my five additional questions for the record and hope that you can respond to those at a later date.

Mr. DENT. And just again, I wanted to thank you, Dr. Shah, again for your time today. Thank you for coming.

This concludes today's hearing. Members may submit any additional questions for the record.

Mr. DENT. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs stands adjourned.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
 USAID Administrator Shah by
 Chairwoman Kay Granger
 Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
 Committee on Appropriations

April 8, 2014

Operating Expenses:

1. Please provide the program-funded operational costs by account and percentage for fiscal years 2012 through 2015. By account, please provide a narrative describing in detail the uses of these funds, i.e., number of direct hire staff, number of contractors, rent, vehicles, etc.

The table below shows program-funded operational costs (PFOCs) by account and percentage for fiscal years (FY) 2012 through 2015.

Fund Account	FY 2012 PFOCs Actuals	FY 2012 Actuals as % of Program \$ Obligated	FY 2013 PFOCs Actuals	FY 2013 Actual as % of Program Obligated	FY 2014 PFOCs Estimate	FY 2014 Estimate as % of Program Estimate	FY 2015 PFOCs Estimate	FY 2015 Estimate as % of Program Estimate
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia	34,191	7.50%	25,139	13.84%				
Development Assistance	161,374	6.13%	163,205	12.58%	157,941	6.30%	165,060	6.30%
Economic Support Fund	129,882	2.49%	139,595	2.65%	111,287	2.50%	123,120	2.50%
Global Health and Child Survival - USAID	75,076	1.61%	86,650	2.18%	59,543	2.15%	57,620	2.15%
International Disaster Assistance	58,936	5.30%	58,356	3.99%	70,239	3.90%	50,700	3.90%
Transition Initiatives	17,878	29.69%	23,649	21.44%	12,096	21.00%	14,196	21.00%
Total	477,337	3.38%	496,593	3.74%	411,106	3.55%	410,696	3.54%

The table below shows how the Agency used PFOCs in FY 2013, broken out by account and budget object class, or broad spending category. Agency systems do not capture some of the detail requested, such as the number of vehicles and contractors.

BGC	DESCRIPTION	AFECA	OA	ESF	USAID	IDA	TI	TOTAL
11.1	Personnel compensation, full-time permanent	-	10,699	2,284	1,382	403	112	14,880
11.3	Personnel compensation, other than full-time permanent	9,856	39,524	36,676	24,982	15,739	10,968	137,768
11.5	Other personnel compensation	177	1,709	4,799	1,208	63	-	7,958
11.8	Special personal services payments	-	506	-	7	1,946	-	2,459
12.1	Personnel benefits	1,532	8,779	11,731	6,909	3,505	2,087	34,562
13.0	Benefits for former personnel	95	40	310	28	-	-	474
21.0	Travel and transportation of persons	2,544	10,154	5,010	7,215	4,761	2,401	32,109
22.0	Transportation of things	239	526	658	1,618	225	1	3,266
23.1	Rental payments to GSA	66	3,583	855	421	1,352	1,225	7,545
23.2	Rental Payments to Other Non-Federal Sources	1,022	2,777	4,419	4,364	1,611	432	14,623
23.3	Communications, Utilities, and Miscellaneous Charges	368	893	843	1,191	306	342	3,944
24.0	Printing and Reproduction	5	508	30	45	0	1	589
25.1	Advisory and assistance services	321	40,716	2,915	3,170	136	532	47,789
25.2	Other Services	519	1,616	29,177	1,279	180	130	32,900
25.3	Purchase of goods and services from Government accounts	5,134	9,943	23,537	16,654	1,972	1,743	58,982
25.4	Operation and maintenance of facilities	20	287	43	429	32	5	817
25.5	Research and Development Services	-	105	-	-	-	-	105
25.6	Medical Care	-	74	87	67	11	-	240
25.7	Operation/maintenance of equipment & storage of goods	214	465	508	174	19	17	1,396
26.0	Supplies and materials	185	1,610	685	839	-	60	3,398
31.0	Equipment	251	1,790	843	1,646	210	199	4,938
32.0	Land and structures	-	34	5	25	-	2	67
41.0	Grants, subsidies and contributions	2,591	26,869	14,182	12,994	25,883	3,394	86,235
Grand Total		25,139	163,205	139,595	86,650	58,356	23,650	496,593

The total program-funded staff in FY 2013 is shown in the table below. Note that total program-funded staff does not directly correspond to PFOC spending, since PFOCs exclude staff that directly support host-country institutions and are located outside USG premises.

Program-funded Staff	September 30, 2013 Actual			
	USDH	Other US	FSN	Total
Total	164	991	2,406	3,561

Source: Semi-annual Worldwide Staffing Pattern Report as of 9/30/13.

2. Please describe any updates from last year to USAID's plans for consolidating space, including square footage goals per employee. Please describe in detail and with cost estimates if updated in FY14 and for FY15 and outyears, the plan to implement this space consolidation.

USAID has developed a domestic real property strategy to identify the best ways to implement the guidance provided in the March 14, 2013 OMB Memo M-12-12 Section 3 regarding Freeze the Footprint. The strategy includes using existing space more efficiently to accommodate Agency space needs without acquiring new office space through FY2015 and conducting a survey that will define future space requirements for Washington. USAID's negotiated domestic footprint is 789,634 usable square feet located in the National Capital Region.

In FY2012, USAID averaged 182 usable square feet per person at the Ronald Reagan Building (RRB). USAID has proactively established a goal of 150 square feet per person as part of modernization efforts at the RRB. As part of the current modernization project, USAID has already reduced the allocation of space to staff on part of the 7th floor of the RRB to 143 square feet. USAID will renovate the remainder of the 7th floor of the RRB to take advantage of more efficient design concepts that will increase better space utilization rates.

Phase one of the consolidations at the RRB was a partial renovation of the 7th floor and averaged \$200 per square foot, with additional costs added for non-standard work for restricted/secure space construction. This phase covered approximately 27,000 square feet of space and added 50 staff within the existing footprint, thus increasing space efficiency and improving utilization. The cost data was provided by the GSA project management team.

USAID is planning now for the second phase of renovation at the RRB, which will duplicate the space efficiencies realized in phase one. This phase covers approximately 40,000 square feet and includes similar improvements to office space from phase one. Costs are estimated to be similar to costs in phase one. This phase is scheduled to be completed by Fall of 2015.

USAID is conducting a space survey that will define out-year requirements for USAID/Washington facilities and help to create cost estimates and metrics for future implementation of improved space utilization projects. In the immediate out-years, USAID will

continue phased renovation of the RRB, contingent on funding availability, and will explore extending or replacing the 187,000 square foot lease at 400 C Street NW (SA-44) by January 2018.

USAID is also participating in the Presidential Management Agenda (PMA) benchmarking initiative which requires real property metrics to be reported for:

- Current Portfolio Square Feet as a percent of Freeze the Footprint Baseline SF
- Rent per square foot
- Operation and Maintenance costs per square foot
- Square feet per person (office space only)

3. Please provide FY13 actual, FY14 estimate, and projected FY15 request for lease payments. Please break out the top 10 most expensive leases and describe the number of employees in that location, other uses, and length of lease.

The table below identifies the top 10 most expensive USAID leases for Washington and overseas. The total staff at each location includes every person working at that location.

#	Location	Address	Property Name	2013 Lease Cost	2014 Estimated Lease Cost (\$)	2015 Projected Lease Cost (\$)	Total 3 Year Lease Cost (\$)	Lease Start Date	Lease Exp. Date	Total Staff
1	Washington DC	1300 Pennsylvania Ave	RRB/ITC	42,447,554	42,598,509	42,752,643	127,798,706	10/1/2010	9/30/2015	2,800
2	Washington DC	400 C St SW	SA-44	8,688,452	8,455,050	9,207,558	26,351,060	1/3/2014	1/2/2018	500
3	Washington DC	2733 Crystal Drive	2 PY	2,992,557	3,016,803	3,041,776	9,051,136	11/8/2010	11/7/2020	400
4	Almaty Mission	Kazybek Bi St. 41/26	USAID Office Bld.	2,335,341	2,452,108	2,574,713	7,362,163	9/1/2010	7/31/2020	158
5	Maputo Mission	Av. 25 De Setembro #420	Jat 3 (USAID)	1,786,411	1,956,211	1,995,335	5,737,957	1/1/2012	11/30/2021	197
6	Washington DC	2231 Crystal Drive	Washington Learning Center	828,660	2,342,363	2,514,139	5,685,162	12/15/2012	12/14/2017	25
7	Washington DC	2200 Crystal	Crystal Plaza Four	-	1,818,122	3,143,976	4,962,098	3/1/2014	1/31/2016	TBD

		Drive								
8	Tel Aviv Mission	25 Hamered Street	USAID Office	1,541,848	1,588,103	1,635,747	4,765,698	8/1/2008	7/31/2017	98
9	Bangkok Mission	Wireless Road	USAID Offices	1,436,919	1,357,416	1,357,416	4,151,751	7/16/2012	7/15/2015	157
10	Abuja Mission	Zambezi Street	Mangal Building	547,843	1,209,263	1,330,189	3,087,295	9/15/2010	9/14/2015	130

Limited Competition for Local Organizations

4. The FY12, FY13s and FY14 Appropriations Acts include a 10% limit on funds that are made available for limited competition for local organizations. Please provide a list of such contracts, including the dollar value of such contract and contractor, awarded in FY13 and FY14 to date.

The table below reflects the contracts that were awarded with limited competition to local organizations by fiscal year for FY 2012, FY 2013, and FY 2014 to date.

FY	Site	Award Number	Contractor Name	Date	Total Estimated Contract Ceiling	Procurement Instrument Type
2012	South Africa	AID-674-I-12-00002	Khulisa Management Services Ltd.	7/17/2012	\$5,000,000.00	IQC
2012	South Africa	AID-674-I-12-00003	DNA Economics	7/17/2012	\$5,000,000.00	IQC
2012	South Africa	AID-674-I-12-00004	Southern Hemisphere	7/17/2012	\$5,000,000.00	IQC
2012	South Africa	AID-674-I-12-00005	University Research South Africa	7/17/2012	\$5,000,000.00	IQC
2012	South Africa	AID-674-I-12-00006	Grant Thornton	7/17/2012	\$5,000,000.00	IQC
2012	South Africa	AID-674-I-12-00007	Manto Management	7/17/2012	\$5,000,000.00	IQC
2013	Egypt	AID-263-C-13-00002	Center of Planning and Architectural Studies (CPAS)	12/31/2012	\$271,951.00	Contract
2013	Bosnia	AID-168-O-12-00025	Ngo And Business Audit Doo Sarajevo	3/18/2013	\$26,559.00	Purchase Order
2013	Afghanistan	AID-306-C-13-00010	Omran Holding Group (OHG)	3/23/2013	\$3,533,950.00	Contract
2013	El Salvador	AID-519-C-13-00003	Civing S.A. de C.V.	6/4/2013	\$2,081,658.00	Contract
2013	Egypt	AID-263-C-13-00004	EcoConServ Environmental Solutions	6/7/2013	\$157,372.00	Contract
2013	Liberia	AID-669-C-13-00001	AEP Consultant Inc.	6/11/2013	\$278,381.00	Contract

2013	Bosnia	AID-168-O-12-00032	King lct D.O.O.	7/15/2013	\$29,807.89	Purchase Order
2013	DCHA/OT I	AID-OAA-C-13-00111	Rahman Safi Impact Consultancy	8/12/2013	\$4,862,616.00	Contract
2013	Ghana	AID-641-C-13-00003	FAS Consult Limited	8/22/2013	\$378,686.00	Contract
2013	Peru	AID-526-O-12-00027	Sinergica	9/13/2013	\$95,000.00	Purchase Order
2014	East Africa	AID-623-S-12-00006	Douglis, Carole	11/27/2013	\$179,248.00	Contract
2014	Mexico	AID-523-E-14-00001	Centro de Investigacion Para El Desarrollo, A.C.	1/23/2014	\$450,000.00 (5 years) - \$150,000.00 per order	BPA
2014	Mexico	AID-523-E-14-00002	C230 Consultores SC	1/24/2014	\$450,000.00 (5 years) - \$150,000.00 per order	BPA
2014	Mexico	AID-523-E-14-00003	Integrated Development Services, SC	1/24/2014	\$450,000.00 (5 years) - \$150,000.00 per order	BPA
2014	Mexico	AID-523-E-14-00004	IPSOS BIMSA S.A. DE C.V.	1/31/2014	\$450,000.00 (5 years) - \$150,000.00 per order	BPA
2014	El Salvador	AID-519-C-14-00001	OMNI	3/13/2014	\$4,954,833.00	Contract
2014	Bosnia	AID-168-O-14-00013	Kreativni Tim Za Dizajin, Marketing I Reklamu Fabrika Drust	3/26/2014	\$146,250.00	Purchase Order
2014	Nepal	AID-367-C-14-00001	Research Inputs & Development	4/8/2014	\$1,496,524.00	Contract
2014	Bosnia	AID-168-O-14-00014	Ngo and Business Audit Doo Savajevo	4/10/2014	\$19,246.00	Purchase Order
2014	Nepal	AID-367-C-13-00005	Lifeline Nepal	4/15/2014	\$2,197,006.00	Contract
2014	Nepal	AID-367-C-14-00002	Development Project Service Center	4/15/2014	\$4,095,155.00	Contract
2014	South Africa	AID-674-S-14-00013	Gill. Mesa	4/22/2014	\$24,117.00	Contract

2014	Nepal	AID-367-O-14-00017	Nepal Development Research	6/20/2014	\$24,000.00	Purchase Order
2014	Philippines	AID-492-C-13-00016	Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc	7/7/2014	\$24,000,000.00	Contract
2014	Western Africa	AID-624-C-14-00003	Gimpa Consultancy Services	7/7/2014	\$108,300.00	Contract
2014	Bosnia	AID-168-O-13-00057	Institut Za Razvoj Mladih Kult	7/10/2014	\$117,458.12	Purchase Order
2014	Madagascar	AID-687-C-13-00003	Cabinet Adapt	7/23/2014	\$347,320.00	Contract
2014	Malawi	AID-612-O-14-00023	Corporate Branding	7/23/2014	\$34,313.73	Purchase Order
2014	Nepal	AID-367-O-14-00020	Samsung Mobile Plaza	8/1/2014	\$14,028.95	Purchase Order

5. Please provide a list of all assistance and cooperative agreements awarded as a result of limited competition where US firms and organizations were excluded in the competition. Please provide in addition to the list, the dollar value of the award, the country, and the organization.

Our records indicate that competition was limited to local entities for the assistance awards listed in the table below FY 2012, FY 2013, and FY 2014 to date. U.S. firms may not compete for an award where the competition was limited to local entities.

FY	Site	Award Number	Recipient Name	Date	TEC
2013	Republic of Indonesia	AID-497-A-13-00003	Lembaga Kesehatan Nahdlatul Ulama	11/08/12	\$3,773,460.00
2013	Republic of Macedonia	AID-165-A-13-00001	Macedonian Civic Education Centre (Mcec)	12/04/12	\$949,684.00
2013	West Africa Regional	AID-624-F-13-00001	Ghana Institute Of Management And Public Administration	12/04/12	\$72,673.00
2013	Republic of Indonesia	AID-497-A-13-00007	Jaringan Kesejahteraan/Kesehatan Masyarakat	12/20/12	\$3,732,108.00
2013	Republic of El Salvador	AID-519-A-13-	Fundacion Para La Educacion Integral	12/20/12	\$25,000,000.00

		00001	Salvadorena		
2013	United Republic of Tanzania	AID-621-A-13-00006	Ifakara Health Institute	03/14/13	\$800,000.00
2013	Republic of Macedonia	AID-165-A-13-00002	Step By Step Macedonia	05/14/13	\$1,722,412.00
2013	Republic of Indonesia	AID-497-A-13-00011	Roman Catholic Diocese Of Timika	06/07/13	\$3,957,282.00
2013	Egypt	AID-268-A-12-00004	Ren Moawad Foundation	06/19/13	\$9,296,150.00
2013	Republic of Mali	AID-688-F-13-00003	Asdap	08/06/13	\$1,500,000.00
2013	East Timor	AID-486-A-13-00006	Ngo Belun	09/13/13	\$1,000,000.00
2013	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia	AID-663-A-13-00012	Research Inspired Policy & Practice Learning In Et	09/26/13	\$337,774.00
2013	United Republic of Tanzania	AID-621-G-13-00002	Sagcot Centre Limited	09/30/13	\$2,298,350.00
2013	Republic of Mozambique	AID-656-F-13-00002	Unidade De A. Tecnica De Alfabetizacao Funcional	09/30/13	\$1,253,936.00
2014	Republic of the Philippines	AID-492-A-13-00008	Synergia Foundation, Inc.	10/08/13	\$7,082,499.00
2014	Zimbabwe	AID-613-A-12-00004	Population Services Zimbabwe (Psz)	11/07/13	\$8,749,925.00
2014	Republic of Mozambique	AID-656-A-14-00003	Fundacao Desenvcomunidadefdc	11/18/13	\$2,977,540.00
2014	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia	AID-663-A-13-00007	Pro Pride	12/07/13	\$1,599,675.00
2014	Rwandese Republic	AID-696-A-12-00003	Caritas Rwanda	02/12/14	\$4,655,281.00
2014	Republic of Albania	AID-182-F-13-00001	Creative Business Solutions	03/10/14	\$1,499,224.00

2014	Republic of Mozambique	AID-656-F-14-00001	Reencontro	03/28/14	\$1,335,989.00
2014	CAR_ASIA	AID-176-A-12-00019	Association Of Civil Society Development Argo	04/23/14	\$3,851,353.00
2014	Rwandese Republic	AID-696-A-13-00001	Society For Family Health Rwanda	05/02/14	\$9,383,276.00
2014	Kosovo	AID-167-F-14-00005	Kosovo Democratic Institute	05/06/14	\$245,518.00
2014	India	AID-386-A-14-00001	Ipe Global Private Limited	06/03/14	\$6,113,000.00
2014	Colombia	AID-514-A-10-00003	Fundacion Pais Libre	06/03/14	\$537,480.32
2014	India	AID-386-A-14-00006	Phfi	06/04/14	\$2,836,000.00
2014	Guatemala	AID-520-A-12-00003	Asociacion Guatemalteca De Exportadores	06/04/14	\$23,000,000.00
2014	Guatemala	AID-520-A-12-00004	Asociacion Nacional Del Cafe	06/05/14	\$19,000,000.00
2014	Armenia	AID-111-A-14-00002	Eurasia Partnership Foundation	06/06/14	\$1,999,878.00
2014	Cambodia	AID-442-F-14-00001	Community Health And Development Action	06/06/14	\$83,373.00
2014	Republic of Zambia	AID-611-F-13-00007	Snow Systems Zambia	06/06/14	\$50,000.00
2014	Cambodia	AID-442-F-14-00004	Khmer Women Cooperation Development	06/09/14	\$35,882.00
2014	Republic of Zambia	AID-611-F-13-00008	Caritas Zambia, Zambia Episco Pal Conference	06/09/14	\$39,201.59
2014	Cambodia	AID-442-F-14-00005	Akphivath Neary Khmer Organization	06/13/14	\$72,278.50
2014	Republic of Zambia	AID-611-A-13-00002	Women And Law In Southern Africa	06/18/14	\$3,298,237.00
2014	South Africa	AID-674-A-13-00003	Child Welfare Bloemfontein & Childline Free State	06/20/14	\$3,274,260.00
2014	Republic of	AID-675-	Consortium For Elections	06/23/14	\$3,135,840.00

	Guinea	A-13-00007	& Political Process Strengthening	4	
2014	Republic of Zambia	AID-611-F-13-00004	Women For Change	06/24/14	\$68,224.00
2014	Republic of Zambia	AID-611-F-13-00006	Biocarbon Partners Trust	06/24/14	\$96,344.87
2014	Republic of Mali	AID-688-F-12-00001	Non Profit Organisation	06/24/14	\$202,747.71
2014	Republic of Mali	AID-688-G-12-00001	Urtel	06/26/14	\$27,189.47
2014	Republic of Paraguay	AID-526-A-14-00001	Fundacion Paraguaya De Coop	06/27/14	\$442,430.00
2014	Republic of Indonesia	AID-497-A-10-00001	Pattiro	06/30/14	\$961,656.86
2014	Republic of Paraguay	AID-526-A-13-00003	Centro De Estudios Ambientales Y Sociales	07/01/14	\$24,437,572.00
2014	South Africa	AID-674-A-13-00006	Hiv Sa	07/01/14	\$4,860,684.00
2014	South Africa	AID-674-A-13-00004	Repssi	07/03/14	\$3,580,309.00
2014	Republic of Albania	AID-182-A-13-00003	Aac Lushnje	07/09/14	\$967,152.00
2014	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia	AID-663-A-13-00005	Tigray Development Association	07/11/14	\$1,599,994.00
2014	Republic of Paraguay	AID-526-A-13-00002	Federacion De Cooperativas De Produccion	07/14/14	\$7,989,321.00
2014	South Africa	AID-674-A-14-00012	Johns Hopkins Health And Education In South Africa	07/15/14	\$39,967,670.00
2014	Republic of Paraguay	AID-526-A-00-01-00100	Centro De Informacion Y Recursos Para El Desarrollo	07/17/14	\$5,720,000.00
2014	Peru	AID-527-A-12-00002	Cedro	07/22/14	\$8,000,000.00
2014	Moldova	AID-117-	Centre Of Legal	07/23/1	\$92,209.96

		G-11-00001	Assistance For Persons With Disabilities	4	
2014	Haiti	AID-521-A-14-00004	Group Croissance Sa	07/23/14	\$374,584.00
2014	Pakistan	AID-391-A-00-10-01162	Aurat Publication And Information Service Foundation	07/24/14	\$40,000,000.00
2014	South Africa	AID-674-A-12-00016	Broadreach Healthcare Africa	07/28/14	\$58,000,000.00
2014	South Africa	AID-674-A-12-00017	Foundation For Professional Development	07/28/14	\$71,943,370.00
2014	Republic of Zambia	AID-611-A-13-00003	Zambia Centre For Communication Programmes	07/29/14	\$5,995,678.00
2014	Republic of Indonesia	AID-497-A-00-10-00023	Kemitraan	08/04/14	\$2,923,152.00

Guatemala: The end-of-project evaluation of the Program Against Violence and Impunity was timed to inform the new project design process. The findings influenced the choice of performance indicators and validated much of the new project design work that had been done to that point. The evaluation found that the former performance monitoring indicators were not a useful measure of activity success as they were undervaluing the activity of the courts and their successes.

Evaluations

6. Please provide a list of independent evaluations that have been paid for with USAID funds (therefore not including GAO and other US agencies) and the source of funds.

Please see the enclosed excel spreadsheet pulled from the 2013 Performance Plan and Report for a list of 243 evaluations completed in FY 2013 using USAID funding.

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Evaluations Completed by USAID in FY2013 as Reported by USAID Operating Units in the FY2013 Evaluation Registry

by USAID Bureau and Operating Unit
Completed USAID FY 2013

Africa	Benin	Final Evaluation of Community Teachers Professional Training Project (CTPT)	12/3/2012	DA	154558	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cID=0DvhZk4NWQIM2Ym00YRmI.Tkx4jK2TcxMM2ND8mY2Uy8nID=MzQ1ODMz
Africa	Benin	Final Evaluation of Girls' Education and Community Participation Project (GCEP)	3/18/2013	DA	20000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cID=0DvhZk4NWQIM2Ym00YRmI.Tkx4jK2TcxMM2ND8mY2Uy8nID=MzQ1ODMz
Africa	Benin	Final Evaluation of Teacher Motivation and Training Project	7/1/2013	DA	25000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACX671.pdf
Africa	Burkina Faso	FASO Program Mid-Term Evaluation	5/31/2013	Title II	42000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cID=0DvhZk4NWQIM2Ym00YRmI.Tkx4jK2TcxMM2ND8mY2Uy8nID=MzQ1ODMz
Africa	Burundi	Burundi Agribusiness Program Final Evaluation	11/15/2012	DA	213792	
Africa	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Evaluation of the Integrated Health Project (IHP) in the Democratic Republic of Congo	9/30/2013	GHCS	344235	
Africa	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Final Evaluation: ProJustice Program in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	9/30/2013	DA, ESF	200000	
Africa	Democratic Republic of the Congo	USAID/Democratic Republic of the Congo, Integrated HIV/AIDS Program (ProVIC) Final Evaluation	7/30/2013	GHCS	200000	
Africa	Democratic Republic of the Congo	USAID/DRC: Mid-Term Performance Evaluation for the Advancing Social Marketing for Health in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	10/28/2012	GHCS	48000	
Africa	Djibouti	End of Project AIDE Performance Evaluation	6/13/2013	DA	82145	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cID=0DvhZk4NWQIM2Ym00YRmI.Tkx4jK2TcxMM2ND8mY2Uy8nID=MzQ1ODMz
Africa	Eritrea	End-point evaluation on School-Community Partnership Serving OVC	9/26/2013	DA	60000	http://dec.usaid.gov
Africa	Ethiopia	Final Performance Evaluation on Strengthening Institutions for Peace and Development	4/30/2013	DA	48500	
Africa	Ethiopia	Mid-term performance evaluation of the Private Health Sector Program	7/5/2013	GHCS	246000	http://dec.usaid.gov
Africa	Ghana	Local Governance and Decentralization Project (LOGODEP) Evaluation	1/15/2013	DA	128292	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACX990.pdf
Africa	Kenya	Evaluation of the USAID-KARI Partnership for Increased Rural Household Incomes (2004-2013)	4/10/2013	DA	114670	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACX749.pdf
Africa	Kenya	Final Performance Evaluation of the Laikipia Natural Resource Management and Biodiversity Conservation Program	7/2/2013	DA	83060	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACX678.pdf
Africa	Kenya	Final Performance Evaluation of the Teacher Education & Professional Development Project in Kenya	3/26/2013	DA	111000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACX751.pdf
Africa	Kenya	Final Performance Evaluation of USAID/Kenya's Support to the Kenya Wildlife Service "Wildlife Conservation Project"	3/8/2013	DA	60943	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACX688.pdf
Africa	Kenya	Global Give Back Circle Program Mid-Term Evaluation	5/28/2013	DA	25340	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACX748.pdf
Africa	Kenya	Kenya Dairy Sector Competitiveness Program Final Performance Evaluation	7/10/2013	DA	216815	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACW804.pdf

Africa	Namibia	Mid-term Evaluation - KAYEC & Project Hope DVC Programs	5/3/2013	PEPFAR	100000	
Africa	Nigeria	Bauchi Sokoto Focus States Strategy Assessment	2/28/2013	CSH- DA	250000	
Africa	Nigeria	Leadership Management Sustainability – Prevention organizational systems AIDS Care and Treatment Project (LMS - ProACT)	11/30/2012	GHCS	198000	
Africa	Nigeria	Mid-line Evaluation of the Targeted States High Impact Project (TSHIP)	10/31/2012	GHCS	230934	
Africa	Rwanda	End of Project Evaluation: HIV/AIDS Clinical Services Project	12/15/2012	PEPFAR	50000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacr194.pdf
Africa	Rwanda	Evaluation of USAID investments in Nyungwe National Park	4/12/2013	DA	50000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACC669.pdf
Africa	Senegal	Final Evaluation of the Fixed Amount Reimbursement Agreement	12/31/2012	DA	43562	
Africa	Senegal	Mid-term Evaluation of the Basic Education Project	7/19/2013	DA	74581	
Africa	Senegal	Mid-term Evaluation of the USAID/Senegal Millennium Water and Sanitation Program	4/30/2013	DA	110289	
Africa	South Africa	Evaluation of the Palliative Care Program in South Africa	12/11/2012	PEPFAR	100000	
Africa	South Africa	Johns Hopkins Health and Education in South Africa (JHESA)	4/1/2013	PEPFAR	216000	
Africa	South Sudan	Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of Food, Agribusiness and Rural Markets (FARM)	1/15/2013	ESF	104730	
Africa	South Sudan	Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of Seeds for Development (S4D)	9/24/2013	ESF	37529	
Africa	Sudan	Evaluation of DG Fixed Obligation	11/30/2012	ESF	32000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?r=R9HqY5F4mFscdNFQw9UjR1N1ZCFu&eID=ODVhZjI4NWM0M2YyM00YRmLTkxNkZlTcxMM2NDmY2Yy&nD=MzQwMDY4&qcl=&ph=VHJ1ZQ==&bkTol=VHJ1ZQ==&
Africa	Sudan	Performance Evaluation of Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation Program	9/30/2013	ESF	296163	http://sharepoint.usaid.gov/dec/SBUPDACY273.pdf
Africa	Tanzania	Conservation Based Livelihoods Program Evaluation	7/31/2013	DA	70000	
Africa	Tanzania	FHI ROADS II End of Project Evaluation	4/30/2013	PEPFAR	250000	
Africa	Tanzania	Champion end of project evaluation	7/30/2013	PEPFAR	196000	
Africa	Tanzania	Malaria Impact evaluation in Zanzibar	9/30/2013	GHCS	150000	
Africa	Tanzania	Mid-term evaluation of Marie Stopes Tanzania outreach activities	7/31/2013	GHCS	75000	
Africa	Tanzania	PharmAccess TPPI end of project evaluation	1/31/2013	PEPFAR	148000	
Africa	Tanzania	Tanzania Vector Control (TVCS) Mid-term evaluation	4/30/2013	GHCS	159952	
Africa	Tanzania	Wildlife Management Areas Evaluation	4/30/2013	DA	295000	
Africa	Uganda	End of Project Evaluation of the Hospice Africa Uganda (HAU) Program: "Expanding the access to and scope of Palliative Care for People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLHIV) and their families"	2/28/2013	PEPFAR	95250	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACC6B4.pdf
Africa	Uganda	Evaluation of the Health Initiatives in the Private Sector (HIPS)	1/31/2013	PEPFAR	114726	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/usercontrols/cui/GetDoc.ashx?eID=ODVhZjI4NWM0M2YyM00YRmLTkxNkZlTcxMM2NDmY2Yy&nD=MzI3NDgw&gId=NTYw&atchmnt=VHJ1ZQ==&dp=ZmFsc2U=
Africa	Uganda	Final Evaluation of the Health Communications Project (HCPH)	4/19/2013	PEPFAR	104137	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/GetDoc.ashx?eID=ODVhZjI4NWM0M2YyM00YRmLTkxNkZlTcxMM2NDmY2Yy&nD=MzYyM00YRmLTkxNkZlTcxMM2NDmY2Yy&atchmnt=VHJ1ZQ==&dp=ZmFsc2U=
Africa	Uganda	USAID/Uganda AFFORD – Health Marketing Initiative Project Evaluation	9/27/2013	PEPFAR	118478	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?eID=ODVhZjI4NWM0M2YyM00YRmLTkxNkZlTcxMM2NDmY2Yy&nD=MzQwMDY4&qcl=&ph=VHJ1ZQ==&bkTol=VHJ1ZQ==&

Africa	Zambia	Local Partners Capacity Building (LPCB) Program End of Project Performance Evaluation	7/31/2013	GHCS, PEPFAR	266439	http://dec.usaid.gov
Africa	Zambia	End of Project Performance Evaluation for School WASH and Quality Education Project in Northern and Muchinga Provinces	9/30/2013	DA, GHCS	199824	Submitted to DEC
Africa	Zambia	Partnership for Integrated Social Marketing (PRISM) Mid-Term Evaluation	5/31/2013	GHCS, PEPFAR	449930	http://dec.usaid.gov
Africa	Zambia	Zambia Institution System Strengthening Project, Mid-term Performance Evaluation	5/31/2013	GHCS	464232	https://dec.usaid.gov
Africa	Zimbabwe	CSVR End of Project Evaluation	9/30/2013	ESF	16000	
Africa	Zimbabwe	Family AIDS Initiative End of Project Evaluation	1/30/2013	GHCS	129000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACA945.pdf
Africa	Zimbabwe	OVC End-of-Project Evaluation	12/14/2012	GHCS	110000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACA949.pdf
Africa	Zimbabwe	Promoting Recovery in Zimbabwe Final Evaluation	4/30/2013	Title II	200000	
Africa	USAID Africa Regional (AFR)	Midterm Performance Evaluation for SUWASA	5/31/2013	DA	400000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?q=2V3YXNt&ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQzMzYyMjQyRmUxNjZTc0MjM2NDhmY2Uy&ID=MzM4OTQz&qt=&ph=VHJIZQ==&bkTol=VHJIZQ==&
Africa	USAID Africa Regional (AFR)	Water and Development Alliance Evaluation	1/31/2013	DA	350000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQzMzYyMjQyRmUxNjZTc0MjM2NDhmY2Uy&ID=MzQ1NjZj
Africa	USAID East Africa Regional	End of Project Evaluation of the Flexible Family Planning Project	4/12/2013	GHCS	100000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACA203.pdf
Africa	USAID East Africa Regional	Evaluation of USAID/East Africa Technical Assistance Support to the East African Power Pool (EAPP)	12/28/2012	DA, Other	132000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACA314.pdf
Africa	USAID East Africa Regional	PEACE II Program	2/9/2013	DA	250000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACA315.pdf
Africa	USAID West Africa Regional	Mid-term Performance Evaluation of the Gambia-Senegal Sustainable Fisheries Project	1/1/2013	DA	138511	
Africa	USAID West Africa Regional	PDev II Performance Evaluation	4/1/2013	DA	150000	
East Asia and Pacific	Burma	Burma Outreach and Distance Education (World Learning) Project Final Performance Evaluation	12/30/2012	ESF	130000	DEC Number - 48d9d12-8823-4d50-ben3-71188aa51303
East Asia and Pacific	Indonesia	Decentralized Basic Education Evaluation Reports	10/1/2012	DA	690000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACA718.pdf
East Asia and Pacific	Indonesia	Forestry Program Midterm Evaluation	4/1/2013	DA, Other	150000	
East Asia and Pacific	Indonesia	Indonesia Marine and Climate Support (IMACS) Midterm Evaluation	3/1/2013	DA	50000	
East Asia and Pacific	Indonesia	KINERJA Midterm Performance Evaluation	2/28/2013	DA	30000	
East Asia and Pacific	Indonesia	PNPM (Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat) Performance Evaluation	8/1/2013	DA, ESF	500000	
East Asia and Pacific	Indonesia	PROREP - Midterm Evaluation	3/22/2013	Other	70000	
East Asia and Pacific	Mongolia	Final Performance Evaluation of Ulaanbaatar School Buildings Thermo-technical Retrofitting Project	1/1/2013	DA	55000	
East Asia and Pacific	Philippines	Literacy for Peace and Development (LIPAD) Final Performance Evaluation	9/30/2013	DA	142299	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQzMzYyMjQyRmUxNjZTc0MjM2NDhmY2Uy&ID=MzQwNTA4
East Asia and Pacific	Philippines	Microenterprise Access to Banking Services Program IV (MABS 4) Evaluation	4/24/2013	DA	81836	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACA377.pdf
East Asia and Pacific	Philippines	Private Sector Mobilization for Family Health Phase II (PRISM 2) Final Performance Evaluation	9/15/2013	GHCS	223000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?q=UHJpdnF0ZSB1ZWN0b3JlW9laWVpamF0eW9uZG9vZG9YW1pbnRlZG9YVnNlRmUxNjZTc0MjM2NDhmY2Uy&ID=MzM4OTQz&qt=&ph=VHJIZQ==&bkTol=VHJIZQ==&
East Asia and Pacific	Timor-Leste	Access to Justice (ATJ) Final Evaluation	10/31/2012	DA	150000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACA3022.pdf

East Asia and Pacific	Timor-Leste	Consolidating Cooperative and Agribusiness Recovery (COCAR) Mid-term Evaluation	3/31/2013	DA	260000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacc381.pdf
East Asia and Pacific	Vietnam	East Meets West (EMW) Kon Ray Boarding School and Central Highlands Education Project (KRBS Project) End of Project Evaluation	1/31/2013	DA	144213	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacc676.pdf
East Asia and Pacific	Vietnam	MID-TERM EVALUATION OF THE HIGHER ENGINEERING EDUCATION ALLIANCE PROGRAM (HEEAP)	6/30/2013	DA	157468	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACC675.pdf
East Asia and Pacific	State East Asia and Pacific Regional	Evaluation of EAP Support for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)	12/14/2012	ESF	132360	
East Asia and Pacific	USAID Regional Development Mission-Asia (RDM/A)	APEC TATF Midterm Evaluation of Performance and Institutional Capacity to Absorb Foreign Assistance	1/31/2013	DA	118090	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACCW256.pdf
East Asia and Pacific	USAID Regional Development Mission-Asia (RDM/A)	ASEAN Development Vision to Advance National Cooperation and Economic Integration (ADVANCE) Midterm Evaluation	10/1/2012	DA	76000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACCUB44.pdf
East Asia and Pacific	USAID Regional Development Mission-Asia (RDM/A)	Citizen Engagement and Reconciliation in Thailand: Midterm Evaluation of the Sapan Program	4/18/2013	DA	140000	
East Asia and Pacific	USAID Regional Development Mission-Asia (RDM/A)	Control and Prevention of 3 Diseases (CAP-3D) Midterm Evaluation for Burma, Laos, Thailand/Final Evaluation for China	5/20/2013	CSH, PEPFAR	104483	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQIM2YyM0Q0YRml.TkxNjk2TcxMM2NDmBmY2Uy&ID=MzQxODQ0
East Asia and Pacific	USAID Regional Development Mission-Asia (RDM/A)	Final Evaluation of the U.S. Coral Triangle Initiative (US CTI) Program	9/30/2013	DA	318000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQIM2YyM0Q0YRml.TkxNjk2TcxMM2NDmBmY2Uy&ID=MzQwMjEw
East Asia and Pacific	USAID Regional Development Mission-Asia (RDM/A)	Midterm Evaluation of Maximizing Agricultural Revenue through Knowledge, Enterprise Development and Trade (MARKET) Project	8/31/2013	DA	50000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQIM2YyM0Q0YRml.TkxNjk2TcxMM2NDmBmY2Uy&ID=MzQxNzE0
East Asia and Pacific	USAID Regional Development Mission-Asia (RDM/A)	Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of Asia's Regional Response To Endangered Species Trafficking (ARREST) Program	9/30/2013	DA	318000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQIM2YyM0Q0YRml.TkxNjk2TcxMM2NDmBmY2Uy&ID=MzQ1NzE0
East Asia and Pacific	USAID Regional Development Mission-Asia (RDM/A)	Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of the Lowering Emissions in Asia's Forests (LEAF) Program	9/30/2013	DA	318000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQIM2YyM0Q0YRml.TkxNjk2TcxMM2NDmBmY2Uy&ID=MzQ1NzE1
Europe and Eurasia	Armenia	Evaluation of Alternative Resources in Media Project	6/6/2013	AECEA	69400	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQIM2YyM0Q0YRml.TkxNjk2TcxMM2NDmBmY2Uy&ID=MzQ1NzE2
Europe and Eurasia	Armenia	Evaluation of Civil Society and Local Government Support Program	6/6/2013	AECEA	69400	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQIM2YyM0Q0YRml.TkxNjk2TcxMM2NDmBmY2Uy&ID=MzQ1NzE3
Europe and Eurasia	Armenia	Evaluation of Health Services Strengthening Project (HS-STAR)	6/6/2013	AECEA	69400	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQIM2YyM0Q0YRml.TkxNjk2TcxMM2NDmBmY2Uy&ID=MzQ1NzE4
Europe and Eurasia	Armenia	Evaluation of Pension and Labor Market Reform Project	6/6/2013	AECEA	69400	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQIM2YyM0Q0YRml.TkxNjk2TcxMM2NDmBmY2Uy&ID=MzQ1NzE5
Europe and Eurasia	Armenia	Evaluation of the Energy Security and Regional Integration Project	6/6/2013	AECEA	69400	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQIM2YyM0Q0YRml.TkxNjk2TcxMM2NDmBmY2Uy&ID=MzQ1NzE6
Europe and Eurasia	Azerbaijan	Final evaluation of the Azerbaijan Competitiveness and Trade (ACT) Project	9/19/2013	AECEA	124918	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQIM2YyM0Q0YRml.TkxNjk2TcxMM2NDmBmY2Uy&ID=MzQ1NzE7

Europe and Eurasia	Serbia	The Mid-term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Serbia Business Enabling Environment	8/1/2013	AEECA	85296	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?q=KERVY3VZVW50cy5EzN16Wwdf9UjA8R4ZTcoOnVzA93c3MgRf95nrmazongJHxomvjdcBTZLwA9E6pQc==&ctID=ODVhZj44NWQIM2YyM00YRmlTksNjk2TcoNM2ND8BmY2Uy&hID=MzQ1M0Q0S5qpfhODVhZj44NWQIM2YyM00YRmlTksNjk2TcoNM2ND8BmY2Uy&ph=VHJ1ZQ==&boxToL=VHJ1ZQ==&
Europe and Eurasia	Serbia	The Mid-term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Serbia Sustainable Local Development Project	8/1/2013	AEECA	85296	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?q=KERVY3VZVW50cy5GawWdHzaKN0YWhUjVZ5S8b2NhbC9bZXZ2bG3wWYUd9Bwemfz2NM9GqQJ5EChEg2N16Wwdf9UjA8R4ZTcoNM2ND8BmY2Uy&hID=ODVhZj44NWQIM2YyM00YRmlTksNjk2TcoNM2ND8BmY2Uy&ph=VHJ1ZQ==&boxToL=VHJ1ZQ==&
Europe and Eurasia	Ukraine	Final Evaluation of the Financial Sector Rehabilitation Project (FINREP)	10/25/2012	AEECA	166418	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/submit.aspx
Europe and Eurasia	Ukraine	Final Performance Evaluation of the HIV/AIDS Service Capacity Project (USCP) in Ukraine	9/30/2013	AEECA	200000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/submit.aspx
Europe and Eurasia	Ukraine	Legislative Policy Development Project evaluation	4/16/2013	AEECA	50000	
Europe and Eurasia	Ukraine	Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of the Access to Justice and Legal Empowerment Project	4/16/2013	AEECA	92439	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdsc372.pdf
Europe and Eurasia	Ukraine	Ukrainian Standardized External Testing Initiative (USETI) Legacy Alliance Project Evaluation	9/17/2013	AEECA	99966	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/submit.aspx
Europe and Eurasia	Eurasia Regional	Evaluation of the Eurasia Foundation	2/28/2013	AEECA	215810	
Near East	Egypt	Evaluation of Avian and Pandemic Influenza Program	12/15/2012	ESF	322000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=ODVhZj44NWQIM2YyM00YRmlTksNjk2TcoNM2ND8BmY2Uy&hID=MzQ1M0Q0S5qpfhODVhZj44NWQIM2YyM00YRmlTksNjk2TcoNM2ND8BmY2Uy&ph=VHJ1ZQ==&boxToL=VHJ1ZQ==&
Near East	Egypt	Evaluation of the Egypt Health Systems 2020	4/1/2013	ESF	301300	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=ODVhZj44NWQIM2YyM00YRmlTksNjk2TcoNM2ND8BmY2Uy&hID=MzQ1M0Q0S5qpfhODVhZj44NWQIM2YyM00YRmlTksNjk2TcoNM2ND8BmY2Uy&ph=VHJ1ZQ==&boxToL=VHJ1ZQ==&
Near East	Iraq	Mid-term Evaluation of Access to Justice Program	2/28/2013	ESF	250000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=ODVhZj44NWQIM2YyM00YRmlTksNjk2TcoNM2ND8BmY2Uy&hID=MzQ1M0Q0S5qpfhODVhZj44NWQIM2YyM00YRmlTksNjk2TcoNM2ND8BmY2Uy&ph=VHJ1ZQ==&boxToL=VHJ1ZQ==&
Near East	Iraq	Mid-term evaluation of Iraq Financial Sector Development Program	11/4/2012	ESF	461191	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?q=KERVY3VZVW50cy5EzN16Wwdf9UjA8R4ZTcoOnVzA93c3MgRf95nrmazongJHxomvjdcBTZLwA9E6pQc==&ctID=ODVhZj44NWQIM2YyM00YRmlTksNjk2TcoNM2ND8BmY2Uy&hID=MzQ1M0Q0S5qpfhODVhZj44NWQIM2YyM00YRmlTksNjk2TcoNM2ND8BmY2Uy&ph=VHJ1ZQ==&boxToL=VHJ1ZQ==&
Near East	Iraq	Mid-term Evaluation of Primary Health Care Project	3/31/2013	ESF	300000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?q=KERVY3VZVW50cy5EzN16Wwdf9UjA8R4ZTcoOnVzA93c3MgRf95nrmazongJHxomvjdcBTZLwA9E6pQc==&ctID=ODVhZj44NWQIM2YyM00YRmlTksNjk2TcoNM2ND8BmY2Uy&hID=MzQ1M0Q0S5qpfhODVhZj44NWQIM2YyM00YRmlTksNjk2TcoNM2ND8BmY2Uy&ph=VHJ1ZQ==&boxToL=VHJ1ZQ==&
Near East	Iraq	Tajira Microfinance Final Evaluation	1/21/2013	ESF	281523	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?q=KERVY3VZVW50cy5EzN16Wwdf9UjA8R4ZTcoOnVzA93c3MgRf95nrmazongJHxomvjdcBTZLwA9E6pQc==&ctID=ODVhZj44NWQIM2YyM00YRmlTksNjk2TcoNM2ND8BmY2Uy&hID=MzQ1M0Q0S5qpfhODVhZj44NWQIM2YyM00YRmlTksNjk2TcoNM2ND8BmY2Uy&ph=VHJ1ZQ==&boxToL=VHJ1ZQ==&
Near East	Jordan	Community Based Initiatives End of Project Evaluation	5/17/2013	ESF	16391	

South and Central Asia	Afghanistan	Kabul City Initiative (KCI) - Final Performance Evaluation	3/22/2013	ESF	94198	https://dec.usaid.gov/doc/content/Detail.aspx?ciID=7C9jdW1BnRZLnVbnRyYWN0XzQyYW50X251bWUqcmRkURJCmDMyYyOyMwMDAAMpactID=ODVhZjZkNmM2Ym00YyRmlTcxNjhZTCxMMjNDNBm2Yluy&iD=m3NzMykqchODVhZjZkNmM2Ym00YyRmlTcxNjhZTCxMMjNDNBm2Yluy&ph=VhU1ZQ==&bckTol=VHJ1ZQ==&
South and Central Asia	Afghanistan	Land Reform in Afghanistan (LARA) Program - Mid Term Performance Evaluation	3/26/2013	ESF	164000	
South and Central Asia	Afghanistan	Performance Based Governance Fund (PBGF) Project - Final Performance Evaluation	9/1/2013	ESF	228410	
South and Central Asia	Afghanistan	Regional Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Population (RAMP UP) - Performance Evaluation	8/25/2013	ESF	306475	https://dec.usaid.gov/doc/content/Detail.aspx?ciID=7C9jdW1BnRZLnVbnRyYWN0XzQyYW50X251bWUqcmRkURJCmDMyYyOyMwMDAAMpactID=ODVhZjZkNmM2Ym00YyRmlTcxNjhZTCxMMjNDNBm2Yluy&iD=m3NzMykqchODVhZjZkNmM2Ym00YyRmlTcxNjhZTCxMMjNDNBm2Yluy&ph=VhU1ZQ==&bckTol=VHJ1ZQ==&
South and Central Asia	Afghanistan	Sub-National Governance (SNG) Project - Performance Evaluation	9/25/2013	ESF	150900	
South and Central Asia	Bangladesh	Bangladesh Smiling Sun Franchise Program Impact Evaluation (NGO Service Delivery)	12/19/2012	GHCS	1000000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACU075.pdf
South and Central Asia	Bangladesh	Evaluation of the Improving Local Level Governance (ILLG) Project - Combining Traditional Folk arts with Democratic Local Governance	12/20/2012	DA	100090	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACU906.pdf
South and Central Asia	Bangladesh	Mid-term Performance Evaluation of the Actions for Combating Trafficking-in-Persons (ACT)	7/27/2013	DA	124000	https://dec.usaid.gov/doc/content/Detail.aspx?ciID=vZhZk4NWQM2Ym00YyRmlTcxNjhZTCxMMjNDNBm2Yluy&iD=MzM5OTAz
South and Central Asia	Bangladesh	Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of the Promoting Democratic Institutions & Practices (PRODIG) Project	3/4/2013	DA	200000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDAC655.pdf
South and Central Asia	Bangladesh	Performance Evaluation of the Integrated Protected Area Co-management (IPAC) Project: Democracy and Governance Components	9/9/2013	DA	250000	https://dec.usaid.gov/doc/content/Detail.aspx?ciID=vZhZk4NWQM2Ym00YyRmlTcxNjhZTCxMMjNDNBm2Yluy&iD=MxOnTU0
South and Central Asia	Bangladesh	Performance Evaluation of USAID's Promoting Governance, Accountability, Transparency, and Integrity (PROGATI) Project	12/9/2012	DA	200000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACU996.pdf
South and Central Asia	Bangladesh	USAID/Bangladesh: A Midterm Performance Evaluation of the Modhumita Project for HIV/AIDS	12/18/2012	GHCS	230000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACU952.pdf
South and Central Asia	Bangladesh	USAID/Bangladesh: Final Evaluation of the MaMon Integrated Safe Motherhood, Newborn Care and Family Planning Project	8/21/2013	GHCS	226252	https://dec.usaid.gov/doc/content/Detail.aspx?ciID=vZhZk4NWQM2Ym00YyRmlTcxNjhZTCxMMjNDNBm2Yluy&iD=MzM5OTAz
South and Central Asia	India	IFPS (Innovations in Family Planning Services) Project	12/12/2012	GHCS	299087	
South and Central Asia	Kazakhstan	Dialogue (HIWTB) Performance Evaluation	12/31/2012	AEECA	177975	https://dec.usaid.gov/doc/content/Detail.aspx?ciID=vZhZk4NWQM2Ym00YyRmlTcxNjhZTCxMMjNDNBm2Yluy&iD=MzQ1ODU5
South and Central Asia	Kyrgyz Republic	FINAL EVALUATION OF BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT	11/29/2012	AEECA	0	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdaws265.pdf
South and Central Asia	Nepal	Combating Trafficking in Persons Modern Evaluation	9/28/2013	DA, ESF	40000	https://dec.usaid.gov/doc/content/Detail.aspx?ciID=vZhZk4NWQM2Ym00YyRmlTcxNjhZTCxMMjNDNBm2Yluy&iD=MzQwNAZ
South and Central Asia	Nepal	Education for Income Generation Final Evaluation	2/12/2013	DA, ESF	55000	https://dec.usaid.gov/doc/content/Detail.aspx?ciID=vZhZk4NWQM2Ym00YyRmlTcxNjhZTCxMMjNDNBm2Yluy&iD=MzQwNDE1
South and Central Asia	Nepal	Nepal Peace Support Project (NPSP) Mid-term Evaluation	9/28/2013	DA	50000	https://dec.usaid.gov/doc/content/Detail.aspx?ciID=vZhZk4NWQM2Ym00YyRmlTcxNjhZTCxMMjNDNBm2Yluy&iD=MzQ1ODE0
South and Central Asia	Pakistan	JSD/DELIVER-II Midterm Performance Evaluation on the Health Commodities Component of the MCH Program	6/30/2013	ESF	350000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACX670.pdf

South and Central Asia	Sri Lanka	Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of Eastern Garment Alliance project (EGA)	12/21/2012	DA, Other	60000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdscw255.pdf
South and Central Asia	Uzbekistan	Agricultural Linkages Performance Evaluation	4/30/2013	AEEGA	81345	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cid=00VhZjK4NWQIM2YyM00YRmLTkxNjK2TcxMjM2ND8mY2Uy&ID=MzQxNDMw
South and Central Asia	Central Asia Regional	Performance Evaluation of the Business Environment Improvement Project	12/31/2012	AEEGA	144745	
Western Hemisphere	Brazil	TB Program Final Evaluation by November 2012	1/15/2013	CSH	209002	
Western Hemisphere	Colombia	Evaluation of the Community-Oriented Reintegration Program	7/31/2013	DA, ESF	338000	http://sharepoint.usaid.gov/dec/SBU/POAC764.pdf
Western Hemisphere	Dominican Republic	Impact Evaluation of the Baley Community Development Project	9/30/2013	ESF	50000	00075636-bc32-4849-b639-618031ba61ec
Western Hemisphere	Ecuador	Mid-term Evaluation of Sustainable Coasts and Forests Project	8/28/2013	DA	70900	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cid=00VhZjK4NWQIM2YyM00YRmLTkxNjK2TcxMjM2ND8mY2Uy&ID=MzQxNDMw
Western Hemisphere	El Salvador	Mid-term Performance Evaluation of the Transparency and Governance activity	1/27/2013	Other	100666	
Western Hemisphere	Guatemala	Education Reform in the Classroom Final Evaluation	9/27/2013	DA	124000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cid=00VhZjK4NWQIM2YyM00YRmLTkxNjK2TcxMjM2ND8mY2Uy&ID=MzQxNDMw
Western Hemisphere	Guatemala	Final Evaluation of Assorted Economic Growth Projects	10/19/2012	DA	477102	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cid=00VhZjK4NWQIM2YyM00YRmLTkxNjK2TcxMjM2ND8mY2Uy&ID=MzQxNDMw
Western Hemisphere	Guatemala	Mid-term Performance Evaluation for Two Economic Growth Office Projects	10/19/2012	DA		https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cid=00VhZjK4NWQIM2YyM00YRmLTkxNjK2TcxMjM2ND8mY2Uy&ID=MzQxNDMw
Western Hemisphere	Guatemala	Program Against Violence and Impunity Final Evaluation	12/28/2012	DA	103750	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cid=00VhZjK4NWQIM2YyM00YRmLTkxNjK2TcxMjM2ND8mY2Uy&ID=MzQxNDMw
Western Hemisphere	Haiti	Developpement Economique pour un Environnement Durable (DEED) Final Performance Evaluation	1/13/2013	ESF	120000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cid=00VhZjK4NWQIM2YyM00YRmLTkxNjK2TcxMjM2ND8mY2Uy&ID=MzQxNDMw
Western Hemisphere	Jamaica	COMET Evaluation	11/30/2012	ESF	292000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdscw255.pdf
Western Hemisphere	Jamaica	Jamaica Basic Education Program	1/18/2013	DA	202000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdscw255.pdf
Western Hemisphere	Mexico	USAID Supported TB Control Activities in Mexico Final Evaluation	10/1/2012	GHCS	18346	http://11.usa.gov/Tf1Vw
Western Hemisphere	Nicaragua	ACORDAR Final Evaluation	12/23/2012	DA	49885	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cid=00VhZjK4NWQIM2YyM00YRmLTkxNjK2TcxMjM2ND8mY2Uy&ID=MzQxNDMw
Western Hemisphere	Nicaragua	Alliances 2 Mid-Term Evaluation	8/21/2013	GHCS	90000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cid=00VhZjK4NWQIM2YyM00YRmLTkxNjK2TcxMjM2ND8mY2Uy&ID=MzQxNDMw
Western Hemisphere	Nicaragua	Conservation and Sustainable Tourism Program Final Performance Evaluation	7/26/2013	DA	45585	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cid=00VhZjK4NWQIM2YyM00YRmLTkxNjK2TcxMjM2ND8mY2Uy&ID=MzQxNDMw
Western Hemisphere	Nicaragua	Education for Success Mid-Term Evaluation	9/21/2013	GHCS	80000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cid=00VhZjK4NWQIM2YyM00YRmLTkxNjK2TcxMjM2ND8mY2Uy&ID=MzQxNDMw
Western Hemisphere	Nicaragua	Family Planning Graduation Evaluation	11/22/2012	GHCS	31511	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cid=00VhZjK4NWQIM2YyM00YRmLTkxNjK2TcxMjM2ND8mY2Uy&ID=MzQxNDMw
Western Hemisphere	Nicaragua	Final Performance Evaluation of the Organizational Development of Nicaragua Civil Society Project and Human and Institutional Capacity Development Program	11/25/2012	DA	41649	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cid=00VhZjK4NWQIM2YyM00YRmLTkxNjK2TcxMjM2ND8mY2Uy&ID=MzQxNDMw
Western Hemisphere	Nicaragua	Mid-term evaluation of Democratic Leadership Development Program and final evaluation of Expanding Electoral and Civic Education Program	9/22/2013	DA	112826	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cid=00VhZjK4NWQIM2YyM00YRmLTkxNjK2TcxMjM2ND8mY2Uy&ID=MzQxNDMw
Western Hemisphere	Nicaragua	Nicaragua Media Program Final Evaluation	7/25/2013	DA	50419	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?cid=00VhZjK4NWQIM2YyM00YRmLTkxNjK2TcxMjM2ND8mY2Uy&ID=MzQxNDMw

Western Hemisphere	Peru	Evaluation of ProParticipation Project	1/4/2013	DA	200000	https://dec.usaid.gov/doc/content/Detailed.aspx?q=KERVY3VZWS0cySEbZN1bWUdF9UxRkz2TpoJHJvXhDhcNRY2wYYRP22qKSB7BQgKERVY3VZW50cy5bnNlXR1dGvbIsv8VULDFJRF9CdxJYXVIXDYdaGyOYhhpWFZ4pqKO==&cid=ODVnZjk4NWQIM2YmM0YRml.TcxNjZTcMjM2NDNmY2Yy&id=MzQwMDM0Q08pID=NtYw&&title=VHJ1ZQ==&bckTol=VHJ1ZQ==&
Western Hemisphere	Peru	Final Evaluation of the ProDecentralization Project	11/21/2012		61761	https://dec.usaid.gov/doc/GesDoc.and?cid=ODVnZjk4NWQIM2YmM0YRml.TcxNjZTcMjM2NDNmY2Yy&id=MzQwMDM0Q08pID=NtYw&&title=VHJ1ZQ==&bckTol=VHJ1ZQ==&
Western Hemisphere	Peru	Intermediate impact and baseline assessment for the Private Sector Competitiveness project- PRA II	12/31/2012	DA, Other	316538	https://dec.usaid.gov/doc/content/Detailed.aspx?q=UGVY3SBOUEgSW50ZKJZWRPjXROEhOGFyjsGbmhmOgQnFZV4pbtmgQJNhzZ2wWuocGsm3pgGHIE5dyBCoMZXXRIFnHYRvucRBZtwZXppqCZ2VHS3MyYWSHfBdmYdyHsgUmVskcnmQNAWbaUcfqzCBDBGdxmhdGvbAeUqJJBKSBOcmQZWN0&cid=ODVnZjk4NWQIM2YmM0YRml.TcxNjZTcMjM2NDNmY2Yy&id=MzQwMDM0Q08pID=NtYw&&title=VHJ1ZQ==&bckTol=VHJ1ZQ==&
Western Hemisphere	Peru	Performance Evaluation of "Promoting Long-Term Sustainability of Parque Nacional Cordillera Azul" project	9/23/2013	DA, Other	40000	https://dec.usaid.gov/doc/content/Detailed.aspx?q=KERVY3VZWS0cySEbZN1bWUdF9UxRkz2ToY29yz3l8sbGVY3ShenVsSkx=&cid=ODVnZjk4NWQIM2YmM0YRml.TcxNjZTcMjM2NDNmY2Yy&id=MzQwMDM0Q08pID=NtYw&&title=VHJ1ZQ==&bckTol=VHJ1ZQ==&
Western Hemisphere Regional (WHA)	State Western Hemisphere Regional (WHA)	Performance Evaluation of A Gananar Caribbean Youth Empowerment Programs- St. Kitts & Nevis, Dominica, St Vincent & Grenadines, Suriname, Antigua & Barbuda, St Lucia, and Grenada	9/30/2013	ESF	318916	https://dec.usaid.gov/doc/content/Detailed.aspx?q=UGVY3Zm9ybWFrYU2URzRXZnRhbVh0GvbIsv8VULDFJRF9CdxJYXVIXDYdaGyOYhhpWFZ4pqKO==&cid=ODVnZjk4NWQIM2YmM0YRml.TcxNjZTcMjM2NDNmY2Yy&id=MzQwMDM0Q08pID=NtYw&&title=VHJ1ZQ==&bckTol=VHJ1ZQ==&
Western Hemisphere	USAID Central America Regional	USG Partnership Framework - PEPPAR Evaluation	9/29/2013	GHCSS	300000	
Western Hemisphere	USAID Latin America and Caribbean Regional (LAC)	Dominican Republic Biodiversity Program Evaluation	3/29/2013	Other	171800	
Western Hemisphere	USAID Latin America and Caribbean Regional (LAC)	Higher Education (SEED) Project Evaluation	11/21/2012	DA	406699	
Western Hemisphere	USAID Latin America and Caribbean Regional (LAC)	PREAL Evaluation and Education Policy Sector Assessment	12/24/2012	DA	350000	
Western Hemisphere	USAID Latin America and Caribbean Regional (LAC)	Public Private Health Partnerships in LAC - Worth the Price?	2/78/2013	GHCSS	100000	
Western Hemisphere	USAID Latin America and Caribbean Regional (LAC)	Strategic analysis of supermarket value chains in Central America	4/1/2013	DA	244096	https://dec.usaid.gov/doc/GesDoc.and?cid=ODVnZjk4NWQIM2YmM0YRml.TcxNjZTcMjM2NDNmY2Yy&id=MzQwMDM0Q08pID=NtYw&&title=VHJ1ZQ==&bckTol=VHJ1ZQ==&
Asia Middle East Regional	Asia Middle East Regional	External Review of the Water and Livelihoods Initiative	10/1/2012	DA	50000	
BFS - Bureau for Food Security	USAID Bureau for Food Security (BFS)	External Evaluation of the Feed the Future Food Security Innovation Lab: Collaborative Research on Horticulture	7/15/2013	DA, Other	88986	

BFS - Bureau for Food Security	USAID Bureau For Food Security (BFS)	External Evaluation of the Feed the Future Food Security Innovation Lab: Collaborative Research on Integrated Pest Management	7/15/2013	DA, Other	107612	
BFS - Bureau for Food Security	USAID Bureau For Food Security (BFS)	External Evaluation of the Feed the Future Food Security Innovation Lab: Collaborative Research on Sustainable Agriculture & Natural Resource Management	7/15/2013	DA, Other	112026	
BFS - Bureau for Food Security	USAID Bureau For Food Security (BFS)	IFPRI (CAADP and Asia/LAC Activities)	8/30/2013	DA, Other	150000	
BFS - Bureau for Food Security	USAID Bureau For Food Security (BFS)	Performance Evaluation for African Agricultural Technology Foundation	6/30/2013	Other	0	
DCHA - Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance	USAID Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA)	Evaluation of the USGS Volcano Disaster Assistance Program in Indonesia	12/31/2012	IDA	280446	
DCHA - Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance	USAID Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA)	Haiti Final Evaluation	8/30/2013	Other	350000	
DCHA - Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance	USAID Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA)	Kenya Final Evaluation	9/30/2013	Other	150000	
DCHA - Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance	USAID Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA)	Latin America Caribbean Regional Disaster Response Program	1/12/2013	IDA	76500	
DCHA - Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance	USAID Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA)	Sri Lanka Final Evaluation	9/30/2013	Other	135000	
E3 - Economic Growth, Education, and Environment	USAID Economic Growth, Education and Environment (E3)	Africa HUB Evaluation	9/30/2013	DA	327552	
E3 - Economic Growth, Education, and Environment	USAID Economic Growth, Education and Environment (E3)	Assessment of the Nature, Wealth and Power Approach	9/30/2013	DA	200000	
E3 - Economic Growth, Education, and Environment	USAID Economic Growth, Education and Environment (E3)	Final Evaluation: Integrated Agriculture for Women's Empowerment (INAWE)	9/27/2013	DA	15875	
E3 - Economic Growth, Education, and Environment	USAID Economic Growth, Education and Environment (E3)	Housing Finance Cooperative Agreement (Aga Khan Foundation, Afghanistan)	9/30/2013	DA	1	
E3 - Economic Growth, Education, and Environment	USAID Economic Growth, Education and Environment (E3)	Housing Finance Cooperative Agreement (Habitat for Humanity, India)	7/31/2013	DA		https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=001VhZk4NwQM2YyM00YRmLTkxNjzTcxMjM2NDNm1Y2Uy&ID=MzQwMjM3
E3 - Economic Growth, Education, and Environment	USAID Economic Growth, Education and Environment (E3)	Housing Finance Cooperative Agreement (Opportunity International, Ghana)	5/31/2013	DA		https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=001VhZk4NwQM2YyM00YRmLTkxNjzTcxMjM2NDNm1Y2Uy&ID=MzQwMjM3
E3 - Economic Growth, Education, and Environment	USAID Economic Growth, Education and Environment (E3)	Housing Finance IGP - Opportunity International Ghana	5/31/2013	DA	206783	

E3 - Economic Growth, Education, and Environment	USAID Economic Growth, Education and Environment (E3)	Liberia - Electricity Efficiency, Safety and Loss Reduction Project	5/20/2013	DA	650000	
GH - Global Health	USAID Global Health (GH)	CapacityPlus Mid-term Evaluation	7/1/2013	GHCS, Other	215183	
GH - Global Health	USAID Global Health (GH)	Influence of School WASH on Attendance	6/1/2013	GHCS, Other	110000	
GH - Global Health	USAID Global Health (GH)	Performance Evaluation of CARE's Initiative to Manage People Centered Alliances in Control of Tuberculosis (IMPACTY) Project in India	9/30/2013	GHCS, Other	6500	
GH - Global Health	USAID Global Health (GH)	Performance Evaluation of the Child Survival and Health Grants Program	8/10/2013	GHCS, Other	370000	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?oID=ODvhZjk4NWQmM2YmO0YRmlTksXjkZTcxMM2ND8mY2Uy&nID=MzM5O0g1
GH - Global Health	USAID Global Health (GH)	Project SEARCH End-of-Project Evaluation	9/30/2013	GHCS, Other	500000	
GH - Global Health	USAID Global Health (GH)	SHOPS Mid-term Evaluation	1/1/2013	GHCS, Other	394651	
GH - Global Health	USAID Global Health (GH)	WUEI	9/30/2013	Other	450000	
IDEA - Office of Innovation and Development Alliances	USAID Office of Innovation and Development Alliances (IDEA)	Cooperative Development Program - Midterm Evaluation of CRI Project	9/30/2013	DA	40000	
IDEA - Office of Innovation and Development Alliances	USAID Office of Innovation and Development Alliances (IDEA)	Cooperative Development Program - Midterm Evaluation of ACCI/VOCA Project	8/6/2013	DA	14650	
IDEA - Office of Innovation and Development Alliances	USAID Office of Innovation and Development Alliances (IDEA)	Cooperative Development Program - Midterm Evaluation of CHF Program	6/3/2013	DA	15000	
IDEA - Office of Innovation and Development Alliances	USAID Office of Innovation and Development Alliances (IDEA)	Cooperative Development Program - Midterm Evaluation of Equal Exchange Project	12/14/2012	DA	13471	
IDEA - Office of Innovation and Development Alliances	USAID Office of Innovation and Development Alliances (IDEA)	Cooperative Development Program - Midterm Evaluation of Land O'Lakes Project	8/6/2013	DA	14650	
IDEA - Office of Innovation and Development Alliances	USAID Office of Innovation and Development Alliances (IDEA)	Cooperative Development Program - Midterm Evaluation of NCBA/CLUSA Project	8/6/2013	DA	14650	
IDEA - Office of Innovation and Development Alliances	USAID Office of Innovation and Development Alliances (IDEA)	Mid-Term Cooperative Development Program Evaluation for HealthPartners	6/28/2013	DA	15529	
OST - Office of Science and Technology	OST - Office of Science and Technology	LAUNCH Valuation Report	9/30/2013	Other	25000	
PPL - Policy, Planning and Learning	USAID Policy, Planning and Learning (PPL)	Bureau for Policy, Planning and Learning: Evaluation of Program Cycle Implementation	9/15/2013			http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACK5f8.pdf
PPL - Policy, Planning and Learning	USAID Policy, Planning and Learning (PPL)	Meta-Evaluation of Quality and Coverage of USAID Evaluation 2009 - 2012	8/31/2013	DA	125000	http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACK771.pdf

7. How have these evaluations changed the way USAID manages its programs?

According to FY2013 reporting, at least 55 percent of the USAID evaluations completed in FY2013 have informed decisions about the design of follow-on or similar new programs, 42 percent informed project management and provided feedback for necessary course corrections, 30 percent were used as a basis to judge overall project performance, 11 percent contributed to overall learning on a topic, 11 percent influenced decisions by other actors such as host governments or other donors, and about eight percent were used to assess and support the capacity of local institutions. Since one evaluation can be used for more than one purpose, these percentages add up to over 100 percent.

8. Have any funds been redirected or reprogrammed as a result since last year's hearing? Please be specific.

At the operating unit level, funds have been redirected or programs have been adjusted as a result of an evaluation. Here are a few examples based on reporting in FY2013:

Armenia: A mid-term evaluation prompted early termination of a health program due to revealing a number of significant design and implementation flaws. Since then, the Mission has redesigned its health portfolio to focus on areas where it can make a lasting difference as USAID phases out of the sector.

Bangladesh: Evaluation findings and recommendations were used to revise USAID's follow-on activity in the area of local governance and the findings from another evaluation were used to inform strategic changes to improve implementation of a project, such as addressing inefficiencies in the distribution of Misoprostol tablets at the community level and investigating options for increasing male involvement in family planning.

Procurement Reform

9. When USAID began proposing USAID Forward and procurement reform, the costs of these reforms were intended to reduce contracting and other overhead costs. How are these savings being estimated? What are the latest estimates?

USAID Forward is a comprehensive series of reforms begun in 2010 that are designed to strengthen the Agency's ability to partner to end extreme poverty and promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity. Procurement reform is an important part of this initiative, but only a part. In general, USAID Forward's reforms are focused on three main areas:

- **Deliver results on a meaningful scale through a strengthened USAID.** In order to maximize our impact with every development dollar, we are pursuing a more strategic, focused and results-oriented approach. From strengthening our policy and budget management to enacting a world-class evaluation policy, USAID Forward is helping us to do that.
- **Promote sustainable development through high-impact partnerships and local solutions.** In order to achieve long-term sustainable development, we must support the institutions, private sector partners and civil society organizations that serve as engines of growth and progress for their own nations. USAID Forward is helping us to do that through new models for public-private partnerships and increased investment directly to partner governments and local organizations.
- **Identify and scale up innovative, breakthrough solutions to intractable development challenges.** At USAID, we have a strong history of partnerships with the scientific community that helped pioneer some of the greatest successes in development to date. USAID Forward is helping us to further this legacy by strengthening our work with scientists, researchers and universities, investing in new technologies to source and scale game-changing solutions, and supporting mobile solutions to dramatically expand opportunity.

In particular, the Agency's Local Solutions initiative under USAID Forward is focused on using, strengthening and partnering with local actors – government, private sector, NGOs, and academia – strategically, purposefully and cost-effectively to achieve our sustainable development objectives. To do this, we need to use – and as warranted, strengthen – those systems to ensure their efficacy. Not only will working directly through local systems yield results, but we expect that it will also be able to sustain such results over time using the country's own resources.

While the necessary due diligence and risk mitigation measures mean that many of our Local Solutions investments are only in the initial phases of implementation, below are some of examples of cost savings and cost effectiveness as a result working directly with local partners:

South Africa – In collaboration with the South African Government (SAG), USAID/South Africa has begun its Voluntary Medical Male Circumcision (VMMC) activity which aims to provide high quality, high volume, and high efficiency services to males ages 15-49 in rural and urban areas. VMMC has been proven to reduce direct heterosexual HIV transmission from females to males and may indirectly reduce infection in women. Given the urgency to scale up HIV prevention in South Africa, this VMMC activity comes at a crucial time, and the SAG has set a goal of 4.3 million VMMCs (80% coverage of men aged 15-49) over 5 years. **By using a local partner (Right to Care) familiar with the local development environment, the VMMC activity has delivered results that were less costly by an estimated \$6.6 million dollars.**

Nepal – In Nepal, USAID worked with a local pharmaceutical company to develop a chlorhexidine (CHX) gel despite the lack of an existing market. Committed to acting on what they saw as an important public health investment for Nepal, the local firm developed the gel knowing that the price had to be reasonable and affordable, despite the fact that profit was uncertain. Today, in addition to Nepal, this firm has **supplied the chlorhexidine (CHX) gel in Madagascar, Nigeria, and Liberia** as well. While many organizations might not have taken on the risk inherent to the production of the gel, in this case working through the local private sector proved more cost-effective than a comparable partnership and highlights the potential of a Local Solutions approach.

Haiti – The USAID-led Feed the Future initiative supported 30,000 Haitian farmers to increase their yields through improved production technologies. The mission now intends to provide grants directly to local farmer associations at a significant cost savings due to much lower overhead costs. To reach their ambitious goal of doubling the incomes of at least 100,000 rural households, USAID's Mission in Haiti will use these cost savings to spread knowledge and increase the use of innovative technologies throughout these organizations.

Internally, the Agency has been engaged in an ongoing effort to improve and strengthen acquisition and assistance pre- and post-award processes to increase cost-efficiency and maximize the development impact of foreign assistance dollars. We doubled our overseas staffing, thanks to the Development Leadership Initiative, and we increased the number of Washington-based contracting specialists by 20%, thereby increasing greater professionalism and oversight in our acquisition and assistance operations.

Furthermore, the recently completed Award Cost Efficiency Study (ACES) produced a series of recommendations designed to increase the value that USAID achieves for taxpayer money. These include:

- clear, measurable project objectives tied to development outcomes;
- evaluating cost relative to the effectiveness of the given investment;
- promoting competition by creating and competing awards that can be successfully managed by a wider variety of applicants;
- managing partner performance over the life of the award;
- managing awards as a portfolio to exploit synergies, partner insights, and benchmarking; and
- equipping personnel with the right skills and tools to assess value for money, hold them accountable, and provide incentives to motivate.

USAID is acting on these ACES recommendations, including issuing updated guidance on selection of the most appropriate implementing mechanisms, streamlining timelines, and issuing new and updated templates on cost analysis.

Finally, through its Acquisition and Assistance Review and Approval Document (AARAD), the Agency's leadership is now reviewing all awards with an estimated cost of \$25 million or more. The AARAD reviews are intended to increase senior management engagement and accountability for acquisition and assistance, ensure more rigorous project design and costing standards, establish greater linkages between Washington and field activities, and result in more effective implementing mechanisms.

It is important to stress that cost savings from the USAID Forward reforms will most likely not materialize in the short term. The reforms undertaken to deliver more effective and efficient results require many years of continued investment to ultimately achieve cost savings in the long term. Nevertheless, we believe that these reforms will enable the Agency to achieve its mission while providing the best value for investments of U.S. taxpayer funds.

10. Please provide a staffing chart from FY2008 to present that shows the increases in staff attributable to USAID Forward reforms by bureau.

In FYs 2011 and 2012, the Agency hired 50 new Civil Service (CS) staff to support Local Solutions, formerly known as procurement reform. The table below shows the 50 CS staff hired by operating unit and year.

Operating Unit	FY 2011	FY 2012	Total
Bureau for Africa	4	-	4
Bureau for Food Security	-	1	1
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance	8	-	8
Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment	4	-	4
Office of General Counsel	1	1	2
Bureau for Global Health	3	-	3
Bureau for Management	3	23	26
Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization	1	1	2
Total	24	26	50

As the chart above shows, the Bureau for Management received the majority of the positions for contracting officers and financial management staff, which are critical to the oversight and implementation of Local Solutions.

In addition, since FY 2008, the Agency hired 820 Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) under the Development Leadership Initiative in all technical and stewardship backstops. These FSOs implement and support the Presidential Initiatives, USAID Forward reforms, and other priorities. The table below shows the 820 FSOs by backstop and year.

Backstop	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011	Total
Program and Planning Officers	32	48	32	10	122
Executive Officers	3	17	16	3	39
Financial Management Officers	9	38	16	13	76
Agriculture Officers	2	12	50	12	76
Economic Officers	3	12	24	5	44
Private Enterprise Officers	14	20	36	3	73
Public Health Officers	13	40	19	12	84
Engineers	-	8	13	3	24
Education Officers	8	12	15	2	37
Democracy, Conflict, Governance, and Humanitarian Assistance Officers	29	40	41	12	122
Energy and Environment Officers	3	10	21	12	46
Legal Advisors	2	-	-	-	2
Contract Officers	2	43	17	13	75
Total	120	300	300	100	820

Global Health

11. The President's request for FY15 includes decreases relative to the enacted FY 14 levels for the Global Health programs that USAID administers to fight tuberculosis, for maternal and child health, and for pandemic preparedness. For each disease category, please provide a list of countries in which programs in these categories will be reduced in FY15 compared to FY14 including narrative explaining the reductions.

The Administration's FY 2015 budget request for USAID's Global Health Programs reflects difficult choices made in a constrained budget environment. Once the FY 2015 levels are established, we will be in a position to make any necessary decisions in the programming levels.

12. In your answer to Congressman Dent's question, you stated that the USAID TB program was only a portion of US support for TB. Please include a chart that compares USAID TB programs to other US programs from fiscal year 2013 through the fiscal year 2015 request.

The rate of new TB cases has been declining for the past decade and the world is on track to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of reversing TB incidence, along with a 50 percent reduction in the mortality rate by 2015, compared to 1990. Since 1990, TB treatment has saved the lives of more than 22 million people.

There are 22 high-burden countries, which account for 80 percent of the world's TB cases. Five of these countries, which account for almost half of the TB cases – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – have the ability to increase domestic funding for TB. Further, all of these five countries are now providing development assistance to other countries.

The Global Health Programs-USAID FY 2015 request for TB does not represent the totality of the U.S. Government's response to the disease. USAID collaborates with other agencies on TB efforts, including: the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), to integrate and expand TB health services and strengthen delivery platforms; and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), on TB/HIV co-infection interventions. On average, PEPFAR programs \$130-160 million each year for TB. Further, three-quarters of the annual international donor funding for TB is provided by the Global Fund, and the U.S. Government remains the largest donor to the Fund.

TB funding will continue to focus on early diagnosis and successful treatment of the disease to both cure individuals and prevent transmission to others. The funding priority

will go toward countries that have the greatest burden of TB and multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB). Country-level expansion and strengthening of the Stop TB Strategy will continue to be the focal point of USAID's TB program. In addition, USAID will continue to accelerate activities to address MDR-TB and extensively drug-resistant TB (XDR-TB), including diagnosis and treatment, and infection control measures.

13. Specifically, which countries will receive decreased levels of USAID TB funding in the FY15 request, and provide a narrative about other sources of funding.

Once the FY 2015 levels are established, we will be in a position to make any necessary decisions in the programming levels.

The rate of new TB cases has been declining for the past decade and the world is on track to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of reversing TB incidence, along with a 50 percent reduction in the mortality rate by 2015, compared to 1990. Since 1990, TB treatment has saved the lives of more than 22 million people.

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TB funding will continue to focus on early diagnosis and successful treatment of the disease to both cure individuals and prevent transmission to others. The funding priority will go toward countries that have the greatest burden of TB and multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB), and country-level expansion and strengthening of the Stop TB Strategy will continue to be the focal point of USAID's TB program. In addition, USAID will continue to accelerate activities to address MDR-TB and extensively drug-resistant TB (XDR-TB), including diagnosis and treatment, and infection control measures.

14. The Administration includes in its request a \$45M Global Health Security Initiative. Will funds in this initiative replace USAID funding as decreased in the FY15 request for infectious disease programs such as TB and pandemic influenza?

The Administration's FY 2015 budget request for activities within USAID's Global Health Programs reflects difficult choices made in a constrained budget environment. The FY 2015 budget request of \$45 million for Global Health Security is for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), not USAID.

Development Credit Authority

15. Of all the guarantees issued by Development Credit Authority (DCA) using FY 2013 and FY 2014 funds to date, what is the estimate of guarantees issued over 50%?

Only one DCA guarantee issued using FY 2013 funds was above 50 percent coverage. This guarantee, covering private lending for the construction of a 10MW hydro power facility in Tanzania, was the first transaction supported by the Agency under the Administration's Power Africa initiative. Coverage for this guarantee was set at 60 percent given the nascent state of the power generation sector in Tanzania and the extended tenor of 12 years required for the underlying loan. In terms of FY 2014 funds, DCA is currently developing three projects with *potential* guarantees above 50 percent coverage, likely at the 60 percent level. If they come to fruition, each of these transactions will also mobilize private, long-term financing for the power sector in Power Africa countries.

16. Does DCA intend to issue guarantees over 50% in calendar year 2015?

It is too early to know if there will be guarantees with coverage in excess of 50 percent in calendar year 2015. Project development for calendar year 2015 will begin in October 2014. It should be noted that DCA seldom goes above 50 percent coverage on its guarantees and does so only in environments in which no market participant will loan at a 50 percent coverage ratio. For context, less than 5 percent of transactions in DCA's historic portfolio have ever breached the 50 percent coverage ratio.

17. With regard to the DCA guarantee for the Pledge Guarantee for Health, have any funds been disbursed or any guarantees been made? Please describe in detail.

No funds have been disbursed and no guarantees have been issued to date under the Pledge Guarantee for Health (PGH). PGH is in the final stages of negotiating legal agreements with Ecobank as a lender for \$40 million and the Calvert Foundation as a lender for \$10 million under the PGH facility. Both of these lenders have been approved by USAID's Credit Review Board.

18. Does USAID have plans for similar guarantees in calendar year 2014 or 2015? Please explain all similar ideas being considered by DCA.

No. DCA is not currently developing any guarantees for calendar years 2014 or 2015 that involve mobilizing private financing backed by donor commitments, as was done in the PGH structure.

HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund

19. Please provide a detailed chart showing all inflows and outflows from the HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund during fiscal year 2013. Please include source of funds as well as beginning and ending balances. Please break out appropriated and non-appropriated funds.

The HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund (WCF) was established in 2006 to assist in providing a safe, reliable, and sustainable supply chain of pharmaceuticals and other products needed to provide care and treatment for person with HIV/AIDS and related diseases. Beginning in FY 2014, Congress expanded the authorization to include pharmaceuticals and other products for child survival, malaria, and tuberculosis.

The WCF does not receive direct appropriations. Funding is deposited in the WCF by the Department of State, USAID, other U.S. government agencies, and donors and host governments, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the World Health Organization, and United Kingdom's Department for International Development for commodity procurement. The WCF also receives repayments of funds advanced to host country governments and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria to avert stock-outs of life-saving HIV/AIDS commodities. To date, donors and host governments have deposited \$24 million, including \$11 million during FY 2013.

The funds are obligated into the PEPFAR procurement agent (Supply Chain Management System) for the purchase of life-saving HIV/AIDS commodities. The WCF, which is managed by USAID, does not incur travel or other administrative expenses nor does it generate a profit.

HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund

(\$ in millions)	FY 2013 Actual	FY 2014 Estimate	FY 2015 Estimate
Budgetary Resources and Obligations			
Unobligated balance brought forward, October 1	414	235	200
Spending authority from offsetting collections	<u>403</u>	<u>415</u>	<u>415</u>
Total budgetary resources available	817	650	615
Obligations incurred	<u>582</u>	<u>450</u>	<u>450</u>
Unobligated balance end of year	235	200	165
Obligated Balances and Disbursements			
Undisbursed obligations brought forward (net), October 1	246	350	267
Obligations incurred	<u>582</u>	<u>450</u>	<u>450</u>
Total obligated balance	828	800	717
Disbursements	-478	-533	-525
Obligated balance end of year	350	267	192

20. Please provide financial details of the HIV/AIDS Emergency Commodity Fund?

PEPFAR established the HIV/AIDS Emergency Commodity Fund (ECF) in 2010 to provide flexibility and resources to respond to emergency situations in countries where potential stock-outs of key commodities, such as antiretrovirals (ARVs), threaten continuity of essential HIV treatment services. The ECF is intended to provide support over a limited time period, and is not intended to be used for treatment scale-up situations where resources have not been identified to maintain that scale-up. In addition, ECF requests must include a description of the underlying causes of the pending stock-out and evidence of plans for remedy. Replenishment of funds advanced through the ECF is the standard, although not formally required.

As of May 2014, the ECF has been utilized to avert ARV stock-outs in 11 countries (Benin, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Liberia, South Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Uganda). More than \$45 million have been disbursed to procure commodities to avert stock-outs of essential HIV commodities, and approximately \$16 million has been repaid by host country governments or the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The table below details the deposits, commitments, repayments and current balance of the ECF, as of May 2014.

PEPFAR Deposits	Disbursements	Repayments	Current Balance
60,159,491	(45,389,764)	15,806,084	30,575,811

21. Please provide details on how the expanded authority included in the FY14 Appropriations Act is being implemented.

USAID is very appreciative of this expanded authority. We believe it will create greater efficiencies through consolidated procurements.

USAID is in the very early stages of structuring the implementation of the new authority, which will allow other global health activities to use the HIV/AIDS Working Capital Fund (WCF). Within USAID's Bureau for Global Health, the various health elements are assessing current and future programming needs that could benefit from the WCF. One potential new use of the WCF is the procurement of medicines and other commodities for USAID's priority effort of Ending Preventable Child and Maternal Deaths.

American Schools and Hospitals Abroad

22. Is there a policy to graduate ASHA recipients from funding?

Unlike most other USAID programs, USAID does not have a policy to graduate its recipients from USAID/ASHA funding. The USAID/ASHA Program is an annual open and competitive program that values all existing and potential program partners. In 2011, the USAID/ASHA office began a process of reforming its grant solicitation and application procedures to better comply with federal standards on competitiveness and transparency and align with USAID's business practices. Over the past three years, USAID/ASHA staff have worked diligently to communicate changes in its application and grants procedures to its current partners, overseas missions, the U.S. Congress, and potential future recipients.

USAID/ASHA has conducted eight regional partner workshops (in Israel, Kenya, Thailand, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, and the United Arab Emirates) in conjunction with three annual Washington, D.C., conferences. The workshops and conferences were open to all interested stakeholders and are intended to clarify USAID/ASHA's program objectives, solicitations, and application procedures, as well as to share other funding opportunities within USAID.

The USAID/ASHA office remains committed to working with existing and potential partners to ensure that changes in procedures are clearly communicated and to provide guidance on ways to strengthen proposals.

23. How does ASHA determine how much funding is provided on a regional basis?

There is no regional preference or allocation for USAID/ASHA grant funding. Each proposal is assessed on quality and competitiveness of the individual proposal. Each year the regional breakdown changes depending on the number and quality of proposals received. Since instituting process reforms, the APS solicitation now reaches a much greater audience. In FY 2014 and FY 2013, the USAID/ASHA office received 110 proposals—up from 83 proposals in FY 2012. USAID/ASHA funds over the past few years have been divided among 30-40 grants per year based on the merit of the proposals submitted.

24. How is the scoring criteria determined?

The USAID/ASHA Annual Program Statement (APS) identifies the scoring criteria a proposal is reviewed against. This document is available on the Grants.gov website. The metrics used to evaluate applications in FY 2014, as set out in the APS, prioritize an organization's ability to achieve USAID/ASHA's legislative mandate. Criteria are established by the USAID/ASHA office using Agency guidance on required evaluation criteria for assistance competitions and the office's unique mandate. Input is sought each year from other stakeholders, including implementing partners and legislative offices, on how to improve these criteria. In FY 2014, USAID/ASHA's APS, including its evaluation criteria, was also posted for public comment prior to being finalized.

25. Have you given consideration to increasing the weight of the ASHA mandate criteria given the unique goals of the program as compared to traditional development program?

The existing proposal criteria do reflect USAID/ASHA's legislative mandate and purpose. The USAID/ASHA team is currently in the process of developing a five-year strategy that brings greater clarity and focus to the USAID/ASHA program, including a clear commitment to USAID/ASHA's legislative mandate. This strategy, developed with input from across the agency, implementing partners, and the Hill, will guide the evaluation criteria in future solicitations. The USAID/ASHA strategy is currently posted on the USAID website for public review and comments prior to finalization.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#1)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 8, 2014**

Global Health

Dr. Shah, Global Health funding has enjoyed bipartisan support, and I was pleased to support increases in nutrition, TB, and other health accounts in the FY14 Omnibus. However, the President's request proposes reductions for vulnerable children (-34%), pandemic influenza and pandemic preparedness (-31%), and global tuberculosis (TB) efforts (-19%). I would like to better understand the results we are seeking with these investments and how you justify the proposed reductions.

Tuberculosis

- Similar to past concerns about pandemic influenza, Multiple Drug Resistant or MDR and Extremely Drug Resistant, or XDR Tuberculosis (TB) has been characterized as a rapidly growing global threat. It is a highly contagious airborne disease, with limited treatment options, which crosses borders with ease.
 - Given this threat to our own population, why has the Administration slashed funding for TB control programs overseas?
 - Is there adequate global funding to contain the threat and therefore our dollars are not needed?
 - What new medicines and diagnostics are on the horizon?
 - Why is USAID proposing to reduce the global TB budget, particularly in light of the strong relationship between HIV/AIDS and TB?

The rate of new TB cases has been declining for the past decade and the world is on track to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of reversing TB incidence, along with a 50 percent reduction in the mortality rate by 2015, compared to 1990. Since 1990, TB treatment has saved the lives of more than 22 million people.

There are 22 high-burden countries, which account for 80 percent of the world's TB cases. Five of these countries, which account for almost half of the TB cases – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – have the ability to increase domestic funding for TB. Further, all of these five countries are now providing development assistance to other countries.

The Global Health Programs-USAID FY 2015 request for TB does not represent the totality of the U.S. Government's response to the disease. USAID collaborates with other agencies on TB efforts, including: the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), to integrate and expand TB health services and strengthen delivery platforms; and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), on TB/HIV co-infection interventions. On average, PEPFAR programs \$130-160 million each year for TB. Further, three-quarters of the

annual international donor funding for TB is provided by the Global Fund, and the U.S. Government remains the largest donor to the Fund.

TB funding will continue to focus on early diagnosis and successful treatment of the disease to both cure individuals and prevent transmission to others. The funding priority will go toward countries that have the greatest burden of TB and multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB). Country-level expansion and strengthening of the Stop TB Strategy will continue to be the focal point of USAID's TB program. In addition, USAID will continue to accelerate activities to address MDR-TB and extensively drug-resistant TB (XDR-TB), including diagnosis and treatment, and infection control measures.

Maternal and Child Health

- USAID's initiative on Ending Preventable Maternal and Child Deaths is certainly commendable. Please share the results from this initiative and how you are measuring progress.
 - How many countries have seen a decrease in maternal and child deaths since you began this initiative?
 - How many lives have we saved?
 - Also please describe how a reduction in funding for maternal and child health programs may impact implementation of the initiative and progress in reducing maternal deaths.

During 1990-2012, deaths of children under 5 dropped from 12.6 million to 6.6 million worldwide. In June 2012, the Governments of Ethiopia, India, and the United States hosted a forum called *Child Survival Call to Action*, in collaboration with UNICEF, to bring together public and private constituencies in support of a global goal to end preventable child deaths by 2035 and pioneer new approaches to accelerate progress on maternal and child survival. To date, 13 African countries have launched sharpened national strategies, set national targets, and developed scorecards to track progress. They are targeting efforts toward areas where the highest rates of child and maternal deaths occur. In the last two years alone, 24 priority countries – of which 16 are in Africa – have achieved an eight percent reduction in under-five mortality, saving 500,000 lives.

Further, in the last decade, malaria mortality rates in African children have been reduced by an estimated 54 percent, saving 3.3 million lives over the last decade through the President's Malaria Initiative and partnerships with the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and other partners. In April 2014, African Ministers of Health committed to ending preventable maternal, newborn and child deaths in Africa at the first Joint African Union/World Health Organization Conference of Ministers of Health.

Together with our partners, USAID is working to reduce preventable child deaths to fewer than 20 per 1,000 live births and maternal deaths to fewer than 50 per 100,000 live births by 2035. Achieving these goals will save an additional 5 million children's lives each year and decrease the number of women who die from complications during pregnancy by 75 percent annually. In June 2014, USAID and the Governments of Ethiopia and India, in collaboration with UNICEF, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and other partners, came together for a high-level forum

called *Acting on the Call: Ending Preventable Child and Maternal Deaths* to celebrate the progress, assess the challenges that remain and identify the steps needed to drive momentum around concrete action.

The Administration's FY 2015 budget request for USAID's Global Health Programs reflects difficult choices made in a constrained budget environment. Tremendous progress has been made in Ending Preventable Maternal and Child Deaths, and this will continue with the funding level to be provided for FY 2015.

Coordination of Effort

- Effective coordination at the country level is paramount. With so many different USG agencies such as USAID, PEPFAR, and CDC working in global health, in addition to multilateral partners such as Global Fund, GAVI and World Bank—how are programs being coordinated on the ground to best avoid duplication?

USAID is committed to ensuring effective coordination on health programs across the U.S. Government, the donor community and our partners. USAID recognizes that partnering – both at the Washington and country level – avoids duplication of effort and enhances results, making better use of every tax dollar.

Misuse of Health Funds

- USAID has long struggled with ensuring that foreign aid dollars are not diverted or wasted. There have been stories in the press that indicate USAID recently audited the procurement and distribution processes of the Ugandan National Medical Stores. After this audit, PEPFAR-implementing agencies in the country have discontinued using the facility for the purchase and distribution of HIV/AIDS medication.
 - What were the findings?
 - Was money diverted or misused?

USAID offers to brief you on this response.

Health Systems

- I understand that USAID has opened several new offices on health systems and health innovation.
 - What is the mandate of these initiatives and what results have been achieved?
 - How are these initiatives funded and at what levels?

USAID invests in health systems strengthening (HSS) to ensure that the life-saving impact of our global health programs extends beyond those we directly reach and beyond our time of direct engagement. The Global Health Bureau's (GH) Office of Health Systems (OHS) undertakes HSS work to support USAID's strategic goals of Ending Preventable Child and Maternal Deaths (EPCMD) and achieving an AIDS-free Generation (AFG). By providing a critical mass of multi-disciplinary HSS expertise to lead USAID toward EPCMD and AFG, OHS is accelerating progress by partnering with countries to effectively address complex health system challenges, ultimately improving the long-term sustainability of partner country health systems. OHS has

three major functions: technical leadership and strategic direction; knowledge and talent management; and program and field implementation. In particular, OHS has worked to keep the global agenda on Universal Health Coverage (UHC) focused squarely on maternal and child survival, and HIV/AIDS – and has promoted a global agreement for measuring country progress toward UHC. While supporting the World Health Organization’s rollout of the new System of Health Accounts, OHS advanced the global consensus on health resource tracking to ensure continued emphasis on developing country priorities and to protect the 1990s’ introduction and application of the National Health Accounts methodology for tracking health spending. Further, OHS provided catalytic financing for the development of PharmaChk – a simple, field-based tool to enable health care staff to detect substandard medicines.

GH established a center of excellence – i.e., the Center for Accelerating Innovation and Impact (CII) – to accelerate the development, introduction and scale up of priority global health interventions. CII promotes and reinforces innovative, business-minded approaches and solutions, including convening industry experts and academic thought leaders to inform our thinking. Applying these forward-looking practices to USAID’s health investments, CII invests seed capital in the most promising ideas and cuts the time it takes to transform “discoveries in the lab” to “impact on the ground.” CII is focusing on three channels to promote innovation and impact: (1) identifying state of the art practices; (2) catalyzing innovation and partnerships; and (3) scaling for impact. For example, through a partnership with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Governments of Norway and the United Kingdom, and Grand Challenges Canada, USAID has supported 81 potentially groundbreaking innovations, including several that are already showing tremendous impact in the field. In addition, CII has developed several public-private partnerships, including an innovative collaboration with the Coca-Cola Company, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and the Gates Foundation to leverage Coca-Cola’s business intelligence in operating efficient and effective supply chains (recognized as one of the farthest reaching in the world) to improve medical supply chains in Africa and ultimately increase the availability of essential medicines. Finally, CII is also working with GH’s technical teams to develop global introduction and launch plans for priority solutions – including chlorhexidine, injectible antibiotics and ORS/zinc – leveraging private sector best practices and business-minded approaches. CII serves as GH’s principal liaison with the Agency’s new Global Development Lab – working in partnership to discover, test, and scale break-through technologies, which will dramatically impact poverty.

Anti-LGBT Laws

- Please describe the public health impact of the anti-LGBT legislation and policies in countries such as Uganda, Nigeria, and Russia.
 - How is USAID addressing this issue?

USAID offers to brief you on this response.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#2)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 8, 2014**

Basic Education

I mentioned in my opening statement at the hearing my disappointment that the Administration continues to undercut education. We need to be doing more, not less, to offer a quality basic education to the world's children.

- If we know how to get results and how important basic education is to our success on every other important U.S. priority, why aren't we investing additional resources in the sector?
 - How can we succeed in democracy promotion, maternal health or economic growth if children are growing up illiterate with no basic literacy and math skills?

We recognize the critical role that education plays in democracy promotion, maternal health, and economic growth. USAID's basic education programs promote equitable, accountable, and sustainable education systems in over 40 countries, making the U.S. the largest bilateral donor to basic education. The FY 2015 request makes progress toward the goals of our Education Strategy by concentrating resources and activities in the highest priority areas in target countries, where U.S. assistance can have the most impact.

USAID has taken significant strides to refocus and revitalize its support for education. Our Education Strategy goals focus on measurably improving reading skills, strengthening workforce development and higher education, and increasing equitable access to education in crisis and conflict-affected environments. Additionally, last year USAID added education as a core development objective of the Agency.

Under the Education Strategy, USAID is working with governments and Ministries of Education to address the global learning crisis by initiating programs aimed at improving children's reading skills in approximately 40 countries around the world. These programs strengthen the national policies, teacher training, curriculum and materials development, coaching and other support structures that support improved reading instruction. Early Grade Reading Assessments, along with other national, regional, and civil society measures of early learning, have provided a wealth of data never before available to the sector and allow for tailored programming and instruction to improve the particular skills and foundational sub-skills that are necessary for reading.

We know that over fifty-seven million children of primary-school age are not in school and do

not have access to educational opportunities. Many of these children live in environments that are affected by crisis or conflict. We know that children living in such environments are more than three times as likely not to be enrolled in primary school. Yet we know we can reach these children. Our programs support them through the provision of temporary and permanent schools, non-formal and accelerated learning programs, the use of radio instruction and other alternative forms of service delivery, safe schools programs, disaster risk reduction, and training and psychosocial support to teachers and students.

We are focusing resources strategically and aligning our planning and budget processes. We have developed criteria and a process to define and prioritize needs and opportunities in the education sector, based on the goals of the Education Strategy. This allows us to have an Agency view of sector priorities to inform both the priority setting discussions of the Country Development Cooperation Strategy process, as well as the Agency-wide budget formulation and allocation processes. This has helped us to shift over \$120 million in basic education funding to support the expansion and/or intensification of programs in several African countries. Between FY 2010 and FY 2013, USAID more than doubled the basic education funding allocations in DRC, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia. Allocating resources to country programs such as these is vital to making progress toward achievement of our Education Strategy goals. We are working to leverage these dollars and work in close coordination with the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), UNICEF, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and other development partners.

- If there is demonstrated need but we are having difficulty programming basic education funding bilaterally, why not give greater resources to the Global Partnership for Education?
 - How are you partnering with GPE at the country level and at the global strategic level?

The total basic education pipeline (obligated but not expended) as of March 31, 2014 is \$1.49 billion. This is approximately 18 months of programs overall, in a fiscal environment where programs get one tranche of revenue annually to last the fiscal year. Pipeline issues are largely limited to a small subset of countries. These Missions are being engaged by headquarters, and we are working to resolve the issues by conducting program reviews, providing technical support, and shifting education budget allocations. In terms of disbursement, USAID has expended 68 percent of the \$4.7 billion in basic education funds that have been obligated since FY 2007. This amounts to a cumulative disbursement of over \$3 billion for basic education from FY 2007 to present. According to the December 2013 Quarterly Financial Update on the EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund, GPE has disbursed a total of \$2 billion of the \$3.7 billion they have allocated since 2003. This is a disbursement rate of 55 percent.

We believe that we can achieve maximum educational impact through well-managed bilateral programs that are aligned with host country priorities and coordinated with the efforts of other partners and donors at the country and at the global level. Bilateral programming is integrated with other USAID sector activities, resulting in a more holistic and effective engagement with the host country's development plans. USAID's strong field presence and technical assistance are two of its comparative advantages, enabling ongoing policy dialogue and engagement with ministries of education and other local stakeholders. Bilateral relationships can also build strong political and economic relationships between the U.S. Government (USG) and host governments, helping to advance overall USG foreign policy efforts. There is no substitute for direct USG engagement with host country governments.

At the same time, we are strongly committed to global partnership and multilateral engagement in advancing the goals of the education sector, and ensuring that all children have access to education and the opportunity to learn. The combination of strong bilateral engagement and multilateral assistance can be a powerful force for improvements in education systems around the world. We recognize GPE's role as a significant contributor to the progress we need to make towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals, as well as how our support for GPE directly advances the goals of USAID's Education Strategy.

Since the first replenishment in 2011, USAID has taken a greater leadership role within the GPE through its seat on the GPE Board of Directors, membership in the GPE Financial Advisory Committee and now Strategy and Policy Committee, and spearheading the GPE's work on results-based financing focused on learning outcomes.

At the country level, USAID is providing additional support by serving as Coordinating Agency in 15 percent of GPE's member countries, including: Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Sudan, and Senegal.

Through strategic and targeted financial contributions at the country level, we are:

- Funding the GPE country level Secretariat in Afghanistan.
- Leveraging the GPE grant in South Sudan by providing an additional \$30 million to UNICEF to scale-up the program (UNICEF is the GPE Managing Entity in South Sudan).
- Doubling the impact of the GPE \$100 million grant in Ethiopia by providing an additional \$20 million into the General Education Quality Improvement Program II (GEQIP II) pooled funded and aligning an additional \$86 million of our own programming to complement GEQIP II.

At the global level:

- We are investing \$10 million in a global community of practice for early grade reading, which includes the GPE as partners.
- We have financed and co-organized four GPE All Children Reading Workshops in

Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, which the GPE Board cites as one of the largest GPE successes of the past two years.

- We have provided funding to support the creation of GPE's Sector Monitoring Initiative, which provides comprehensive support to GPE partner countries on Education Sector Plan development and Joint Sector Reviews.

- Can you share concrete results and progress with respect to USAID's bilateral education program?
 - What have we achieved with this funding?

USAID's 2011 strategic shift to improving education quality by improving primary grade reading for tens of millions of kids brings with it a commitment to measuring results. USAID is at the forefront of measuring success at the level of student learning and is aligned with global discussions calling for a shift in focus from universal access to access plus learning. However, many countries lack sufficient data and capacity to systematically measure and track student learning outcomes over time. Many countries even lack data on the number of children and youth who are out-of-school. The data that we are collecting allows us to gain insights and knowledge of student learning and reading skills at a level that was not possible even a few years ago.

Student learning assessments, many developed and funded by USAID, are validating our concerns regarding education quality. In Kenya this year, only one-third of second grade students assessed could read a single word, and only three percent had reading comprehension skills at grade level. Of second graders assessed by USAID in Ethiopia last year, only 5 percent were able to read at benchmark (60 words per minute) or above. Results like these are typical of countries and areas in which USAID operates.

In 2010, the majority of Malawian primary students assessed could not read a single word after three years of schooling. Results from several follow-up assessments in Malawi show that large gains were achieved through USAID programming: students in USAID-supported schools are able to name over 21 letters per minute, compared to students in control schools who can name only 1.5 letters per minute. In Liberia, first grade students in USAID-supported schools almost tripled their ability to read familiar words, more than tripled their decoding skills, and were able to read text more than one-and-a-half times more fluently. In Kenya, children in USAID-supported schools are three times more likely to read with fluency than children in control schools.

Access to education remains an issue, especially in conflict-affected areas. Here, too, our programs are showing progress. Since 2002, girls' enrollment in primary and secondary school in Afghanistan increased from 5,000 students to nearly 3 million, including 165 thousand girls in secondary school, and now girls represent almost 40 percent of the nearly 8 million children in

school in 2012. In Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), data from programs in Katanga Province show that the number of students who dropped out from USAID-supported schools is 65 percent lower in 2013 than in 2010. Through collaboration and coordination with the DRC government, the French Development Agency, and the Global Partnership for Education, USAID's models and materials are planned to be scaled in nine of 11 provinces in 2015.

In FY 2013 alone, USAID basic education programs:

- Supported over 19 million learners at the primary and secondary levels.
- Provided over 37 million textbooks and other teaching and learning materials.
- Trained over 333,000 teachers and over 37,000 administrators and officials.
- Supported over 40,000 school governance structures (e.g. parent-teacher associations).
- Built and repaired over 1,500 classrooms.

Also in FY 2013, our higher education and workforce development programs:

- Increased access to post-secondary education for over 8,000 individuals from disadvantaged groups.
- Supported over 127,000 individuals in gaining new or better employment.
- Completed nearly 400 workforce development initiatives as a result of public-private partnerships.
- Supported 59 joint research projects between U.S. and host country institutions.

I am concerned that USAID is not allocating enough foreign service officers and technical and contract staff to ensure that the bilateral education program funds are being optimally used.

- Is the lack of dedicated education and contracting officers hampering bilateral programming? Please send us staffing data for education programs.

USAID is committed to recruiting top-quality staff across multiple disciplines and program areas. Over the last several years, the Agency has nearly doubled our Foreign Service Officers. USAID has placed almost half of those new officers in Africa for their first assignment—filling almost all of our vacant positions in Africa for the first time in years.

Currently, there are roughly 65 education Foreign Service Officers for approximately 73 education “slots” within USAID offices around the world. With approximately 150 Foreign Service Nationals working on education teams around the world, we have an average of five education professionals per mission. The Agency is currently in the process of hiring 15 additional education Foreign Service Officers. By 2015, USAID should have 80 education Foreign Service Officers across our roughly 50 missions with education programming.

We also know that hiring and placing staff is just the first step. Last year, we launched an ambitious effort to develop a formal mentoring program geared to the specific needs of all our

staff. We have also developed additional promotional and leadership opportunities for our Foreign Service Nationals, leading to a more talented workforce across the board.

- The “Room to Learn” initiative was initially targeted for DRC, Nigeria, and South Sudan. What types of assistance is delivered? Why were these countries chosen as targets for this program? Are other African countries likely to receive similar assistance, given that many have similar needs?

USAID’s “Room to Learn” effort is aimed at increasing equitable access to education for children in six countries where an estimated 25 million primary school age children are out of school. These countries are Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Nigeria, Pakistan, and South Sudan. This effort includes a close examination of USAID’s ongoing and planned programs for ways to improve and scale up partnership, innovation, reduce costs, and maximize impact. These countries were selected based on a confluence of factors: established USAID presence in the education sector, with programming focused on increasing equitable access to education in a conflict/crisis setting; a large number of out-of-school children; country commitment; and a focus country of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Global Education First Initiative (GEFI).

As an example of the type of assistance being delivered, in South Sudan last year the Mission awarded a \$105 million, five-year agreement for the “Room to Learn” project, which aims to: improve and expand safer education services for children and youth; enhance relevance and promote learner well-being; and strengthen quality and management at the county and payam level to support basic education. Additionally, the Mission in Juba recently announced the start of a new \$17 million project with UNICEF to provide emergency education to girls, boys and youth forced to flee their homes by the recent fighting and violence in South Sudan. The intervention will provide safe and protective temporary learning spaces, supply teaching and learning materials, support accelerated learning for out-of-school adolescents and youth, train teachers in life skills, peacebuilding and psychosocial support.

Another example comes from DRC, where the Mission is working with DFID to co-design and co-fund a new project (“Equitable Access to Education and Learning Project”) that will improve educational outcomes for girls and boys by: increasing equitable enrollments to a quality education environment; improving education quality; and improving governance and accountability by stakeholders.

“Room to Learn” is one component of USAID’s commitment and engagement to sustainably increase access in a wider range of countries, specifically those impacted by conflict and crisis. This includes our programming in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Philippines, and Somalia. Other countries in Africa are receiving comparable amounts of basic

education funding. The initial FY 2014 653(a) allocations included \$30 million for DRC, \$20 million for Nigeria, and \$38.5 million for South Sudan. Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia were all allocated between \$20 million and \$22.5 million. Ethiopia was allocated \$30 million, and Liberia was allocated \$26 million. This is part of a deliberate effort to shift education resources based on needs and opportunities linked to the goals of the Education Strategy.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#3)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 8, 2014**

Nutrition

UNICEF released a report last week outlining the terrible, irreversible, and stunting, effects of malnutrition. According to the report, one in four children under the age of 5 suffer from chronic under nutrition. This of course has devastating long-term consequences on them, as well as the economic well-being of their communities. This is even more tragic because we know that early interventions make a critical difference in preventing stunting, supporting healthy brain development, and improving maternal health and child survival rates.

One of the primary challenges of a strong and sustainable nutrition initiative is that funding and accountability are scattered amongst health, agriculture, and humanitarian programs.

- Knowing that between 60% and 80% of infants who die within their first month of life have low birth weights, why is USAID requesting a reduction in nutrition funding?

The Administration's Global Health Programs FY 2015 request for nutrition is only part of what USAID is allocating toward undernutrition. USAID's overall approach to addressing malnutrition concentrates on a multidisciplinary approach working across funding streams to address the root causes of malnutrition. The aggregate nutrition request for FY 2015 is \$234 million, from development and humanitarian accounts. Aligned with USAID's new Multi-sectoral Nutrition Strategy, USAID is coordinating across budgets and programs to combat malnutrition. Additionally, USAID's aim to End Preventable Child and Maternal Deaths requires a multidisciplinary approach including efforts to improve nutrition.

- How are we measuring the nutrition impacts of the investments we are making in agriculture and food aid, health and water programs?

USAID measures the impact of our nutrition investments over time through periodic population level surveys such as the Demographic and Health Surveys, and through the Feed the Future Monitoring System, as well as Feed the Future baseline, mid-term and end-line impact evaluation studies in the zones of influence. High-level impact indicators monitored in each country include: prevalence of stunting, wasting, underweight and anemia. We also are looking at under-five mortality reduction to which undernutrition contributes about 45% of overall mortality. To complement and extend the impact of investments, USAID looks at additional nutrition impacts across the Agency. USAID has incorporated nutrition indicators into non-health programs, such as measuring the consumption of vegetables by mothers and their children in key horticulture programs. In water, hygiene, and sanitation programs, USAID is measuring the reduction in incidence of child diarrhea (which adversely affects nutrition and growth.) By

integrating programs, USAID will achieve greater impact than through stove-piped nutrition interventions alone.

- Does the Global Health Bureau have a joint monitoring and evaluation plan with Feed the Future and agreement on key indicators?

The Bureau for Global Health, Food for Peace (Title II) and Feed the Future use the same impact, outcome, and output targets and indicators to monitor nutrition investments. Through the Feed the Future monitoring system, these programs track program results from nutrition activities implemented across health, agriculture and humanitarian assistance. Of the nearly 60 indicators defined in the Feed the Future Monitoring Handbook, 16 are nutrition specific or nutrition sensitive indicators to which program reporting contributes. Collectively, USAID aims to reduce the number of stunted children by a minimum of 2 million, in the areas where our agriculture and nutrition programs are working, reflecting a 20 percent reduction over five years.

- What key nutrition program results can you share?

In 2013, through Feed the Future, Global Health Initiative, and the Office of Food for Peace, USAID and partners achieved impressive results -- reaching more than 12.5 million children (12,699,186) with nutrition interventions to reduce the threat of hunger, poverty, and malnutrition. Evidence has shown that when women are empowered, educated, and can earn and control income, infant mortality declines, child health, nutrition, and development improve, agricultural productivity rises, population growth slows, economies expand, and cycles of poverty can be broken. Recognizing this critical role of women, Feed the Future supported nearly 91,000 women farmers in homestead gardening, improving access to nutrient-dense foods and increasing income for women and children.

USAID continues to address nutrition in a multi-sectoral way. For example, in Uganda, more than 50,000 households received inputs to grow bio-fortified crops, including iron-rich beans and vitamin A-rich orange flesh sweet potato. In Cambodia, Feed the Future reached 22,807 rural households with nutrition education, many in remote areas, through an innovative approach using mobile food carts to demonstrate nutrition-rich cooking methods and to provide information on healthy eating habits. And in Ethiopia, preliminary data indicates child stunting rates in Ethiopia have declined over the past three years, such that there are an estimated 160,000 fewer stunted children today, despite population growth over this period.

Further, in FY13, 1,316,254 people were trained in child health and nutrition through USG-supported health area programs. These achievements enable continued progress to scale up effective nutrition interventions and fulfill USAID's commitments to reduce stunting and to end preventable child and maternal deaths.

Nutrition programs are the building blocks for healthy and productive life. The international community is increasingly coalescing around the idea of boosting nutritional intake to stave off maternal and child mortality.

- What changes have we made in programming to target the 1000 day window of pregnant mothers and children under the age of two?

Evidence suggests that the 1,000 days between pregnancy and a child's second birthday is the most critical period to ensure optimum physical and cognitive development. In USAID's strategy, an increased focus is given to the 1,000 day window. USAID will support good maternal nutrition, optimal breastfeeding (immediate and exclusive for six months), and appropriate complementary feeding (e.g., dietary diversity in children 6-23 months, continued breastfeeding) tracking change over time in populations served by development nutrition programs.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#4)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 8, 2014**

Family Planning

Dr. Shah, as you know it is beyond dispute that international family planning programs lead to fewer unwanted pregnancies, fewer abortions, and fewer maternal and infant deaths. Yet, last year our bill carried language codifying the Mexico City Policy and banning funding for the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). I assume that the House Republican leadership will insist on a similar approach this year.

- What effect would similar restrictions that muzzle freedom of speech and interfere with the doctor-patient relationship, mean to basic – and often life-saving – health care for millions of women?
 - What effect does the global gag rule have on your global health strategy?

As the world's largest family planning bilateral donor, USAID is committed to helping countries meet the family planning and reproductive health needs of their people. A legislative provision imposing Mexico City Policy conditions would damage USAID's ability to reach the Administration's global health goals. It would also hinder the Agency's efforts in support of the Family Planning 2020 (FP2020) goal to enable an additional 120 million women to use contraceptives by 2020.

Legislation consistent with the Mexico City Policy would require USAID and the State Department to withhold family planning assistance from current non-governmental organization (NGO) implementing partners that would not agree to the conditions of the legislation, preventing us from working with some of the most experienced and qualified family planning providers and organizations working at the grassroots level to meet the growing demand for voluntary, safe family planning. Our support to these local organizations ensures that women in countries with the highest needs receive family planning and reproductive health care to improve their lives and the lives of their families. It could also limit the pool of NGOs with expertise, capacity, and proven track records on promoting women's health around the globe that could bid on future U.S. Government projects that would receive family planning assistance. These potential scenarios not only could severely erode the progress made to date, but also slow the acceleration of future progress needed to improve maternal and child health, access to family planning services, and HIV prevention in the countries where USAID works.

- What would a total ban on UNFPA funding do to reproductive health care?
 - What effect would there be in the nearly 150 countries in which UNFPA has programs?

USAID and UNFPA are the world's leading organizations in providing family planning and reproductive health information, services and commodities. Through USAID's country missions and UNFPA's country offices, the two agencies play an important role in supporting and advancing global and country-level initiatives in reproductive health and family planning, including shaping the post-2015 global development agenda and meeting the goals of FP2020.

The Obama Administration strongly supports UNFPA's goals and programs, which provide life-saving assistance to women, children, and families in over 150 countries. This partnership between USAID and UNFPA is critical to achieving the health and development goals of the Administration, especially those focused on the promotion of sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights, including increased access to voluntary family planning, as well as the Millennium Development Goals. We simply could not achieve sustained progress in these areas without UNFPA, which is a world leader in efforts to reduce maternal mortality and morbidity, end female genital mutilation and cutting, reduce the transmission of sexually transmitted infections and HIV/AIDS, and ensure access to health care and essential supplies for women and families impacted by emergencies.

USAID and UNFPA frequently join forces in an effort to ensure that the family planning and reproductive health service needs of all women and girls in the developing world are met. The two agencies closely collaborate at the global and country levels, leveraging funds and technical expertise. By combining distinct comparative advantages and skills, UNFPA and USAID support reproductive health information and education, clinic and community-based programs, and commodities for millions of women, men and young people who need and want to delay, limit or space their births. Additionally, because UNFPA has a presence in more countries than USAID, the collaboration allows us to expand our reach into more countries and further leverage our work in countries where we are both present.

Because the U.S. Government is one of UNFPA's largest donors, a total ban on USG funding to UNFPA would dilute the institution's ability to carry out its global and country-level programs. A funding prohibition could also harm the strengthened collaboration between USAID and UNFPA that has occurred under this Administration. Further, at the country level, a funding ban could hinder donor coordination efforts and efficiencies in supporting implementation of reproductive health program activities.

USAID has played a strong leadership role in the development of new contraceptive methods, especially those that can be used in low-resource countries.

- What does USAID have planned in this area of research?

USAID's research efforts on new contraceptive methods focus on the development and introduction of methods that are appropriate for delivery and use in low-resource settings, protect against unintended pregnancy and HIV and Sexually Transmitted Infections (STI), and fill the growing demand for long-acting temporary or permanent methods. USAID's research objectives for new contraceptive technologies include the following.

1. Refining existing family planning methods to address method-related reasons for non-use: USAID supports the development of the SILCS contraceptive diaphragm that does not require women to undergo a pelvic exam to be fitted. This means that health workers at lower levels of the health care system can provide the method, thereby expanding access. USAID also supported the development of the Woman's Condom, a much easier to use and, thus, more acceptable female condom.
 2. Developing new family planning methods that address method-related reasons for non-use, or fill gaps in the existing method mix: USAID supports the development of a biodegradable implant that lasts for one year, but can be removed sooner at the woman's request. This one-year implant helps fill a gap in duration of effectiveness between the three-month injectable and five-year implant that are currently available.
 3. Developing multipurpose prevention technologies (MPTs) to address the simultaneous risks of unintended pregnancy, HIV, and other STIs – particularly Human Papillomavirus (HPV) and Herpes Simplex Virus (HSV).
- I have heard USAID discuss graduating countries from bilateral family planning assistance. How many countries are now 'graduated' and how many are on the way?
 - How do you ensure that these countries continue to prioritize access to family planning and progress is not lost?

USAID has graduated 24 countries from family planning assistance, including most recently, countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region, such as Peru and Honduras. Planning for graduation from USAID family planning assistance begins when a country's total fertility rate reaches 3.0 and the modern contraceptive prevalence rate reaches 50 percent.

USAID's systematic evidence-based approach to graduation assesses and strengthens the existence of in-country technical, administrative, and programmatic capacity to maintain family planning service delivery and adapt to change as the family planning landscape in countries evolves. USAID's efforts build capacity and create enabling environments for family planning at all levels and across sectors – including governments, NGOs and private sector – to maintain sustainability of family planning programs post-graduation. USAID seeks to stay engaged with graduated countries by, for example, encouraging NGOs and ministries of health to participate in regional technical fora around family planning.

USAID considers all countries receiving USAID family planning assistance to be on a path toward eventual graduation, although no USAID family planning country programs are implementing a specific graduation plan at the present time. USAID works across sectors to build in-country capacity and supportive enabling environments with the ultimate aim of creating sustainable family planning programs.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#5)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 8, 2014**

Cuts to Humanitarian Assistance

In the 2014 bill we increased the request for the humanitarian assistance accounts due to unprecedented demand and need. Yet the FY 2015 request cuts IDA by 28 percent and MRA by 33 percent from the FY 2014 enacted levels. We are still facing a protracted humanitarian crisis in Syria, a simmering conflict in South Sudan, escalating ethnic violence in the Central African Republic, and huge uncertainty in Afghanistan.

- The budget requests notes the State will be able to respond to the Syrian crisis with this requested level, but what about other crises around the world like the Central African Republic? Where are you going to find the necessary resources?
- Are you confident that there are sufficient funds to respond to a potential natural disaster or new emergency in FY 2015?
- What humanitarian contingency planning are you doing around the troop withdrawal in Afghanistan?
- As the world faces unprecedented crises in Syria and the Middle East, is there a cushion in the IDA and MRA budgets to respond to possible increased refugee flows that may result from growing insecurity in Afghanistan, Iraq, CAR, Sudan, etc.?

The Administration remains dedicated to providing robust support for humanitarian programs worldwide. The President's FY 2015 budget request reflects the Administration's ongoing commitment to humanitarian programs, while taking into account the current constrained budget environment. The request includes \$2.097 billion for the Migration Refugee Assistance and the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance accounts and \$1.3 billion for the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account. The request also includes \$1.4 billion in Title II to respond to development and emergency food assistance needs. The Administration also has additional authorities including the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT), borrowing authority, and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) resources to draw upon if necessary to respond to humanitarian needs. While we currently anticipate having sufficient funding to support our humanitarian assistance goals in Syria, Africa, and elsewhere, the scale-up of the U.S. Government's response to the Ebola crisis may require USAID to reevaluate funding needs and priorities.

Although it is difficult to predict whether the drawdown of international troops will lead to large population movements within/outside of Afghanistan, the U.S. government is closely

coordinating with its international and non-governmental partner organizations on contingency planning, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in the event of a general decline in security. As part of this planning, the Department of State and USAID are closely monitoring the humanitarian situation on the ground, assessing humanitarian needs in Afghanistan. USAID will continue to support programs that develop effective methods for reliably capturing, reporting, analyzing, and disseminating humanitarian and security information. USAID will also support humanitarian transportation and logistics partners, and monitor and respond to food insecurity. The Afghan government has also increased its capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies in partnership with the international community. For several years, USAID has been advising and assisting Afghan government agencies and non-governmental organizations to develop capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
 USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
 Representative Nita M. Lowey (#6)
 Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
 House Committee on Appropriations
 April 8, 2014**

Global Health Workforce

Last year I introduced H.Res.135 recognizing the importance of frontline health workers. Global health workers are a key component of building local capacity and strengthening health systems in a sustainable way. The World Health Organization has identified 57 countries that have a human resources crisis defined as fewer than 2.3 doctors, nurses or midwives per thousand people. There is a significant focus on health workers in many of our current global health programs, but it seems to me that these efforts are within the specific disease silos and we are not maximizing their use in a way that makes sense.

- What steps has USAID taken to create a health workforce strategy to provide a coherent framework for the many activities the U.S. government is currently supporting to train and support health workers? Are these activities targeted at increasing access in remote areas for the most vulnerable?

USAID is partnering with the World Health Organization, and other global stakeholders and U.S. Government agencies to develop a shared vision and strategy for ensuring an appropriate mix of competent health human resources to deliver essential health services in developing countries, particularly to the poor, vulnerable and underserved. USAID has convened stakeholder expert working groups in eight areas to:

1. develop and implement models for the special human resources for health (HRH) needs of conflict-affected and fragile states;
2. improve the knowledge base on the economic, demographic and epidemiological transitions and future health labor markets;
3. develop and implement effective models for transformative education;
4. improve data and measurement of HRH availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality;
5. foster accountability and alignment for post-2015 development agenda, through both government and civil society actors;
6. improve public sector stewardship and leadership in HRH;
7. strengthen the role of community health workers and personal care givers; and
8. improve productivity and performance of health workers.

At the recent sixty-seventh session of the World Health Assembly, USAID's Assistant Administrator for Global Health, Dr. Ariel Pablos-Mendez, moderated a session on "Framing a Global Strategy on Human Resources for Health." USAID was instrumental in planning this session and garnering support from other member states for its place on the agenda.

USAID has also convened representatives from other U.S. Government agencies to formulate a U.S. Government strategy on health human resources, which will better align the various agencies' activities and strengthen our response to human resource challenges impeding progress in global health outcomes.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
 USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
 Representative Nita M. Lowey (#7)
 Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
 House Committee on Appropriations
 April 8, 2014**

Afghanistan

I remain concerned for the women of Afghanistan following the U.S. military withdrawal. In the section on Afghanistan in its worldwide report for 2013, Human Rights Watch said, “With international interest in Afghanistan rapidly waning, opponents of women’s rights seized the opportunity to begin rolling back the progress made since the end of Taliban rule.” The country’s Parliament is about to approve legislation that would strip away crucial legal protections, and the slates of many of the presidential candidates are dominated by warlords and fundamentalists who share the Taliban’s view that women should never be allowed out of their homes.

- How are we supporting brave Afghan women working to change their country? How can we make sure the gains they have made are not reversed once the last soldier leaves?

Sustaining and maintaining the significant gains made by Afghan women and girls is a key objective for USAID’s work in Afghanistan through the 2014 transition and beyond. USAID’s Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Policy requires consideration of gender equity and female empowerment throughout all USAID project design and implementation across all sectors. Over forty gender analyses have been done to date in Afghanistan, the findings of which will ensure that opportunities for men and women in USAID projects in Afghanistan are equitable. The programs we are designing and implementing are intended to provide strong support to women and girls to maintain the gains that have been achieved.

During the last thirteen years, and despite the ongoing challenges for women and girls, there have been exceptional advances for women and girls in Afghanistan. We have helped to rebuild the healthcare system with low cost, high impact interventions, to improve the health of Afghans, primarily women and children. According to the Afghanistan Mortality Survey 2010, the results of this investment include a decline in maternal mortality ratio from 1,600 per 100,000 births to 327 per 100,000 births since 2002. We have also helped Afghanistan rebuild an education system that was severely degraded by years of conflict. In 2002, only an estimated 900,000 boys were in school and virtually no girls. Now, according to the latest information from the Afghan Government, there are approximately 7.3 million students attending school in Afghanistan, more than a third of whom are girls.

USAID’s work has also helped Afghan women take on larger roles in society and shown strong results:

- Almost 20 percent of Afghans enrolled in higher education are women;

- The Afghan Government is committed to ensuring at least 30 percent of government employees are women. Currently, twenty seven percent of seats in Parliament, one governor, and three cabinet positions are held by women. Women also represent eleven percent of sitting judges and twenty percent of judges in training.
- In addition, USAID has trained more than 12,000 community health workers and 2,000 midwives. In 2013, more than 150,000 babies were delivered by skilled birth attendants (a 34 percent increase since 2002) and more than 420,000 pre-birth care visits were attended by skilled providers (a 54 percent increase since 2002).
- Multiple women's organizations are working to end violence and discrimination against women, and USAID initiatives have helped shape gender-related legislation like the law of the Elimination of Violence Against Women.

USAID is implementing three gender-focused programs and is supporting women and girls through cross-cutting efforts across multiple other programs. The Promoting Gender Equity in National Priority Programs ("Promote") project will be the largest investment USAID has made in any one country to advance women in development, and will build on earlier investments in Afghanistan. Promote is designed to develop a cadre of 200,000 educated women ages 18 to 30 to enter and advance into decision-making positions in Afghanistan's public, private and civil society sectors through four components: (1) Women's Economic Empowerment, (2) Women's Rights Groups and Coalitions, (3) Women in Government and (4) Women's Leadership Development. The project will increase women's contributions to Afghanistan's development by strengthening women's rights groups, boosting female participation in the economy, increasing the number of women in decision making positions within the Afghan government, and helping women gain business and management skills.

USAID will also be implementing the American Scholarship Program for Afghan Women. Through this activity, women will be selected based on academic merit, financial need, and leadership potential for university scholarships. USAID anticipates that at least 400 undergraduate and graduate scholarships will be awarded for study in high-quality institutions in other countries, including the United States.

Additionally, the Ministry of Women's Affairs Organizational Restructuring and Empowerment project (MORE) is designed to strengthen the Afghan government's capacity to develop and implement its National Action Plan for Afghan Women (NAPWA) and works directly with the Ministry of Women's Affairs to implement national and provincial level ministerial restructuring and to improve public relations, awareness raising campaigns and women's rights.

Cross-cutting efforts in other portfolios to support women and girls include the following:

- USAID will continue to work to improve the health of Afghan people -- especially women and children -- through increased access to quality health products and services and increased capacity of the Afghan Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) at the central and sub-national levels through the Partnership Contracts for Health (PCH) project.

- USAID will pursue further economic opportunities for women through strengthening women's land rights and providing a full range of business development services to existing and women-owned enterprises that will grow sustainable and profitable business ventures with full and un-biased access to credit facilities, contract/bid prospects and employment opportunities. For instance, USAID's Financial Access for Investing in the Development of Afghanistan (FAIDA) project's Gender Mainstreaming Unit ensures that women are integrated into financial sector activities including business development training and helps to ensure women are provided access to financing and opportunities for economic and professional growth.
- In the agriculture sector, the Regional Agriculture Development Programs (RADP) North, East, South and West are targeting women as a portion of their beneficiaries to increase agricultural production marketing and sales. Also, the Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Marketing Program (CHAMP) program's female-focused kitchen garden activities are increasing household nutrition and incomes. Through these projects and others, USAID will target opportunities across multiple levels from micro/household to macro/financial institutional strengthening, expanding women's income-generating potential, improving access to markets, and addressing constraints that disproportionately affect women in order to allow greater participation and benefit from project interventions.
- In education, a key factor for empowering women and girls, USAID will focus on improving quality instruction through teacher training, placing emphasis on access to both formal and community-based education (CBE) for boys and girls. Through the CBE program, at least 116,000 girls will be provided access to education in villages without local schools close enough for girls to attend. USAID is also planning to launch an Early Grade Reading and Access program to improve the quality of education for primary school children, especially girls.
- USAID's efforts in democracy, rights and governance projects will continue to support women's participation in democratic governance and political processes through investment in women's civic leadership (PROMOTE) and support to women journalists and media professionals through the Afghan Civil Engagement Program (ACEP). Additionally, USAID's upcoming rule of law program is being planned to support women's judicial training and outreach programs, access to justice and legal rights awareness and activities to ensure informed participation of Afghan women as voters, candidates, elections administrators and observers.
- What is the current status and near-term outlook for USAID's program in Afghanistan? What are we retaining and what are we turning over to the Afghan government? How do we combat fraud and abuse of USG dollars? What concerns do you have?

The current transition period is a pivotal moment for Afghanistan, in anticipation of which USAID has been planning and adjusting its programming to maximize sustainability, oversight and accountability. In the near term, USAID has three strategic goals for programming in Afghanistan: (1) sustaining and maintaining the gains made in health, education, and the empowerment of women; (2) mitigating the economic impact of the drawdown of troops through a focus on the agriculture sector, private sector development, building systems to support the operations and maintenance of infrastructure investments and developing the future potential of the extractives industry; and (3) fostering improved stability by supporting legitimate and effective Afghan governance.

Given the need to prioritize its efforts, USAID has adjusted its implementation model by focusing assistance to the Regional Economic Zones (REZs) that cover major population centers and promoting regional trade and economic opportunities, especially with regional markets in Central and South Asia. Additionally, USAID is adapting its approach to one of mutual accountability that incentivizes Afghan reforms by conditioning an increasing percentage of our assistance to the government on progress on reforms. To ensure proper oversight, USAID has developed a multi-tiered oversight strategy to address reduced mobility and decreased field staff that, along with other monitoring and evaluation efforts, will continue to ensure adequate oversight over projects in the field. Direct government-to-government assistance to the Afghan government is used, subject to close oversight and multiple safeguards, when appropriate to accomplish certain development outcomes and to build the Afghan government's ability to sustain the investments and gains that have been made and to reduce dependence on donors over time.

USAID takes seriously its role as a responsible steward of taxpayer funds. In addition to standard USAID oversight measures implemented worldwide, USAID has implemented the Accountable Assistance for Afghanistan (A3) initiative, designed to prevent funds from being diverted from the development purpose to malign actors. Some of the approaches we use under A3 include:

1. Limiting the number of sub-contracting tiers;
2. Implementing a robust vetting system of non-U.S. companies and key individuals, at both the prime and sub-contractor level, and the establishment of the Vetting Support Unit;
3. Enhancing financial controls on project funds, such as using electronic funds transfers in lieu of cash payments, using independent audit firms to verify appropriate usage of funds, reviewing recipients' claims prior to payment, and performing 100% audits of locally incurred costs; and
4. Implementing robust oversight of all USAID projects in Afghanistan through a five-tiered monitoring approach, encompassing monitoring information gathered from USAID and other U.S. Government staff, USAID implementing partners, other donors, Afghan civil society and beneficiaries, as well as independent monitoring contractors.

USAID's multi-tiered monitoring approach focuses on gathering and analyzing multiple sources of data across these tiers in order to compare information and ensure confidence in reporting data, allowing USAID to use the results to make further programmatic decisions.

Supporting this approach is the new Implementation Support Team (IST) headquartered at the USAID Mission in Kabul. The IST is charged with providing an additional layer of critical review and analysis for the streams of monitoring information and for providing USAID leadership with alternative courses of action for addressing challenges with project implementation.

Independent data inputs will be provided to this team by the Monitoring Support Project. This project will utilize a variety of monitoring methods to verify project data, including site visits, Global Positioning System (GPS) data, and time/date stamped photos, interviews, and crowd sourcing. USAID will not hesitate to terminate projects or work at specific activity sites if USAID determines that adequate oversight is not possible.

Audits also provide useful oversight and discipline and complement and reinforce USAID's own efforts to ensure U.S. tax dollars are used effectively and efficiently. There are currently over 100 on-going audits of USAID programs in Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2013, the U.S. Government Accountability Office, USAID Office of Inspector General, and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction completed over 65 financial and program audits in Afghanistan.

Oversight is a process that requires continual re-examination and the ability to adjust to new circumstances as they arise. Although there are inherent risks in doing business in a country like Afghanistan, our first priority is to ensure taxpayer dollars are adequately protected even as we carry out a vital component of the U.S. Government's national security policy.

A principal concern going forward is the risk that foreign assistance to Afghanistan will be reduced precipitously, endangering the development gains made to date. Precipitous cuts in funding for development programming would increase risks for the transition planning that has been conducted by the USG and other donors, as well as the programming that has been put in place to carry Afghanistan through this transition period. Continued funding is needed to place Afghanistan on a long-term path of improving stability and enhancing its government's ability to responsibly manage and fund the country's further recovery from decades of conflict and its future development. A responsible glide path on the funding side and a steady, continuing USG commitment to Afghanistan's development, including important incentive programs like the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, will be critical factors in fostering a successful transition and future for Afghanistan and the region.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#8)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 8, 2014**

USAID Staff

Under the Development Leadership Initiative, USAID had been on a trajectory to double the number of Foreign Service officers between 2008 and 2012 to 2,400. Budget cuts in recent years have delayed the achievement of this objective. As of September 2013, USAID had 2,142 Foreign Service officers, 258 short of its goal.

- How has failure to meet the objective affected USAID's ability to develop, implement, and monitor its programs?

Because of bipartisan Congressional support, USAID has been able to bring onboard 820 new foreign service officers, resulting in an increase of almost 94 percent in career FSOs overseas (738 to 1429) by the end of FY 2013. This increase has greatly strengthened USAID's ability to implement, support and monitor its progress around the world. Of course, if USAID were able to reach the full additional 1200 FSOs, it would enable USAID to be able to work more closely with host country governments and local organizations.

- What technical expertise does USAID continue to lack?

The greatest continuing shortages of career technical staff are in health and contracting.

- Is there a similar shortfall in the number of Civil Service staff at the agency?

Yes, there has been a similar shortfall in the number of Civil Service. USAID has steadily increased the U.S. Civil Service direct hires from 1,068 in September 2008 to 1,601 by the end of September 2013.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#9)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 8, 2014**

Procurement Reform

One aspect of procurement reform is to build the capacity of recipient country governments and NGOs to be able to implement USAID programs directly, in what is called “local ownership”. USAID’s goal is that 30% of programs will be locally implemented by FY2015.

- How does USAID respond to the concern of U.S. NGOs and contractors that they are financially endangered by a move to direct local contracting?

USAID values its longstanding partnerships with U.S. NGOs and contractors, and the vast majority (over 82%) of USAID partner funding continues to go to U.S. NGOs and contractors, not to direct local awards. USAID will continue to use U.S. NGOs and contractors as our leading partners when our project designs, development objectives and program goals make those partners the best option. However, as part of an effort to build local capacity and better sustain the long-term impacts of our aid, USAID is revitalizing our approach to working directly with local government and non-governmental organizations, where prudent and appropriate.

- How is USAID addressing congressional concerns regarding the accountability of local institutions utilizing U.S. funds without exposing them to corruption and waste?

USAID welcomes and shares the focus on accountability, and believes that building local capacity to manage USAID funds and other resources effectively and transparently is inextricably linked to effective development. Building local capacity is also key to sustaining results and beginning to create the conditions under which one day countries are able to stand on their own two feet. USAID aims to ensure that we identify and mitigate appropriately all risks to USAID funds before we provide them to local partners, and to monitor all risk mitigation plans as projects are implemented.

USAID has developed a series of tools that assess these risks. They include the Public Financial Management Risk Assessment Framework (PFMRAF), which specifically examines the fiduciary and reputational risks of providing direct assistance through local governments to achieve stated objectives. USAID also examines the risks associated with making awards to non-governmental partners, be they local or international, and requires a “responsibility determination” before award. Projects implemented by local partners are intensively monitored and evaluated, and are also subject to both internal and external audits. USAID also facilitates review of such projects by our Inspector General, as well as by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and other oversight authorities.

USAID is concerned about more than just fiduciary risk. Earlier this year, USAID issued the Local Systems Framework, which addresses three additional types of risk in terms of accountability: contextual, programmatic, and reputational risk.

- Contextual risk assesses the local context – political, economic, enabling, and operational -- to try to anticipate its impact on planned development outcomes. Examples include risks of a natural disaster or civil unrest, or a restrictive regulatory environment.
- Programmatic risk involves monitoring project design and implementation to ensure, so far as possible, that unanticipated contingencies do not affect project results.
- Reputational risk is analyzed to ensure that the means by which a project is implemented or the partner chosen to do so does not risk a loss of credibility or public trust, or frustrate USAID's and more broadly, the U.S. government's development objectives, strategic goals and management of the bilateral relationship.

Through our recently revised and enhanced project design process, we carefully examine the contextual and programmatic risks associated with different technical, institutional, and other approaches and seek to determine which will provide the greatest return on our investment, coupled with an appropriate level of accountability and sustainability, for the use of taxpayer resources.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#10)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 8, 2014**

Global Development Lab

The U.S. Global Development Lab seeks to identify and conduct pilot programs introducing innovations in science and technology that might solve development problems. In the past, USAID has had difficulty taking its pilot programs to a broader audience.

- What steps is the agency taking to “scale-up” its new ideas in development? What challenges does it face in accomplishing this?

The challenges of international development are measured in millions: 60 million out of school, 850 million undernourished, 2.5 billion without financial services. To bring USAID’s response in line with the scale of these problems, the Agency is developing new guidance, training and technical assistance to support a new approach to programming and planning. This includes the new Center for Global Solutions in the Lab, with the mandate to build awareness, tools and capacity to support stronger integration of scaling principles into USAID policy, planning and programming.

In addition to strengthening the Agency’s capacity to scale, the Lab is leading efforts to dramatically expand USAID’s network of partners in order to leverage a more comprehensive resource base, both human and financial, for addressing problems at scale. The Lab has led efforts to build relationships with private sector, university and NGO partners, and other U.S. Government Agencies with whom the Lab will co-create, co-design and co-invest in innovative tools and approaches.

Scaling up solutions requires complex systems that cut across regions and cultures and also requires time and resources to deliver services to millions of people. The types of up-front, often cross-sectoral, foundational investments required to achieve results at scale tend to generate more modest results in the initial years of investment. This sacrifice of short term benefits for a much larger return in the medium and long-term poses challenges. Given the current USAID accounts structure, cross-sectoral investments also require significant coordination across USAID offices and bureaus and agreement on reporting and implementation that adds to the challenge.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#11)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 8, 2014**

Food Aid: Continued U.S. Commodity Procurement

The Administration's budget request calls for the increasing use of cash-based food assistance, reducing the amount of U.S. commodities procured through the program.

- What is your thinking about future funding of U.S. food procurement?
- Do you plan to transition completely away from U.S. procurement?
- In what situations might the purchase and shipping of U.S. commodities be the most efficient and effective means of addressing a food crisis?

The majority of funding for USAID's Food for Peace (USAID/FFP) program is provided by the Subcommittee on Agriculture Appropriations and is authorized through the Food for Peace Act, as amended by the Agricultural Act of 2014. The Agricultural Act of 2014 maintains USAID/FFP as a U.S. commodity-based food aid program, though it provides USAID with some limited flexibility to enhance USAID/FFP commodity-based programs with the complementary use of other food assistance modalities, such as local and regional procurement. The majority of the USAID/FFP program will continue to rely on U.S. agricultural commodities. USAID's Emergency Food Security Program, funded through the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account, is another critical part of the USAID/FFP program which allows for a portion of IDA funds to be used to meet emergency food needs in places where commodities are not the most appropriate response. While a critical tool, the majority of these funds are currently used to meet the extraordinary needs in Syria and additional flexibility is needed in order to sufficiently respond to other ongoing emergencies.

Despite the modest changes made by the Agricultural Act of 2014, as part of the FY15 budget request the Administration proposed that 25 percent of Food for Peace Title II funding be available as cash for local and regional procurement, food voucher and cash transfer programming. This proposal to reform food aid acknowledges that U.S. commodities will remain a foundational element of U.S. food assistance while also seeking to advance the need for additional flexibilities to respond to ever more complex food security crises and difficult operating environments. The President's proposal maintains the majority of these funds for the purchase, transport, and related costs of American commodities.

The Administration and USAID are not seeking a complete shift away from the U.S. commodities as part of food assistance. We seek the flexibility to use the best tool – whether that

be U.S. commodities, local or regional procured commodities, food vouchers or cash transfers – to respond to each unique crisis. In Syria, for example, U.S. commodities are not appropriate but rather the provision of food vouchers and the use regional procurement is critical to USAID’s food assistance response. Without these modalities, the U.S. response to the food security crisis in the region would be significantly muted. In contrast, the current situation in South Sudan warrants the use of U.S. commodities due to the scarcity of food in the country and level of emergencies in the region. In this instance, having the ability to choose U.S. commodities allows USAID to respond to a complex crisis with the most appropriate tool.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
 USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
 Representative Nita M. Lowey (#12)
 Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
 House Committee on Appropriations
 April 8, 2014**

Syria Conflict

- How would you assess the response of the U.S. government and international community to Syria's humanitarian crisis so far? What do you anticipate will be the response going forward?

The U.S. has provided more than \$ 1.7 billion in humanitarian assistance since the beginning of the Syria crisis. To date, the U.S. remains the single largest donor of humanitarian aid to the people whose lives have been shattered by this tragic and devastating conflict. And, the United States remains committed to providing its assistance by working through all available channels -- including through the UN, international, non-governmental, and local humanitarian organizations -- to help those in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria, no matter where they reside.

The United States remains unwavering in its support for a negotiated political solution to the crisis, which will end the terrible violence and suffering the people of Syria have endured for over three years. The United States continues to urge all parties in Syria, in particular the Assad regime, to fully implement UN Security Council Resolution 2139, including to promptly allow rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access for UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners, including across conflict lines and across borders.

The most recent Secretary-General's report (March 24) on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2139 condemns the Assad regime's and extremist opposition groups' failure to implement UNSCR 2139's demands for humanitarian access to those in need: the government's continued, brutal use of barrel bombs in populated areas; and the utter disregard for human rights and the sanctity of human life we have seen manifest itself in torture, arbitrary arrest, kidnappings and gender-based violence. We share that condemnation. The report particularly singles out the Assad regime for not fully implementing the Security Council's demands in UNSCR 2139 and clearly states it has failed in its responsibility to look after its own people, has refused consent to humanitarian organizations to use all means to deliver humanitarian assistance, including cross-border assistance, and continues its attacks on civilian populations.

- Please discuss ways that the Administration plans to meet future Syria-related needs in FY2014, including the use of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) and Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) funds.

USAID thanks Congress for the International Disaster Assistance account Overseas Contingency Operations (IDA-OCO) funding provided in the FY 2013 and FY 2014 appropriations, \$751 million and \$924 million respectively. This funding has allowed USAID to respond robustly to needs in Syria and other major protracted emergencies, with minimal impact to other humanitarian programs world-wide. In FY 2014, USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance plans to program approximately \$300 million in total for needs in Syria. In FY 2014, USAID's Office of Food for Peace plans to program approximately \$500 million in food assistance for Syria and neighboring countries. The USG continues to rely on IDA and MRA OCO as a critical component to USAID's humanitarian response in Syria, and expects to do so as the crisis continues to persist.

Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) is authorized by the President to meet unexpected urgent refugee and migration needs. The administration authorized the use of \$15 million in ERMA funding in January 2013 in response to the crisis in Syria. While State/PRM plans to meet Syrian humanitarian assistance requirements through base MRA and MRA-OCO funding, needs in response to the Syria crisis will continue to be assessed and addressed through ERMA if necessary.

- Please describe the main challenges for USAID in administering the Food for Peace Title II emergency food aid program in Syria. How do you assess the effectiveness of the World Food Program (WFP), which is one of the key implementing partners in food distribution?

USAID's Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP) has provided nearly \$531 million in food assistance for conflict-affected Syrians and Syrian refugees. Of the total, approximately 8 percent is Title II emergency food assistance; the remainder of food assistance for Syria has been provided with IDA base funding (23 percent) and IDA OCO (69 percent) funds and comprises a combination of local and regional food procurement and provision of food vouchers. The UN World Food Program (WFP), USAID/FFP's largest partner inside Syria, has faced numerous challenges importing Title II commodities into Syria, including Syrian Arab Republic Government (SARG) specifications for imported wheat flour. As a result, Title II wheat is often shipped to Turkey or Lebanon, where it is milled, and combined with flour from other sources before WFP imports the flour to Syria. In addition, Syrian labeling and product specifications for other commodities, such as lentils and vegetable oil, have discouraged suppliers in the U.S. from responding to tenders released by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. For example, a recent tender for vegetable oil received no bids.

Where possible and permitted by security, USAID regularly monitors its food assistance in refugee hosting countries through camp visits, observation of food and voucher distributions, beneficiary interviews, and monitoring visits to supermarkets participating in the food voucher program. For security reasons, USAID is unable to directly monitor food distributions inside Syria. However, USAID works closely with WFP staff in the field and at headquarters to assess effectiveness of food distributions. Each month, USAID receives and analyzes detailed distribution information from WFP to determine whether food assistance is reaching the families in areas of greatest need.

- Please discuss the issue of branding and efforts by the U.S. government to balance the desire to maintain visibility as a contributor of humanitarian assistance on the one hand with concerns for the security of implementing partners on the other. Do you believe the U.S. government has found an appropriate way to leverage its political objectives without politicizing humanitarian aid in the Syria context? Why or why not? What are your concerns and challenges on this issue?

Wherever possible, we brand U.S. Government aid. For example, we have provided a small amount of USAID branded plastic sheeting for internally displaced persons camps in northern Syria. Similarly, we identify our flour as being from the U.S. Government in Memoranda of Understanding signed by our contractor with bakeries in Syria. Additionally, we continue to promote the role of U.S. Government humanitarian aid via social media, high-level visits to the region, and Pan-Arab media outreach.

However, we are actively responding to a complex crisis in the middle of a brutal war zone – a humanitarian crisis people are calling the worst in generations. Aggressively branding our humanitarian assistance carries significant risks for our partners. USAID works with 26 organizations across Syria. We have a moral imperative to keep these humanitarian workers safe so they can continue to deliver life-saving aid.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
 USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
 Representative Nita M. Lowey (#13)
 Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
 House Committee on Appropriations
 April 8, 2014**

Pakistan

Some in Congress contend that the Pakistani government is insufficiently transparent and competent in its operations to justify devoting hundreds of millions of dollars in ongoing assistance to the country.

- How do you respond to such contentions? To what extent, if any, has the placing of conditions on U.S. assistance contributed to changes in Pakistani behavior?

Pakistan's already struggling economy has faced an increasingly severe energy crisis in recent years. USAID now identifies its energy programs in Pakistan as being a top priority and reports that these have increased the country's generation capacity by 1,000 megawatts.

- What future work does USAID plan in this area and to what extent do you consider energy-related projects to be more urgent than, say, those focused on health or education?

USAID's civilian assistance program in Pakistan supports our nation's interest in Pakistan becoming a secure, economically sound, and stable democracy that plays a positive role in countering terrorism and contributing to peace and stability in the region. To that end, we are seeking to build an enduring and cooperative U.S.-Pakistan relationship with the civilian-led government and the Pakistani people.

USAID looks for ways to use assistance to support Government of Pakistan (GOP) reform and development efforts that coincide with our priorities, and there is significant overlap between USAID and GOP interests. The Sharif government has outlined its governing priorities as the following: economic revitalization, energy, education, and countering extremism. USAID's five-sector strategy for civilian assistance – energy, economic growth and agriculture, education, health, and stabilization and governance – reflects these priorities. The GOP has taken a number of important reform steps in energy and the broader economy following the agreement in September 2013 to a \$6.7 billion, three-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The agreement includes accompanying energy sector and economic reform requirements that are designed to support macroeconomic stability. USAID provides ongoing technical assistance to the GOP in the energy sector to support reforms and policies targeted under the IMF agreement. These reforms and policies include effective pricing, reduction of subsidies, improved management and efficiency, and capacity building of policy makers, planners, regulators, and facility managers. Education programming helps Pakistan

improve its system and make it more accessible to youth, including girls. The U.S. government's civilian assistance program continues to be aligned with the GOP's stated priorities and will continue to adjust to facilitate GOP reform efforts.

Pakistan is a challenging environment in which to work. Recognizing that fact, the USAID program emphasizes transparency through rigorous oversight measures we have put in place for the assistance we provide. In addition, the USAID program, particularly through its Government-to-Government (G2G) assistance, emphasizes building and enhancing the capacity of governmental institutions competently to provide basic services competently. We have made important progress over the past five years, even while experiencing a series of challenges in the bilateral relationship and for with USAID's program in Pakistan.

USAID emphasizes results and accountability in all of its projects in Pakistan. Prior to awarding and disbursing funds, USAID's Office of Financial Management performs pre-award assessments of all G2G implementing agencies and ministries at both the federal and provincial level, and at local non-governmental organizations as well. The assessments examine the organizational and management structure including the adequacy of staff, accounting and financial management systems, internal controls, technical capabilities, and quality assurance capabilities, as well as the organizations' policies, procedures, and practices for effective and efficient management of USAID resources. The assessment also determines if the entity has adopted the GOP's competitive procurement policies and whether effective monitoring systems are in place to ensure that assistance is used for its intended purposes. These assessments identify and document potential recipients' weaknesses and areas for improvement. USAID then actively works with the partners to build capacity and mitigate risks through multiple mechanisms.

USAID later conducts an assessment to judge the success of the capacity building exercise and to help us determine how to proceed with the activity. For all programs, we also conduct regular financial audits through an independent contractor, and monitor performance throughout the life of the activity. Additionally, USAID's Office of Inspector General (USAID/OIG) has established a formal office with a permanent staff presence in Pakistan. Through a program with Transparency International, USAID/Pakistan has also instituted the Anti-Fraud Hotline, which operates 24/7 and has been widely advertised in Pakistan. Anyone can call the hotline and make a complaint anonymously. Complaints are referred to the USAID/OIG, which thoroughly investigates claims. In the event wrongdoing or misconduct is conclusively identified, steps are taken to prosecute, recoup U.S. funds, change practices, and/or end funding, as appropriate. The hotline is the mechanism that helped uncover the details that led USAID to terminate the an agreement with Rafi Peer Workshop for the Pakistani Children's Television project.

During project implementation, USAID requires multiple levels of protection to mitigate risks, including:

- Development of a risk mitigation strategy, inclusive of a plan to address systemic weaknesses.
- Use of contractors such as Certified Public Accounting and engineering firms or local technical assistance providers to reduce USAID's risks and to build institutional capacity by developing systems, training programs, and advisory services.
- Close oversight to ensure that all G2G funds are approved by the GOP through an established consultative process in which all USAID financed G2G programs are authorized, approved and implemented through government systems, and included in the GOP budget.
- Use of a dedicated Single Treasury Account at the State Bank of Pakistan for each G2G project.
- Substantial involvement and oversight by USAID contractors when necessary to ensure the reliability of the safeguard processes.
- Maximum use of fixed amount disbursements, with reimbursement only after government implementers have met specific milestones and conditions verified by an independent USAID contractor.
- USAID/Pakistan retains audit rights over all projects. Annual audits are conducted by the Supreme Audit Institution and other auditing firms.

Conditions on security and civilian assistance to Pakistan have been in annual appropriations bills since Fiscal Year 2012. For example, the FY 2014 Appropriations bill requires the Secretary to certify to the Government of Pakistan's actions on counterterrorism efforts, countering improvised explosive devices, nuclear non-proliferation, visa issuance, and humanitarian access before the United States makes assistance available. Indeed, the Administration consistently presses Pakistan, at the highest political levels, to take further action in these priority areas. In doing so, we have achieved some progress – such as in counterterrorism, countering improvised explosive devices, and visa issuance – even as we continue to expect and request more. In that diplomatic context, we do cite the certification requirement in pressing for results.

Nonetheless, the Administration emphasizes the importance of a waiver for any such conditionality as, fundamentally, the objectives we support with both security and civilian assistance – a more stable and prosperous Pakistan, with its own robust domestic counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capability – are in the U.S. national security interest. Further, consistent cooperation through civilian assistance helps demonstrate the enduring nature of the bilateral relationship with the civilian government and Pakistani people, and our shared long-term interest in a stable, growing region.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
 USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
 Representative Nita M. Lowey (#14)
 Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
 House Committee on Appropriations
 April 8, 2014**

Palestinian Aid

Since the 2007 split between a Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and a Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, annual ESF to the Palestinians has averaged between \$400 and \$500 million. The FY2015 ESF request is for \$370 million, the same amount requested in FY2013 and FY2014.

- How effective has U.S. aid been in advancing U.S. policy goals related to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, preventing terrorism, and PA reform and development?

A just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, including a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is a long-standing bipartisan goal of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. U.S. assistance programs through USAID effectively develop viable and democratic PA institutions as a foundation for a future Palestinian state, as shown by significant improvements in governance, service delivery, and private-sector led economic growth.

USAID programs support increases in economic opportunities, build institutions, and promote cross-border cooperation. Promoting a prosperous Palestinian economy helps open up new markets to Israel, empowers moderate voices, and deepens the ties between the two peoples, thereby increasing security. With USAID's and other donors' support, Palestinian per capita gross domestic product (GDP) has increased by 50 percent since 2007. Tourism has increased nearly 350 percent. In the agribusiness and information and communication technology (ICT) sectors, entire industries have emerged. Cooperation with and between Israelis and Palestinian businesspeople contributed to a 44 percent increase in Palestinian exports.

The High Impact Micro-Infrastructure Initiative (HIMI), announced by Secretary Kerry in September 2013 in partnership with the PA, is an excellent example of the impact of our assistance. USAID contributed \$100 million for HIMI, which is designed to create jobs and build vital infrastructure throughout the West Bank. Projects have included constructing new roads, schools, community centers, water and sanitation systems and health clinics. These projects were designed to deliver tangible benefits to improve the living conditions of the Palestinians and to support the growth of the Palestinian economy. To date, USAID has completed 28 projects, and another 60 projects are ongoing. HIMI has benefitted 1.8 million people, generated nearly 345,000 work days for Palestinian workers, and increased access to basic services and expanded economic opportunities by improving infrastructure within the West Bank.

- Has there been any backsliding, as some reports have claimed?

Under the leadership of President Abbas and Prime Minister Hamdallah, the Palestinian Authority continues to make significant strides in reforming its institutions to better serve the Palestinian people. The PA remains committed to and continues to promote and support nonviolence, full transparency and anti-corruption efforts. Current Prime Minister Hamdallah has continued to build on former Prime Minister Fayyad's reforms, including tax reform.

In February 2014, Prime Minister Hamdallah announced that he would seek an amendment to the Palestinian Investment Promotion Law in order to encourage investment and rationalize tax incentives. In addition to the Investment Law, Prime Minister Hamdallah continues to demonstrate commitment to legislative changes that will ease doing business and minimize conflicting economic legislation. Prioritized legislative reform includes a new Company Law, a Secured Transaction Law, a Competition Law, a Financial Leasing Law, and a Debt Resolution Law.

USAID supports reform efforts in several ways. The Palestinian Justice Enhancement Program, for instance, develops the capabilities of the High Judicial Council and the Ministry of Justice, improves legal education for judges and future lawyers, and increases public understanding of the justice system. Similarly, USAID's Effective Governance Program strengthens the operational and management capabilities of selected ministries and public institutions to perform administrative functions more effectively, improves delivery of public services, and improves accountability and oversight functions. Further, USAID's Palestinian Health Capacity Project is working with the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Health to reform the costly health referrals system, whereby patients in need of specialized services are referred to hospitals outside the West Bank at a premium cost. Reforming the referrals process will lead to greater transparency and more efficient fiscal management.

U.S. law explicitly requires the executive branch to take measures to prevent aid from being used to support Palestinian terrorism. A number of sources claim that the fungible nature of U.S. contributions to the PA's budget frees up other PA funds to pay salaries to prisoners detained by Israel for terrorism.

- Given these claims and existing legal provisions, what measures do you plan to take before making future aid disbursements?

No U.S. funding goes toward payments to current or former Palestinian prisoners or to their families. We go to great lengths, including thorough vetting, to help ensure that no U.S. funding can be used to support terrorism. All U.S. assistance to the West Bank and Gaza is delivered through reputable implementing partners, is subject to stringent controls, and is audited annually.

When the U.S. provides budget support to the PA, the PA is authorized to only use our funding for purposes pre-approved by USAID. In the past, this has been limited to specific PA expenditures related to the payment of debt to commercial suppliers, including Israeli energy or utility companies, and the payment of debt to commercial banks providing credit for purchases from suppliers. U.S. government vetting is required before the disbursement of funds to private

sector creditors, and the U.S. government maintains full audit rights. USAID confirms payments and routinely audits use of these funds.

- Will you seek changes in PA practices? If so, what kind of changes? If not, why not?

It has been a longstanding practice of the PA to provide certain Palestinian prisoners a separate allowance upon their release and welfare assistance to their families during incarceration. These practices were initiated by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1960s and continued by the PA. The specific policy of providing stipends to released prisoners was codified by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in 2003 as a means of rehabilitating and reintegrating released prisoners into society. This practice only applied to “security” prisoners or those who have been imprisoned for offenses related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The PA, in coordination with the Israeli Prison Service and through the Israeli Postal Bank, also provides a separate stipend for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails to cover necessities (including meals) at the prison commissary.

Separately, the PA provides welfare payments and social assistance to families that have lost income or the means to support them. No U.S. funds are used for these welfare and social assistance payments. The PA provides limited financial support to indigent families regardless of why they have lost their income – e.g., through injury, death of those who provided for the household, unemployment, or imprisonment. In the case of the families of prisoners, the aim of this support is to protect and care for children so they are less susceptible to radicalization by violent extremist groups, who often use social assistance as a means of recruitment.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#15)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 8, 2014**

Cuba Democracy and Human Rights Funding

In the FY2014 omnibus appropriations measure, Congress appropriated up to \$17.5 million in ESF for programs and activities in Cuba, but stipulated that none of the ESF may be obligated by USAID for any new programs or activities in the country; of the \$17.5 million, the explanatory statement to the measure provided that not less than \$7.5 million shall be provided directly to the National Endowment for Democracy and not more than \$10 million to be administered by the State Department. The State Department currently estimates that \$20 million in ESF will be provided for Cuba democracy funding in FY2014, and the Administration's FY2015 request is for \$20 million.

- What accounts for the increase of \$2.5 million in FY2014 funding over the amount stipulated in the FY2014 omnibus measure?

For Fiscal Year 2014, the Administration requested \$15 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF); since the 2014 omnibus states "none of the funds appropriated by this Act under the heading 'Economic Support Fund' may be obligated by USAID for any new programs or activities in Cuba," we defer to the Department of State.

- Will USAID be responsible for administering any of the FY2014 assistance for Cuba, or will it be closing out its activities after its FY2013 funding is obligated and disbursed?

USAID does not anticipate administering any of the funds provided in FY2013 or FY2014 for assistance programs in Cuba but will continue to consult with Congress moving forward.

- Does USAID have plans for administering any of the FY2015 request for Cuba?

USAID has a long tradition of promoting democracy in Cuba and remains committed to promoting fundamental freedoms and reaching out to people who are systematically marginalized by their governments simply for what they believe. The most recent GAO report on USAID's Cuba program heralded it for its improved oversight and management of programs. USAID is proud of the reforms that we made and remains committed to supporting human rights and democracy in Cuba. The decision about which specific agencies carry out programs in Cuba using FY2015 funds will be determined in part through conversations with Congress and will take place during the implementation stage of those programs.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#16)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 8, 2014**

Foreign Aid to Burma

The United States reestablished its aid mission in Burma in 2012.

- How is USAID partnering with governmental and/or non-governmental entities in order to carry out its aid objectives?

The United States Government's engagement in Burma is in line with the principled approach established in the U.S.-Burma Partnership for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity. Through the implementation of this partnership the U.S. Government has emphasized a balanced engagement with the people of Burma, civil society, and reformers within the Government of Burma, centered on inclusivity, transparency, accountability, and local empowerment.

An integral part of USAID's engagement with Burma has been partnering and working with civil society organizations to increase their participation in constitutional reform and other government legislative decisions, as well as building their capacity to help the people of Burma in areas such as health and water and sanitation. From FY 2012 to FY 2014, USAID has provided over \$23 million for civil society activities in Burma. This assistance directly supported over 94 indigenous civil society groups and includes 107 grants to civil society organizations through USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives. The increasing strength and activism of civil society in Burma is becoming readily apparent. For example, USAID facilitated the convening of members of civil society and Parliament to develop a new draft Association Registration Law that was less restrictive and mutually agreeable to both parties. This trend in opening to civil society is continuing—Parliament recently passed a bill that would amend the Peaceful Assembly and Procession Law, which both increases civil society's ability to assemble as well as lessens penalties for violating assembly laws.

USAID is also actively working with other international donors to coordinate development assistance. We are also partnering with the Myanmar Development Research Institute (MDRI), a domestic Burmese non-governmental organization, on food security diagnostics that investigate potential value chains for rural agricultural-led development.

USAID provides technical assistance to Parliament, the Union Election Commission (UEC), and several ministries of the Government of Burma, including the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Rural Development; the Ministry of Trade and Investment; and the Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry. This assistance is focused on areas such as strengthening national health systems; developing a national land tenure and land use policy; and modernizing Burma's laws, policies, and institutional capacities to better facilitate international trade and investment. USAID assistance to the UEC is focused on four key areas to

strengthen Burma's electoral and democratic systems in the run up to the 2015 elections: 1. Improving the electoral administration, 2. Supporting civic and voter education and domestic election observation, 3. Improving the functioning of Parliament, and 4. Strengthening the capacity of democratic political parties and their ability to better represent citizens' interests.

USAID's program in Burma is fully aligned with the Agency's new model of development, which focuses on building and leveraging science, technology, innovation, and partnerships to achieve sustainable development outcomes. USAID currently has 24 public-private partnerships with companies such as Gap Inc., Hewlett-Packard (HP), Cisco, Exxon, Microsoft, and Proctor & Gamble, as well as universities such as Johns Hopkins, Indiana University, and the University of Washington. These partnerships address important issues such as providing access to clean drinking water; training birth attendants for improved maternal and child health; improving the success of micro-, small- and medium-enterprises through information and communication technology (ICT)-led programs; and advancing women's economic opportunity and empowerment through ICT and business trainings.

- Given Burma's recent past which includes international isolation, authoritarian government, and economic stagnation, what unique challenges is USAID facing as it attempt to develop development programs in the country?

Addressing the challenges of Burma's legacy of isolation, military rule, and economic stagnation is central to our engagement in the country. Burma's isolation has weakened its institutional capacity and ability to meet international norms and standards. USAID is working to increase institutional capacity by building the capacity of civil society to participate in the reform process and providing technical assistance to government ministries on international norms and best practices.

Achieving durable and long-term peace and national reconciliation in Burma is critical to address a modern, peaceful and democratic society. The United States is poised to support the peace process as a path to a viable and durable political settlement between state and non-state actors. USAID will support peace and reconciliation efforts through programs that support ethnic groups and civil society to monitor the implementation of ceasefire agreements, peacebuilding needs assessments in conflict-affected areas, and on-going dialogue among stakeholders to the process.

Burma's legacy of repressive laws, poor legal infrastructure, and a flawed constitution are also a concern. The United States has continually stressed that in order to realize its democratic potential, Burma will need to undertake constitutional reform that is driven by the people of Burma. USAID is promoting an inclusive approach that works with key reformers in parliament, but also builds civic participation in Burma's evolving democracy while ensuring a more transparent political process that reflects the will of the people of Burma. For example, USAID's Rule of Law program supports legal reform and promotes and protects citizens' rights while the Elections and Political Processes program strengthens civil society, political parties, parliament, and the Union Election Commission to pursue political and electoral reform.

Years of economic stagnation and control have made Burma one of the poorest countries in Asia, with high rates of stunting and extreme poverty, low agricultural productivity, and little choice in the crops farmers grow. USAID is focusing on fostering inclusive, agricultural-led growth that

will increase incomes and reduce hunger among small farmers, and bring real and sustained dividends of the reform agenda to people in all parts of the country. This approach introduce new technologies and techniques to raise agricultural productivity, advocating legal reforms to protect the rights of small holder farmers and international investors alike, and engagement with the private sector to make responsible investments in key value chains that will link small holder farmers to markets. Through this approach, we are aiming to reduce poverty in Burma by 20 percent within five years; and within three years to increase rice yields by 30 percent, double the national production of key high-value crops, and reach 350,000 farm households with new technologies.

To achieve international norms and standards after its years of isolation, Burma must also continue to develop its legal and regulatory framework to ensure continued and sustained international investment. This year, USAID launched our Economic Reform through ASEAN Integration (ERA) project, which will assist the Government of Burma in modernizing its laws, policies and institutional capabilities affecting trade, investment and the domestic business environment, bringing them closer in line with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Economic Community, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and other international standards. Through this project, USAID will help strengthen the rule of law, encourage responsible investment, support small to medium enterprise (SME) development, enhance information and communication technology (ICT) capabilities, and facilitate economic integration into ASEAN and international markets.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#17)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 8, 2014**

GAO Access to USAID Documents

This committee relies on the Government Accountability Office to conduct oversight of very important issues under our jurisdiction, such as international food assistance and Haiti reconstruction.

It has come to our attention that USAID has issued a directive (ADS 593) governing its interactions with GAO that now requires GAO to read a significant amount of documents at USAID, requires that a USAID official be present while GAO reviews the documents, does not allow GAO to take verbatim notes and prohibits them from removing those documents from USAID. GAO receives sensitive information, both classified and SBU, from agencies across the executive branch. GAO has an unblemished record in safeguarding sensitive information and documents. This policy adds unacceptable costs in terms of resources and time both for you and GAO.

- This is untenable. Please explain to the Committee the steps you will take to ensure that GAO will be able to conduct its work in a more efficient manner.

USAID greatly values the work of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and to that end takes very seriously its statutory responsibility to provide the GAO information, including expeditiously providing the GAO with access to responsive documents.

USAID enacted its policy, which is modeled after and closely tracks the State Department's, via the Automated Directives System (ADS – the Agency's internal regulations) chapter 593: *Reviews Conducted by the Government Accountability Office* in July 2012. We provide public and non-Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) responsive documents to GAO; give GAO access to classified and SBU documents and information in reading rooms on the premises of USAID or the State Department; and provide SBU documents to GAO with redactions as requested.

USAID's policy allows it to fulfill its statutory responsibilities to GAO while protecting the Agency's legitimate interests in safeguarding sensitive documents, which, for example, may contain internal deliberations, third party proprietary information, or could compromise the privacy or safety of individuals. USAID's policy enables the Agency to fulfill these goals while ensuring that sensitive documents are subject to appropriate administrative control. We have confirmed with other Executive Branch agencies that the access that USAID provides to GAO conforms with the access provided by other departments and agencies.

GAO has raised its concerns about the policy directly with the Agency, and in response, we are working with GAO to determine potential ways to facilitate their reviews, including possibly through the use of technological solutions or the development of further guidance to ADS 593.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#18)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 8, 2014**

USAID Operating Expenses

The base budget request for State and USAID for fiscal year 2015 seeks \$40.3 billion, which is the same level as was appropriated last year. However, you are requesting \$1.38 billion for USAID operating expenses, which is more than 21 percent higher than what was appropriated last year.

- Please explain why you are seeking such a significant increase in funds for the cost of administering USAID programs.

The FY 2015 Operating Expense (OE) request represents the minimum level of resources necessary to preserve the Agency's current operations. Congress specifically set the FY 2014 OE appropriation at the significantly lower level of \$1.140 billion predicated on the availability of \$335 million in other resources. The Conference report accompanying the FY 2014 appropriation stated that "With an additional \$335,211,000 available from other sources, the funding level for fiscal year 2014 for USAID Operating Expenses totals \$1,475,440,000."

With FY 2015 estimated other resources at \$116 million, the President's request of \$1.384 billion would provide a total OE budget of \$1.5 billion. Thus, the FY 2015 OE budget request represents only a \$25 million, or 1.6%, increase from the FY 2014 OE funding level Congress provided.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
 USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
 Representative Nita M. Lowey (#19)
 Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
 House Committee on Appropriations
 April 8, 2014**

Local Solutions Initiative

In 2010, to promote country ownership, build capacity, and enhance sustainability, USAID set a target of providing 30 percent of program funds directly to partner country governments and local NGOs by the end of fiscal year 2015.

- As of fiscal year 2013, what percentage of program funds is USAID providing to these entities?

As part of USAID's commitment to sustainability, the Agency seeks to work directly with local government, private sector, civil society, and academia to end extreme poverty and promote resilient, democratic societies. USAID's consideration of direct funding, where prudent and appropriate, also reflects commitments by the United States Government under the George W. Bush administration to consider use of local actors "as a first option". USAID is also sharpening its focus on efforts by its U.S. contractors and grantees to build sustainability, and organized an 'Experience Summit' to capture the lessons learned from our U.S.-based partners' efforts in this regard.

By the end of Fiscal Year 2015, USAID's goal is to implement 30 percent of all mission program funds through local actors, where prudent and appropriate to the local context of each country in which USAID considers direct assistance. This is a global goal across 79 missions, not a mission-by-mission mandate that requires a "one size fits all" approach. While considering use of local government and non-government partners, USAID has been mindful to ensure that our investments are deliberate, strategic, and financially prudent. The selection of the implementer – whether a local government or non-governmental organization, U.S. or international contractor, grantee, or other partner – is driven by project design considerations, U.S. strategic and development objectives, and country context and development needs, not the 30 percent indicator. Thus the actual percentage of these funds implemented through local partners will vary depending on the situation in a country and the Agency's development objectives there.

In FY 2010, the global average of mission funds provided to local organizations and governments was 9.6%. Today, it has risen to 17.9% in FY 2013,¹ with an even breakdown between funds provided to partner governments and those provided to local civil society, private sector, and academia.

¹ When cash transfers and qualifying trust funds are included, the amount obligated through local systems rose from 20.2% in FY 2010 to 30.5% in FY 2013.

- How will the planned draw-down in Afghanistan affect the agency-wide percentage of funding under this initiative?

As anticipated, the drawdown will reduce funding for Afghanistan, where a higher than average ratio of funding is given to local actors covered by the indicator and where the amount of funding is much greater than other countries. USAID anticipates that the amount of direct funding will continue its positive trend, but at a slower, more moderate rate of increase, as a result of the Afghanistan drawdown.

- Beyond this target, how does USAID plan to measure and report on progress in implementing this initiative?

The revitalization of USAID's approach to working directly with local actors is an integral part of how USAID engages in development and hence, is being integrated into core business processes, measuring and reporting on our assistance. The program cycle is a common set of processes around strategic planning, project design and implementation, monitoring and evaluation, learning and adapting, and budget and resources that are intended to achieve more effective development interventions and to maximize impact. Based on December 2011 guidance, Missions are required to prepare project designs, including prudent risk mitigation measures and appropriate monitoring and evaluation procedures for measuring and reporting on concrete results for taxpayer-funded foreign assistance. This encompasses projects that involve working directly with host country governments as well as the local private sector, NGOs, and academia.

Consideration about whether to provide funding directly to or through local actors begins in the strategic planning process and is decided during the project design process, when the design team determines that using, strengthening, and partnering with key local actors is important to achieving that project's development objectives. Project managers are responsible for reviewing data, making sure implementation is on track, and providing additional oversight. Progress is reported through project and activity monitoring reports, project portfolio reviews, and at a broader level through the annual Performance Plan and Report submitted by each Mission. As such, there is a robust system in place for measuring and reporting on a given project, including those involving Local Solutions.

At the project level, we will continue to refine, as relevant and appropriate, measures of organizational capacity development and institutional strengthening in order to assess whether our assistance is yielding sustainable results fit to the given purpose and context of the project, country and local development partner in which it is implemented.

- To what extent is USAID evaluating the initiative to assess achievement of its overall goals?

As we do with our other programs, USAID is strongly committed to evaluating this initiative to assess achievement of its overall goals. Projects implemented through local actors are subject to the same requirements for monitoring and evaluation set forth in USAID's Evaluation Policy and

ADS 203, *Assessing and Learning*. This ensures all plans include indicators to measure progress toward objectives and evaluation findings are used to inform and improve our existing programs. In FY 15 USAID will use the Evaluation Registry of the annual Performance Plan and Report to track the evaluation of projects that have a Local Solutions component. This project-level information will further our ability to monitor and evaluate progress moving forward and will be available early in CY 16.

Additionally, in Fiscal Year 2016, USAID will commission a multi-country meta-evaluation to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of Local Solutions interventions that use direct funding. Since many Local Solutions interventions are just beginning implementation, this Fiscal Year 2016 timeframe will provide a more accurate evaluation of both the operational aspects and development impact of working directly through and with local actors. We will provide the findings of this meta-evaluation to Congress upon its completion.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#20)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 8, 2014**

International Food Assistance

Last year, the Obama Administration proposed food aid reforms which, according to USAID, provide certain flexibilities that would enable the U.S. government to reach up to 4 million more people in food crises around the world with the same level of resources authorized through both the 2014 Farm Bill and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014. USAID has reported that the FY15 budget request seeks additional flexibilities that will allow the agency to reach about 2 million more people in emergency crises each year.

- Please discuss the additional flexibilities that the Administration is proposing for the delivery of food assistance and how agencies will ensure that these flexibilities are appropriately used in the difficult environments in which they operate.

In FY15, the President's request builds on positive reforms enacted in 2014 that will enable USAID to reach more people annually with the same resources in chronically food insecure communities, including about 600,000 more people through changes made in the 2014 Agricultural Act of 2014, and another 200,000 people in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014.

The flexibility provided in the Agricultural Act of 2014 will allow USAID to practically eliminate monetization (the sale of commodities overseas to fund development activities) above the 15% floor required by law, while also providing additional flexibility for use in all Title II programs. These changes reduce costs and offer USAID a wider range of programming options that can improve program outcomes and help achieve more sustainable results, particularly within development programs.

In the FY 2015 budget request, the President seeks to build on these important changes, and further expand the reach and impact of life-saving emergency food operations. The FY 2015 request seeks 25% flexibility within the Title II account that will allow USAID to reach about two million more people in emergency crises each year through increased use of local and regional procurement, voucher, and cash transfer programs. These programs increase the efficiency, effectiveness, and appropriateness of U.S. humanitarian food assistance.

In a 2013 GAO report on the Feed the Future (FtF) initiative (GAO-13-809), GAO reported that, USAID had disbursed about \$1 billion towards the L'Aquila commitment and another \$1.4 billion in FTF related programs from fiscal years 2010 to 2013 (as of March 2013).

- To what extent is Feed the Future reducing poverty and increasing agricultural productivity in FtF countries? What progress has FtF made in achieving its overarching goal to accelerate progress toward the United Nation's Millennium Development Goal of halving the proportion of people living in extreme poverty and hunger by 2015?

The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of eradicating extreme poverty and hungry looks at the number of people living under \$1.25 per day. Feed the Future (FTF), the U.S. government's global hunger and food security initiative, has set high-level goals to sustainably reduce poverty and undernutrition by 20 percent in the Zones of Influence (ZOIs) within its 19 focus countries, as measured by population-based surveys. The baselines for these surveys are now completed with interim and final surveys to be conducted in 2015 and 2017, respectively that will allow FTF to assess its progress towards achieving its overarching goal and the UN's MDG. The ZOIs are composed of areas where agriculture is prominent but poverty and undernutrition remain high. Many FTF programs aim to connect smallholder farmers, those with generally less than a hectare of land, to larger value-chains, affording them better market access for purchasing inputs (e.g., seeds, fertilizer) and for selling their produce at fair prices.

While USAID's agriculture programs are as diverse as the contexts in which we work, many programs focus on activities that introduce new agricultural technologies and provided instruction to farmers on more efficient and sustainable farming practices. Other initiative programs help build local infrastructure, such as roads or canals, to improve production and promote commercialization. Programs also enable small farmers and enterprises to better engage in the agricultural sector by providing business training, increasing access to loans and other financial services, and training them to meet international trade standards so they can participate in regional and international markets.

FTF is seeing impressive interim results on the road to sustainable reductions in poverty. In FY 2012, as a result of our efforts, 5.2 million smallholder farmers were applying better technologies and practices on over 3.2 million hectares of improved land. In FY 2013, that number grew to 6.76 million farmers on over 4.1 million hectares, an area slightly larger than Switzerland. In FY 2012, more than 9 million households benefited directly from FTF investments. In FY 2013, that number was 11 million. In FY 2012, with FTF support, the value of agricultural products sold by farm households increased by more than \$100 million, contributing to increases in smallholder incomes. In FY 2013 that number increased to \$174 million. Reductions in stunting, which is generally understood to result in lower earning potential for those afflicted later in life, also takes sustained investments over time. In FY 2013, Feed the Future reached 12,699,186 children under five with live-saving nutrition interventions, up from 12,038,528 the year before.

USAID is also committed to building resilience in the areas where we work. Funding for FTF resilience activities is targeted toward vulnerable populations and the rural poor. These programs bridge humanitarian and development objectives through expanded support for productive rural safety nets, livelihood diversification, microfinance and savings, and other programs that reduce vulnerability to short-term production, income, and market disruptions. In FY 2012, economic resilience funds launched FTF's expansion into drought-prone areas of the Horn of Africa and the Sahel with the aim of addressing the underlying causes of recurrent

humanitarian crises in both regions and serving some of the poorest populations on the planet. The FY 2015 budget request includes \$105 million for economic resilience programing. These funds will enable Feed the Future to continue to build on USG humanitarian efforts to reduce chronic hunger among the most poor.

Monitoring and evaluation are critical oversight and program tools that would help U.S. food assistance programs meet their objectives.

- With increased flexibility and more options, including local and regional procurement, cash vouchers, do you think USAID has sufficient capacity to effectively monitor and evaluate programs that are different in nature from the traditional food aid programs?

USAID has sufficient capacity to effectively monitor all its humanitarian food assistance programs, despite some differences between traditional U.S.-based commodity food aid programs and newer modalities of local and regional procurement, food vouchers and cash transfers. Local and regional procurement programs differ from traditional Title II commodity assistance primarily at the point of procurement. Once the commodities have entered the implementing partner's warehouse, the same commodity management principles used to administer U.S. agricultural commodities through traditional Title II programs largely apply to those commodities purchases locally or regionally. Likewise, beneficiary targeting and work components follow the same standards whether food, cash, or vouchers are used. In all cases, the same indicators of household food security largely apply in assessing outcomes.

USAID's Office of Food for Peace, which administers food assistance programs, has built a highly skilled monitoring and evaluation team based in Washington and abroad that works on all food assistance modalities. As USAID employs a broader range of food assistance methods, we will continue to evolve our monitoring and evaluation to ensure they are effective, impactful, well managed, and efficient.

GAO's recent report (GAO-14-277) showed that prepositioning saves time, but it costs money. Earlier this year, Congress authorized an increase from \$10 million annually to \$15 million annually for overseas prepositioning warehouses,

- How does USAID balance the costs and the benefits of prepositioning? Does the agency have the right tools to balance the cost and the benefit? Does USAID have plans to expand the amount of commodities it prepositions overseas or expand the number of its overseas prepositioning warehouses?

In addition to the GAO's report, USAID's Office of Food for Peace recently completed a study focused on measuring the cost-effectiveness and time-efficiency of its pre-positioning warehouses. The results of this study are being used to develop metrics that will be built into an end-to-end inventory tracking system and provide real-time information on cost-effectiveness and time-efficiency. While the study shows that prepositioning modestly improves the speed of

U.S. commodity-based food aid in reaching its recipients, our findings also confirm that the use of prepositioning increases the end-cost of delivering Title II food. As a result, we must continuously evaluate the various costs and benefits of prepositioning and make programmatic changes based on need, storage space availability, and funding. At this time, USAID does not have plans for increasing the size of the inventory or expanding the number of overseas warehouses.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#21)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 8, 2014**

Haiti

The State and USAID budget request for fiscal year 2015 includes over \$260 million toward various programs to help develop Haiti. However, according to GAO, as of October 2013, USAID had disbursed only 35 percent of the \$651 million for bilateral Haiti reconstruction activities provided under the 2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act.

- What is the rationale for requesting this level of annual appropriations given the large amount of Supplemental funding still unspent?

In compliance with the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-212), FY 2010 Supplemental funds (\$918 million) were obligated by September 30, 2012 into letters of agreement and the Haiti reconstruction grant agreement for activities aligned with the Post-Earthquake Haiti Strategy. Of the \$651 million in FY 2010 Supplemental funds programmed by USAID/Haiti, \$381 million (58%) have been obligated and \$320 million (49%) disbursed as of May 2014.

The U.S. government is making necessary adjustments to meet commitments detailed in the multi-year Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy. The FY2015 foreign assistance request is below pre-earthquake levels due to pipelines in ESF and INCLE accounts, and, in fact, represents a 17% decrease from the FY 2013 actual level. A return to pre-earthquake levels will be necessary once the pipeline is expended in order to sustain these investments.

FY 2015 funding will catalyze increased access to cleaner and/or cheaper energy in Haiti; attract investment through the strengthening of micro, small, and medium sized enterprises; foster environmentally sustainable agriculture and post-harvest processing; support provision of health services, including infectious disease prevention and integrated HIV/AIDS services; support programs aimed to help rebuild and reform public administration, and improve local and national government resource generation and management, and basic service delivery.

Four years after the earthquake, there have been measureable advances: the economy grew 4.3 percent last year, and private investment increased from an annual average of \$48 million in the three years preceding the earthquake to \$170 million for each of the three post-earthquake years. We therefore remain cautiously optimistic that we will continue to see progress in the years ahead. The USG is increasing its focus on local consultation and ownership, sustainability, and capacity building to promote effective GOH institutions. The Martelly Government has been serious about Haiti taking a greater role in leading its development and promoting investment and growth.

GAO reported in 2011 that the U.S. government was working with the Haitian government, via the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, to determine how to use and coordinate donor resources after the 2010 earthquake. This commission has now ceased to function.

- What steps are you taking to promote coordination of the large influx of U.S. and other donor assistance provided to Haiti since 2010?

The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission was replaced by the Coordination of External Development Aid (CAED in the French acronym) in September 2012. CAED is led by the Haitian Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe and consists of high-level representatives of major donor nations and the United Nations. The lead U.S. delegate is the Haiti Special Coordinator at the State Department. To promote coordination, we are in frequent contact with relevant ministries at all levels and with local government in areas where we make investments, as well as donor partners. The entire U.S. Government assistance program to Haiti is agreed upon with the host government.

State has emphasized the use of public-private partnerships as a means of transformational development, such as through its “flagship” project of helping build an industrial park in northern Haiti.

- What is your opinion of public-private partnerships as a solution to development problems?
- What challenges need to be overcome in order to implement such partnerships successfully?

USAID considers Public-private partnerships (PPPs) to be an increasingly strategic component of development, along with other non-traditional donor assistance. These partnerships leverage private sector financing, know-how, and technology to anchor and complement USAID’s major investments in infrastructure and energy, food and economic security, health and other basic services, and governance and rule of law, especially in the three development corridors in Haiti. The USG is also supporting the recently launched PPP unit within Haiti’s Ministry of the Economy and Finance and PPP champions within the selected line ministries to address Haiti’s infrastructure development. In addition, a trilateral partnership in food security among the U.S., Brazil and Haiti highlights the strategic importance of non-traditional donors emerging as donors themselves.

It has been challenging to attract private sector interest in our work in Haiti because the country is considered to be a “high-risk country” by the international capital market and foreign investors. Indeed, the total foreign debt of Haiti is to bilateral and/or multilateral institutions and foreign direct investment in Haiti is a fraction of what it is for other countries in the Caribbean region.

As a result, few multinational corporations invest in the country and local businesses also struggle to survive. We continue, however, to use the PPP tools at our disposal to facilitate the private sector’s participation in our development efforts in Haiti. Specifically, we use Global

Development Alliance resources to co-create and co-fund public private partnerships for development; provide seed capital and technical assistance to job-creating small and medium businesses; use loan guarantees (Development Credit Authority) to unlock financing and credit for local companies; and award innovation grants to private sector entities working on commercially viable development innovations. Our participation in these partnerships can help to assuage the private sector partner's concerns about entering a risky market like Haiti.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
Representative Nita M. Lowey (#22)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 8, 2014**

GAO Report Recommendations

For fiscal years 2010 through 2013, GAO reports identified 87 recommendations to improve USAID programs and operations. To date, almost half of those recommendations have been “closed as implemented” by GAO.

- What steps is USAID taking to ensure that the remainder of GAO’s open recommendations will be implemented in a timely fashion?

USAID assigns a high priority to following up on open audit recommendations from the Government Accountability Office in accordance with the following policies and procedures: 1) ADS 593, Reviews Conducted by the GAO (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdact848.pdf); 2) GAO-05-35G, GAO’s Agency Protocols (<http://www.gao.gov/assets/80/76875.pdf>); and 3) OMB Circular A-50, Audit Follow-Up (http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a050/).

Agency management officials are responsible for receiving and analyzing audit reports, providing timely responses to GAO, and taking corrective action where appropriate. The Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Management (AA/M), serves as the Agency’s Follow-Up Official for all types of audits, including those conducted by GAO. Where management officials disagree with an audit recommendation, the matter is resolved by the Audit Follow-Up Official. In coordination with the Agency’s Chief Financial Officer, the Audit Follow-Up Official ensures that (1) systems of audit follow up, resolution, and corrective actions are documented and in place, (2) timely responses are made to all audit reports, (3) disagreements within the Agency with respect to all audit matters are resolved, (4) corrective actions are taken, and (5) semiannual reports are sent to the USAID Administrator.

At the semiannual Management Control Review Committee (MCRC) meetings, the Agency’s Deputy Administrator emphasizes to the Bureau Assistant Administrators and Independent Office Directors the importance of timely implementation of audit recommendations. At the Management Operations Council (MOC) meetings, the AA/M ensures management officials understand the value of the audit process and are responsive to audit recommendations.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
 USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
 Representative Nita M. Lowey (#23)
 Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
 House Committee on Appropriations
 April 8, 2014**

Central African Republic

The U.S. response to the humanitarian, political and security crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) has increased dramatically in recent months, particularly as the crisis in CAR has become more desperate. While the response to the immediate crisis has been critical, the protracted nature of the situation in CAR will require sustained U.S. and international support.

- How is the U.S. government planning to sustain necessary humanitarian interventions as well as diplomatic and development engagement, including activities around peacebuilding and social cohesion, in order to support the Central African Republic through its transition and prevent the country from falling back into crisis?

The U.S. Government (USG) has committed up to \$100 million to support international peacekeeping in CAR. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, the USG has also committed nearly \$67 million in multi-sector humanitarian assistance and \$7.5 million to support atrocity prevention, social cohesion, and peacebuilding activities. In addition to vital humanitarian assistance, the ability to tap into flexible rapid response funding, such as the Complex Crises Fund and the Human Rights Grants Program, has been critical for our ability to respond to the situation in CAR.

The USG is actively looking for ways to leverage additional humanitarian assistance and funding for activities such as peacebuilding and social cohesion, including engaging other donors, both public and private. International institutions are stepping up their assistance efforts, including the recent approval of the rapid credit facility by the World Bank and new funding commitments from the International Monetary Fund and African Development Bank. However, to assist the CAR government in addressing urgent needs now and to transition out of crisis and onto a more sustainable path, a broader international effort is needed.

Support needs to be provided in ways that can bridge short-term crisis response with longer-term development, state building, and peacebuilding. The USG has been actively engaging with the CAR government and other donors, including the European Union, UN, and France, at the diplomatic and technical levels to try to ensure our own contributions are part of a larger whole that can support the CAR government and the people of CAR to chart a new path for their country.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
 USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah by
 Representative Nita M. Lowey (#24)
 Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
 House Committee on Appropriations
 April 8, 2014**

South Sudan

As of February 28, 2014, over 885,000 South Sudanese civilians have been internally displaced or made refugees by the current crisis, sparking a humanitarian emergency in the world's newest nation. Despite the serious security risks and logistical difficulties posed by the situation on the ground, UN humanitarian agencies and other organizations are working to deliver food, shelter, clean water, hygiene supplies, vaccinations, primary health care, and other lifesaving supplies and services to tens of thousands of people in need of help.

- How is the U.S. ensuring that assistance is reaching internally displaced persons based on need including those sheltering in UN bases but also those in rural and other difficult-to-reach areas?

The U.S. Government (USG) funds the humanitarian response at all levels – coordination, supplies and logistics, and on-the-ground service delivery. Through our funding to UN coordinating bodies, we support a system of assessing and prioritizing conflict-affected areas with the greatest needs. We also meet regularly with other international donors to ensure that the international community as a whole is identifying and filling gaps in assistance and that our aid is not duplicative. The U.S. then uses that information to fund partners with the ability to reach vulnerable people, particularly in high need areas. Our partners are currently spread across UN bases; internally displaced camps; and rural, food-insecure areas as well as in refugee camps in neighboring countries. However, access remains a challenge due to insecurity and the recent onset of rains, which limit the ability to reach up to 60 percent of the country by road. The USG continues to press the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) to allow full, unfettered humanitarian access to all populations in need, and has achieved success in helping to attain cross-border access from Ethiopia. To help partners work in difficult-to-reach areas, the USG is supporting rapid response teams that can quickly fly into a location that might be too insecure for permanent presence and provide urgently needed assistance. The USG is also supporting air operations as a platform to move commodities to areas inaccessible by other means. Other assistance in remote areas includes support for mobile health teams that can follow a population in need even if people are displaced multiple times as they flee unpredictable fighting.

- With the declaration of South Sudan as a level three emergency, what kinds of resources are being marshaled to scale up these efforts, as needs continue to grow and what assistance is the U.S. providing to ensure efforts are not hampered by lack of funding?

The level three declaration prompted the UN to deploy top-level operational planning managers and to scale up emergency teams in country. To support the UN's resulting Crisis Response Plan, which outlines humanitarian needs through the end of the year, the U.S. is providing funding for enhanced pipelines of food, health and nutrition supplies, and other relief commodities that our non-governmental organization (NGO) implementing partners can then draw from as they carry out life-saving programs to meet the needs of conflict-affected South Sudanese. In addition, we are also funding a robust logistical effort to provide transport for aid workers and supplies by all means available, including air, river, and road. This effort is particularly important to keep aid flowing during the current rainy season, when approximately 60 percent of the country becomes inaccessible by road. To date in Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, the U.S. has provided more than \$143 million in response to the South Sudan crisis. This funding is supporting programs in food security and livelihoods, health, nutrition, protection, and water, sanitation, and hygiene, among other areas.

- The humanitarian needs resulting from this crisis will require significant resources for months and possibly years to come. Has USAID budgeted for these longer-term needs?

The Administration remains dedicated to providing robust support for humanitarian programs worldwide. The President's FY 2015 request includes \$1.3 billion for the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account. USAID also plans to carry over some FY 2014 IDA Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding into FY 2015 to support humanitarian assistance needs. The President's request also includes \$1.4 billion in Title II to respond to development and emergency food assistance needs. The Administration has additional authorities, if needed, to draw upon to respond to humanitarian needs. Taken together, we anticipate having the funds needed to support our humanitarian assistance goals in South Sudan, Syria, and elsewhere. However, this is contingent upon avoiding a further deterioration in any of the current major emergencies, and no new large-scale emergencies before the end of the fiscal year.

In consultation with Congress, USAID is also making adjustments to our entire portfolio of development activities in South Sudan in order to best help meet the need of the people of South Sudan.

- What is being done to galvanize other donor nations to support the humanitarian needs of South Sudanese?

The USG is using all available diplomatic avenues to urge fellow donors to provide funding in response to the South Sudan crisis. The USG continues to press other donors in bilateral meetings and ongoing diplomatic conversations to support those in need as a result of the South Sudan crisis.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
 USAID Administrator Shah by
 Representative Diaz-Balart
 Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
 Committee on Appropriations

April 8, 2014

1. Innovations in Global health have saved millions of lives around the world. Thanks in large part to US investments in global health technologies, we have cut in half the number of children who die before age 5 from pneumonia, diarrheal disease, and malaria, the leading killers of children worldwide. USAID has been invested in new tools to prevent and treat malaria and tuberculosis, and vaccine research. What steps are you taking to ensure investments in global health research are not lost and we are making investments today in the needs of tomorrow? How are we involving the private sector? How will you ensure that global health R&D efforts are coordinated across agencies to ensure maximum impact?

USAID continues to invest in a wide range of vaccines and other technologies to prevent and treat many of the leading killers of children worldwide. Diseases like polio, smallpox, measles, and mumps have been controlled or eradicated through the development of vaccines and childhood immunization programs. U.S. health programs have contributed to a 40 percent decline in child deaths since 1990, saving the lives of 6 million children each year. Every day, nearly 15,000 children *now live* to see their fifth birthday. Further, the World Health Organization estimates that 3.3 million malaria deaths have been averted since 2001, the majority of which are in the ten countries with the highest malaria burden and among children under five years of age.

In 2012, USAID released a Global Health Strategic Framework for FY 2012-16, and each year reports on progress toward implementing the strategy, including an update on health-related research and development. USAID has contributed to advances in global health through investments in research and development and support for the introduction and scale up of evidence based interventions at the country level, which have contributed to mortality reduction in areas such as HIV/AIDS and maternal and child health. USAID also is investing in a broad range of other innovations through programs like “Saving Lives at Birth,” a Grand Challenge to bring new partners to the mission of ending extreme poverty and ending preventable child deaths through the development of technologies that have the potential to dramatically reduce maternal and newborn deaths and stillbirths for future generations of women and newborns.

USAID continues to work diligently with other federal science agencies and the private sector to develop the most efficacious vaccines for malaria and HIV/AIDS patients. USAID actively supports product development partners, such as the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, the Medicines for Malaria Venture, and the Integrated Vector Control Consortium to enrich the clinical pipeline and advance the development and testing of novel vaccines and new anti-malarial drug candidates, and new insecticide based tools for

malaria vector control programs. However, since clinical trials for new vaccines can take many years to reach completion, USAID maintains a balanced portfolio of both treatment and prevention research to help reduce the burden of disease and preventable mortality. USAID's global health research and development portfolio includes investments in more than 100 technologies in various stages of development, with several to be launched within three years. For example, USAID is investing in a confirmation trial and introduction plans for Tenofovir gel, which was shown in 2010 to be effective in preventing acquisition of HIV as well as Herpes Simplex Virus (HSV-2) in women. In addition, USAID is investing in TB drug development, including a new treatment regimen for multidrug resistant TB that can shorten treatment from the current 24 months to 6 to 9 months, resulting in great cost savings for patients and better treatment outcomes.

Partnership with the private sector is vital to further develop and scale these and other new therapeutics, diagnostics, and technologies. For instance, since 2004, USAID has supported the Medicines for Malaria Venture, a public-private partnership, to catalyze antimalarial drug development. Currently, the venture is partnering with more than 50 biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies to develop drugs that are safe for young children and pregnant women. Additionally, USAID has placed a new emphasis on private sector partnership through the establishment of the Center for Accelerating Innovation and Impact (CII) in USAID's Bureau for Global Health which is supporting the rapid adoption of products and interventions in target regions and is developing innovative financing mechanisms to accelerate product development and access for high-priority health innovations. These efforts will be further accelerated with greater Agency emphasis on science and technology to bring new solutions to existing challenges, as exemplified through the recent announcement of USAID's Global Development Lab. The Global Development Lab brings together a diverse set of partners to develop, test, and scale groundbreaking solutions to the greatest development challenges. The goal is to reach over 200 million people through a new Lab-supported global marketplace of innovations in the next five years alone.

Rational scientific research, including clinical, health services, and behavioral research, will continue to inform the evidence-based decisions that guide the USAID's continued success. USAID does not work in isolation; rather, the Agency actively collaborates with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Department of Defense (DoD), multilateral and donor agencies, foundations, partner country governments, universities, non-governmental organizations and private sector partners. Much of the 'upstream' vaccine and drug development work funded by USAID is supported by a strong partnership with other U.S. Government agencies, including the CDC, NIH, and DoD. In particular, USAID's Malaria Vaccine Development Program provides direct support to Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, NIH's National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, and the Naval Medical Research Center for the development of new vaccine candidates. USAID also partners closely with NIH through PEER Health, a USAID and NIH program that leverages the comparative strength of each agency to support developing country researchers.

2. This year's request for global health represents a cut of about 4% over last year's enacted level. Can you explain why global health was not prioritized in your budget request this year and whether you expect this to be a trend?

While there is a decrease from the FY 2014 enacted level, the FY 2015 Global Health Programs-USAID request of \$2.680 billion is a 1.3 percent increase (or \$35 million) over the FY 2014 request of \$2.645 billion. The Administration's support for furthering global health advances is absolutely unwavering. Tremendous progress has been made in global health, and this will continue with the funding level requested for FY 2015. U.S. health programs have contributed to a 48 percent decline in child deaths since 1990, and from 1990 to 2012, the total number of child deaths fell from 12.6 to 6.6 million. This means that every day, nearly 15,000 children – who would have otherwise died – *now live* to see their fifth birthday. Moreover, seven high-burden countries – Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Tanzania – have already reached their Millennium Development Goals for child mortality, reducing child mortality rates by two-thirds or more since 1990.

- Babies born today in USAID's 24 MCH priority countries have a better chance of surviving their first 28 fragile days of life. In these countries, newborn mortality rates declined by more than a third, from 49 per 1,000 in 1990 to 31 per 1,000 in 2012.
- The President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), led by USAID, is a major catalyst in the remarkable progress to reduce the devastating burden of child mortality and build country capacity to fight diseases. Since 2006, all the original 15 PMI focus countries have had reductions in childhood mortality rates, ranging from 16 to 50 percent.
- By preventing unintended pregnancy and encouraging healthy timing and spacing of births, family planning use has been estimated to reduce maternal deaths by 44 percent. In recent years, USAID's voluntary family planning programs have contributed to significant increases in contraceptive prevalence in many countries, including a near doubling of contraceptive prevalence rates in Liberia – from 11.4 percent in 2007 to 20.2 percent in 2013 – and Ethiopia – from 14.7 percent in 2005 to 28.6 percent in 2011.
- USAID is a key implementing agency of PEPFAR, which supported life-saving antiretroviral treatment for 6.7 million men, women, and children living with HIV worldwide in FY 2013.
- Since 1990, deaths from TB have been reduced 41 percent and the overall prevalence of TB has been reduced by 40 percent in the countries where USAID works. More than 1.3 million smear-positive TB patients were successfully treated, and over 45,000 people with multi-drug resistant TB began treatment in 2012, the most recent year for which data is available.
- Cumulatively, USAID has delivered 969 million treatments to 436 million people, trained nearly 750,000 people in the elimination and control of targeted Neglected

Tropical Diseases (NTDs), and leveraged \$6.7 billion in donated medicines -- with a USAID investment of \$386 million since 2006. USAID-supported countries have started to document the elimination of several NTDs. In the countries where we work, 35.8 million people no longer require treatment for blinding trachoma, and 52.4 million people no longer require treatment for lymphatic filariasis.

3. I understand that USAID is in the process of developing a comprehensive nutrition strategy, which is expected to be finalized soon. Can you let us know when we can expect to see this new nutrition initiative launched and describe the work USAID has been doing with other donors and recipient governments to ensure that this program is sustainable, locally lead, and has wide participation by donors?

The USAID Nutrition Strategy will be launched on May 22, 2014. The strategy's multi-sectoral approach, bringing together health, nutrition, and food security addresses both direct and underlying causes of malnutrition, and its focus on linking humanitarian assistance with development programming helps build resilience to shocks in vulnerable communities. It outlines USAID's approach to set and monitor nutrition targets, manage investments in more targeted and effective ways, and focus on key, high-impact actions such as improving breastfeeding and dietary diversity, scaling up nutrition-sensitive agriculture interventions, increased coverage and treatment for severe acute malnutrition, and training front-line nutrition workers. These improvements will enable missions to assess and identify critical gaps in national nutrition efforts, and focus nutrition investments on priority needs.

The Nutrition Strategy will further link our efforts with the work of other stakeholders through the global Scale Up Nutrition (SUN) movement by promoting country leadership to resolve critical nutrition and development issues. USAID is pleased to be part of SUN and its support to countries to develop their own nutrition investment plans. Fifty countries have joined SUN since its launch in 2010, representing a surge of commitment to undernutrition in countries around the world. USAID represents the U.S. Government to the SUN Lead Group, and USAID serves on the Senior Officials' Group and the Donor Network, while USAID Missions serve as SUN Donor-Convener in six countries.

The Nutrition Strategy will also inform a broader U.S. government-wide nutrition coordination plan, which is currently being developed. The U.S. Nutrition Coordination Plan will bring together all the U.S. government agencies working in global nutrition with the purpose of maximizing impact through better coordination of U.S. government global nutrition investments.

Nutrition is the key point of intersection between food security and health, and improving nutrition is a high-level objective of both the Global Health and the Feed the Future Initiatives. Through these initiatives, the United States is supporting country-owned

programs and strategies, based on individual country needs, to address the root causes of undernutrition and improve the future potential of millions of people.

USAID strengthens essential country systems that assure good governance, resource tracking, and accountability, as well as effective management and delivery of services at national, regional, and local levels. We leverage existing community workers—both health workers and agriculture extension workers—to deliver nutrition education at a local level. USAID also provides global leadership and technical assistance to priority countries in both initiatives to facilitate the planning, introduction, and scale up of high-impact nutrition activities.

4. How has the U.S. contribution to GAVI been leveraged to ensure maximum results and what more can the U.S. do to ensure our work with GAVI is successful? As GAVI goes into its second replenishment later this year what are your expectations in terms of leveraging this contribution and ensuring GAVI has a successful replenishment?

USAID's contributions to the GAVI Alliance have resulted in a 10-to-1 leverage of other donor resources to GAVI. USAID leverages its investment in the GAVI Alliance in four primary ways. First, USAID has been engaged in the development and implementation of GAVI strategy, program and policy through the GAVI Board since its inception in 2001. Second, USAID consistently coordinates with the other major donors of the GAVI Alliance, which include the United Kingdom, Norway, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, as well as, the UN agencies providing support to GAVI-eligible countries. Third, within each country the Interagency Coordination Committee includes the Minister of Health, USAID, and other in-country donors and stakeholders who work to harmonize activities. Fourth, USAID is increasing its focus on incorporating new vaccines into GAVI-eligible country programs, reaching more children through strengthened immunization programs and supply chains, data quality and use, service delivery, integration and surveillance. In addition, by working closely with our GAVI donor and UN partners, USAID has been able to leverage our global polio eradication contributions and our GAVI contributions to create greater program alignment and convergence. Since 2000, an additional 440 million children have been immunized against leading vaccine-preventable diseases in the world's poorest countries with GAVI support – preventing approximately six million deaths.

The first GAVI Alliance replenishment was successful because of the unprecedented level of commitment and coordination of the GAVI Alliance's major donors. For the upcoming replenishment, USAID will, again, play a central role in the multi-agency U.S. Government outreach effort targeting countries the donors believe can and should increase their contributions or join the ranks of contributors. USAID will engage those countries through multiple channels. Additionally, it should be noted that in 2013, the cumulative USAID contribution to GAVI exceeded \$1 billion, and that our annual contribution has since increased. GAVI is the single largest health investment USAID makes, and the FY 2015 request includes a \$200 million contribution.

The GAVI Alliance's new strategy for 2016-2020 will focus on reaching more children in GAVI-eligible countries with GAVI, as well as country financed, high impact vaccines. There will also be increased attention on strengthening country immunization systems, with USAID assistance, and building local capacity. GAVI's results are tremendously impressive and USAID is proud to have been an important part of this success – not only through financial contributions, but also as a technical agency.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Shah by
Representative Charles Dent
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
Committee on Appropriations

April 8, 2014

Question:

1. Despite great progress over the last 25 years, 18,000 children still die needlessly every day from preventable diseases. Vaccines, bed nets, safe drinking water and sanitation, basic nutrition, and strengthened local health systems can help save these children's lives and put them on the path to economic self-sufficiency. How is our federal investment in these programs leveraging private American support, and what more should the government be doing to leverage its investment.

For over four decades, USAID has partnered with countless groups in the private sector to help carry out its mission. This long and rich history of partnership is visible in many USAID achievements, including partnerships with pharmaceutical manufacturers to develop new products for family planning, child and maternal health, malaria and tuberculosis; partnerships with food manufacturers to develop ready-to-use therapeutic foods that decrease micronutrient deficiencies; and collaborations with consumer product manufacturers to promote the importance of soap, clean water and hand washing to decrease mortality from diarrheal disease.

USAID leverages support from the private sector in numerous ways. For example, the Helping Babies Breathe Alliance was launched with the medical device maker Laerdal Global Health. This public-private alliance promotes neonatal survival by offering evidence-based training and high-quality affordable resuscitation devices to birth attendants in low-resource countries. By partnering with Laerdal, USAID has been able to support the design of low-cost medical devices. Laerdal also helped create a marketplace for these products by first developing a package of essential educational materials and then supporting the training of birth attendants. Currently, the Helping Babies Breathe Alliance has been introduced in over 54 countries, materials translated in 22 different languages, and over 100,000 birth attendants have been trained and equipped with the devices.

Further, in Kenya, a partnership between GE and the Kenya Commercial Bank was recently announced that allows up to \$10 million in lending available to healthcare providers for the purchase life-saving equipment, such as portable ultrasounds and MRI machines. GE covered the upfront cost of establishing the risk-sharing agreement, representing the first time to USAID's knowledge that a multinational company has paid the cost of establishing such a financing facility. USAID is looking to create additional guarantees to encourage commercial banks to lend to health care facilities to purchase commodities, medical equipment and supplies.

Furthermore, USAID is also using mobile health technology to deliver vital health information to expectant mothers through a public-private partnership called the Mobile Alliance for Maternal Action (MAMA) with Johnson & Johnson, the United Nations Foundation, the mHealth Alliance and BabyCenter LLC. MAMA is supporting efforts to increase the impact of existing mobile health services in Bangladesh, India, and South Africa. Additionally, MAMA is providing resources and technical assistance to promising new businesses and helping build an evidence base around effective application of mobile technologies for improved maternal health. This partnership has accelerated efforts to provide millions of women with mobile phone service with life-saving health information.

USAID recognizes that the landscape of private sector engagement is fast evolving. Companies are increasingly looking at sustainability and development as core components of their business strategy, rather than simply a matter of corporate philanthropy. From our partners across the table, we no longer find them asking “why” they should be working with us. Rather, the dialogue has shifted to “how,” “where” and “when” we can work together to achieve common objectives.

2. The Senator Paul Simon Water for the Poor Act of 2005 made safe drinking water and sanitation a priority of US foreign assistance for the first time. Your agency has made great progress in helping the world's poorest people gain sustainable access to drinking water and sanitation since then. Between the 2013 launch of the five-year water strategy, the recently published Field Guide to that strategy including a heavy focus on sanitation in the world's poorest countries, and USAID's partnership with a variety of non-governmental groups, you have made a huge difference in millions of lives. What else could USAID be doing with organizations on the safe drinking water and sanitation front to get more leverage for our taxpayer dollars?

To more effectively leverage taxpayer dollars toward water and sanitation (WASH) related results, USAID is enacting the Operational Principles referenced in the Water and Development Strategy. These principles, referenced below, are consistent with USAID Forward and provide the foundation for how water issues will be integrated into USAID programming.

USAID Water and Development Strategy Operational Principles are:

- Support host country ownership
- Build in sustainability from the start
- Apply integrated approaches to development
- Leverage "solution holders" and partner strategically
- Promote gender equality and female empowerment
- Leverage science and technology
- Measure and evaluate impact
- Achieve resilience

An example of leveraging is through USAID's Grand Challenge for Development (GCD). USAID in partnership with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of The Netherlands (MFA-NL) launched Securing Water for Food: A Grand Challenge for Development in September 2013. Through Securing Water for Food, USAID, Sida and MFA-NL are contributing \$32 million (\$11 million from USAID) to source and accelerate innovations that will enable the production of more food with less water and/or make more water available for food production, processing, and distribution. By partnering with Sida and MFA-NL, USAID has leveraged \$2 for every tax-payer dollar invested.

In addition, USAID is committed at all levels to strengthen aid effectiveness as it relates to WASH. Internally, USAID is working to improve monitoring, evaluation and reporting of our own achievements – and setbacks – to achieve a more effective feedback loop to improve our programmatic approaches. At the national level, USAID is engaging more directly in national planning processes including Joint Sector Reviews and other collaborative platforms, and is seeking ways to strengthen and link with national monitoring platforms. At the global level, we are participating in efforts to harmonize global monitoring platforms where that is in the best interest of the sector. We will continue support to data collection and

monitoring processes such as the Demographic Health Surveys, UNICEF-WHO Joint Monitoring Programme and UN-Water's Global Analysis and Assessment on Sanitation and Drinking Water.

3. With the fall of M23, there are new opportunities to scale up economic development efforts in the eastern Congo. What steps are being taken to actively pursue investment opportunities that will promote job creation in the east?

While the defeat of M23 was a significant step in achieving peace in the DRC, ongoing conflict is perpetuated by the approximately 40 armed groups still operating in the region.

Where sufficient security exists in DRC, USAID will continue or expand community-level interventions with local, provincial, national, and regional peace-building and governance initiatives. Despite the security and governance challenges, significant and responsible foreign and domestic investment is occurring, mainly in mining and agriculture. USAID will review and expand successful activities that promote responsible mining, cash crops, and income-earning improvements. This includes the development of public-private partnerships, which leverage external resources. For example, USAID is working in partnership with the American Refugee Committee and private investors in piloting an innovative entrepreneurial service delivery model. Additionally, USAID is continuing its partnership with the Eastern Congo Initiative to revitalize the coffee industry in South Kivu.

USAID is also currently working with U.S. mining companies to improve the traceability of minerals, thus increasing the economic benefit to individual miners in Katanga Province. Other potential intervention areas include formalizing and legalizing artisanal mining on or near industrial concessions, expanding alternative livelihoods choices, and promoting regional infrastructure planning and improved economic governance.

A stable and secure environment, and other preconditions for institutional development, must exist before many development-oriented interventions have a chance of success in DRC. Research on fragile states, like DRC, have shown that post-conflict countries have a much higher tendency to fall back into conflict than stable ones and that transition to a normal development trajectory takes a long time and strong political leadership. Such states require long-term investment to build the capacity of state and civil institutions. USAID will continue to support economic development in eastern DRC but progress must be made on certain reforms, like political inclusiveness and leadership, before eastern DRC can transition to a post-conflict mode where a full development agenda can be adopted.

4. A number of local and international non-governmental organizations and businesses have shown that private investment in eastern DRC can produce very promising results. How can USAID benefit from these examples and best practices for increased public-private partnerships and similar types of engagement?

USAID has noted increased private, responsible foreign and domestic investment, mainly in the mining and agriculture sectors in DRC. DRC has great economic potential. In many instances, USAID and the private sector have shared development interests.

USAID values public-private partnerships and has learned from the best practices of the business and NGO community. USAID has a number of successful public-private partnerships, including work with brewery, mining and cell phone companies; American investors in agriculture; and local banks.

USAID will continue its robust work with the private sector, including a public-private partnership with the industrial gold mine, BANRO, which leverages external resources. USAID is also working in partnership with the American Refugee Committee and private investors in piloting an innovative entrepreneurial service delivery model. USAID continues its investment, in coordination with the Eastern Congo Initiative, in the coffee industry in South Kivu. Additionally, USAID's Responsible Mineral Trade Program continues to support the Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Mineral Trade, which brings together end users to ensure conflict-free mining. The conflict-free mining sites that have been created to date have proven that participating in conflict-free mining has economic benefits to the miners as well.

There is a significant opportunity for USAID to expand its public-private partnerships in DRC with potentially great economic and social benefits. When done strategically, these partnerships can influence the investment climate so that new responsible investors are attracted to DRC. These investors would be well positioned to manage the economic and social risks of creating employment and generating transparent tax revenues. This investment could also have a positive impact on governance, security, and economic development in DRC. Additionally, these partnerships may also serve to convene stakeholders, including sources of finance, to design and finance critical infrastructure, anti-corruption activities, introduce new tax and business regimes, and to engage in border de-bottlenecking-- all areas that are critical for the country's growth but where USAID has limited funding to invest.

5. Congo has the 5th highest under-five mortality rate in the world. With just 1% of the global population, Congo is responsible for over 6% of global under-five mortality. According to USAID's own reporting, 148 out of 1000 Congolese children will not reach the age of five due largely to preventable diseases like malaria, pneumonia and diarrhea. This is especially true in eastern Congo where war, unrest and weakened health systems have diminished efforts to meet critical health needs. What steps are being taken by USAID to address child and maternal mortality in eastern Congo and how do we scale up these efforts now that there is greater peace and stability?

The maternal and child mortality rates in the DRC are indeed abysmal and USAID is addressing these issues head on. It is important to note that child mortality rates are very high throughout the entire country. For instance, the under-five mortality rate for Katanga is

185 per 1,000 live birth whereas North Kivu is 131 per 1,000 live births and South Kivu is 166 per 1,000 live births (source: UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 2010). The weak government health care delivery system in DRC makes it difficult to address the high rates of mortality in the country. Consequently, USAID is focused on improving institutions and health systems, with an emphasis on health sector governance throughout the country, not just in the Eastern Region.

USAID has strong child survival programming in eastern DRC. USAID/DRC's largest health program, the Integrated Health Project, operates in 80 health zones in the DRC, including 28 health zones in South Kivu. The goal of the program is to improve the basic health conditions of the population in targeted geographical areas. Specifically, the project aims to increase the availability, access and use of quality, high-impact services, products, and practices for family planning, maternal and child health, nutrition, malaria, tuberculosis, HIV, water supply, sanitation, and hygiene in targeted health zones. Women and children under-five from underserved rural locations are the main focus of interventions. To better address child survival in eastern Congo, this activity will scale up the number of integrated community case management (iCCM) sites in health zones where geographic access to health centers is difficult. In these care sites, trained community health workers (CHWs) provide key essential education and behavior change activities and can treat for malaria, pneumonia, and diarrhea, screen malnutrition among children under five, and refer complicated cases to the health center. These iCCM sites are connected to the health center network, providing key child health services for illnesses with the highest burden and providing referral with vouchers for illnesses that surpass the capacity of the CHW.

Other interventions that will be expanded in eastern Congo are focused on the promotion of essential newborn care. Health facility services are being strengthened to provide additional critical care to both mothers and newborns during the third stage of labor by providing oxytocin for preventing post-partum hemorrhage, resuscitation of the neonate, management of newborn sepsis, Kangaroo Care (a skin to skin technique practiced on newborns, usually preterm babies, to increase their chance of survival) and routine distribution of long-lasting insecticide-treated nets (LLINs) for pregnant women and children under-five.

Since malaria is a key determinant of child mortality in the DRC, USAID is tackling malaria through the President's Malaria Initiative Expansion project (PMI-E) which assists the Government of the DRC in achieving its target of reducing malaria-associated mortality by 50 percent. It is centered on three essential and mutually dependent components: 1) prevention through the provision of LLINs and intermittent treatment for pregnant women; 2) diagnosis and treatment of simple and severe cases of malaria; and 3) cross-cutting activities including behavior change communication, supply chain management, and monitoring and evaluation. PMI-E provides these services in five health zones in South Kivu and nine health zones in the Kalemie region of Katanga.

USAID is also pioneering new approaches to engage the private sector in the fight against child mortality in eastern Congo. One pilot project aims to create community-driven "social enterprise zones" in order to test and demonstrate an innovative approach to improving child survival and maternal health within a fragile development context. The project includes

health, nutrition, agriculture, and water components; and, it ultimately aims to reduce child mortality and morbidity among children under five and promote maternal health in eastern Congo.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Administrator Shah by
Representative Adam Schiff
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
Committee on Appropriations

April 8, 2014

I have a few questions regarding aid to Pakistan and, in particular, our aid to Sindh, which is one of the four provinces of Pakistan and which is known for its diversity.

Does USAID have a way of keeping track of the funds that it gives or provides for the building of schools in Pakistan? Is there an auditing system in place to help prevent corruption at all levels (fed/local government and NGOs)?

USAID carefully tracks and monitors all assistance funds in Pakistan in accordance with Agency and U.S. Government guidelines. While there is no way to eliminate risk completely or guarantee a result in undertaking development programming in Pakistan, USAID, in the field and in Washington, is acutely conscious of the trust that has been placed in us to safeguard taxpayer funds while implementing development programs in support of the national interest. We are always looking at ways to refine and adopt improvements to our systems.

Prior to awarding and disbursing funds, USAID's Office of Financial Management (OFM) performs pre-award assessments of all Government-to-Government (G2G) implementing agencies and ministries at both the federal and provincial level, and local non-governmental organizations as well. The assessments examine the organizational and management structure including the adequacy of staff, accounting and financial management systems, internal controls, technical capabilities, and quality assurance capabilities, as well as the organizations' policies, procedures, and practices for effective and efficient management of USAID resources. The assessment also determines if the entity has adopted the Government of Pakistan's (GOP) competitive procurement policies and whether effective monitoring systems are in place to ensure that assistance is used for its intended purposes. These assessments identify and document potential recipients' weaknesses and areas for improvement. USAID then actively works with the partners to build capacity and mitigate risks through multiple mechanisms.

During project implementation, USAID requires multiple levels of protection to mitigate risks, including:

- Development of a risk mitigation strategy, inclusive of a plan to address systemic weaknesses.
- Use of contractors such as Certified Public Accounting and engineering firms or local technical assistance providers to reduce USAID's risks and to build institutional capacity by developing systems, training programs, and advisory services.
- Close oversight to ensure that all funds are approved by the GOP through an established consultative process, where all USAID financed G2G programs are

authorized, approved and implemented through government systems, and included in the GOP budget.

- Use of a dedicated Single Treasury Account at the State Bank of Pakistan for each G2G project.
- Substantial involvement and oversight by USAID contractors when necessary to ensure the reliability of the processes.
- Maximum use of fixed amount disbursements, with reimbursement only after government implementers have met specific milestones and conditions verified by an independent USAID contractor.
- USAID/Pakistan retains audit rights over all projects. Annual audits are conducted by the Supreme Audit Institution and other auditing firms.

For construction efforts, including schools, all USAID-funded G2G projects are completed under fixed amount reimbursements. Structures for school construction are designed with full specifications and details, and the total cost for completion is estimated and negotiated before any such award is signed.

USAID/Pakistan procures direct stand-alone quality assurance and control contracts under which licensed Pakistani architect-engineering (A&E) firms independently review all solicitation-related materials submitted to validate that they reflect a realistic market value for construction at the specific site(s) and time(s). Modes of monitoring construction vary by location, security, accessibility, level of partner involvement and capability, and implementation mechanism. For school infrastructure projects in Pakistan, the implementation mechanism is a G2G award. In addition, USAID has staff engineers that supervise the contracted A&E firms and periodically visit construction sites, security permitting, to monitor construction quality and progress.

2. The recent famine and drought in Thar has caused loss of life and has seen a rise in the amount of religious extremist groups, who are supported by the government through the ISI in the area. Thar has a high population of Hindu Sindhis who are in fear of forced conversion or being pushed off their land if they do not convert. Is USAID doing anything to provide an alternate form of relief to people so that they do not have to choose between conversion or survival?

USAID and its implementing partners work across religious and ethnic groups, and our humanitarian assistance is based on need. We take seriously any indication that assistance is not being provided fairly and we have no indication that that is the case in Tharparkar. We encourage anyone concerned about this issue to report problems to USAID, either in Washington or through its mission, or through the USAID/Pakistan Transparency International hotline.

Regarding the drought and famine issue, despite some incomplete media reports, in 2014, most of Tharparkar has had normal seasonal rains, although some areas did experience low rain fall and below average crop yields (approximately 30% below average). Historical rainfall data demonstrate above average rains for the last five years. Even with recent above-average rainfall, however, indications are that drought will affect Tharparkar again in the future.

3. While USAID has done a wonderful job in building schools in the Sindh region, there is the question of quality. Are there qualified female teachers in rural areas and if not, how does USAID plan to remedy the situation?

Several programs in USAID/Pakistan's education portfolio are designed to work together to address the need for more qualified teachers in Sindh and across Pakistan, in rural and urban school districts. USAID puts particular emphasis on hiring and training more qualified female teachers. Increased numbers of qualified female teachers are expected to help increase the number of girls that attend and graduate from primary and secondary schools.

USAID has two ongoing education programs that focus on increasing both the number and the quality of female teachers: the Pakistan Reading Project (PRP, more details below) and the Sindh Basic Education Project (SBEP). The SBEP supports higher enrollment in primary, middle, and secondary schools in Sindh through school construction, improved early grade reading instruction, and capacity support to the Government of Sindh. SBEP is also working in collaboration with local partners to increase the recruitment of female teachers in SBEP-supported schools.

These two programs build on prior work by USAID to strengthen teaching standards by helping the Government of Pakistan (GOP) establish an Associate's Degree in Education (ADE) and a Bachelor's Degree in Education (B.Ed.). These two degree programs are currently being offered in 23 Pakistani universities and 75 teacher training institutions.

Through the new PRP, which was launched in 2014, the degree programs will be rolled out to 87 additional teacher training institutes throughout Pakistan. In addition, a scholarship program will help women receive Associate's Degree in Education (ADE) and a Bachelor's Degree in Education (B.Ed.) at this expanded set of institutions.

Under this scholarship program, USAID is providing 6,400 scholarships for students to obtain Associate's and Bachelors' Degrees in Education, of which 60 percent (3,840) will go to women. To date, 1,136 teachers have completed the ADE program -- 770 graduates are women, and of those 277 are in Sindh. The B.Ed. degree program is expected to graduate its first class in the fall of 2014.

USAID is also supporting Sindhi teachers' continuous professional development through in-service training. The focus of this training is on improving reading instruction through the Sindh Reading Program -- a component of the PRP -- because literacy is a foundational skill that students need to be successful in school.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2014.

**UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS BUDGET**

WITNESS

**SAMANTHA POWER, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED
NATIONS**

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN GRANGER

Ms. GRANGER. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs will come to order.

Ambassador Power, thank you for being with us today to testify on the fiscal year 2015 budget request for the United Nations and other international organizations. The direct appropriations requested goes up significantly, by more than 25 percent. We need to hear why this is justified, especially in light of the fiscal challenges we face here at home.

In the short time you have been Ambassador to the U.N., many important issues have come before you that impact U.S. national security. On Iran, the U.N. and the IAEA in particular have an important role to play, both in terms of making sure Iran follows through on its commitments, and in keeping up the pressure as the final deal is negotiated.

In Syria, the U.N.'s role is critical, both in eliminating the chemical weapons stockpile and getting humanitarian aid to people in dire need.

On Ukraine, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution last week that affirms its commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty. However, the U.N. has not been able to send a more powerful message because of Russia's veto on the Security Council.

On the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, just yesterday, President Abbas announced that the Palestinians intend to be a party to 15 international conventions. This is very concerning and could jeopardize the peace process and possibly U.S. assistance. Since this has just happened, the ramifications are unclear. The administration must send a clear message to the Palestinians that the only path to statehood is through a negotiated agreement with Israel, not through unilateral attempts at the U.N. I hope you will update the subcommittee on these and other policy challenges that you face.

There are a few other issues I want to mention. The first is a U.N. reform. During your confirmation hearing, you said that you would aggressively pursue efforts at the U.N. to eliminate waste, improve accounting and management, strengthen whistleblower protections, and end any tolerance for corruption. I would like to know what progress you have made in these areas.

As you know, the fiscal year 2014 appropriations bill strengthens the transparency and accountability requirements. After all of these years, there is simply no excuse for the U.N. not making these commonsense changes.

The final issue is the significant fiscal year 2015 budget proposed for the U.N. and its agencies. The subcommittee has learned that the U.S. intends to vote for a new peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic. The humanitarian situation is troubling, and there is a clear need to protect civilians and ease their suffering. Yet the costs of such a mission would be significant, and the subcommittee needs to know what you plan to reduce to offset this commitment and whether you intend to submit a budget amendment to the Congress.

The United States is by far the largest contributor to U.N. organizations and peacekeeping activities. More work needs to be done to ensure that the U.N. is making serious tradeoffs and is getting its budget under control.

In closing, I want to thank you and the U.S. delegation to the U.N. in New York and around the world for the work you do to promote our national interests.

[The information follows:]



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

April 2, 2014

Contact: Steve Dutton | (202) 225-5071

**GRANGER OPENING STATEMENT: FY 15 BUDGET REQUEST FOR
THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs will come to order.

Ambassador Power, thank you for being here today to testify on the fiscal year 2015 budget request for the United Nations and other international organizations.

The direct appropriation requested goes up significantly - by more than 25%. We need to hear why this is justified, especially in light of the fiscal challenges we face here at home.

In the short time you have been Ambassador to the U.N., many important issues have come before you that impact U.S. national security.

On Iran -- the U.N., and the I.A.E.A. in particular, have an important role to play, both in terms of making sure Iran follows through on its commitments, and in keeping up the pressure as a final deal is negotiated.

In Syria -- the U.N.'s role is critical, both in eliminating the chemical weapons stockpile and in getting humanitarian aid to people in dire need.

On Ukraine -- the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution last week that affirms its commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty. However, the U.N. has not been able to send a more powerful message because of Russia's veto in the Security Council.

On the Israeli-Palestinian peace process -- just yesterday, President Abbas announced that the Palestinians intend to become a party to 15 international conventions. This is very concerning and could jeopardize the peace process, and possibly U.S. assistance.

The Administration must send a clear message to the Palestinians that the only path to statehood is through a negotiated agreement with Israel, not through unilateral attempts at the U.N.

I hope you will update the subcommittee on these and other policy challenges you face.

There are a few other issues that I want to mention.

The first is U.N. reform. During your confirmation hearing, you said that you would aggressively pursue efforts at the U.N. to eliminate waste, improve accounting and management, strengthen

whistleblower protections, and end any tolerance for corruption. I would like to know what progress you have made in these areas.

As you know, the fiscal year 2014 appropriations bill strengthens the transparency and accountability requirements. After all of these years, there is simply no excuse for the U.N. not making these common sense changes.

The other issue is the significant fiscal year 2015 budget proposed for the U.N. and its agencies.

In addition to the funding requested, the subcommittee has learned that the U.S. intends to vote for a new peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic. The humanitarian situation is troubling, and there is a clear need to protect civilians and ease the suffering.

Yet, the cost of such a mission would be significant and the subcommittee will need to know what you plan to reduce to offset the commitment and whether you intend to submit a budget amendment to congress.

The United States is by far the largest contributor to U.N. organizations and peacekeeping activities. More work needs to be done to ensure that the U.N. is making serious trade-offs and is getting its budget under control.

In closing, I want to thank you and the U.S. delegations to the U.N. in New York and around the world for the work you do to promote our national interests.

And now I'll now turn to Ranking Member Lowey for her opening remarks.

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Ms. GRANGER. Now I will turn it over to Ranking Member Lowey for her opening remarks.

OPENING STATEMENT OF MRS. LOWEY

Mrs. LOWEY. Ambassador Power, I join Chairwoman Granger in welcoming you today. I must begin by raising yesterday's media reports that Palestinian President Abbas applied for recognition from 15 U.N. conventions and treaties. This reckless effort signals a breakdown in the peace process, with far-reaching repercussions on the United States' relationship with the U.N. and its specialized agencies.

Madam Ambassador, I hope you will begin your remarks today by discussing the administration's response to this news. This is distressing because the United Nations plays an integral and indispensable role in maintaining international peace and security; promoting economic and social development; alleviating hunger; championing human rights; and supporting efforts to address humanitarian crises.

Conversely, instances of the U.N.'s negligence or unwillingness to act by some members of the Security Council, is unacceptable in the face of haunting images of victims of chemical weapons, gross violations of human rights, millions of refugees, and other tragic and eminently avoidable suffering around the globe.

While the U.N. is far from perfect, neglecting or refusing to pay our commitments leaves the United States in a position of weakness, not strength. Our robust engagement is necessary to better protect our credibility on the world stage as well as our national security. Problems in remote areas now cross borders at alarming rate. We need to leverage the strength of this coalition of nations to prevent emerging threats abroad from reaching us here at home and to ensure the U.N. remains accountable and effective.

Nuclear proliferation, terrorism, drug trafficking, manmade and natural disasters, infectious disease, extreme poverty and suffering, and environmental degradation confront the entire world community, and no one nation should address them alone. Burden sharing remains the most cost-efficient use of our tax dollars. For all these reasons, the U.S. must pay its bills in full and on time, a responsibility both Republicans and Democratic administrations have consistently upheld.

In an increasingly globalized world, the U.N. continues to serve as a critically important tool for advancing U.S. interests and augmenting our own response to many international challenges. For example, the U.N. Security Council imposed tough sanctions against Iran, which played a critical role in bringing about an interim nuclear deal. The IAEA is now monitoring, inspecting, and verifying that Iran is fully implementing the agreement's requirements. Given Iran's history of deception, I would like to hear an update from you on the IAEA's mission and your assessment of Iran's compliance thus far.

With regards to Syria, recent reports by the U.N.'s Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons indicate that 50 percent of Assad's chemical weapons have now been removed. Yet the Syrians missed a March 15th deadline for the destruction of its pro-

duction facilities. Ambassador Power, what timeline can we now expect for their entire program's disposal?

Additionally, please update us on the U.N.'s ability to deliver humanitarian aid. What options do we have if Assad continues to defy the U.N. Security Council and forbid aid workers from reaching hundreds of thousands of innocent Syrians in need?

Finally, given the recent crisis over Crimea, I am particularly worried that Russian President Putin will never be a partner in ending this horrific war. What, in your view, can we do about Russia's ever-increasing intransigence?

Madam Ambassador, I look forward to hearing from you how the President's budget request will enhance U.S. global leadership at the United Nations. I hope you will highlight the successes since your confirmation as well as your strategies for overcoming the many challenges ahead of us. Thank you.

[The information follows:]



COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

Congresswoman Nita Lowey (D-NY), Ranking Member

For Immediate Release

April 2, 2014

Contact: Matt Dennis 202-225-3481

Lowey Statement on 2014 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act

Congresswoman Nita Lowey (D-NY), Ranking Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee and the Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations, delivered the following statement at the Subcommittee hearing on the United Nations:

Ambassador Power, I join Chairwoman Granger in welcoming you today.

I must begin by raising yesterday's media reports that Palestinian President Abbas applied for recognition from 15 UN conventions and treaties. This reckless effort signals a break down in the peace process, with far-reaching repercussions on the United States' relationship with the UN and specialized agencies. Madame Ambassador, I hope you will begin your remarks today by discussing the Administration's response to this news.

This is a highly distressing development because the United Nations plays an integral and indispensable role in maintaining international peace and security, promoting economic and social development, alleviating hunger, championing human rights and supporting efforts to address humanitarian crises.

Conversely, instances of the UN's negligence, or unwillingness to act by some members of the Security Council is unacceptable in the face of haunting images of victims of chemical weapons, gross violations of human rights, millions of refugees, and other tragic and eminently avoidable suffering.

While the UN is far from perfect, neglecting or refusing to pay our commitments leaves the United States in a position of weakness, not strength. Our robust engagement is necessary to better protect our credibility on the world stage as well as our national security.

Problems in remote areas now cross borders at alarming rates. We need to leverage the strength of this coalition of nations to prevent emerging threats abroad from reaching us here at home and to ensure the UN remains accountable and effective.

Nuclear proliferation, terrorism, drug trafficking, manmade and natural disasters, infectious disease, extreme poverty and suffering, and environmental degradation confront the entire world community, and no one nation should address them alone. Burden sharing remains the most cost-efficient use of our tax dollars.

For all these reasons, the U.S. must pay its bills in full and on-time – a responsibility both Republican and Democratic Administrations have consistently upheld.

In an increasingly globalized world, the UN continues to serve as a critically important tool for advancing U.S. interests and augmenting our own response to many international challenges.

For example, the UN Security Council imposed tough sanctions against Iran, which played a critical role in bringing about an interim deal. The IAEA is now monitoring, inspecting, and verifying that Iran is fully implementing the agreement's requirements. Given Iran's history of deception, I would like to hear an update from you on the IAEA's mission and your assessment of Iran's compliance thus far.

With regard to Syria, recent reports by the UN's Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons indicate that fifty percent of Assad's chemical weapons have now been removed. Yet, the Syrians missed a March 15th deadline for destruction of its production facilities. Ambassador Power, what timeframe can we now expect for their entire program's disposal?

Additionally, please update us on the UN's ability to deliver humanitarian aid. What options do we have should Assad continue to defy the UN Security Council and forbid aid workers to reach hundreds of thousands of innocent Syrians in need?

Finally, given the recent crisis over Crimea, I am particularly worried that Russian President Putin will never be a partner in ending this horrific war. What in your view can we do about Russia's ever-increasing intransigence?

Madam Ambassador, I look forward to hearing from you how the President's budget request will enhance U.S. global leadership at the United Nations. I hope you will highlight the successes since your confirmation as well as your strategies for overcoming the many challenges ahead of us.

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Ms. GRANGER. Ambassador Power, please proceed with your opening remarks. I would strongly encourage you to summarize your remarks so we can leave enough time for questions and answers. And your full written statement, of course, will be placed in the record.

OPENING STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR POWER

Ambassador POWER. Thank you so much, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Lowey, Congressmen.

Thank you for the invitation to testify. I am really delighted to have the chance to talk with you about the pressing challenges that you have alluded to, and our country's leadership at the United Nations and beyond.

Madam Chairwoman, at my confirmation hearing last summer, I pledged to work vigorously for a U.N. that would advance America's stake in global stability, operate with greater efficiency, eliminate anti-Israeli bias, and contribute to universal human rights. My full statement outlines the steps that we have taken in each of these areas. But to honor your time, I will today confine my remarks to five key points.

First, I respectfully but strongly urge you to support full funding for the administration's request for a new peacekeeping response mechanism and for the CIPA, CIO, and IO&P accounts. I recognize, and you both have alluded to this, that your consideration of the fiscal year 2015 budget comes at a time when both the administration and Congress are committed, rightly, to fiscal restraint. I am acutely mindful of the very difficult budget climate we are in and, in particular, the extraordinary sacrifices being made by American taxpayers every day. You are making difficult choices about what to fund and what to cut. The United Nations and our financial support to it must receive rigorous scrutiny.

Recognizing the need for restraint in spending but also conscious of the very real value these resources provide, we ask for your support because the U.N. and other international organizations enable our country to address diverse problems around the world at a cost and a risk far lower than if we acted on our own. We are the world's leading power and the primary architect of the international system, which continues to benefit the United States and the American people. Our citizens will do better and be safer in a world where rules are observed, prosperity is increasing, human suffering is alleviated, and threats to our well-being are contained. The United Nations is an indispensable partner in all of this. And if you will allow me, in the discussion period, I will go into greater detail on the specific funding requests.

Second, the State Department and the U.S. mission will continue to press and press hard, in much the same way you have, Madam Chairwoman, for U.N. reform. This past December, I personally presented the case for financial discipline to the committee that handles the organization's regular budget. I am pleased that the United States has kept the U.N. budget to near zero real growth since the 2010–2011 biennium. We have also secured U.N. progress in reducing staff, freezing pay, cutting waste, increasing transparency, and strengthening oversight of peacekeeping operations. Much more needs to be done, and much more can be done. With

your support, we will continue our work to make the U.N. more effective, efficient, transparent, and accountable.

Third, we are fighting every day on numerous fronts to end the bias against Israel that has long pervaded the U.N. system. With our help, Israel has in recent months become a full member of two groups from which they had long been excluded, the Western European and Others Group in Geneva, and what is called the JUSCANZ human rights caucus in New York. These groups are where much of the behind the scenes coordination takes place for U.N. meetings, leadership assignments, and votes. And the United States and Israel had tried for years to break down the barriers that were blocking Israel's entry to both groupings. These milestones would perhaps seem less consequential if they had not been so unjustifiably delayed.

Slowly but surely, we are chipping away at obstacles and biases. Israel's inclusion sends a powerful message to those striving to isolate or delegitimize the Jewish state, and that message is, "You will not succeed." The United States will stand with Israel. We will defend it, and we will challenge every instance of unfair treatment throughout the U.N. system.

Let me also add, given reports yesterday of new Palestinian actions that both of you have referenced, that this solemn commitment also extends to our firm opposition to any and all unilateral actions in the international arena, including on Palestinian statehood, that circumvent or prejudice the very outcomes that can only come about through a negotiated settlement.

If I may, Madam Chairwoman, again, I would like to come back to this troubling issue in the discussion period, if I could. Fourth, I ask the subcommittee's full support for U.N. peace operations. From Haiti to Lebanon to Sub-Saharan Africa, our country has a deep and abiding interest in restoring stability, mitigating conflict, and combating terrorism. Multilateral peace operations enable us to do so in a cost-effective manner in such strife-torn countries as South Sudan, Somalia, the DRC, and Mali, as well as in transitioning countries critical to U.S. interests, such as Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq.

Since the President submitted his budget on March 4, owing to a sharply deteriorating security environment in the Central African Republic, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has in fact recommended the rapid deployment of a new U.N. mission to protect civilians. The emergency in the Central African Republic and our view that a peacekeeping mission is in fact required because of the acute security needs highlights the value of a peacekeeping response mechanism of the type that we have proposed to deal with contingencies arising outside the regular budget cycle. But at the same time, the real world is presenting catastrophic humanitarian emergencies like this one to which it is in the U.S. national interest to respond. We are rigorously reviewing all U.N. missions and urging the U.N. to do so as well. We know the importance of reducing or closing missions where conditions on the ground permit and when host governments have the capability and must find the will to manage their own affairs, particularly after many year-long deployments by the United Nations.

In our view, peacekeeping activities are often essential, but they need not be eternal. Finally, we are striving to mobilize the U.N. as a vehicle for the promotion of human dignity and human rights, in a forum in which the United States can continue to stand up to repressive regimes. With the strong backing of many in Congress, including all of you here today, we have exposed Russian duplicity in Ukraine, fought back against the global crackdown on civil society, provided a platform for the victims of repression in North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Syria, Venezuela, and elsewhere, and pursued such vital objectives as universal access to education, an end to gender-based violence, support for religious liberty, and the defeat of HIV/AIDS.

Madam Chairwoman, for almost 70 years, American leaders have found it in our interests to participate actively in the United Nations and other international organizations. In this era of seemingly nonstop turbulence, diverse threats, and border-shrinking technologies, we can accrue significant benefit from an institution that seeks every day to prevent conflict, promote development, and protect human rights. For these reasons, I again urge your favorable consideration of our 2015 budget request.

To close on a personal note, I consider it both an enormous honor and a great responsibility to sit behind America's placard at the U.N. And a big part of that privilege and that responsibility is the chance to work closely with you, as the guardians of America's purse and Representatives of the American people, to ensure that our national interests are well served. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have, including some you have already posed.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

[The information follows:]

**Statement of Ambassador Power
U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
House Appropriations Committee: Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations & Related
Programs
Wednesday, April 2, 2014**

INTRODUCTION

Madam Chairwoman, Representative Lowey, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify. I am grateful for this panel's firm and time-tested commitment to American leadership at the United Nations and throughout the international system.

At my confirmation hearing and from my first day in office, I have emphasized the critical importance of assertive American leadership at the United Nations in order to maximize our ability to address the global challenges of the twenty-first century. I pledged to work hard for a UN system that would help to advance America's national interests, including the maintenance of international peace and security, the advancement of human rights, and the promotion of human dignity; a UN that would operate more effectively, more efficiently, and more transparently; and a UN that would be less weighed down by bias and hypocrisy. I know you share these critical goals.

I will outline these goals in greater detail as well as the progress that we've already been able to achieve. However, I want to be clear that our ability to exercise leadership in the UN – to protect our core national security interests, to champion budget discipline and transparency, to promote fairness and end bias, and to ensure that the UN stands up for human rights and human dignity – is directly tied to meeting our financial obligations.

It is within this context that I respectfully request full funding for the Administration's FY15 request for three accounts: Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA); Contributions to International Organizations (CIO); and International Organizations and Programs (IO&P). I also strongly urge you to support the newly proposed Peacekeeping

Response Mechanism (PKRM), which will allow us – in partnership with you – to respond to unforeseen crises.

I recognize that your consideration of the FY15 budget comes at a time when both the Administration and Congress are committed to fiscal restraint. You are making difficult choices about what to fund and what to cut. The Administration has had to make similarly hard calls about what to propose and what to refrain from proposing. Of course, the United Nations – and our financial support to it – must receive rigorous scrutiny. In this tight budget climate, our budget request is a clear signal of the value that the United Nations provides to the United States by helping advance U.S. national interests around the globe.

PRESERVING INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND PEACE

The first – and most critical – measure of the value of the United Nations is how it helps the United States to advance our national security interests, and to keep Americans safe. Events in recent months provide a clear reminder of the continuing threats to international peace and security – from the diffusion and spread of terrorist groups especially into areas of unrest, the aggressive actions of a large power looking to extend its influence, and the persistent challenge of countering the proliferation of the world's most dangerous weapons. In each case, the United States is leveraging the United Nations to help mobilize global action to address these shared challenges, in a manner that shares with other countries the costs and burdens of international action.

Syria. In the past three years, the brutal civil war in Syria has claimed the lives of an estimated 140,000 people, injured tens of thousands more, left hundreds of thousands barely surviving while under siege, and driven upwards of six million from their homes. The depth of this human catastrophe is well known; what may be less visible are the diligent efforts being undertaken by UN agencies and programs to ease the suffering. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has been coordinating relief operations outside Syria for more than 2.5 million refugees. The UNICEF-led “No Lost Generation” initiative is striving to shield children from the fighting, reunite broken families, and develop opportunities for education. The UN Human Rights Council authorized creation of the Syrian Commission of Inquiry, an expert group whose reports have

opened a window on events that have shocked the conscience of the world, including the Assad regime's reliance on abductions, torture, rape, and murder, in addition to the systematic shredding of the doctrine of medical neutrality.

Because Russia has blocked significant UN Security Council (UNSC) action, we have tried to make the most of the assets and capabilities of other parts of the UN system. However, at our persistent urging, the Council did vote unanimously on February 22 to demand an end to efforts by both sides to prevent the delivery of food, medicine and other supplies to endangered civilians. We are also insisting that Syria fulfill its obligations - under UNSC Resolution 2118 - to eliminate its chemical weapons program and to cooperate with the international community in that effort. To date, the Joint Mission put together by the UN and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, has verified the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons-production equipment, the machines that mix the components, and the removal of nearly half of Syria's declared stockpile. The mission's goal is to complete the removal of declared chemicals as soon as possible in April and the verified destruction of these chemical weapons and materials by June 30. We are pushing aggressively toward this critical deadline as CW in Syria are in nobody's interest.

None of the actions we have taken has stopped the slaughter in Syria, and the Administration is not remotely satisfied with what we see on the ground. We continue to support Joint Special Representative Brahimi's dogged efforts to facilitate meaningful negotiations within the framework of the 2012 Geneva communique. Ultimately, a political solution will be needed to end the suffering.

Ukraine. Since the beginning of last month, the UN Security Council has met ten times to discuss Ukraine. Our primary focus has been on the Russian Federation's illegal and unjustified attempt to annex Crimea, and other threats directed at parts of southern and eastern Ukraine. In this troubled period, the Security Council has served as a platform not only for exposing the immense gap between Russian rhetoric and reality, but also for demonstrating Russia's international isolation. This was made very clear when, on March 15, Russia alone opposed the Resolution sponsored by the United States to underscore that the Crimean referendum was

invalid and to reaffirm support for Ukraine's territorial integrity. Just last week, this judgment was reinforced when the UN General Assembly adopted a similar resolution by the overwhelming margin of 100-11. Meanwhile, UN observers have deployed to Ukraine to monitor the situation and Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has visited the region, urging Russia to avoid further provocations and on all sides to refrain from violence.

United States policy is to support Ukraine's political and economic stability and to make clear that Russia's decision to willfully ignore international law will carry costs. To that end, President Obama has joined with leaders in Europe, Canada and elsewhere in imposing a variety of sanctions against individuals and institutions in response to Russia's attempted Crimean land grab. We have also taken steps to assure our NATO allies that the United States will fully meet its Article V obligation should threats to their territory arise.

Iran and North Korea. The United States has also used the United Nations as an essential platform for countering the global threat posed by nuclear proliferation. Over the years, we have learned that the tool of sanctions is most effective when imposed multilaterally, and U.S. leadership has led to global sanctions against Iran and North Korea. Importantly, sanctions approved by the UN Security Council bind all countries.

Such a sanctions regime has played an important part in the international community's efforts to reach a diplomatic solution to concerns over Iran's nuclear program. So far, the so-called "P-5 plus 1" negotiations have resulted in a Joint Plan of Action by which Iran agreed to halt uranium enrichment above 5 percent and not add to its stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched uranium. Further, Iran committed not to increase the number of centrifuges it has in operation, and not to install or use any next-generation centrifuges. The P5+1 and EU agreed to provide limited and targeted relief in return. This arrangement has created space for a second round of negotiations – now ongoing in Vienna – that is aimed at achieving a comprehensive solution to the nuclear issue. Here, let me emphasize that, as President Obama has repeatedly said, the United States will not allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. Both the UN sanctions committee and International Atomic Energy Agency have been important components of this effort to resolve our concerns with Iran's nuclear program.

Similarly, UN sanctions against North Korea have made clear that the international community is united in opposition to Pyongyang's dangerous nuclear program, and that to end its isolation North Korea must refrain from provocative actions, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and it must denuclearize. Strong Security Council resolutions have provided the basis for mobilizing assertive international action to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

PREVENTING CONFLICT

Preventing deadly conflict is in the best interest of the United States, and the United Nations is a key partner in this effort. We know from history and our own experience that small wars can grow into big ones; that unrest provides targets of opportunity for aggressors, criminals and terrorists; that hundreds of thousands of lives can be lost in a matter of weeks; and that unresolved conflicts can spark the displacement of millions, draining the world's economic and humanitarian resources. UN peacekeeping is not the answer in all cases, but well-designed and -conducted operations do allow us to share with others the costs and risks of containing conflict and preventing its recurrence.

Today, more than 115,000 personnel serve in fifteen UN peacekeeping missions worldwide, protecting civilians from violence, facilitating lifesaving humanitarian assistance, and keeping a lid on combustible situations in countries where conflict already has killed millions, and could do so again if left unchecked. Many of these missions operate in countries where government institutions are weak or nonexistent; where infrastructure is lacking or absent; and even sometimes where violence remains rampant. The United States' share of the cost of these and other international peacekeeping activities is largely financed through our CIPA account. For 2015, we estimate requirements of \$2.52 billion in FY 2015, including the cost of fully accrued U.S. commitments for each mission.

We recognize that the requested amount is a significant increase from current year funding, but emphasize that this increase stems not from increases in the costs of peacekeepers (which as noted have actually decreased), but from the growing number of complex threats that UN

peacekeepers are addressing worldwide, including in Mali and South Sudan, and the continued need for UN peacekeeping in places like Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Peacekeepers are also now on the frontlines of the international community's efforts to counter growing terrorist threats in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Let me highlight several of the places where peacekeeping is directly advancing these and other U.S. national interests.

Mali. In Mali, the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) is playing a critical role in building a sustainable peace in the face of an ongoing terrorist threat. We have requested \$390 million to facilitate MINUSMA's continued stabilization of major population centers, which have been wracked by a coup, separatist movements, Al Qaeda-linked terrorism, and widespread civil violence. In February, I visited Mali with other members of the UN Security Council and found a population determined to recover from the dark days of 2012 and 2013, when a loose coalition of terrorist and militant groups killed and tortured civilians, destroyed priceless parts of the country's historic heritage, and sought to split the nation in half. UN peacekeepers and French troops have played a critical role in reversing extremist gains and have helped the country to regain its footing. The need now is to further marginalize the terrorist groups, while fostering national reconciliation, ending impunity, guarding against corruption, and laying the groundwork for a government in which all Malians can have faith. For decades, Mali served as an example of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society living in relative security and peace. Ridding Mali of terrorists and strengthening the democracy there is an effort well worth supporting.

Sudan and South Sudan. Madam Chairwoman, few parts of the world have been as politically fragmented and plagued by strife as the area now encompassed by Sudan and South Sudan. The UN played a central role in helping shepherd South Sudan to independence in 2011, and since fighting broke out in December 2013, the UN peacekeeping mission there (UNMISS) has protected tens of thousands of civilians and sought to maintain the conditions for vital humanitarian assistance to continue. Meanwhile, the UN continues to play a critical role on both sides of the Sudan-South Sudan border, especially in the long-troubled regions of Abyei and Darfur – where a joint UN-African Union peacekeeping force (UNAMID) is deployed. The United States and the United Nations are jointly determined, in keeping with many regional leaders, to do everything possible to resolve ongoing disputes and create a lasting climate of

stability, improved governance, and respect for human rights. Our FY 2015 requests of \$340 million for UNMISS, \$410 million for UNAMID, and \$92.5 million for the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) are indispensable to this effort.

Democratic Republic of Congo. The largest UN peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO) is in the vast Democratic Republic of Congo, where a weak central government, poor infrastructure, rich natural resources, and ethnic rivalries exacerbated by the 1994 Rwanda genocide have produced over time a toxic mix of deprivation and violence. For some time, many in this body – and many in the DRC – questioned whether the UN operation was a worthwhile investment. In 2010, the mission was given a stronger mandate to protect civilians and humanitarian workers and to support the government in its efforts to consolidate internal peace. But it is only in the last year – when the Security Council voted in March 2013 to authorize the Force Intervention Brigade consisting of three infantry battalions and associated units -- that MONUSCO has begun making significant gains. Last December, the mission was instrumental in forcing the surrender of the dangerous M23 rebel movement, and it is now assisting the government in confronting the anti-Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces, which has ties to Islamic extremist groups, possibly including Al Shabaab. MONUSCO also has made clear its intention to take on the leadership of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, the remnants of the genocidal force that two decades ago caused such horror in that country.

Central African Republic. If and when a UN peacekeeping mission begins in the Central African Republic, it will do so as a follow-on to an African Union (AU) operation that has, since December, worked side-by-side with France in an effort to prevent mass atrocities. Due to the timing of the sharp deterioration in CAR, the administration did not include funding for a UN peacekeeping mission for that nation in its FY 2015 budget presentation. However, the new Peacekeeping Response Mechanism – if approved – could help finance the U.S. share of what will prove an incredibly important mission.

In December, I traveled to CAR where – over the past six months -- more than 700,000 civilians have been displaced by attacks perpetrated by Muslim and Christian militias. Most of the casualties have resulted not from clashes between these forces, but by each side assaulting

unarmed civilians who are associated with the rival faith. While in CAR, I was approached by a Muslim woman who described the death of her husband, who had been hacked with a machete, then doused with gasoline, and set afire. A Christian teenager told me that on a road near his village, he had counted 22 bodies, including several cousins, who had been murdered; he was tempted, he said, to join a militia to take revenge. Alongside the Bangui airport, I visited a sprawling camp where people literally lined the runway, drawn by the promise of safety offered by nearby French peacekeepers. This was a virtual city of 40,000 men, women and children, with no infrastructure except a single tent serving as a medical clinic and one freshly-dug latrine. The night before I arrived, eight babies were delivered; two died.

The term “failed state,” when applied to CAR, is too bloodless a description. Indeed, CAR shows how devastating the human consequences can be when a government is either unable or unwilling to perform its most basic functions. Peacekeepers from the African Union and France have made a stalwart effort to restore order and protect civilians. They have had some success, but lack the resources to fully contain the fighting, especially in the more remote parts of the country. Late last year, the UN Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate reports of violations and abuses to help ensure that those responsible are held to account. In January, the country’s transitional council took a positive step by installing a new president, Catherine Samba-Panza, who is committed to national reconciliation and to implementing a roadmap for elections and the creation of a democratic government. On March 3, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon recommended the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission with a mandate to protect civilians. Going forward, I am heartened by the concern that many Members of Congress have expressed about this chilling crisis. The Obama Administration seeks the support of this subcommittee for the earliest possible dispatch of a blue-helmeted peacekeeping mission to CAR.

Peacekeeping Response Mechanism. To be manageable, budgets are devised and debated many months prior to the events to which the relevant funding is applied. That is usually sufficient, because sadly, the continued need for many of these missions is predictable. However, as this subcommittee is well aware, unforeseen emergencies do arise; South Sudan and the Central African Republic are but the most recent examples. Periodically, it is in the U.S.

national interest to support a new or expanded peacekeeping mission for which we had no reason previously to request funding, thus making it necessary to go outside the regular budget cycle to identify the needed resources. For these reasons, the administration is requesting an appropriation of \$150 million for a Peacekeeping Response Mechanism that will support critical requirements for otherwise unbudgeted emergency peacekeeping operations and activities.

PKRM funds would be subject to a determination by the Secretary of State that additional resources are urgently needed, and in allocating any such funds we would do so only after consulting closely with this subcommittee and Congress as a whole, and of course after submitting formal notifications.

Curtailing and Closing Missions. At a time of growing demands on UN peacekeepers – and increasing costs to the U.S. Government and other financial contributors as a result – I want to note the Administration’s continued commitment to curtailing and terminating missions that have met their stated objectives. Just as peacekeeping missions are created when needed, we must insist that, when appropriate, they come to an end. Peacekeeping missions should not amount to an eternal commitment of American taxpayer resources. Since 2009, we have ended UN missions in Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone, while reducing the size of operations in Kosovo, Lebanon, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Haiti. I can assure you that the administration is continuing to actively seek opportunities to reduce UN expenses by ending or reducing the size of UN missions that have achieved their goals or that have reached diminishing returns on what they can usefully accomplish.

Outstanding Commitments and Scales of Assessment. At the same time, we know that American influence at the UN is enhanced, and UN peace operations are made more effective, when the United States pays what we owe in full and on time. For example, one of the great challenges to UN peacekeeping is recruiting trained forces in a quantity and on a timetable that enables missions to achieve their mandates. The United States often encourages other countries to make such forces available, but this is a hard case to make if our own financial obligations are unmet. Over the years, this subcommittee has been extremely helpful in trying to minimize U.S. unpaid commitments in the CIPA account. I ask your consideration now for our request that

Congress lift the statutory cap on U.S. payments to UN peacekeeping missions from the current level of 27.14 percent to the UN-assessed level of 28.36 percent -- and to make this higher level applicable for Fiscal years 2013 and 2014, as well as FY 2015. This will allow us to proceed without accumulating hundreds of millions of dollars in additional unpaid commitments. In making this request, I can also assure this subcommittee that the administration and our UN mission will work tirelessly to negotiate future scales of assessment that better reflect the global economy.

PROMOTING FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY

Madame Chairwoman, advocating reform is also a core element of the U.S. agenda at the UN, and something to which I personally devote much energy and time. The message we convey is that precisely because of our firm support for international security, peace, human rights, and economic development, it is essential that the UN operate as efficiently, effectively, and economically as possible. In accordance with these objectives, let me highlight three elements of our reform agenda.

First, we push for fiscal discipline. Several years ago, we made clear that the decades-long pattern of increases in the UN's regular budget could not continue; since then, we have helped establish a new pattern of relative restraint on spending. In December, I personally presented the case for financial discipline to members of the UN General Assembly's Fifth Committee, which is responsible for budgetary matters. After deliberations that stretched into and beyond Christmas, we persuaded member states to approve a UN regular budget for 2014-5 that was \$50 million below the final level for the previous biennium. This budget includes a reduction of 219 staff positions, or two percent, and a further freeze in UN pay for one year and in UN allowances for two years. This is crucial because the UN's greatest asset -- but also its most significant cost -- is its staff.

The second pillar of our reform agenda is accountability. The UN should operate in the open as much as possible. To this end, we have successfully pushed for more robust oversight mechanisms, the online disclosure of internal audit reports, and increased whistleblower

protections. We have supported the webcasting of all formal UN committee meetings. We have increased accountability for UN personnel in the field by establishing an independent office to review peacekeeping and support operations. And we have advocated for a total prohibition on payments to UN troops sent home for sexual abuse or other forms of misconduct. The international community should show zero tolerance toward abuses committed by individuals acting in the world's name.

Our third pillar is excellence. This standard is especially vital in the area of peacekeeping, where the quality of performance dictates whether or not the lives of innocent people can be saved. Accordingly, we have promoted the Global Field Support Strategy, which has enabled the UN to streamline and standardize its support for peacekeeping missions. This has enhanced the timeliness of equipment supply so that missions are able to focus less on logistics and more on fulfilling their mandates. The result has been improved operations and savings to date of more than \$250 million. The United States has also pushed for and won reforms to rationalize troop reimbursement rates and to extend the typical troop rotation from six to twelve months, thus cutting travel and training expenses while keeping UN forces with experience in the field.

ENSURING THAT THE UN IS FAIR

The great benefit of multilateral organizations is that they vest political and legal legitimacy in the actions they authorize. The accompanying drawback is that a diverse membership can be a barrier to consensus. There are times when -- in defense of fairness and common sense -- the United States must take a stand against the UN majority. This has been the case with our country's principled fight against the anti-Israel bias that has long pervaded and tarnished the UN system -- a fight that I have made a priority since arriving in New York.

For decades, certain groups of states have used the UN General Assembly as a forum for isolating and attempting to delegitimize Israel by voting through a seemingly endless supply of resolutions that are inaccurate and imbalanced. This same hostility has colored the actions of bodies within the UN system, including the deliberations of the Human Rights Council where democratic Israel -- not North Korea, Cuba, Iran, or Belarus -- remains the only country subject to a standalone item on the permanent agenda. This misguided choice of priorities seriously

damages the Human Rights Council's credibility – as does the failure of the General Assembly to abide by its expressed intent to limit Human Rights Council membership to countries that actually respect human rights.

While much remains to be done, we have made some progress to more fully integrate Israel into the UN system. In 2009, Israel was invited to participate in the Geneva-based deliberations of JUSCANZ, a regional group that includes the United States, Australia, Japan, Canada, and New Zealand. In 2010, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon asked Israeli police to assist post-earthquake UN reconstruction efforts in Haiti. In 2012, Israel became a member of the Executive Board of the UN Development Program. On January 1, 2013, Israel re-joined the board of UNICEF after a hiatus of forty years. Also in 2013, Israel was invited to participate for the first time in the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) in Geneva; this is where much of the behind-the-scenes work is done in preparation for UN meetings and votes including those of the Human Rights Council; Israel had joined the New York-based WEOG in 2000. On February 27, Israel was also admitted to the Industrialized Market Economy Countries (IMEC) regional group within the International Labor Organization (ILO). IMEC is an informal but highly influential caucus in which the United States is active and which frequently speaks with one voice in ILO meetings.

Earlier this year, I was pleased to help facilitate – after being involved in many calls and meetings on the subject -- Israel's admission into the New York-based version of JUSCANZ at the UN's Third Committee. These milestones would perhaps seem less consequential if they had not been so unjustifiably delayed. As it is, they send a powerful message of inclusion and engagement at a pivotal moment in history – a message, loud and clear, that those striving to isolate Israel must not and will not succeed. To further reinforce that message, the United States has made a commitment to support Israel's candidacy for membership on the UN Security Council for the term beginning in 2019. This is not the kind of promise we ordinarily make, but we have made it to Israel, because of our special relationship, and because Israel has been denied fair treatment at the UN for far too long.

CHAMPIONING HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Finally, Madam Chairwoman, the Obama Administration believes that the UN is at its best when it is standing up for freedom, human rights, and the fundamental dignity of every man, woman, and child. The very first words of the UN Charter -- "We the peoples of the United Nations" -- emphasize the UN's role not simply as a pact among countries, but as a pledge by all of us to respect others, even as we insist on respect for ourselves. This commitment to human dignity is in keeping with American interests and universal values; and it reflects the reality that the job of maintaining peace and security has many dimensions.

On any given day, the many parts of the UN system are hard at work trying to help governments end conflict, counter terrorism, curb nuclear proliferation, fight crime and drug addiction, foster development, prepare for elections, protect children, empower women, promote respect for human rights, feed the hungry, prevent the spread of disease, respond to natural disasters, preserve the environment, and cope with refugees. This long list of important jobs is regularly implemented by the organizations covered by our CIO and IO&P accounts. Although the Administration's request cut voluntary funding to a range of UN funds and programs due the necessity of making difficult tradeoffs, let me highlight just some of the invaluable work that UN departments, agencies, funds and programs do in this regard:

Our contributions to the World Health Organization (WHO) assist countries in addressing critical health problems and help protect Americans from infectious diseases, such as the H1N1 and avian influenza. WHO programs have led to the eradication of smallpox and helped reduce deaths from measles by 78 percent worldwide over the past twelve years.

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is a global leader in providing health, nutrition, and educational services to children especially among the neediest and most vulnerable groups in the least developed countries. Over the years, the Fund has pioneered the use of low-cost technology, education, and advocacy to improve immunization rates against the principal childhood diseases. UNICEF can be counted on to play a crucial role in responding to humanitarian emergencies, such as those we are now witnessing in Syria and the Central African Republic. Historically, UNICEF has excelled in innovation and program delivery. More

recently, it has improved its administrative efficiency, reduced overhead, and implemented reforms in the areas of accounting, staffing, and transparency.

The UN Development Program (UNDP) is the central coordinating and funding mechanism for development aid within the UN system. Its activities include support for free-market reforms, privatization, job-creation, democracy, the empowerment of women, and peace. The UNDP is also focused on the prevention of humanitarian emergencies by helping countries to anticipate famines, avoid harmful environmental practices, and foster inter-ethnic and inter-religious cooperation.

The World Food Program (WFP) is a critical international instrument for addressing the needs of more than 870 million undernourished people around the globe. It is the major humanitarian agency protecting livelihoods in emergencies, but also a key partner to the United States in addressing long-term challenges to food security and nutrition.

America's membership in and support for these and other international organizations is evidence of the many dimensions of U.S. leadership across the globe. The United States was instrumental in the founding of a majority of these bodies and has a continuing stake in the effectiveness and efficiency of their work.

Moreover, the United Nations played a key part in the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals -- benchmarks for progress in such vital areas as education, women and children's health, economic development, and the environment. In the fourteen years since the MDGs were established, much has been achieved. Extreme poverty has been cut in half. Access to primary education has increased dramatically. Infant mortality rates and maternal health has improved. And yet, progress toward the MDGs has been mixed, with many of the goals far from being met.

So, there remains much more to do. In his 2014 State of the Union Address, President Obama declared that, if we act boldly in building on recent gains, we have an historic opportunity in the next two decades to rid the world of extreme poverty. To succeed, we must recognize the many connections that exist between human rights, economic opportunity, democracy, and the ability

to respond to social challenges. Improvements in global statistics don't happen by accident; they depend on changes that enlarge the ability of individuals to make free choices in their own lives. For this reason, the United States will be playing a leadership role in shaping the successor goals to the MDGs – the post-2015 agenda – as it is negotiated in New York over the coming months.

Defending Human Rights and Civil Society. But even as we plan an agenda that goes beyond 2015 and the Millennium Development Goals, we are aware of a trend that may make it harder to achieve further gains in almost every arena. Within the past five years, literally dozens of countries have adopted new laws or regulations aimed at restricting the activities of civil society. Such steps undermine the ability of civil society to perform its crucial role in advancing peace, promoting well-being, and ensuring that governments are open and responsive to their citizens. At President Obama's direction, we are striving to push back both in our bilateral diplomacy and at the UN.

In 2009, we established a Community of Democracies Working Group on Enabling and Protecting Civil Society. In 2010, we joined with partners in creating the first-ever Special Rapporteur to independently examine and report on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. In 2011, we came together with Brazil to launch the Open Government Partnership and -- with the help of philanthropic partners -- unveiled a multilateral "Lifeline" fund that has already provided emergency aid to more than 200 civil society organizations. At the UN last fall, amid the gathering of world leaders and all the urgent discussion about Syria and Iran, President Obama insisted that we carve out time for him to meet with other heads of state, foundation leaders, and opinion-makers to underscore our commitment to work together to protect civil society in the face of those who would unduly restrict it.

Supporting and defending human rights activists and civil society is a vital part of my own job. That is why I insist on meeting with groups of local activists and reformers wherever I travel and why -- in public and private -- I consistently highlight their persecution and achievements. It is why we have welcomed to our UN mission such advocates for justice and freedom as Pakistan's Malala Yousafzai, Russia's Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and Maria Alyokhina, Cuba's Rosa Maria Paya, and representatives of Uganda's beleaguered LGBT community. It is why our diplomats

have raised with UN officials and with our foreign counterparts many cases related to persons wrongfully imprisoned, including the U.S. citizen Amir Hekmati, who is being held in Iran. And it is why the United States is determined to make its presence felt at the UN Human Rights Council, which should be championing these cases and the cause of human rights everywhere.

While the Human Rights Council remains problematic and flawed, through U.S. leadership we have worked to focus the Human Rights Council on addressing pressing human rights crises. A principal example was its decision last year to establish a commission to investigate human rights practices in the Democratic Republic of North Korea (DPRK). The commission's findings and recommendations have generated a new and important global conversation about one of the most devastating human rights crises of our era.

CONCLUSION


Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Lowey and members of the subcommittee, the Obama Administration believes that U.S. leadership across the United Nations and other international organizations is strongly in our national interests. In this, we maintain a tradition that extends back almost 70 years through Republican and Democratic administrations alike. We are the world's leading power and the primary architect of the international system, which continues to benefit the United States and the American people. Our citizens will do better and be safer in a world where rules are observed, prosperity is increasing, human suffering is alleviated, and threats to our well-being are contained. The United Nations is an indispensable partner in all of this, and U.S. leadership remains essential to an effective UN. To ensure we can maintain this leadership and its benefits for American citizens, and to effectively share the burdens of global action, I urge your full and favorable consideration of our funding request for Fiscal Year 2015. We believe that our proposals will benefit America while fully recognizing the need for fiscal discipline and reform.

To close on a personal note, I consider it both an enormous honor and a great responsibility to sit behind America's placard at the UN. And a big part of that privilege and responsibility is the chance to work closely with you, as the guardians of the American purse and representatives of

the American people – to ensure that our nation’s interests are well served. In that capacity, I cannot guarantee infallibility; far from it. But I do promise to be a straight shooter; to be accessible to you at short notice; to answer questions as promptly, fully and honestly as I can; and to represent our country with pride, vigilance, and all the energy and strength at my command.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

Ambassador Samantha Power



Ambassador Samantha Power is the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations and a member of President Obama's Cabinet. At the United Nations, Ambassador Power works to advance U.S. interests, promote and defend universal values, and address pressing global challenges to global peace, security, and prosperity.

Prior to serving as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Power served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights on the National Security Staff at the White House. In this role she focused on issues including UN reform; LGBT and women's rights; the promotion of religious freedom and the protection of religious minorities; human trafficking; and democracy and human rights.

Before joining the U.S. government, Ambassador Power was the Anna Lindh Professor of the Practice of Global Leadership and Public Policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, teaching courses on U.S. foreign policy, human rights, and UN reform. She was also the founding executive director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy.

Ambassador Power is the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of "A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide (2002) and Chasing the Flame: Sergio Viera de Mello and the Fight to Save the World (2008), the basis for the award-winning HBO documentary, "Sergio." She is also the recent co-editor of The Unquiet American: Richard Holbrooke in the World (2011). Ambassador Power began her career as a journalist, reporting from places such as Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, Rwanda, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, and contributed regularly to The Atlantic Monthly, The New Republic, the New York Review of Books, and The New Yorker Magazine.

Ambassador Power immigrated to the United States from Ireland at the age of nine. She graduated from Lakeside High School in Atlanta, Georgia and received a B.A. from Yale University and a J.D. from Harvard Law School. She is married to Cass Sunstein, with whom she has two young children.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you so much. Thank you for that.

I will begin the questions, and Mrs. Lowey and I both share concerns about President Abbas' actions yesterday. As you know, provisions of the U.S. law restrict funding if the Palestinians attempt to obtain member status at the U.N. or its agencies, such as UNESCO, outside of an agreement with Israel. Please give us your interpretation of what happened, why it happened, and explain the impact on the peace process and whether these actions will trigger a cutoff of economic aid to the Palestinians.

Ambassador POWER. Thank you for that question.

We are all completely seized with this issue. And I think you have heard Secretary Kerry speak to it already. But let me say just a few things.

First, as I said in my opening statement, and as we have discussed privately as well, the United States opposes all unilateral actions anywhere they may occur in the international system, including where I work every day at the United Nations. There are no short cuts to statehood. And we have made that clear. Efforts that attempt to circumvent the peace process, the hard slog of the peace process, are only going to be counterproductive to the peace process itself and to the ultimate objective of securing statehood, the objective that the Palestinian Authority, of course, has.

So we have contested every effort, even prior to the restart of negotiations spearheaded by Secretary Kerry. Every time the Palestinians have sought to make a move on a U.N. agency, a treaty, et cetera, we have opposed it. By the same token, here, given this apparent move on a number of treaties, Secretary Kerry and all of us have made clear, again, that we oppose unilateral actions and that they are going to be tremendously disruptive and that they will not achieve the desired end. So that is the first point, I think which is in keeping with our traditional position.

In terms of its impact on the peace process, which is a question you have also raised, I think what Secretary Kerry has said, and he is still—this is a very fluid situation. It just came about, as you know, yesterday. He is working it probably as we speak, certainly was working it all day yesterday and this morning. It is I think premature to make a final judgment on what impact this will have on the peace talks and on the prospects for a negotiated settlement. So I wouldn't want to prejudge that.

As you mentioned, the Palestinians have pursued in this instance it seems treaty membership. We will need to see, again, what it is that they have submitted before being able to speak to what the ramifications are. So if I could just again continue to work with you in the days ahead.

And then, finally, on the question of the U.N. waiver, as you know, the United States has pursued a national interest waiver, notwithstanding our strong and relentless opposition to unilateral efforts at enhancement of status and unilateral efforts at statehood. The reason that we have sought this waiver, and it is so critically important, is that in the event that the Palestinians seek and obtain membership in a U.N. agency, the last thing we want to do is to give them a double win. And it would be a double win for them to secure a win at an agency on the one hand and then the exclusion of the United States from that very agency, leaving the

agency at the mercy of leadership from Russia, China, Cuba, Venezuela, the countries that tend to fill the space when we depart. So, again, our goal is to use the U.N. system to advance the interests of the United States and the American people. Being excluded from those agencies does not allow us to do that. And of course, and we can go agency by agency if you like, but you are as familiar with these organizations as I am, vaccinations for children, weapons inspectors in the IAEA, you know, the postal system. I mean, this is the international system, and it is strongly in the U.S. national interest to be a part of it. But that in no way detracts from the firmness of our opposition to Palestinian unilateral moves.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Before I go to Mrs. Lowey, I would like to request all the members of the subcommittee to stick to the timeline. I think this will allow us more than one round of questions.

I will turn to Mrs. Lowey now.

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Madam Chair.

And again, welcome. I am going to move to another issue, but I just want to associate myself with the comments of the chair. As one who has been very optimistic about a potential peace process and has strongly supported Secretary Kerry's efforts and his determination to bring the parties together, it was extremely disappointing to me that Abu Mazen chose to take this action at the U.N. It is counterproductive, and doesn't move them closer to any final resolution. I think it was wrongheaded and very, very disappointing. And frankly, I wonder whether Secretary Kerry can save the process in light of this action.

But let's move on to Iran for a moment. We understand that Iran now faces domestic pressure and international isolation. While I believe the pressure of sanctions and the demand for a better economy pushed the Supreme Leader to allow for the election of President Rouhani, I am not convinced there has been a change in heart. And I am very concerned about the perspective of the overall Iranian leadership. I remain concerned that the election of Rouhani and his subsequent charm offensive was nothing more than a political maneuver or a facade intended to break the unity of international sanctions by making Iran appear to be cooperative. We have every reason to believe and to question Iran's real intentions, given their track record and history of deception.

So a couple of questions. Many people have argued in the Congress that the threat of additional sanctions is necessary to pressure Iran to stay at the negotiating table until we have an acceptable final deal. Can you share with us your opinion on that? Maybe I will just group these, because you are keeping the time pretty tight, and then you can respond in any way you choose. How will the Security Council respond if Iran does not agree to a final deal? The Secretary of State has said that no deal is better than a bad deal and I wonder what you would consider a bad deal.

Now, one of my concerns, the preamble to the Joint Plan of Action states that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons. So I have been very distressed to learn that the IAEA cannot inspect or gain access to Parchin, which has been rumored as the facility where they do weaponization testing. If you can comment on the whole deal and you can speak to why

the JPOA does not allow IAEA to inspect the sites where delivery mechanisms are made, it seems to me that such sites are an integral part of nuclear capability. So if you can just comment in general, I would be most appreciative, and in specific on the Parchin issue.

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, Congresswoman.

Let me just make a few comments if I can. You have certainly put your finger on some core issues. First, we share your skepticism. We share your lack of trust. There is no way that one can look at the U.S.-Iranian relationship over the course of the last three decades and bring anything other than great skepticism and a lack of trust. And I think that is the mind set that our diplomats have brought at every turn to our engagements with the P5+1 and, of course, with Iran. I think President Obama has been clear that in the event that these talks break down and this agreement does not provide a foundation for a long-term agreement that we believe will shut down Iran's nuclear weapons program and deny them the prospect of obtaining a nuclear weapon, as he has put it, he will be leading the charge up here for additional sanctions in order to impose further pressure on the regime.

Right now, we are seeking to take advantage of a diplomatic window that, again, as the President has said, will not remain open for long. And, you know, talks are opening again, I believe next week, where Under Secretary Sherman I think is already on her way or will be soon.

Mrs. LOWEY. If I may just comment, and you can respond on the sanctions issue, because I know it has been an issue where there is a great deal of difference of opinion on the part of the administration.

Ambassador POWER. Yes.

Mrs. LOWEY. The \$6 billion to \$7 billion in sanctions could be reinstated in a nanosecond. But you and I know, and the administration knows, any additional sanctions can take 180 days to put in place. So I just want to add that for the record.

Ambassador POWER. Okay. Well, to underscore, again, that the overwhelming majority of sanctions remain in place and that the Iranian economy is still in the vice of sanctions put in place, not only here by the Congress and by the executive but also this crippling four rounds of multilateral sanctions that have come through the U.N. Security Council.

And that international sanctions regime, which was your second question, has been a critical complement and force multiplier shall we say of what we have done ourselves here as the United States. So you asked where will the U.N. Security Council be? One of the reasons that it is very important that we keep the P5+1 together, which is not always easy but is critical, is that on the back end of, you know, either a comprehensive agreement at some later stage when all of our conditions are met or in the event of the collapse of talks, that we would then be in a position to act together at the Security Council.

The other thing I want to say, because I don't think it is as evident because of all of the focus on the JPOA, is that we still have not only the robust multilateral sanctions regime in New York, but the sanctions committee, the panel of experts, you know, we are as

a United States at the very same time we are engaging, testing this diplomatic window, seeking to end this what is a crisis diplomatically, we are enforcing the sanctions that are on the books and seeking to close any loopholes that may exist in this multilateral sanctions regime. I mentioned this because, of course, Israel just interdicted a ship that was carrying weapons from Iran to militants in Gaza. And that is something that we are now demanding that the sanctions committee take up in New York, and we figure out what the implications of that are. So, again, in addition to the additional bilateral sanctions that the—sanctions designations of individuals and entities that have happened since the JPOA, we in New York are also always looking to take further action on the basis, again, very crippling regime that exists.

I am well over time, so let me just, maybe if I could, speak to the Parchin issue. The JPOA made clear that the P5+1 and Iran must, quote, “work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern.” This is the formula that is used by the IAEA and Iran in addressing possible military dimensions, which is of course why you are so concerned about Parchin. And that includes Parchin. So what the JPOA says is that a comprehensive solution requires not just a final step, but also resolution of concerns, which is understood again to hit the military dimension. So the more plain English way to put it is that the interim, the JPOA addressed some subset of issues. We only offered very, very modest, reversible, and temporary sanctions relief in return. Parchin is exactly the kind of issue that is on the table now in terms of the longer-term negotiations.

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. GRANGER. I will call on members now, alternating between majority and minority based on arrival time, as we have done before. I want to remind members that you have 5 minutes for your questions and the response. When you have 2 minutes remaining, the light will turn yellow. And again, I think this will allow us to have multiple rounds.

We will call first on Mr. Diaz-Balart.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.

Ambassador, thanks for being here. Let me start out, I would be remiss without first thanking you, and I have even written you a letter in which you responded very quickly, by the way, for I think in the administration nobody has been more forthcoming on support and solidarity with those who are struggling for freedom around the world. You have done so repeatedly on social media, which is crucial, whether it was, for example, during the CELAC issue in Cuba or the students in Venezuela who are trying to recapture democracy. You have been exceedingly forthright. And for that, as I did so in writing, I want to publicly do so now, thank you for that.

Really three issues I am going to throw out really quickly. And let me just do that really quickly, and then you could respond. In March, a U.N. panel of experts provided a report to the U.N. Security Council concluding that the July illegal shipment of weapons to North Korea from Cuba in fact violated sanctions and constituted, by the way, the largest amount of weapons interdicted going to North Korea since the adoption of Resolution 1718 in

2006. I don't have to talk about all the details about that; they were clearly trying to hide it. So given the discovery of Cuba and North Korea's regime's willful, quote, frankly, collusion to violate U.N. sanctions, what action is underway to hold those two regimes responsible for violating—for obviously violating U.S. sanctions? Point number one.

If I can then jump to Venezuela, where, again, like you have been in Cuba, you have been very vocal, very, very vocal. And by the way, you cannot underestimate the importance of those statements that you have been making on Twitter for those who are oppressed and repressed. That is a huge deal. I don't have to tell you about what is going on in Venezuela; you are very familiar. But what is the administration, or what can or are you doing specifically through the United Nations to bring attention to the, frankly, the horrible situation in Venezuela, where students are being arrested, where, frankly, one of the main opposition leaders has been in prison for over a month, and all of the human rights violations in Venezuela? And again, I encourage you, and I know you will continue to do your part publicly. But what is the U.N. looking at that and what can be done there?

And lastly, to a fiscal issue that you talked about—and I think I still have a little bit of time—specifically concerning the issue of the peacekeeping funds. So the President's budget request is more than \$800 million for peacekeeping in a new peacekeeping contingency account. Now, the concern is that the assessed rate for the United States continues—it continues to rise above what is, frankly, authorized by U.S. law. So then, meanwhile, the U.N. approves new and expanded peacekeeping missions that are, frankly, very costly. And then we don't see a lot of reductions or proposals for the elimination or reduction of missions that have been around for decades, for example, such as the one in the Western Sahara. So there, what is the administration doing to reduce or to eliminate, hopefully, outdated U.N. peacekeeping missions? Why should the committee, this committee, support a contingency fund when there is very little, frankly, if any discipline being shown in budgeting for those peacekeeping missions, current peacekeeping missions? And what is being done to help bring, again, a resolution to some of those, specifically, for example, like the Western Sahara?

So, Ambassador, I know I threw a bunch of issues out there. I apologize for that. But we have a very strict chairwoman, and so we try to be very cooperative with her.

Ms. GRANGER. And that color is yellow.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Exactly.

Ms. GRANGER. I want to point that out to you.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. I know my place, Madam Chairwoman.

Ambassador POWER. Given how important each of the questions are, I am very nervous about the 54 seconds I have left to answer them all.

Ms. GRANGER. Do the best you can do.

Ambassador POWER. I hope the chairwoman would give me just a little bit of indulgence so I can at least seek to do some justice.

I suspect the issue of the fiscal climate and the peacekeeping funds will come up and will be raised by other members, so maybe I can elaborate in greater detail. Let me start with that, if I could.

You rightly note that the peacekeeping requests that we are making, or the peacekeeping funds we are asking for, we are asking for more this year than we did last year. That is owing to a couple key issues. The first is Mali last year occurred after our regular budget cycle. By Mali, I mean the takeover of two-thirds of the country by violent extremists. And as a result, part of what we are asking for here is funding to make up for a mission that was authorized outside the regular budget cycle.

But the other reason is that South Sudan tragically, devastatingly, has degenerated into a horrible ethnic conflict just since December of this year, and we have had to expand the number of peacekeepers in South Sudan. In addition, although it is not actually reflected in the President's budget request because this has just come on, we are going to be requesting funding, as the chairwoman indicated in her opening statement, for the Central African Republic for a peacekeeping mission there in all likelihood. And this is something we are just beginning to consult with you all on. And again, at some point, I hope I will have a chance to speak to the devastation of what is happening there.

But you are right, it is not enough to simply say the real world is presenting these emergencies and we have to respond to them, because we live in a fiscally challenged climate. And so what we have done over the course of the last 5 years, and I was actively involved in this when I was working at the White House as the President's U.N. adviser, we have brought down the costs per peacekeeper. The cost now is 16 percent lower than when it was when we started seeking costs.

So, again, the pie is bigger because of the real world emergencies. You only have to read the newspaper to see that the world is presenting successive challenges to us. But per peacekeeper, we are bringing down the costs. And that, you know, has involved eliminating duplication. Again, I won't go into the details here, but I hope we will have a chance to elaborate on some of the measures we have taken. We just last week closed down the mission in Sierra Leone. In my opening statement, you heard me say that these peacekeeping missions, many of them we find essential, but they need not be eternal. And I think there is a habit, sort of once a mission gets set up, to not be sufficiently assessing the original reason that the Congress and the U.S., you know, came to support a mission and assessing whether that mission is appropriately configured given the evolution of circumstances on the ground. There are reductions happening, but in a responsible way, in Haiti, Liberia, Ivory Coast, I think where tremendous gains have been made. And again, I can speak more to that.

On Venezuela, we have a responsibility, of course, as the United States, to speak up on behalf of those who are seeking their freedom. And I really appreciate the tremendous leadership you have shown, always, in standing up to repressive regimes. I think nearly 40 people have been killed in these protests, these peaceful protests where people are airing their legitimate aspirations and their legitimate grievances. You mentioned the criminalization of dissent. That is something, again, we have been outspoken about. We have called for a third party to get involved in mediation in some fashion, because it is in everybody's interests for this crisis to end. But

that third-party mediator needs to be credible to both sides. And that, until recently, had been a sticking point, but a little progress I think has been made on the mediation. At the U.N., at the Human Rights Council, we issued a joint statement on Venezuela, enlisted a number of countries to join us. It will not surprise you that, given that the U.N. is filled—more than half of U.N. member states are nondemocratic, it is not always easy for us to pull together the kind of coalition of the willing, shall we say, within the U.N., a cross-regional coalition. But that is what we seek to do. We seek, even if we can't get overwhelming vote counts, we seek to create kind of alignments of people who share the same democratic values speaking out on behalf of Venezuela. I would welcome any ideas you have about further steps that we can take within the U.N. system. And I agree that it is incredibly important to raise it there and to multilateralize the human rights concerns that are at the heart, meant to be at the heart of the U.N. charter.

Lastly, if I could, just on the DPRK and Cuba sanctions violations, we—there are sort of a lot of very bureaucratic things I can say about the things we are doing at the U.N. on this particular case. It was the largest arms seizure. We are very grateful, and thank Panama for stepping up and meeting its responsibilities, as it is doing in a remarkable way really across a whole host of issues, including Venezuela. We have, through the Sanctions Committee, issued a public—or sought to issue a public implementation assistance notice to share lessons learned with member states and correct Cuba's claims about how they are interpreting the UNSCRs. And the report that came back was very strong. It basically rejected the Cuban arguments, which we felt was very important again and, given that U.N. reporting can sometimes be uneven, is important to stress. We are seeking to impose sanctions on entities we can prove are responsible for the violation. This is challenging, because U.N. sanctions, of course, come by consensus. And so we will need to get China, Russia, and other members of the Security Council to come along board. But that is a work in progress. And we are seeking to release publicly the panel of experts incident report, which again we think rejects frontally Cuban and North Korean claims on this issue.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much for this hearing.

Ambassador Power, good to see you again.

In my role as one of the congressional representatives to the United Nations, yesterday I had the pleasure of leading the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) delegation to the U.N. Thank you so much for meeting with us. We were very happy to meet with U.N. officials to really get a good handle on the importance of American leadership in the United Nations, which we all agree is so important.

Secondly, just as descendants of the transatlantic slave trade, current day simple human rights issues of discrimination both in our own country and abroad are very important to members of the CBC. And so we want to thank you very much for your support for

human rights and civil rights, minority rights throughout the world.

The United Nations is a critical body in our world community. And we believe we must fully engage—at least I know Members of the Congressional Black Caucus believe we must engage in the United Nations and the international community to ensure a safer world. And we get a huge bang for our buck with the United Nations.

A couple of things I want to ask you, though, which I am recently learning about, and that is our dues. Now, given the nominal increase in funding for the United Nations' peacekeeping missions next year, it was pointed out that the bill, the omnibus bill underfunded significantly our peacekeeping commitments. By some estimates, we have come up with about \$350 million short, which again puts us in many ways in an arrears position. So could you explain this, how this peacekeeping dues, the formula by which it is put together, and how does being in arrears really affect our ability to pursue our interests at the United Nations?

Secondly, the Convention on the Rights of People, Persons with Disabilities, inspired in large part by our Nation's own landmark disability laws, I can't for the life of me understand why we would not, or why the Senate would not pass the treaty, the Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities. So we need to know why this is so important to support disability rights around the world so we can—I don't know if we can figure out a way to move on this or not from this side. But I think hearing about this and having this on record is extremely important.

South Sudan. The Security Council's decision to deploy reinforcements, of course, will enhance the ability to carry out a civilian protection mandate. So can you discuss the U.N.'s efforts to ensure the safety of displaced civilians who have sought refuge at United Nations compounds over the last several months?

And then, of course, Afghanistan. What is the U.N. role going to be after 2014, if any? Could you explain that? And thank you again very much. Good to see you here.

Ambassador POWER. Great. Thank you. Let me start, if I can, where you started, which is on the peacekeeping issue. And that allows me to add a little more ballast to the response I offered the Congressman.

I mean, first, your point, peacekeepers are going places and protecting civilians and combating extremism so we don't have to. And it is incredibly important for us to bear in mind that, for instance, when Mali gets taken over by extremist groups and militants in the way that they were—the French of course staged an intervention, and the African Union initially stepped up in really important ways. But in order to consolidate those gains and ensure that militants remain vanquished, we have to support U.N. peacekeeping. That is what those peacekeepers are there to do.

In South Sudan you mentioned the effort to protect civilians who are gathered in U.N. bases. South Sudan is a country, newly independent country, has a historic relationship with us, with, you know, college students around the United States. Even high school students now are exercised about the plight of people in that country. The United States led the effort with many people here on this

committee, including you and Frank Wolf and virtually all of the members, to bring about this country. And now it is the United Nations that is there at a time when we are winding down our mission in Afghanistan and of course have ended our mission in Iraq. It is incredibly important to U.S. interests that peacekeepers be doing that work.

The gap between what we owe the U.N. in terms of peacekeeping and what was appropriated I think is explicable in a couple ways. One, I mentioned already the Mali mission came on the books after our regular budget submission. But second, our assessment rate now is 28.4 percent. And there is a cap, and that I would appeal to this committee to lift, that only allows us to pay a share of 27.1 percent. And again, I think reflected in a number of the members' comments so far, the reason we don't want to pay more is we are paying an awful lot. And that makes a huge amount of sense. The formula on which this percentage is negotiated is based on an ability to pay. And I have made it a huge priority up in New York to try to ensure that others are paying their fair share.

In the recent scales negotiations, which were before my time, where our assessment went up from 27.1 to 28.4, Russian and Chinese assessment rates also went up. Our challenge with some of the emerging economies, the Brazils and the Indias, which have also gone up marginally—in Brazil's case, actually, quite substantially—is that this formula is calculated on the basis of per capita GDP and debt burden. So you get a discount if you are a country that is growing but has still huge amounts of poverty that you deal with in your country.

Now, we are seeking to change that methodology. But the next scales negotiation is in 2015. And while, again, it is—the 28.4 percent is not ideal; we prefer to be at 27.1 percent. We are going to fight to get it back down. It has been much higher in the past. In the 1980s and 1990s, it was at 31 percent at various times. So we are significantly lower than we once were. And we are trying to find savings within the peacekeeping missions that exist.

But I would ask you if you could lift the cap in order to give us the resources we need to fund these really, really important missions. And please know that I will work with you hand in glove, again, to try to bring this back down.

On your other questions, briefly on the disabilities convention, the great champion of this is Senator Bob Dole, who has made this his great passion. And for him, the fact that veterans come home from war in Iraq and Afghanistan, so many more veterans now suffering the loss of limbs and so forth, and rehabilitating here, and getting to take advantage of the ADA, and the accommodations that we have here in this country but then, in effect, being told that the protections end at the Nation's shore, that while your able-bodied counterparts can imagine jobs overseas, the ADA extends only across the continental U.S. And in a global marketplace, that is not fair to our vets. It is not fair to our persons with disabilities generally. So what this convention would do is simply allow the United States to be party to an international convention that enshrines the provisions of the ADA. And as a party to that convention, we would then press other countries to bring their standards up to ours. And it is critical for us to be a part of that convention

in order to show real leadership on disability rights. It has strong bipartisan support in the Senate. And we are still working, again, with Senator Dole, Senator McCain, Senator Barrasso, Senator Ayotte, and of course the Democratic supporters, to try to bring about ratification.

Lastly, on the U.N. role in Afghanistan, forgive me, Congresswoman, there is a lot here, I would say a couple things. First, it is clear that the U.N. will likely maintain a political presence. They have a critical human rights monitoring role. And we are seeing right now the centrality of the U.N. in supporting the Afghan-led election process. And those are all things that don't cease to be necessary, you know, in the wake of any U.S. drawdown or even eventually when, you know, all troops—all American troops are out of Afghanistan. Because President Karzai has not signed the BSA, the President has not made his decisions about what the U.S. troop presence is going to look like after this year. And I think the U.N. is waiting to understand that better. We have seen, just with the monstrous Taliban attacks that have occurred in the last few weeks, in addition to all those that preceded those attacks, just how precarious the security is, particularly for civilians, who are trying to aid the Afghan population.

So that is a challenge. Thank you.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mr. Crenshaw.

Mr. CRENSHAW. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Welcome. Let me ask you, we talked about the fact that we spend a lot of money on the U.N., and over the years, there has been an awful lot of efforts in Congress to bring about reforms to the U.N. And one of the kind of glaring dysfunctions of the U.N. is the U.N. Security Council. It is supposed to bring peace and security on an international basis, but it doesn't seem to always work that way.

If you look at Syria, the efforts to end the conflict there, I think there have been at least three times where China and Russia has vetoed efforts to do that. And so you wonder how it can meet its goal when its permanent membership is divided.

So I would ask you two questions. One, do you think that, to a certain extent, the Security Council has lost a little bit of its credibility, maybe lost a little bit of its legitimacy? And if so, is there anything the U.S. can do to help it regain that? Because the second part of that question is if you look at the other side, it seems like just about every veto that we have put forward in the last 25 years is vetoing some condemnation of Israel. Israel doesn't get treated very well. I know you have been working hard to see that Israel gets fair treatment across the board in the U.N. So take those two things and talk about that: A, what kind of reforms might be brought, either through the U.N. Security Council or even in a broader sense; and B, how you feel like you are doing in trying to make sure that Israel gets treated fairly in the U.N. Thank you.

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, Congressman. And thank you, generously, for leaving me 3 minutes to answer your questions. Let me say about the Security Council that you have put your finger on it. When the permanent members, particularly Russia most recently, backed by China, decide not to fulfill their responsibilities

under the U.N. charter to enforce international peace and security because they are a veto holder, that leaves the council vulnerable. And there is no question that the council's legitimacy has suffered greatly not to be responding to the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria and the profound threat to international peace and security when you have millions of people spilling over into neighboring countries, many of which are fragile, like that in Iraq and Lebanon, and when you now see also foreign extremists take root, you see a regime brutalizing its people using barrel bombs, chemical weapons, Scuds. You know, the fact that Russia can use its veto in circumstances like this really reflects a vulnerability, as you say, in the council structure.

And we have had to work in other ways. Working through the Arab League, working through the Human Rights Council, which, as you know, is very problematic on issues related to Israel but has created a commission of inquiry that has produced really important reports for Syria that will be used some day in some form of accountability to hold the perpetrators of these, again, horrific crimes to task.

So we have had to do workarounds on Syria. On chemical weapons and recently on humanitarian issues, we did manage to get two resolutions finally through the Security Council. And on chemical weapons, we have seen, as you know, just 50 percent of the weapons removed. The deadline for the overall removal operation is not until June 30, but the Syrians are missing a number of milestones along the way. So we are very concerned about the pace of removal and elimination. I would say Russia has worked more constructively, clearly because it sees its interests as imperiled, first because of the threat of force that hung over Syria back in August and September, but also because of their concern that chemical weapons will fall into the hands of terrorists and so forth. So we can still see that Russia *à la carte* can choose to see its interests engaged in ways that coincide with ours on Syria. But by and large, on the humanitarian situation, though we did get a resolution recently, there is not nearly the same energy put into enforcing that resolution. And we are seeing very disappointing results on the ground, which, again, I can speak to later.

What I would say, though, is that in complementing or at the very same time we are seeing this, as you put it, dysfunction on Syria—and obstructionism might be a better word on the part of Russia, because there is more accountability in that—we are also seeing the Security Council go about its business and do really important work. We just in the midst of the Ukraine crisis passed a resolution granting for the first time the international community the authority to interdict stolen oil that ends up on the high seas from Libya. And the U.S. Special Forces did a heroic job retrieving some of that oil. But this is a phenomenon that could persist, and Russia went along with that. We are renewing mandates and enhancing mandates for peacekeepers in Congo and expanding the mission in South Sudan in response to the situation on the ground.

So the council is still doing very important work for the U.S. national interests, but of course, the vulnerability is there because of Russian obstructionism.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Ms. Wasserman Schultz.

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ambassador, it is good to see you. I will try to ask my questions in a compressed way also, so you can have most of the time to answer.

I want to focus more on the Palestinians' pursuit of statehood or recognition by U.N. agencies. And understanding that our policy is that we withdraw from those agencies and cease funding when a unilateral action is taken like that, how can we—if you could walk us through your thoughts on how, perhaps, a unilateral approach to that concern, which is obviously a very significant concern, may not be the best strategic approach for us. You know, instead of maybe a focus in an a la carte way, to use your term, like with the ICC and/or the IAEA, if we were going to try to leverage our participation in a way that is, you know, a more microtargeted approach to respond to wildly inappropriate actions, like the Palestinians.

The other issue is on Israel's treatment in general at the Human Rights Council and our ability to leverage our membership in the Human Rights Council. What are we doing to get the Human Rights Council—how are we using our membership to get the Human Rights Council to stop it almost exclusively focusing on their obsession with Israel and actually focus on very significant, serious human rights abuses in Syria, and Iran, and Venezuela, and Cuba, just to name a few?

Then just a couple of others. On humanitarian assistance, you know, it has been for the entire existence of the United Nations that we have essentially shouldered the burden of financing much of what it does. How do we encourage more cost sharing from, you know, wealthier countries that actually have the ability to step up? And how can we use U.N. Security Council 2139 to encourage other donors to do that, particularly rich Gulf nations, for example, that have the resources but choose not to use them? And then, lastly, if you could just cover the issue of U.N. reform, because I know the United States' position is that reform and economy, accountability, integrity, and excellence are all essential. So what are we working on in that regard?

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, Congresswoman.

I mean, on the Palestinian question, I just would underscore that we will oppose attempts at upgrades in status anywhere. We are in very close touch now. We have a monthly meeting with the Israelis where we look out at the sea of international organizations and U.N. entities, including treaty bodies and treaties and so forth, and coordinate with them, and also try to understand whether they are prioritizing in particular ways, sort of along the lines of what you are suggesting.

The ICC is, of course, something that we have been absolutely adamant about. Secretary Kerry has made it very, very clear to the Palestinians, as has the President. I mean, this is something that really poses a profound threat to Israel, is not a unilateral action that will be anything other than devastating to the peace process, which is, again, where all of our efforts should be placed right now.

Before the peace negotiations started between the two parties, restarted with Secretary Kerry's and the President's leadership, we

were fighting on every front. Contesting unilateral efforts on every front. And that is what we would do in any event, because we don't think that this is a productive approach. We don't think there are shortcuts. And we know that these—that this can be an effort to delegitimize Israel at the same time it is an effort to upgrade Palestine status.

I think my point on the waiver and the funding issue is that the American people and the United States are so much better off when the United States is in good standing within these organizations, defending our interests, fighting for our friends, and not surrendering the playing field to those that would like nothing more than for the United States not to be in these organizations. So we are not punishing the Palestinians if we cut off funding to these agencies; we are punishing U.S. interests. And that is why, again, we need to deter precisely the moves that are at—the spirit behind the legislation is to deter Palestinian action. That is what we do all the time and will continue to do. But we cannot surrender the vast range of U.S. interests in the process. Very briefly on the humanitarian assistance, the cost sharing, I will just touch upon that since it hasn't come up before. The Kuwaitis have been the ones in the Syria context who have hosted the last two donors' conferences. And we think this is progress and an example of the kind of leadership—and they have really shown tremendous leadership on the humanitarian situation. We seek to mobilize resources from the countries that you have alluded to. And you have seen emerging economies, you know, like Brazil and others, make contributions in a new way in light of, again, the scale of the catastrophe. But we still think there is a lot of room for others to be doing their fair share, and particularly those wealthy countries in the region, a region that stands to be very destabilized, again, by the effects of this crisis.

Ms. GRANGER. Mr. Yoder.

Mr. YODER. Thank you, Madam Chair.

And Ambassador, thank you so much for joining us today. And there are so many topics to cover and so little time. And we appreciate the work of all of our diplomats and leaders around the world. And thank you for your leadership.

Certainly, we talked about Syria and North Korea, Russia. Continuing to be I think perhaps on a lot of our minds is the nuclear threat from Iran. I know you have spoken about that this morning on several of the questions. I have some specific questions for you I would just like to get your thoughts on as we as a Congress look at what our future foreign policy should be. As we come back to the Iranian nuclear desires, I know we are in a diplomatic mode now. Should those diplomatic efforts fail, is military action still on the table if Iran does not abandon its nuclear program? And how are we articulating that today? Would that military action require U.N. Security approval to move forward? Would you seek—and I know we are dealing in hypotheticals. I need to articulate this well, but not damage any current efforts. So I respect and appreciate the way you are going to have to try to articulate your answer here. But would you seek U.N. Security approval? And would the country be willing to move unilaterally without that approval? And did the

United States' war and action in Iraq require U.N. Security approval? Do we believe that that did in retrospect?

And then the second topic, the administration has called for certainly a reset with relations in Russia in past years. What can we do to successfully deter Vladimir Putin going forward? What does the new reset look like? What are your thoughts just generally moving forward? And how do we reset those relations again? Because clearly that didn't work as successfully as probably anybody liked. And then you were in the White House and witnessed the struggle in our country over the murder of our ambassador in Benghazi. That continues to be a very big topic in this country and certainly before Congress regarding what the United States did to prevent that attack, statements following the attack from our then ambassador on what may have led to the attack. And so I guess just seeing that firsthand in the position you were in, and now you are the new United States Ambassador to the U.N., what have we learned? And specifically, what are we doing differently with security? And how would we treat something like this differently in the future?

Ambassador POWER. Okay. Thank you so much, Congressman.

Let me—as you anticipated, it will not shock you that I am not going to engage in hypotheticals. So I think it is more appropriate simply to describe generally the President's position, which is that, even today, he has taken no option off the table as it relates to Iran. Consistently, he has made clear on any issue that if America's vital national interests are at stake, he is going to act to protect the American people and our vital national security interests. And what that means is that in the event that the Security Council does not accommodate his need to lead and perform his duties as the commander in chief, he is still going to pursue what he deems the right policy on behalf of the American people.

In terms of the retrospective question you asked, again, I don't think it is appropriate for me here in my current role to be going back over decisions that were made. What we are focused on at the U.N., but across the administration, is trying to shore up the security situation in a country that, unfortunately, in recent months has really taken a turn for the worse in terms of the penetration of terrorists, the seizure, as you know, by terrorists of Iraqi towns, towns that very brave Americans expended, made great sacrifices to try to secure for the Iraqi people. So we are focused, the U.N. Special Representative there is working hand in glove with our embassy to try to defuse that crisis, to try to ensure that the coming elections go off without causing or provoking or being accompanied by more violence. That is our emphasis on Iraq.

On Putin, I would just say that the steps that have been taken even just since the so-called referendum in Crimea, and the so-called annexation, which we reject, and which the United Nations has rejected now in an overwhelming way, the steps that we have taken have already had an effect. You are seeing investor confidence plummet. You are seeing the ruble depreciate. You are seeing investors recognize that if there is not a climate of rule of law in Russia, and clearly taking over part of someone else's country doesn't exactly reflect a respect for the rule of law, whether domes-

tic or international, that that is a very perilous market environment.

And so, again, we do believe that this economic and political isolation that President Putin has chosen for himself is going to have an effect. And we are, in addition to that, of course, supporting, thanks to the House vote and the Senate vote on this issue, robust financial assistance for Ukraine so that, you know, X number of years from now, we see a prosperous Ukraine that is thriving, that is not forced to choose between East and West, and where the people see the benefits of the kind of economic integration available to those countries that play by the international rules.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mr. Schiff.

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Welcome, Ambassador.

At the outset, I want to just express my support for that flexible funding mechanism for U.N. peacekeeping missions. Regrettably, given how unstable the world is right now, it is not a question of whether we will need to support such operations, only where. And I would much rather make that kind of investment than have to either have American boots on the ground or suffer the effect of total state failure and collapse and all the related risks that we ultimately face as a result of those failed states.

I want to direct my question to Syria. Syrian civil war has claimed the lives of at least 150,000 people, one-third of whom are civilians. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights announced yesterday millions more have been forced to flee their homes to neighboring Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and even Iraq. And millions more have become internally displaced, their faiths hanging on the ebb and flow of battle. While all the Syrian people have suffered from fighting, it is minority populations, and especially Syrian Christians, who are most at risk.

As you know, Ambassador, these are some of the oldest Christian communities in the world, dating back to the first century AD. About a week ago, the town of Kessab, which is predominantly Armenian Christian, was attacked by Al Qaeda-linked fighters who had crossed over from Turkey, and the town was emptied in a bloody assault. Many of the residents of Kessab are descendants of the victims of the Armenian genocide. And there was a particular poignancy to their being targeted in this manner.

Can you tell us what efforts the U.N. and its agencies working in and around Syria are making to safeguard Syrian minority communities? My understanding is that many of them are resistant to seeking refuge in UNHCR and other NGO facilities out of fear for their safety and are thus more likely to be internally displaced persons. Also, is the Kessab issue in particular and minority issues generally on the agenda in New York with reference to Syria?

And finally, is there any diplomatic movement at all in resolving the Syrian conflict? Or is Assad so confident of his military advantage now that any hope of a diplomatic resolution is essentially gone?

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, Congressman.

First, on the peacekeeping response mechanism, thank you for raising it. And let me just say a word on that, knowing that not

all may think it is the best idea right from the beginning. This mechanism comes about because what we have gone through in the last few budget cycles, where real world exigencies, like that in Mali or now potentially in Central African Republic, arise after we submitted our budget. You know, the bad guys in the world are not responsive to our budget cycles. And we are trying to prevent the rise of extremism, protect civilians, you know, meet humanitarian needs. This is not something where the money would be spent on anything other than the kinds of emergencies that this committee, subcommittee, and the larger committee have expressed and proven their support for over the years. And one of the things that we would be very eager to discuss with you is how could we create some kind of consultative process where you felt at the heart of the decisionmaking around the use of such a mechanism? But we are finding ourselves—our decision space shrunk in New York when a crisis arises because of the prior year's cycles. And if you look at refugee funding and so forth, they have found a way, because refugee flows also are unpredictable, to embed, I gather, within refugee programming a little bit of flexibility, again, allowing for the kind of consultation that could allow real world emergencies and real world peacekeeping missions, exigencies to secure funding in a nimble way. On Kessab, it is an issue of huge concern. And the broader fate of minorities and all the Syrian people is of pressing concern. In terms of what the U.N. is doing about that particular—the takeover of that particular town, the Security Council has met recently, I believe it was just—I have lost track of time with my preparation for this hearing—but I think it was late last week on Friday, where we discussed the humanitarian situation in Syria generally. And most of the council members raised the issue of Kessab, calling on the U.N. to do more to try to meet the needs of these people. This was in a closed consultation on the humanitarian situation in Syria in compliance with the humanitarian resolution.

I would note that, unfortunately, the extremist group that appears to have taken hold of that town is not one that the United States or the United Nations has a huge amount of leverage over. And so our emphasis now is on supporting the moderate opposition in Syria that is taking on those extremist groups and making sure that the U.N. has the funding it needs, and the resources of all kinds that it needs to accommodate refugee flow along—or IDP, in the case of the Syrian Armenian community, and, as you say, an internally displaced flow. So it is resources. It is strengthening the moderate opposition, which is taking on ISIL, the very group that appears to have taken over that town, making sure that none of the neighbors are giving support to terrorist groups or extremist groups, which would aid their efforts in seizures like that, and going on a funding drive internationally, because only a very small percentage of the U.N. funding appeal for Syria generally has been filled at this point.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mr. Dent.

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Good morning. And following up on Mr. Schiff's question with respect to Syria, that the U.N. Security Council has demanded that

the Government of Syria and opposition groups allow humanitarian aid to be delivered. The Secretary General's report last week made it clear that the Syrian Government is violating the Security Council resolution I believe adopted in February. The administration is also on record that the Syrian regime is in violation of the Security Council's demands. And many of my constituents think, and I mentioned that I have the largest Syrian community of any other Member of Congress in the country, support helping the Syrian people. And this subcommittee provided a significant amount of funding and an increase for humanitarian aid to help meet those particular needs.

What will the United States and the U.N. do to ensure that aid can get to the Syrian people? That is my principal question to you right now.

Ambassador POWER. Well, the first thing we sought to do was to get Russia on board with a humanitarian resolution that included in it a list of very specific demands, which capture at least some, again, of the spirit of your question: a demand to lift named besieged areas; a demand to allow cross-border access so that food could go across borders, potentially reaching up to 3 million or 4 million people who have not been reached to this point or are in so-called hard to reach areas; demanding the end of the use of barrel bombs, et cetera. And although the Russians and the Chinese had vetoed three resolutions on things roughly related to the humanitarian fate of the Syrian people, in February, they finally came on board and supported a strong resolution. That was a resolution also that threatened further steps in the event of noncompliance.

And now because of the noncompliance you allude to, I mean, really just a drop in the bucket compared to the set of demands I have just laid out, we are consulting with our partners about what further steps that we can take, recognizing that Russia's history on this issue does not leave us wildly optimistic that they would be enthusiastic for another Security Council product, but still needing to follow through on the commitments we have made.

What the U.N. on the ground is doing is seeking to leverage this revolution in tactical ways. And what they can report is—here or there—having this resolution has allowed them to get through one cross-border checkpoint that they weren't able to get through before, a lot of bureaucratic fixes, more visas, a committee set up by the government. But it is nowhere near sufficient to deal with the needs of the people on the ground.

And I will say that in addition to regime obstructionism, which is by far the primary culprit here in terms of noncompliance with the resolution, the fact of the terrorists and extremist groups in Syria has not made this task easier for the U.N.

Mr. DENT. Also, I just want to ask, too, since you mentioned the Russians, Ukraine. Anything that can be done at the U.N. outside the Security Council at this point? Because the Russians, obviously, will veto anything we would attempt to do to be helpful. What can be done at the U.N. to help provide some assistance to the people of Ukraine right now, again, outside the Security Council?

Ambassador POWER. That is exactly the approach we take. When we see that the Security Council is blocked, we look for alternative U.N. venues within the broader U.N. family. And I think there are two that we have made use of so far. And we need to look at other mechanisms. The first is we had a very strong, surprisingly suspenseful vote on Ukraine status and on the legitimacy and the legality of the referendum last week.

I say it was suspenseful because a roughly analogous vote on Georgia that had occurred back in 2008 passed by an account of 14 “yes” votes—I think I have the numbers roughly right—12 “no” votes, and 105 abstentions. Whereas, this vote, we got broad cross-regional support. A hundred people voted saying that this referendum has no legality, no validity, and will not be respected. And only the Venezuela, Sudan, Syria, DPRKs, et cetera, voted with Russia. So it was a very, very strong vote. And it has real legal consequences, because now legally, the U.N. finding, as it were, is that that referendum was illegitimate.

The other place I think we can make a big difference through the U.N. is in monitoring. And the Secretary General has now sent a team of 25, 30 monitors to Ukraine, principally deploying in Eastern Ukraine and places that we are concerned about the Russian buildup. That is alongside an OSCE monitoring team, which is both doing election monitoring and human rights monitoring as well.

Mr. DENT. I see my time has expired.

Can I submit a question for the record with respect to Israel?

Ms. GRANGER. You certainly can.

If we all stick to 5 minutes, we can do another round.

Mrs. Lowey.

Mrs. LOWEY. Okay. As we are wrapping up this hearing, given the turmoil in the world, given the public's questions about what is happening in Syria, what good is the U.N., what is happening in Iran, I could go on and on, and we have mentioned so many of the trouble spots, I thought I would give you an opportunity in summing up. How does U.S. involvement in multilateral institutions, such as UNICEF, UNFPA, help in solving global challenges? What benefit is there to the United States in participating in these institutions? Why is participation in the U.N. in our national security interests? And how is your office continuing to work toward updating and increasing the efficiency and transparency of U.N. operations and management practices? How does the U.S. oversee the operations of the United Nations and other specialized agencies? How are results measured and evaluated?

Ambassador POWER. Thank you.

Mrs. LOWEY. So make your case for why we should continue to support the United Nations.

Ambassador POWER. Okay. Well, let me start by noting that we go to work every day recognizing that this is not a perfect body. It is a body filled with 193 governments. And we all know that governments are challenging creatures, and that not all of us, you know, every day execute in just the way that we would seek to execute. When you combine that fact with the fact that half the U.N. member states are again nondemocratic, it gives you some insight into the scale of the challenge sometimes.

But there are vast regions of the world, and it feels like ever more, sadly, where civilians are being targeted, where women are being subjected to horrific sexual violence, where children are being recruited as child soldiers, where terrorists and extremist groups are seeking to spread their bile, shall we say, and recruit others to their cause.

And we, the United States, do not want to be in all of those places. And yet the American people have made clear their long-standing generosity, their humanitarian impulses, their solidarity with the victims of sexual and gender-based violence, with child soldiers, with the victims of a tsunami or any kind of humanitarian catastrophe. America always stands up and steps up first. And often it is the American people doing so through private charities right alongside the contributions they make through this subcommittee and the committee and the Congress.

So we don't want to be deploying our troops around the world to be dealing with every crisis of the nature that I have described. While we pay a good healthy share of the U.N. budget in terms of humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, the regular budget of the U.N., it is the other countries of the world that pay three-quarters of the budget, by and large. Particularly when it comes, again, to the U.N. regular budget and peacekeeping, it is other countries that pay 71 percent. And it is in our interest to pool the resources of the world to deal with these crises.

I give you just a few examples. I think the peacekeeping mission in Mali, where terrorists and extremist elements had virtually taken over that country, and with the U.N.'s help, led by the French, the Africans, the United States pushing to roll back those extremists, Mali now has a chance. And that is a chance not only for the people of Mali, which I think we would of course support, but it is also a chance to wipe out a threat that at some later stage could have come home to roost for us.

Somalia, a place that was almost a poster child for state failure now has an actual chance. They are building a government. The African Union has provided troops. We have helped support that, again, thanks to this committee's flexibility. And Al-Shabaab is on the run, and the people of Somalia have a chance to live in dignity and some security.

Again, it is not a perfect security situation. It is going to take a very long time for the state to be fully recovered there. But that is another example, again, where we don't want to be sending U.S. forces to Somalia, and we want other countries to be doing their share. We have spoken a lot about Iran today. The sanctions that we have gotten through the U.N. Security Council are a force multiplier. You can see through the Iranian sanctions regime—and again, we will wait and see what happens in these negotiations. Nobody is trusting that we are going to be able to get where we need to get. But the reason we are in the position we are in is because of how biting that multilateral sanctions regime is and that every country in the international community is bound to those sanctions. That is the force of doing things through the United Nations.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mr. Yoder.

Mr. YODER. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ambassador, in our last round of questioning, I had a third question that we didn't get to, so I thought I would just give us a chance to answer it. Hopefully, it won't take the full time. The question is on the lessons learned from Benghazi. And I know there are a lot of oversight committees and there are a lot of investigations going on, but for our purposes today and where we are looking at putting dollars forward and where we finance operations I guess, given your position in the White House during the Benghazi crisis, I wanted your thoughts on what we could have done differently, what we have learned from it, and how as a Nation we can move forward to ensure that it never happens again.

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, Congressman.

I guess what I can speak to probably best, or at least most knowledgeably, is what I can see in the government in terms of the precautions that we now take and how we are operating. And again, there are other individuals in the government who would be more expert at precisely what accommodations that we have made and what resources we are deploying where. But, you know, I have at least some visibility into the extent to which every mission is being scrutinized to make sure that our diplomats who are out there serving the American people—in the case of Chris Stevens, one of my real heroes in the government just by the way he chose to operate. I mean, he was always at one with the people, always reaching out, you know, in the Internet cafes, and trying to be out there, really hearing from the Libyans how they saw their future. And it is tragic that in the wake—it is tragic that we no longer have Chris, one of the great human beings and great diplomats that this country has ever seen. And it is tragic that an attack like that, unfortunately, has us needing to, in particular in dangerous places like Libya, to curtail that kind of interaction.

And we had already in the wake of 9/11 beefed up our embassy security of course all around the world. And that had big resource consequences, which you are well aware of. And now we have done, you know, of course another overlay on that in order to make sure that the President and the Congress and the American people are satisfied that our diplomats who are risking their lives every day, just as our soldiers are in some of these very dangerous environments, have the protection they need, and that they know that when resources are needed, that we can come up and work with you and make those resources available. You know, we have a budget ceiling that we are all operating under with the Budget Control Act. We are trying to do a lot internationally with less, because the costs of beefing up those missions and enhancing that security is, of course, substantial. So as we, you know, rightly, again act responsibly fiscally, and set limits on our spending, you know, I do want to note, even though our peacekeeping budget request here is increased for the reasons that I have described, we are finding cuts across the department and in USAID in a way that we can both accommodate real world emergencies along the lines that I have described but also the need to make sure that our diplomats are safe.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Ms. Wasserman Schultz.

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you.

Ambassador, if you wouldn't mind, I know there were a couple of—

Ms. GRANGER. I cut him off I'm sorry. He was not on the red light. His time had not expired.

Mr. YODER. I actually didn't use all of our time. It is a miracle in this committee. If I might, just to follow up with a question. Just you are looking prospectively. Can you look retrospectively a little bit for me? Looking back, what could we have done differently to save Ambassador Stevens' life?

Ambassador POWER. Again, I was not involved in that—I think I don't have the familiarity to offer you a productive response. I think probably there are others who would be better positioned to respond to that.

Mr. YODER. Okay.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you, Ambassador.

I think you didn't get to finish your response to the—I think I asked you four questions.

Ambassador POWER. The Human Rights Council I know I didn't answer.

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Right. And just U.N. reform.

Ambassador POWER. Yes, U.N. reform. And in fact, Congresswoman Lowey asked a similar question.

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. And the other thing I just wanted to get in is to underscore what Mr. Diaz-Balart mentioned on Venezuela, and also to praise you, because you have personally engaged, and the Secretary has, and President Obama has acknowledged the very serious oppression that is going on in Venezuela. But if you can more specifically discuss how we can balance the United States' role and not feed into Maduro's obvious attempt to distract from his own deliberate oppression and blame his problems on the United States.

Ambassador POWER. Okay. Let me start, if I can, by addressing the Human Rights Council question. I don't remember exactly how you worded the question, but it was—

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Basically, how can we get the Human Rights Council, through our membership, to focus less on Israel and more on—

Ambassador POWER. Exactly. That was the line I wanted to pick up on. Because what I would say is since we joined the council, since the President made that decision to return to try to reform the council from within and make the council more functional for human rights around the world, we have had a great deal of success getting the council to focus more on real world human rights abuses. Where we have had less success is getting it to focus less on Israel. And so there are fewer countries, I believe—I would have to look at the statistics each year—but there are fewer country-specific resolutions on Israel from one year to the next, but it is still a standing agenda item. And the notion that Israel is a standing agenda item on the Human Rights Council, and DPRK, which has some of the worst atrocities on planet Earth, Syria, where you have a government using chemical weapons, barrel bombs, and Scuds against his people is not a standing agenda item, it is obscene.

So our challenge there is the numbers. So what we do is we use our platform to call out what is happening and to stand up for Israel and to reject the delegitimization. I indicated in my opening remarks that we also have secured I think a really important step for Israel, which has membership now in a regional grouping, which should not be something that we have to celebrate, but because they had been excluded from a regional grouping in Geneva for so long, this is something that has come to mean a great deal to Israel and a great deal to us. And so that is happening right alongside the challenges that we face on Israel within the Human Rights Council. And we will continue to chip away, including getting Israelis into leadership posts across the U.N. system, which we are doing more and more.

But on the functional side of the Human Rights Council, this is the place where the first ever U.N. resolution acknowledging that LGBT persons were entitled to full human rights was passed 2 years ago, which again should not have taken so long, but it is a very significant piece of normative business. The Syrian Commission of Inquiry would not exist if not for this. You mentioned Iran. The Iran, we just re-upped last week the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights for Iran, which at the very time that we are negotiating on the nuclear issue, we cannot forget the state of human rights, the deplorable state of human rights in Iran. And this Special Rapporteur has provided an independent source of information that has really strengthened, I think, our ability to document and to get the international community—

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Venezuela and Cuba as well.

Ambassador POWER. Yes. I am sorry?

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Cuba and Venezuela.

Ambassador POWER. Cuba and Venezuela are more challenging within the Human Rights Council because of the weighting of the membership. And what we have done there, and again, I mentioned this a little bit earlier, is we seek to use the platform we have. We are America. People listen to us. They care about what we say on human rights. We can show solidarity with people who are suffering inside these countries. And then we have sought to build regional—sort of not creating formal U.N. human rights resolutions, which we haven't—you know, for whatever reason, haven't been able to build the kind of support that we would like on that, but we can still show that in all regions of the world people are willing to condemn the human rights abuses and the crackdowns that are existing.

And I would note in Cuba that there have been more roundups I think in the first quarter of this year than in a very long time. So one cannot be too complacent at all on that situation.

And then, on U.N. reform, if I may—I see a flashing red light, it hasn't become a solid red light just yet—just simply to say that there has been a huge amount of duplication in the U.N., that we have a department of field support strategy that has found \$250 million in cuts on peacekeeping. I mentioned earlier that the per peacekeeper cost has gone down by 16 percent over the last 5 years that we have been working on these issues, thanks in part also to leadership of Congresswoman Granger and the push we have made on audits. You now have UNICEF, UNDP, U.N. Women, and a

bunch of other U.N. agencies who are posting their audits online. We have the Secretariat doing so as well, and they are trying to make that permanent, which I think is a real turning point in the U.N. culture, which has been very opaque. We have created a hot-line on waste, fraud, and abuse. And we have frozen—the regular budget growth had been growing, growing, growing, and we basically, you know, have frozen the budget growth, put in place a spending freeze, and we are looking at staff compensation, which is where 70 percent of the regular budget costs are accrued. And they have got to do a comprehensive review on compensation, which we seek. And we just in the last budget cycle secured the cutting of 221 posts, which, again, in the U.N. culture where everybody is wanting to keep posts for, you know who and you know who, was a pretty substantial achievement.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mr. Dent.

Mr. DENT. Thank you. The question I was going to submit for the record I might as well present to you. I may not be able to stay for the answer. I have a commitment that I must attend. The United States has long led the fight against the Arab League boycott of Israel and has aggressively combatted the delegitimization of Israel through various international forums like the U.N. The latter part of the strategy is known as BDS, boycott, divestment, and sanctions. It is considered by many to represent a new line of attack against Israel, delegitimizing Israel's actions through the use of the international systems, the misuse of international law. And it is now feared in the creation of new international codes of conduct that have the potential to truly harm Israel economically as well as politically. These vestiges remain.

We effectively defeated the Arab League boycott as a tool of delegitimization by establishing legal protocols and advising corporations about the penalties in store for those choosing to abide by it. While the challenge of this boycott, divestment, sanctions, the BDS, is more diffuse, the underlying principle pretty much remains the same. We cannot allow others to pervert international systems to attack Israel. And we cannot allow international codes of conduct to be turned into new weapons in the delegitimization arsenal.

I guess the question is, do you share my concerns? And if so, what steps is the U.S. taking to ensure that the international systems of which we are part and a large contributor to are not taking or supporting actions to deliberately single out and delegitimize Israel?

And the last question is, how are we engaging with international bodies as they seek to establish new codes of conduct that, if left unchecked, could be used as sticks to wage a destructive campaign against one of our closest and dearest allies?

Ambassador POWER. Okay. Well, let me try to take advantage of your presence here for the next minute to say that we oppose and reject divestment and boycotts. I think Secretary Kerry has been very clear on this. I have certainly been clear on this. In the U.N. system, the form that that has taken so far is more along the lines of what we have discussed so far, the exclusion of Israel from various groupings. I just had the chance to discuss this Western European and Others Group, which back in 2000, we were able, the

United States was able in New York to get Israel membership in, in New York. But we were always denied, Israel was always denied in Geneva. Taking advantage of the peace process, and years of lobbying, and months of very intensive lobbying on this issue, Israel was finally admitted just this fall. Similarly, in New York, there is a human rights caucus for like-minded countries that basically vote the same way and think the same way on human rights issues. Israel's voting coincidence with the countries who are part of that group is very, very high, even higher than that of the United States. And yet, for years, it was excluded from that group. We just secured membership for Israel in that group. Israeli officials have had a very hard time becoming senior U.N. officials. But in recent years, we have gotten an Israeli official elected vice president of the General Assembly. The U.N. Human Rights Council has just named an Israeli an independent expert on older persons. We have gotten them on to executive committees for the Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women.

I mention these in some detail because this is what legitimization looks like. This is what has to happen alongside our efforts to oppose boycotts, divestment, and unilateral statehood bids.

Mr. DENT. Thank you.

Ms. GRANGER. Mr. Schiff.

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Two questions. One just to follow up, because I think my clock ran out in the first round, is there any kind of diplomatic avenue still open on Syria? Or given Assad's current military advantage, has the Geneva process and any other completely evaporated?

And second, while a lot of the barriers are coming down at home in terms of the LGBT community, there seem to be a rash of new anti-LGBT laws in Africa. We have seen the action in Russia. But increasingly, even places like Eastern Europe, you are seeing this on the legislative calendar in the parliaments in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. What are we doing at the U.N. to try to get out ahead of this, to be proactive on this? And do you see this as part of, at least as far as Eastern Europe goes, Putin's effort to create a new ideological war with the West and make this one of the components?

Ambassador POWER. Thank you, Congressman.

On Syria, the diplomatic process is not in a good place. That is evident for everyone. I can share personally that the meetings that we had when Lakhdar Brahimi, the U.N. mediator, was in New York, the challenge we are facing is that the mediator has put forth a path forward which would have the parties, both of whom again showed up for the second round of Geneva finally, after much preparatory work on our part with the opposition, but Brahimi's conviction is that in order for these talks to go forward, one cannot exhaust the topic of terrorism and come to conclusion on the topic of terrorism without in parallel dealing with the issue of the transitional governing body, which is the cornerstone of the Geneva communiqué. And the Syrian position, obstinate position up to this point, is we will not talk about the transitional governing body until we have dealt with terrorism, which, you know, is itself a show of bad faith, the way that they are approaching these talks.

So we are working aggressively behind the scenes, notwithstanding Ukraine and all of the other business that we are doing at present, to try to get those who have influence over the Syrian regime to change their position. Right now, it is the Syrians who are preventing the reconvening of another round of Geneva talks.

In parallel, and I spoke a little bit to this earlier, but in a different context, the Kessab context, it is very important that the moderate opposition be strengthened. And we are looking at additional steps that we might take in order to enhance their efforts on the ground. Because something quite significant has happened over the last few months, which is that they have taken on terrorist and extremist groups which, you know, so far probably is one factor behind some of the Assad regime's recent tactical military gains. And that counts as infighting within the opposition, but it is certainly in the U.S. interest for that moderate opposition, who are willing to commit to protect the rights of minorities and who seem to have a vision for Syria that is multiconfessional, it is in our interests for those elements to be strengthened.

Right now, the regime is not—you know, does not—does not feel that it needs to come to the negotiating table. And so that support for the moderate opposition is going to be a critical component, alongside pressure on those who are backing the regime to bring the regime to the table.

On the LGBT issue, it is, I would agree completely with the way you characterized it. Just at the time where LGBT persons in this country are seeing a rate of progress, particularly when it comes to gay marriage and inclusion and acceptance, that is incredibly important and that of course needs to continue and even speed up for the sake of the dignity of all people living in this country, but at the very time we have had some good news stories in this country, the trend internationally is going in the opposite direction.

There are laws criminalizing homosexuality in 80 countries at present. So the countries that you mentioned or alluded to in Sub-Saharan Africa and in the Baltics, this is a new chapter, shall we say, in what has been a chronic effort to criminalize sexual orientation. The death penalty is applied in seven countries on the basis of sexual orientation.

Two years ago, President Obama issued the first ever Presidential directive on LGBT rights as international human rights. Secretary Clinton gave an incredibly powerful, epic speech in Geneva in the Human Rights Council, where many countries were very startled to see the United States out there leading in this way and insisting that LGBT persons were entitled to the same rights as everyone else around the world and are a central part of what it means to promote human rights.

As part of the Presidential directive, we look at assistance; we look at asylum claims on the basis of persecution. And now, in many of these countries, people, of course, have a well-founded fear of persecution because there are mobs going door to door with lists of LGBT persons in countries like Nigeria. Russia was the first recent country to put these laws on the books. And unfortunately, in the old days, we used to talk about the importance of exporting best practices in development and security sector reform and all of that. Now we see countries like Russia exporting worst practices,

and other countries taking the worst aspects of that law and putting them on their books.

But President Obama, again, has been very outspoken on this, and we will continue to contest this and make it a subject of our bilateral diplomacy, and do what we can within the U.N. system along the lines that I described earlier to make sure that other countries are standing with us, particularly from other regions and not just from Europe and North America.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much.

Thank you for being with us. I will be submitting for the record some questions about U.N. reforms, having to do with transparency and accountability, like spending plans for U.N. organizations and a report on funds withheld because of any provision of law. I will submit that to you. If you could just give me an answer in writing. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Ambassador Power. Thank you.

This concludes today's hearing. Members may submit any additional questions for the record. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs stands adjourned.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power by
Representative Kay Granger (#1)
House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
April 2, 2014**

Question:

The FY14 appropriations bill requires that, of the funds appropriated under title I and under the heading “International Organizations and Programs,” in title V that are available for contributions to UN agencies, 15 percent may not be obligated until the Secretary of State reports that the agency is taking certain actions related to transparency and accountability. In which agencies are you seeing positive changes and what have they changed specifically since enactment of the FY14 appropriations bill? In which organizations may the Secretary have a difficult time making the required determination? When do you plan to report to the Committee?

Answer:

Through the United States’ UN Transparency and Accountability Initiative, we have seen all UN organizations make significant progress in efforts to increase transparency and strengthen internal control policies, including granting access to audit reports and implementing whistleblower protections.

We continue to monitor steps taken by UN agencies in this regard, mindful of the requirements of section 7048(a), and to urge UN agencies and other international organizations to increase their transparency and protect

whistleblowers from retaliation. We also have been actively engaging other member states to ensure their management reform objectives align with ours.

We are currently reviewing the policies of these organizations and working with them on the necessary steps they must take for the Department to make a final determination for section 7048(a). In many instances, amendments to an organization's internal control framework and disclosure policies require governing body approval, so we are currently pursuing resolution language in the governing body meetings of those organizations that have not fully met the legislative criteria.

The Department expects to report to the Committee in July 2014.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power by
Representative Kay Granger (#2)
House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
April 2, 2014**

Question:

What is the status of the report on funds withheld because of any provision of law?

Answer:

The withholding report required by Section 7048(d) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014, was transmitted to the Hill on April 28, 2014.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power by
Representative Kay Granger (#3)
House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
April 2, 2014**

Question:

Some members of Congress have pushed to get the U.N. to change its funding model to voluntary, not mandatory, mechanisms. Do you think the U.N. would be more accountable and effective under this model?

Answer:

Switching to a purely voluntary approach for funding the United Nations would not be an effective funding model. Allowing countries to opt out of financing the UN would require changes to the UN Charter and would undermine its basic purposes and principles.

Assessed contributions help to ensure a shared responsibility and accountability among all UN Member States and provide a stable and predictable funding source that allows the UN to address a wide array of global challenges. Assessed contributions also help to ensure that all Member States have a financial stake in the effective performance of the UN and, therefore, a shared interest in the UN Secretariat's accountability to Member States. Assessed contributions ensure

that all member states contribute financially to collective measures for prevention and removal of threats to the peace, as well as the promotion of human rights.

A purely voluntary approach to funding would undercut U.S. arguments for burden-sharing in areas where the U.S. has strong national interests, such as in UN peacekeeping and special political missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Mali, likely resulting in an over-reliance on a handful of Member States for financing certain UN activities, with the United States paying a greater share of the costs.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power by
Representative Kay Granger (#4)
House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
April 2, 2014**

Question:

What specific steps has the United States taken in the UN to reduce its assessment rates for both UN agencies and peacekeeping activities?

Answer:

Preserving the 22 percent ceiling in the regular budget scale of assessments has been a U.S. priority in previous negotiations. The United States successfully resisted proposals to increase the ceiling, most recently in 2012.

There is one UN specialized agency at which the United States assessment rate decreased this year. At the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the U.S. assessment rate decreased from 25 percent to approximately 22 percent due to the recalculation of the ICAO scales of assessment to account for member states' current capacity to pay and participation in global aviation.

A priority of the Administration over the next year and a half is to seek changes to UN regular budget and peacekeeping assessment rates, which the UN General Assembly sets every three years. We will seek to make the scales methodology fairer, so that emerging powers that have an increasing share of the

global economy pay their fair share of the UN's expenses. We also will seek to reduce unfair discounts that developing countries receive on their peacekeeping assessments. These discounts are causing the recent increases in the U.S. peacekeeping assessment rate.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Power by
Representative Kay Granger (#5)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
April 2, 2014**

Question:

What is the Administration doing to reduce or eliminate outdated UN Peacekeeping missions? How often do the United States and the UN evaluate the criteria for determining whether key peacekeeping mission objectives have been achieved and if missions can be phased out or reduced? Are all missions audited, by whom, how frequently, and are the results made publicly available?

Answer:

Cognizant of the growth of the peacekeeping budget and the implications for American taxpayers, the United States reviews *all* UN peacekeeping missions with an eye toward implementing new efficiencies in their operations, and drawdowns or reductions where conditions on the ground permit. We also regularly review these missions to assess their performance and progress toward mandate implementation.

The UN Security Council reviews the mandates of all UN peacekeeping missions at least once a year. The UN Secretariat carries out its own integrated assessments and presents them in reports of the UN Secretary-General, which are

public documents. Occasionally, the UN Secretariat, either on its own or at the behest of the Security Council, may conduct an out-of-cycle assessment.

As a result of U.S. efforts, last year the UN created a new Director for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership. This new position functions as a sort of inspector general for UN peacekeeping standards. The Director's early efforts already have resulted in greater scrutiny of performance and led to eliminations of redundant personnel and repatriation of under-performing units.

There are several missions (e.g. Liberia, Haiti, and Cote d'Ivoire) that are in the process of transition, reconfiguration, and drawdown. We and the UN will continue to monitor their progress closely. As we saw with the conclusion last year of the UN Mission in Timor-Leste and the closure of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone last month, the UN can close missions successfully after they have helped bring peace and stability to conflict-affected countries.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Power by
Representative Kay Granger (#6)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
April 2, 2014**

Question:

The FY 2015 request includes costs associated with 2014 peacekeeping operations in Mali. Why did the Administration not submit a budget request for this in FY 2014?

Answer:

Because the UN Security Council approved the UN Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) well after the FY 2014 budget request was finalized, funds to support a UN assessed peacekeeping mission were not included in the FY 2014 Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) budget request. The most recent estimate for the U.S. assessed share of expenses for MINUSMA is approximately \$325 million for FY 2014, up from \$250 million. The Administration did not submit a budget amendment for FY 2014 because the estimates were still in flux through much of 2013, and the Department planned to meet those assessments by drawing from a combination of

prior year funds, potential credits, and reallocations within the FY 2014 request level.

The FY 2015 CIPA request reflects the Administration's commitment to pay, in full and on time, current assessments for UN peacekeeping missions. Of the \$390.5 million included in the FY 2015 request for MINUSMA, \$100 million is requested to offset a portion of the FY 2014 unbudgeted assessments for MINUSMA. The Department will continue to review all available options during FY 2014 to identify available funding, including the application of CIPA carry forward funding (if available), and the application of potential UN peacekeeping credits (distributed at the end of the UN peacekeeping fiscal year June 2014) to cover funding shortfalls.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Power by
Representative Kay Granger (#7)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
April 2, 2014**

Question:

- 1) While the UN requires police officers and peacekeepers to report misconduct, whistleblower protections do not apply to them.
 - o Why does the UN whistleblower protection policy not apply to contractors, UN police officers, and UN peacekeepers?
 - o Is the US trying to extend these protections to such people not just to United Nations staff members?

Answer:

The UN whistleblower protection policy (ST/SGB/2005/21) applies to directly employed UN civilian staff. Contractors, UN police officers, and UN peacekeepers are currently not covered by the UN whistleblower policy, largely because of the unique authorities under which these individuals serve. The many types of UN peacekeeping personnel fall into three broad categories of military, police, and civilian personnel, and each type is subject to different rules, regulations, policies, and procedures.

The United States believes that some of these personnel serve in functions that place them in positions to uncover and report misconduct that could undermine the United Nation's mission, and therefore they should receive protection against reprisals for doing so. However, where these individuals are not

UN staff and therefore not subject to UN staff rules and regulations or policies, other mechanisms must be identified to increase their protection.

The Administration is pressing the UN Secretariat to address deficiencies where they exist, including with respect to peacekeeping missions. Most recently, we secured a General Assembly request to the Secretary-General in order to expedite strengthened protections against whistleblower retaliation, as reflected in its whistleblower protection policy. We will continue to work to assure that whistleblowers throughout the UN system can report wrongdoing without fear of reprisal.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power by
Representative Kay Granger (#8)
House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
April 2, 2014**

Question:

Please describe all sanctions or suspensions that may occur against contractors and Member nations if they engage in whistleblower retaliation?

Answer:

The UN's whistleblower protection policy is tailored to protect UN personnel against retaliation. The policy includes measures to reverse UN administrative actions deemed to be retaliatory, such as temporary suspension of the action reported as retaliatory and temporary reassignment of the complainant within or outside the complainant's office or placement of the complainant on special leave with full pay while a review takes place. If retaliation is proven, then a rescission of the retaliatory decision, including reinstatement, or, if requested by the individual, transfer to another office or function for which the individual is qualified, also can be granted. The UN's policy also allows disciplinary action to be taken against the perpetrator of retaliation.

We will continue to work with Member States and the UN on finding adequate alternative mechanisms for addressing non-staff disciplinary measures.

Within the UN General Assembly, we are pursuing an independent assessment of the formal administration of justice system, and the UN Ethics Director is currently conducting a comprehensive review of the UN's whistleblower protection policies. We will use these reviews as part of our ongoing efforts to strengthen and enhance the ethics function and whistleblower protection regime.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Power by
Representative Kay Granger (#9)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
April 2, 2014**

Question:

UN Ethics Office's recommendations to protect a whistleblower are not binding and there is no timeline for the enforcement of its decisions. What is the US doing to make Ethics Office recommendations binding and to provide a deadline by which the Secretary-General must decide whether or not to enforce the Office's decision?

Answer:

The United States believes that the Ethics Office Director should have binding authority when making recommendations related to specific cases. As this is currently not in the mandate of the Office, we continue to explore opportunities to amend the mandate in order to make this change. In addition, the Administration has repeatedly engaged with top level management to ensure that the recommendations made by the Ethics Director be respected even if they are not binding.

Further, at U.S. urging, UN member states made a formal request to the Secretary-General at the 67th session of the General Assembly to expedite the development of strengthened protections against whistleblower retaliation, and the UN Ethics Office is currently considering changes to that policy. When this is

presented to the General Assembly, we will also use this as opportunity to seek changes to the Ethic Office Director's authority including a timeline for implementing the Director's decisions.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power by
Representative Kay Granger (#10)
House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
April 2, 2014**

Question:

How does the UN protect whistleblowers against retaliation if they testify before the UN Dispute and Appeals Tribunals, including witnesses?

Answer:

The UN Whistleblower Policy provides protection from retaliation against staff members who report misconduct on the part of one or more United Nations officials, as well as those who cooperate in audits or investigations. It does not include non-UN staff and witnesses. The need for more inclusive provisions has been noted by the UN Dispute Tribunal judges and is a consideration of the review of the UN's whistleblower policy currently underway by the UN Ethics Office.

The Administration recognizes that the limitations in the UN Whistleblower Policy could have a chilling effect on promoting reports of wrongdoing, which is why we secured a General Assembly request last spring for the Secretary-General to expedite the development of strengthened protections against whistleblower retaliation, as reflected in its Whistleblower Policy. The United States will continue to be a vocal proponent for strong whistleblower protection policies in all

public institutions, including the United Nations and organizations throughout the UN system. We also will continue to work with other Member States to pursue reforms that will result in more comprehensive protection of all parties who come forward to report misconduct, fraud or corruption.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Power by
Representative Kay Granger (#11)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
April 2, 2014**

Question:

The Secretary General's Bulletin issued in November 2007 (SGB/2007/11) allows the Funds, Programs and Specialized Agencies of the United Nations system to opt out of the provisions of the US-led whistleblower protections adopted in November 2005.

- How has this Bulletin undermined the goal of uniformly prohibiting retaliation against whistleblowers across the UN system?
- Please describe the agency-specific policies that emerged afterwards and whether they are stronger, weaker, or the same as the 2005 policies.

Answer:

At the 2005 UN World Summit, heads of state and government called for the creation of an independent ethics office and the establishment of a system-wide code of ethics to cover all UN personnel. In 2006, the UN Ethics Office began operations with responsibility for providing ethics training to UN staff, advising staff on ethics matters, administering and reviewing staff financial disclosure statements, and protecting whistleblowers from retaliation.

Prior to 2007, the jurisdiction of the Ethics Office only extended to the UN Secretariat. However, at the urging of the United States and other major donors, in 2007 the Secretary-General created an ethics framework requiring all UN separately administered organs and programs to create independent ethics offices

and protect whistleblowers from retaliation and further established the United Nations Ethics Committee chaired by the Head of the UN Ethics Office, to unify ethics standards among these entities and provide a mechanism for staff to appeal ethics rulings and decisions by their organizations . Recognizing that a one size fits all ethics function may not be appropriate for all UN system organizations, the United States has been working bilaterally and with other member states through governing bodies to strengthen these offices, functions and policies.

In addition, the Ethics Network of Multilateral Organizations, previously the United Nations Ethics Network, promotes system-wide collaboration and coherence in the area of ethics and integrity by facilitating discussions of best practices between the UN Secretariat, specialized agencies, funds and programs and selected international financial institutions.

While improvement can continue to be made, we view the establishment of ethics offices and the adoption of whistleblower policies at all major UN system organizations as a significant achievement. We will continue to closely monitor the Funds and Programs and specialized agencies as these offices and policies mature.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Power by
Representative Kay Granger (#12)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
April 2, 2014**

Question:

With respect to the UNDP corruption charges in 2006 at the UNDP office in Pyongyang, what was found and what changes were made by UNDP to address the findings.

Answer:

UNDP's activities in North Korea were suspended from March 2007 until the UNDP Board approved a proposal to resume them in January 2009 to continue work on human development, food security, and rural development.

During the suspension, the Department of State worked closely with UNDP management , UNDP Executive Board members, and three investigative bodies -- the UN Board of Auditors, the U.S. Senate Permanent Sub-committee on Investigations (PSI), and an independent external panel appointed by UNDP -- to find out what happened and to take the necessary steps to address the problems.

These bodies found that the UNDP Pyongyang office did not follow UNDP financial and management rules and procedures in several key operational areas, including hard currency payments, the local staff hiring process, and project site visits. The audits and investigations did not find evidence of large-scale fund transfers to the North Korean government. For more details please see the three investigative bodies' reports:

- The Senate report "United Nations Development Program: A Case Study of North Korea" issued in January 2008 linked here:
<http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/united-nations-development-program-a-case-study-of-north-korea>.
- The two UN reports which we will forward separately: 1) "Report of the Board of Auditors on the Special Audit Requested by the ACABQ into the Activities of UNDP, UNFPA, UNOPS, and UNICEF in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" issued in May 2007; and 2) "Confidential Report on United Nations Development Program Activities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 1999-2007" issued in May 2008.

In January 2009, UNDP reported that the DPRK authorities had agreed to the rules and procedures required by the Executive Board for operating a program. UNDP management proposed to resume several projects to address both the humanitarian needs of the North Korean people and UNDP program management weaknesses identified in the audit and investigation reports.

In response to specific U.S. requests, UNDP management provided assurances regarding measures to address key conditions for resuming the program. These included:

- Strengthened monitoring - The DPRK government agreed to unhindered access to project sites. UNDP will be able to physically verify the appropriate use of all project equipment and assets. An international staff member in the UNDP country office is charged with monitoring and evaluation responsibilities.
- Program information available online - UNDP will post information about its North Korea program on a public website, including project details, program operations, and procurement.
- No direct transfer of funds to the government - there will be no so-called "national execution" by the DPRK government.

- New payment and hiring practices - UNDP will make all local payments in local currency, and will directly pay local staff (rather than through the DPRK government). UNDP will hire local staff from a government proposed pool of candidates, and can reject any or all such candidates (rather than hiring whomever the DPRK government sends).

In addition, at a September 2010 UNDP Executive Board meeting, UNDP management assured member states that it will be open to consultations with interested Board members as it moves to develop new projects in North Korea.

We continue to hold UNDP management to these commitments and assurances, and follow up regularly with UNDP leadership to discuss issues of mutual concern.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Power by
Representative Kay Granger (#13)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
April 2, 2014**

Question:

How often has retaliation occurred at the UN on UN Peacekeeping Forces who have reported sexual abuse and exploitation of vulnerable groups?

Answer:

There are occasional allegations of retaliation against UN peacekeepers who have reported misconduct by other UN staff. Our information on such allegations is on a case by case basis, and we are not aware of any data-based report on this issue.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Power by
Representative Kay Granger (#14)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs House
Committee on Appropriations
April 2, 2014**

Question:

What is the United States doing to stop the firing of UN police officers who report corruption or other misconduct, as has happened in countries such as Haiti and Kosovo?

Answer:

The UN's current whistleblower policy applies to UN civilian staff. While the UN code of conduct forbids sexual and financial misconduct, and the UN's policy on sexual exploitation and abuse requires UN personnel to report sexual misconduct through established channels, there are no explicit protections for seconded military and police personnel from retaliation for whistleblowing.

This is largely because of the unique authorities under which these individuals serve. The many types of UN peacekeeping personnel fall into three broad categories – military, police, and civilian. Each category of personnel is subject to different rules, regulations, policies, and procedures.

When personnel report misconduct that undermines the UN's mission and credibility, the United States believes that they should receive protection against reprisals for doing so. However, since police and military peacekeepers are not UN employees, and therefore are not subject to either UN staff rules and regulations or the associated policy on protection against retaliation, there should be other mechanisms to increase their protection.

The Administration is pressing the UN Secretariat to address these deficiencies where they exist, including with respect to peacekeeping missions. We secured a General Assembly request last spring for the Secretary-General to expedite the development of strengthened protections against whistleblower retaliation, as reflected in its Whistleblower Policy. We will continue to work to assure that whistleblowers can report wrongdoing without fear of reprisal.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power by
Representative Kay Granger (#15)
House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
April 2, 2014**

Question:

What is the status of the UN Secretary General's proposal to the UN General Assembly to change the UN's internal justice system to specifically exclude decisions made by the Ethics Office? Please respond in detail, including whether or not it has been withdrawn.

Answer:

At the 67th Session of the UN General Assembly, member states requested that the Secretary-General submit to the 68th session an updated report on relevant issues related to proposed changes to the statutes of the Tribunals. At the 68th session, the Secretary-General noted that he had nothing to report in that regard.

However, the consistent position of the UN has been that decisions of the Ethics Office are not receivable under Article 2, paragraph 1, of the UN Dispute Tribunal (UNDT) statute, which was approved by the General Assembly, as they believe it is a threat to the independence of the Ethics Office.

The Administration supports an independent Ethics Office and has been vocal about the need to strengthen the authority of the Ethics Office, in particular, a need to grant the Ethics Office the authority to make binding recommendations and establish a timeline for the enforcement of its decisions. We will continue to engage the UN and other member states to further strengthen the UN ethics function.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Samantha Power by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart (#1)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 2, 2014**

Question:

Congress has previously recognized the problems posed by the Polisario run refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria and urged the State Department and the U.S. Ambassador to the UN to work with UNHCR to conduct a census of those living in the camps. In the past year, the problem has only grown worse as a UN report released in 2013 warned specifically about the potential dangers of radicalization including one government leader in the Sahel region calling the Polisario run refugee camps "a ticking time bomb." UNHCR said that they would like to conduct a census of those living in these refugee camps but they have been unable to do so because of obstruction by the Polisario and the Algerian government. For over 40 years, these refugees have been housed by the Polisario. Will you work with the UNHCR to finally hold a census in these camps so we can know who is actually there and so that those refugees in the camps can have the type of documents they need to live and travel freely outside of the refugee camps?

Answer:

The State Department's most recent Human Rights Report for Algeria submitted to Congress in February 2014 states the Algerian government provided protection to an estimated 90,000 to 165,000 Sahrawi refugees who departed Western Sahara after Morocco took control of the territory in the 1970s. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), the Algerian Red Crescent, the Sahrawi Red Crescent, and other organizations also have assisted Sahrawi refugees.

The UNHCR has not conducted a formal registration of the Sahrawi refugees.

We continue to encourage the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Polisario, including during recent visits to Algeria, to consider refugee registration in the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria to clarify population figures and to better plan for and deliver humanitarian assistance. In FY2013, the U.S. Government provided \$12.5 million for programs to assist the estimated 90,000-165,000 Sahrawis in the refugee camps. This included support from the Department of State for UNHCR programs, and support from USAID for World Food Program's refugee feeding operation.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Samantha Power by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart (#2)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 2, 2014**

Question:

What specific actions is the U.S. Mission to the UN taking to resolve the conflict in the Western Sahara?

Answer:

The United States continues to be a strong supporter of the UN-led diplomatic process for Western Sahara and efforts to find a peaceful, sustainable, and mutually-agreed solution to the conflict. As part of this effort, we are doing what we can to ease tensions on the ground between the parties to the dispute and facilitate UN efforts to monitor and maintain the ceasefire, which continues to contribute to regional security.

Each year, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations works with other members of the Security Council to review the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), consult with the SRSG, and lead in negotiating the mandate for the mission. MINURSO has made significant contributions toward stabilizing the situation in Western Sahara. The mission is focused on monitoring the ceasefire and upholding the military agreements with the parties, supporting the Office of the UN High

Commissioner for Refugees' confidence-building program, coordinating demining activities along the berm, and providing independent and unbiased reporting to the UN Secretary-General and the UN Security Council regarding the overall situation on the ground. By monitoring the ceasefire, MINURSO maintains the environment that allows the UN-facilitated political negotiations led by Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General Ambassador Christopher Ross to take place.

The United States fully supports the Personal Envoy's efforts to find a solution to the conflict. He has visited the region several times in 2014. All sides have stated their approval of his new approach of bilateral consultations with the parties and neighboring states with the aim of encouraging them to find a compromise solution.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Samantha Power by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart (#3)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 2, 2014**

Question:

It has been clearly documented that Israel is treated unlike any other country at the UN. The special committees on the Palestinians, the permanent agenda items related to Israel, and the constant efforts to isolate and punish Israel for behavior that is tolerated by others are just a few examples. What is being done with the professional staff of the UN, the Secretary General, and the heads of individual agencies to ensure that Israel is treated more fairly? What is being done to more effectively push for structural changes to eliminate the institutional bias against Israel?

Answer:

This Administration fights hard for fair and equal treatment for Israel across the UN system, including lobbying the member states of the UN to vote against biased anti-Israel resolutions at the General Assembly, Human Rights Council (HRC), and other UN fora. It is important to note that multilateral action targeting Israel is overwhelmingly driven not by the UN Secretariat, but by various UN member states themselves.

We strenuously oppose anti-Israel statements, resolutions, and efforts to delegitimize Israel throughout the multilateral system. For example, prior to U.S. membership in the Human Rights Council, over half of all country-

specific resolutions adopted by the Council concerned Israel. This number has been reduced to well under one-third since the United States joined the Council in 2009. The United States continues to engage with HRC members to reduce the Council's focus on Israel and to eliminate entirely the biased Agenda Item 7 from the Council's program of work.

The United States also continues working to promote full and equal Israeli participation in international bodies, including the consultative groups in the UN system that act as organizing venues for candidacies and coordination of policy approaches. Most recently, the United States helped Israel gain membership in the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) in Geneva and the JUSCANZ consultative group in New York – both of which had been sought by Israel for many years.

Ensuring that Israel gets fair and equal treatment also means that it fully enjoys opportunities for positive contributions in every UN forum, including the General Assembly. On this score, the Administration is proud to have rallied support behind Israel's recent successful sponsorship of a resolution on entrepreneurship and development, which garnered more than 120 votes.

With strong U.S. support, Israel has been elected to every one of the more than a dozen UN bodies in which it has sought membership over the

last decade. During the 67th General Assembly, the United States supported the successful election of Israel as one of the Vice Presidents of the General Assembly. Last year, Israel's Ruth Halperin-Kaddari was re-elected for her third term on the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.

We have strongly supported Israel's efforts to enhance and "normalize" its engagement at the UN, which we believe will greatly help reduce anti-Israel bias by member states. Some of our efforts include supporting Israel's efforts to proactively contribute in UN bodies by providing technical expertise, aiding Israeli citizens to obtain official positions in various UN organizations, and supporting UN peacekeeping operations.

On all of these issues and more, we maintain frank and regular dialogue with the Secretary-General and leading UN officials and will continue to monitor the statements and actions of all UN funds and programs.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador Samantha Power by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart (#4)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 2, 2014**

Question:

The United States has played an important role in helping Israel gain full inclusion at the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) in Geneva. As you know, Israel is seeking to represent the WEOG on the Security Council in 2018 – the first time Israel would serve at the Security Council. What is the United States doing to promote Israel's candidacy for the Security Council and how do you assess the possibility of Israel winning a Security Council seat? How can we help overcome impediments within WEOG to putting Israel's candidacy forward?

Answer:

The United States supports Israel's full participation in all aspects of the UN system. The United States was a strong supporter of Israel's entry into the WEOG in New York in 2000 and in Geneva in 2013. Through its membership in WEOG, Israel has been elected to numerous positions, including with the UN Commission on International Trade Law, UN HABITAT, UN Environment Program Governing Council, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and the Universal Postal Union Postal Operations Council. In February, Israel was admitted by consensus to the Industrialized Market Economy Countries (IMEC) regional group in the International Labor

Organization (ILO). Israel also has served as a Vice-President of the UN General Assembly.

We have been supportive of Israel's interest in obtaining a UN Security Council seat, and we will be engaging closely with Israel and our other WEOG partners on the way forward.

TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 2014.

UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA

WITNESSES

**LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF
AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

**SHEILA HERRLING, ACTING CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, MILLENNIUM
CHALLENGE CORPORATION**

**EARL GAST, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

THE OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN GRANGER

Ms. GRANGER. The subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs will come to order. Today we will hear from the panel before us on United States assistance to Africa.

I would like to welcome our witnesses: Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Linda Thomas-Greenfield; Assistant Administrator for Africa, Earl Gast; and Acting Chief Executive Officer for the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Sheila Herrling.

Thank you all for being here.

We are expecting more of the members, but we are going to go ahead and start because all they will miss is our opening remarks. Right?

Mrs. LOWEY. Right.

Ms. GRANGER. Today's hearing is very important—given the significant funding that has been provided and the challenges facing the continent. There are also many achievements from our investments over the last several years, and I hope we can hear about the successes and learn from them.

\$6.9 billion of the fiscal year 2015 budget request for State and USAID is for Sub-Saharan Africa. That represents 35 percent of the funds and is more than any other region except the Middle East.

Additionally, all four countries proposed for Millennium Challenge Corporation funding in fiscal year 2015 are in Africa and three of those are in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Africa also receives the majority of funds requested for the President's three major foreign aid initiatives, and last year the administration announced three new initiatives for Africa, focused on power, trade and youth leadership.

We have seen proven results from some of the investments already made, such as life-saving programs in HIV/AIDS, malaria and maternal and child health, and conservation programs that have helped countries manage and protect Africa's unique natural resources.

Our investments pay dividends in public diplomacy. In Africa, opinions of the United States ranks among the highest in the world.

With respect to security, our assistance supports activities ranging from peacekeeping missions, counterterrorism initiatives, and programs to reform and professionalize police and military throughout the continent.

The needs have never been greater. New and troubling conflicts have broken out in South Sudan and the Central African Republic. Longstanding violence continues in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and terrorism remains a significant threat not only to stability in Africa, but to our own national security.

I want to hear from our witnesses how the programs we fund address those challenges.

And, finally, the United States is responding to some of the most devastating humanitarian crises in years. In Africa alone, conflict, disease, and a threat of famine have put millions at risk, but the cuts to humanitarian assistance in the fiscal year 2015 request do not reflect this reality. I hope our panel can address this discrepancy.

There is a wide range of topics we could discuss today, and I expect this will be a very productive hearing. I look forward to hearing about some of the issues I raised.

I will now turn to my ranking member and friend, Mrs. Lowey, for her opening remarks.

[The information follows:]



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

April 29, 2014

Contact: Steve Dutton | (202) 225-5071

GRANGER OPENING STATEMENT: BUDGET HEARING ON UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE IN AFRICA

The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs will come to order.

Today, we will hear from the panel before us on United States assistance to Africa. I would like to welcome our witnesses:

- Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Linda Thomas-Greenfield
- Assistant Administrator for Africa, Earl Gast
- Acting Chief Executive Officer for the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Sheila Herrling

Thank you all for being with us today.

Today's hearing is very important given the significant funding provided and the challenges facing the continent. There are also many achievements from our investments over the last several years, and I hope we can hear about those successes and learn from them.

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The needs have never been greater. New and troubling conflicts have broken out in South Sudan and the Central African Republic. Long-standing violence continues in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Terrorism remains a significant threat not only to stability in Africa, but to our own national security. I want to hear from our witnesses how the programs we fund address these challenges.

Finally, the United States is responding to some of the most devastating humanitarian crises in years. In Africa alone, conflict, disease, and the threat of famine have put millions at risk, but the cuts to humanitarian assistance in the fiscal year 2015 request do not reflect this reality. I hope our panel can address this discrepancy.

There are a wide range of topics we could discuss today and I expect this will be a very productive hearing. I look forward to hearing about some of the issues I raised and I'll now turn to my Ranking Member, Mrs. Lowey, for her opening remarks.

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MRS. LOWEY'S OPENING STATEMENT

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, thank you, my friend, Chairwoman Granger. It is a pleasure for me to join you in welcoming today's distinguished panel.

Today's hearing is important and a welcome opportunity to refocus our attention on Africa. We face numerous global challenges: the upheaval in Ukraine, the interminable civil war in Syria, Iran's nuclear program, our drawdown in Afghanistan and more.

At the same time, we cannot neglect the alarmingly increasing number of crises in Africa and must continue to invest strategically in strengthening development and diplomatic ties.

This is not the United States' responsibility alone. I want to repeat that. I believe fervently this is not the responsibility of the United States alone.

I want to hear from you how the administration is engaging with other donors, the U.N., and multi-lateral institutions to address the challenges and opportunities on the African continent.

From countries in crisis to counterterrorist operations, from conflict mitigation, humanitarian responses, to sustaining health and development initiatives, Africa is a microcosm of our diplomacy and development goals worldwide.

I look forward to hearing the panel's insight regarding our assistance in Africa at this critical time, paying particular attention to three pillars in U.S. policy: mitigating humanitarian crises, promoting security and stability, and supporting health, human rights and democratic governance.

Recent U.N. reports from South Sudan and the Central African Republic reveal haunting details of violence, instability, and human suffering. Ethnic groups are being systematically targeted for political retaliation, and atrocities are being committed against women and children.

I hope to learn further details on the administration's diplomatic strategy and humanitarian response and on the U.N. peacekeeping missions in South Sudan and the Central African Republic.

How can the international community prevent these countries from spiraling further into indefinite genocide? And given other ongoing needs in places like Syria, Somalia, and Mali, are the proposed cuts to the International Disaster Assistance and the Migration and Refugee Assistance accounts by 28 percent and 33 percent, respectively, appropriate?

I am also deeply troubled by the rising tide of terrorism perpetrated by Islamic extremist groups. The merciless brutality demonstrated by al-Shabaab's 4-day siege of the Westgate Mall, Boko Haram's recent kidnappings of schoolgirls and bus station bombings, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's seizure of northern Mali all sent shockwaves throughout the world and threatened U.S. interests and citizens.

I hope you will provide greater insight into the administration's strategy for enhanced security cooperation with African countries, European Union, and the U.N.

We have seen tremendous success with our health investments, with over 6 million people on HIV treatment as well as advance-

ment in child mortality rates due to improved access to vaccines and treatment for deadly illnesses such as malaria and pneumonia.

I am pleased to hear reports of rapid economic growth and development in countries such as Ghana and South Africa. However, we must sustain these gains in health and accelerate progress in other areas such as food security, governance and the elimination of poverty.

We need to ensure that every last foreign assistance dollar is programmed to deliver results in a cost-effective manner. Therefore, I was troubled to learn that the cost of training one person on countering extreme violence can cost up to \$700,000. I hope you can tell me that this was a typo in a report.

Because I ask myself: How many children can we educate for that amount of money instead? Is education a better strategy for countering extreme violence? Are we wisely spending our resources on programs and policies that work and are cost-efficient? How are the difficult decisions and trade-offs made? And what evidence is used to support these decisions?

I am encouraged to see that the year's request continues to prioritize investment in Power Africa, Trade Africa and the Young African Leaders Initiative; yet, it greatly concerns me that the administration is undercutting once again investments in basic education.

So, in conclusion, I hope to learn more about how the U.S. Government is diplomatically engaging African leadership to invest resources in their own people and commit to improved transparency in governance.

Both donor and host countries need to fully synchronize their efforts through a holistic strategic dialogue if we are to increase total investment across the key human development sectors of health, education, energy, and infrastructure.

And, really, finally, I will close by saying I am very concerned about backsliding in the area of human rights, in particular, the proliferation of discriminatory and draconian legislation against LGBT in Uganda and Nigeria, and I remain deeply troubled about the impact on personal freedom and public health.

Thank you again for joining us today. Thank you for your service. I look forward to your testimony.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you, Mrs. Lowey.

I now call on the witnesses to give their opening statements. And I would encourage each of you to summarize your remarks so we can leave time for questions and answers. Your full written statements will be placed in the record.

We will begin with Ms. Thomas-Greenfield.

OPENING STATEMENT OF MS. THOMAS-GREENFIELD

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you very much.

Madam Chairwoman, Representative Lowey, members of the committee, I start by thanking you for the opportunity to speak today in support of the administration's fiscal year 2015 budget request and to further detail—provide further details on our U.S. assistance to Africa.

And, as you noted, a complete version of my testimony has been submitted for the record that will address the full range of issues

that have been raised. And I will be prepared to answer any questions that you have.

As Secretary Kerry noted in his testimony before you last month, we deeply appreciate the role that this committee and the subcommittee play in helping the American people understand why foreign affairs matters to them.

Advancing the values and interests of our country and promoting stability in the world does matter to our citizens, whether it results in jobs and economic opportunities, connections between communities, or the safety and security that we aim to achieve. The Secretary was speaking in a global context; yet, we believe his words are applicable directly to U.S. relations with the continent of Africa.

For far too long, images of poverty and insecurity have dominated the American perspective on Africa. Yes, these do, exist in Africa, and I would be remiss today if I did not express my deep concern with the continued violence and fighting in South Sudan, in Sudan, in Central Africa Republic and with the increasing atrocities committed by Boko Haram against schoolgirls and other innocent citizens committed by Boko Haram and attacks that are committed against all faiths in Nigeria, across the borders in neighboring countries as well.

But as in other parts of the world, they are certainly not the whole story of what is happening on the continent. Those images illustrate only a narrow component of what our partnership on the continent are trying to address and to achieve.

And, in fact, tonight I leave with the Secretary for his second trip to Africa to meet with our partners to address some of the challenges and the opportunities for cooperation.

He will open a high-level dialogue—our fourth high-level dialogue with the African Union, and he will meet with our regional partners regarding the situation in the South Sudan and in the Great Lakes.

We also have an exciting summer ahead, as you mentioned, with our Washington Fellows program, part of President Obama's Young African Leaders Initiative, or YALI, and the historic U.S.-Africa leadership summit to take place in August in Washington.

Our fiscal year 2015 budget request reflects the policy priorities set forth in the presidential policy directive for Sub-Saharan Africa and the State-USAID joint regional strategy for Africa.

The total request for Africa is \$6.9 billion. It seems like a lot, but when you look at all of the priorities that we have and the crises that we are involved in, it is not. Of that total, roughly 68 percent, or \$4.7 billion, of this goes toward bilateral assistance for 15 priority countries.

And over the last 50 years, the relationship between the United States and these countries, as well as the whole continent of Africa, has evolved dramatically.

In each of the priority countries, we are actively pursuing policies of partnerships, ways to promote solutions that yield benefits over the long term for both countries and as well as for their people.

Their policy priorities—these—they are policy-priority countries not just because of the need, but also because of opportunities we

see for mutual prosperity. Moreover, peace and prosperity in these countries will have a positive effect throughout the region.

As in previous years, the request includes a robust support for the three global presidential initiatives: Global Health, \$4.8 billion; Feed the Future, \$500 million; Global Climate Change, \$88 million.

It also includes resources to continue support for the three Africa-specific initiatives begun in fiscal year 2013: Power Africa, \$77 million; Trade Africa, \$27 million; and the Young African Leaders Initiative, \$10 million.

The fiscal year 2015 budget request also includes a proposal to fund the Peacekeeping Resource Mechanism, PKRM, and I know that Ambassador Powers, who—was on April 2nd before you and she addressed this issue.

I want to add my strong support for funding this account. Like many other parts of Africa—other parts of the world, Africa faces many complex crises. And the origins of these crises can be political. They can be ethnic or religious tensions, as we have lately seen in Central Africa Republic and in South Sudan.

And despite our best efforts to plan for these contingencies and forecast the trends, we don't always know when the next crisis will play out.

I don't think we knew that we were going to have the kind of crisis we are in in South Sudan right now. So the United States needs to be able to respond quickly and robustly, and the PKRM will help us do that.

Our challenge is also to try to balance our near-term and urgent imperatives with our long-term priorities. There will be 11 elections on the continent in 2014, 12 in 2015.

And for that reason, our budget request is focused on providing support in all arenas, and most critical are stability and growth, such as promoting strong democratic institutions, building security sector capacity, facilitating economic development, and creating lasting connections between the United States and the people of Africa.

So across the board, we are trying to move beyond outdated models for aid and focus on the objectives that link us with the private sector, with other African Governments, with local NGOs, with civil society, with other regional partners, with our other partners in the donor community, as well as citizens as partners.

And this must be, we believe, the way forward in terms of budget realities and in recognition of how our relationships with African partners have evolved over the past 50 years.

Thank you very much. And I look forward to your questions.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

[The information follows:]

Statement of Assistant Secretary Linda Thomas-Greenfield
House Appropriations Committee: Subcommittee on State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs
April 29, 2014

Madam Chairwoman, Representative Lowey, and members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak on behalf of the Department of State in support of the Administration's FY 2015 budget request for Africa. It is an honor for me to follow Secretary Kerry's presentation to this Committee last month and to provide further detail on U.S. assistance to Africa.

As Secretary Kerry noted, we deeply appreciate the role this Committee and Subcommittee play in helping the American people understand why foreign affairs matter to them. Advancing the values and interests of our country and promoting stability in the world does matter to our citizens, whether it results in jobs and economic opportunity, connections between communities, or the safety and security we aim to achieve.

The Secretary was speaking in a global context, yet we believe his words are applicable directly to U.S. relations with the continent of Africa. For far too long, images of poverty and insecurity have dominated the American perspective on Africa. Yes, these exist in Africa. And I would be remiss today if I did not express my very deep concern with the continued violence and fighting in South Sudan, Sudan, and the Central African Republic (C.A.R.) and with the increasing atrocities committed by Boko Haram against schoolgirls and other innocent civilians of all faiths in Nigeria and across borders of neighboring states. But as in other parts of the world, they are certainly not the whole story of what is happening on the continent. More specifically, those images illustrate only a narrow component of what our partnerships on the continent are trying to address and to achieve.

Tonight Secretary Kerry departs for his first extensive trip to Africa. He will be visiting our partners in Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Angola. The Secretary also will visit South Sudan, a country in which he has been personally invested for a long time, back to when he sat on the other side of hearing rooms as a Senator.

Our FY 2015 budget request reflects the policy priorities set forth in the Presidential Policy Directive for sub-Saharan Africa (PPD) and the State/USAID Joint Regional Strategy for Africa. They are: 1) strengthen democratic institutions,

improve governance, and protect human rights; 2) spur economic growth, trade, and investment; 3) advance peace and security and 4) promote opportunity and development.

The total request for Africa is \$6.9 billion. Of that total, roughly 68 percent (\$4.7 billion) consists of bilateral assistance for 15 policy priority countries: Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.

Over the last fifty years, the relationship between the United States and the countries of Africa has evolved dramatically. In each of these priority countries, we are actively pursuing policies of partnership, ways to promote solutions that yield benefits over the long-term for both countries. They are policy priority countries not just because of need, but also because of opportunities we see for mutual prosperity. Moreover, peace and prosperity in these countries will have positive effects throughout the region.

As in previous years, the request includes robust support for three global Presidential Initiatives: Global Health (\$4.8 billion), Feed the Future (\$501 million), and Global Climate Change (\$88 million). It also includes resources to continue support for three Africa-specific initiatives begun in FY 2013: Power Africa (\$77 million), Trade Africa (\$27 million), and the Young African Leaders Initiative (\$10 million).

The FY 2015 budget request also includes the proposal to fund a Peacekeeping Response Mechanism (PKRM). I know that Ambassador Power discussed this during her April 2 appearance before you. I want to add my strong support for the funding of this account. Like many other parts of the world, Africa faces complex crises. The origins of these crises can be political, ethnic, or religious tensions as we have lately seen in the Central African Republic and in South Sudan. Despite our best efforts to plan for contingencies and forecast trends, we do not always know how the next crises will play out. The United States needs to be able to respond quickly and robustly. The PKRM will help us do so.

Our challenge is always balancing near-term and urgent imperatives with our long-term priorities. For that reason, our budget request is focused on providing support in those arenas most critical to stability and growth, such as promoting strong democratic institutions, building security sector capacity, facilitating economic development, and creating lasting connections between the United States and the

people of Africa. As Secretary Kerry said in his testimony in front of this body, “I firmly believe that in this increasingly inter-connected world, global leadership isn’t a favor we do for other countries, it’s vital to our own strength. It’s vital to our security and the opportunities that we can provide to our children.”

Across the board, we are trying to move beyond outdated models for aid and focus on the objectives that link us with the private sector, African governments, local NGOs, civil society, and citizens as partners. This must be the way forward, in terms of budget realities and in recognition of how our relationships with African partners have evolved.

Strengthen Democratic Institutions, Improve Governance, and Protect Human Rights

Support for democracy, good governance, and respect for basic rights are the keys to stability and security. That stability is what attracts investors and allows economic growth, which in turn can help stave off further conflict. Every day at our Missions across Africa, we work with governments, political parties, electoral commissions, and civil society groups in pursuit of these goals. An election is by no means the only marker of a successful democracy, but it is a powerful one that resonates both inside and outside a country’s borders.

In 2014 alone, there will be 14 executive elections taking place on the continent. Another 17 will take place the following year. To be a true representation of people’s will, elections must be free, fair, and transparent. Citizens must be allowed to cast their votes freely based on their conscience. All votes must be counted, and results made public in a timely manner to be accepted by both the public and those running for office.

Too often we see crooked tactics, electoral tampering, or vote selling or buying. Or worse, there may be violence or intimidation. But it’s not just what happens on election day that matters. Equally vital to the democratic process is the regular and peaceful transfer of power. It means accepting results of elections and not responding with violence or preempting fair elections by changing the rules in the middle of the game. That’s why we call on all elected leaders and candidates to reject these practices. We tell citizens directly that they can demand better from their politicians and political institutions. Constitutions should not be altered to favor incumbents, and elections should not be delayed as a power-saving tactic. Democracies that do not know regular transfers in power, are democracies only in name.

In the run-up to Mali's historic 2013 elections, we worked with a youth association of popular musicians, DJs, TV personalities on a concert series and community discussions about civic responsibility and voting, accompanied by an SMS drive to encourage high youth voter turnout. In Cameroon, a small grant led to the posting of voter rolls on the Internet, creating greater transparency and allowing voters to verify that they were in fact registered.

In Kenya last year, concerted efforts helped avoid a repeat of the 2007-2008 post-election violence. The *My Life, My ID* campaign helped a half million young people obtain identity cards required to vote. Other campaigns helped youth in 25 counties create a plan for how to take action and contact authorities in the case of violence. In Madagascar, we provided funds to the Carter Center to observe and help ensure that the first elections since the 2009 coup would be free and fair. We were very pleased to have the country's new Prime Minister in attendance this week at the swearing-in of a new group of Peace Corps Volunteers. These are just a few examples of how our budget resources are being turned into concrete action in support of strong democratic institutions.

Spur Economic Growth, Trade, and Investment

In the context of economic growth, trade, and investment, we are mindful of and inspired by an important fact that the Secretary mentioned last week as he launched the second Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review or QDDR at the State Department. "It is not a small thing that 11 of 15 nations that used to receive aid from the United States are now donor nations." This is a transformation we want to see expand to Africa as well. It will not happen overnight, but we know there is great opportunity. Africa is home to eight of the ten fastest growing economies in the world. The new initiatives launched by the President, Power Africa and Trade Africa specifically, are key to turning these opportunities into long-term growth and prosperity.

Still today in 2014, more than two-thirds of sub-Saharan Africans lack reliable access to electricity. Power Africa is designed to address those needs, through partnerships between the United States, African governments, the private sector, and other partners like the World Bank and African Development Bank. The goal is to add 10,000 megawatts of cleaner, more reliable energy and to expand electricity access to 20 million households and businesses in six target countries. This is a big effort, not one that any government or investor can do alone.

Improved access to power is literally the switch that so many businesses need to grow and flourish.

Trade between countries in sub-Saharan Africa is extremely low, only 11 percent of the total trade, due to high tariffs, time consuming customs procedures, and inadequate infrastructure. In developing Asia, regional trade constitutes 50 percent of total trade. The goal of Trade Africa is to reduce those trade barriers in order to strengthen economic ties between African countries, starting in East Africa, as well as with the United States and other global markets.

Also important to our relationship with Africa is the renewal of the African Growth and Opportunity Act before September 2015 and ideally much sooner.

Advance Peace and Security

For now Africa is home to pockets of ungoverned spaces that offer safe haven to those who want to prey on local populations, destabilize legitimate governments, exploit natural resources, and use terror tactics for political motives. International actors, including those who seek to do harm to the United States, its citizens, and its interests, also take advantage of areas of insecurity and ineffective governance.

We are concerned about the continued violence perpetrated by al-Shabaab, al-Qa'ida in the Lands of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and other terrorist groups. Through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PRACT), we are seeking to strengthen the political will and capacity of governments and communities to resist these groups.

We cannot prevent every terrorist attack, but we can ensure that states are better prepared to work together and respond. For example, in 2012 and 2013, African forces – many of them U.S.-trained – responded to the situation in Mali and worked alongside the French military to push back AQIM from safe havens in northern Mali. The intervention left AQIM scattered, fractured, and demoralized. And then, Malians took to the polls in a historic democratic election – an election that was a powerful rebuke to the restrictive rule and violent extremist ideology that AQIM and its allies imposed.

Through our bilateral relationships as well as through our engagement in the UN Security Council, we are focused on enhancing the capabilities of our African partners to respond to and prevent crises. We do that through training and

equipping security forces so that they can deploy where needed and sustain those missions in a way that demonstrates professionalism and effectiveness, and ensures the security of civilians.

We are also supporting the African-led African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to take the fight to al-Shabaab, hobble its recruiting efforts, and eliminate its threat to the region and to U.S. interests. By supporting the African Union (AU)'s effort to counter the Lord's Resistance Army, or LRA, we are helping enhance regional cooperation and the capacity to counter cross-border threats. With our support, the AU's regional Task Force has significantly degraded LRA capabilities, increased defections, and improved protection and resilience of local communities.

The AU welcomed the U.S. effort in the Central African Republic, where "just in time" transport of Rwandan and Burundian forces to join the African-led International Support Mission (MISCA) ensured that these valuable peacekeepers were able to mitigate some of the violence in December and January. We are also providing vehicles, personal protection, radios, and other items to help protect the MISCA forces and make them more mobile. There is, of course, much more work to do to protect civilians in Bangui and throughout the country.

The Department's request to fund the Peacekeeping Response Mechanism (PKRM) is designed for this purpose - to ensure we have the ability to respond to urgent and unexpected peacekeeping requirements without impacting ongoing, planned peacekeeping activities. This fund is critical in Africa, the region where 80-85 percent of the world's peacekeepers are deployed. It would strongly signal to the AU that the United States is looking to provide sustainable and predictable resourcing for regional peace operations. As such the PKRM is an important tool to support African immediate responses to crises with logistics and equipment. This more predictable support also allows us to press back against premature calls to transition regional operations to more expensive UN-mandated peacekeeping operations.

We are also encouraged by recent progress in the Great Lakes region, including through the regional peace process to implement the UN-brokered Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework, signed by 13 African countries and aimed at resolving the root causes of conflict in the region and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Through increased pressure from the DRC military and the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), and increased political involvement, including from our Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Russell

Feingold, the DRC successfully ended an 18-month rebellion by the M23 armed group last year. We strongly supported the UN Security Council's decision to approve a 3,000 troop-strong intervention brigade within MONUSCO in order to beef up the mission's ability to neutralize armed groups, including the M23. Additionally, we are now seeing further progress in the Great Lakes through a political dialogue initiated by Angola. This regionally led and owned peace process is a promising sign in a region often known more for cross-border conflict than cooperation.

Whether natural or man-made, crises exact a devastating human toll. Amongst many urgent situations, we are working to address what's happening right now in South Sudan and the Central African Republic. As we work with South Sudan's neighbors and regional bodies on a political solution, we are directly supporting the South Sudanese people. In South Sudan, we have provided more than \$411 million in Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014 to assist victims of the conflict, including internally displaced persons and those who have fled to neighboring countries. For the Central African Republic, we are providing more than \$91 million in humanitarian assistance. This is in addition to commitments and support I mentioned before that we are providing to MISCA.

Promote Opportunity and Development

With one in three Africans between the ages of 10 and 24, and approximately 60 percent of the population below the age of 35, we are just beginning to see the transformative power of youth on the continent. The conversation about this so-called youth bulge can be one about needs, the cost of education, risks of unemployed or marginalized youth, but it can also be a conversation about opportunity. That opportunity is where the Department of State and USAID focus much of our energy.

Thanks in large part to support for vaccine research and distribution, child mortality has dropped by nearly a third and maternal mortality by 41 percent over the past 20 years. For the first time since the epidemic struck, the numbers of Africans infected with HIV is decreasing, partly due to assistance provided by PEPFAR.

In less than a year, the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, a joint initiative among the United States and other G8 countries, has resulted in commitments from more than 140 companies to invest more than \$3.7 billion in African agriculture. We are requesting just over \$500 million in Feed the Future

funding in FY 2015 and with it, we will tailor our contributions to the Alliance and other food security programs to reflect local needs and opportunities.

The FY 2015 request continues strong support for basic education in Africa, and we are supporting opportunity and development and reaching out to youth specifically through the Young African Leaders Initiative or YALI. YALI is the President's signature initiative for engaging youth across the continent. This summer, 500 young people from across Africa will travel to Washington, D.C. to participate in YALI's Washington Fellows program. When they return home, the Fellows will have internships in their own countries. We will support their networking, professional development, and mentoring opportunities, so that they can spread their ideas and knowledge among their peer group, who will represent the next generation of leadership on the African continent.

The response to this program has been overwhelming. We received nearly fifty thousand applications for these 500 slots. So we know there are youth out there who are interested in engaging with us and we hope to expand the size of the Washington Fellows program in the coming years. We are very excited to meet these Fellows and to develop programs for the thousands of other young African leaders who want to be part of the President's YALI Network.

I know Secretary Kerry is looking forward to meeting with young people on the continent later this week as well.

On a final note, President Obama has invited African Heads of State to Washington for a two-day Leaders Summit in August. It is the first time that a U.S. President has done so. We are deep in the consultative process with our colleagues from each of these countries to determine ways to make this summit one of concrete outcomes.

Thank you for the opportunity to brief the panel today on the FY 2015 request for assistance to Africa. I would be delighted to take your questions.

Linda Thomas-Greenfield



Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs

Term of Appointment: 08/06/2013 to present

Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, a member of the Career Foreign Service, was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2013 and sworn in on August 6, 2013 as the next Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.

Prior to assuming her current position, as Director General she led a team of about 400 employees who carried out the full range of personnel functions for the State Department's 60,000-strong workforce - from recruitment and hiring, through evaluations and promotions, to retirement.

Since beginning her Foreign Service career in 1982 as a consular officer in Kingston, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield has risen through the ranks to the Minister Counselor level. Overseas she has served in Jamaica, Nigeria, The Gambia, Kenya, Pakistan, Switzerland (at the U.S. Mission to the UN), and most recently as Ambassador to the Republic of Liberia, where she served from 2008 to 2012. In Washington she has worked in the Bureau of Human Resources, as well as the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, where she was a Deputy Assistant Secretary from 2004 to 2006, and the Bureau of African Affairs, where she was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary from 2006 to 2008.

Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield was the 2000 recipient of the Warren Christopher Award for Outstanding Achievement in Global Affairs in recognition of her work with refugees. She has received several Superior, Meritorious, and Performance awards, including the Presidential Meritorious Service Award. She was a 2010 inductee into the Louisiana State University Alumni Association Hall of Distinction.

Prior to joining the Department of State, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield taught political science at Bucknell University in Pennsylvania. She earned a bachelor's degree from Louisiana State University and a master's degree from the University of Wisconsin, where she also did work towards a doctorate.

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. GAST

Ms. GRANGER. Mr. Gast, you are now recognized.

Mr. GAST. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Lowey and Member Schiff, it is my pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the President's budget for U.S. aid in Africa.

Nowhere in the world is development such an important part of U.S. engagement efforts as it is in Africa, and the changing tide on the continent requires a new model for development.

This new model is at the core of USAID's approach in Africa, which seeks to end extreme poverty by investing in Africa's greatest resource, its people, to sustain and further develop opportunity and human rights for this and future generations.

Across the continent, we are implementing major initiatives to improve health, food security, electricity access, trade and resilience that are underpinned by commitments to good governance, education, gender equality and the environment.

These programs are driven by a culture of innovation, powered by efforts like USAID's Development Lab, which brings together a diverse set of partners to discover, test, and scale break-through technologies and solutions to chronic development challenges.

Our fiscal year 2015 request focuses on bilateral assistance for 15 priority countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that are critical to national security and economic trade. 80 percent of the rest would go toward three of the President's global initiatives: Feed the Future, the Global Health Initiative, and Global Climate Change Initiative.

The request also supports three Africa-specific initiatives launched by President Obama last year: Power Africa, Trade Africa, and the Young African Leaders Initiative. All complement the global initiatives and broaden our development impact.

And when they are applied on a country or community basis, along with the work of other government agencies and other donor partners, they are designed to take root and fuel real long-term change.

Each of the 42 countries where USAID works requires unique support, from the devastation in the Central African Republic to the rising prosperity in Tanzania, the violent crisis in South Sudan and the peaceful political transition in Senegal, the fragility of Niger and the anchor of South Africa.

While the governing principles of our work applies across the continent, our strategies are tailored to each of these country's singular challenges and opportunities. The effectiveness of this approach is evident.

The Millennium development goal of reducing the number of hungry people in the developing world is reachable by 2015. PEPFAR is supporting life-saving anti-retroviral treatment for more than 6 million persons.

The number of people newly infected with HIV is decreasing for the first time since the epidemic struck, and 10 African countries have reduced the number of malaria cases and deaths by over 50 percent in the last decade.

Our long-term investments in the Global Health Initiative half the burden of malaria for 450 million people, representing 70 percent of the at-risk population in Africa.

Over the past 20 years, with help from USAID maternal and child health programs, child mortality has dropped by nearly a third and maternal mortality has dropped by 41 percent.

A focus on resilience is being institutionalized within Feed the Future, and progress has been steady, especially in areas that recently suffered from historic drought.

And since the launch of the new Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition at the G8 Summit in 2012, more than 140 companies—two-thirds of them are African—have committed to responsibly invest more than \$3.7 billion in new alliance countries.

In less than 1 year, Power Africa has closed deals that will add more than 2,800 megawatts, about 28 percent, committed through Power Africa, which is a remarkable achievement that will advance our efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change, promote economic development, and improve education and healthcare.

Trade Africa, a partnership between the U.S. and the East African community, will aim to double intraregional trade and exports to the U.S. by 40 percent.

In recent years, skilled civilians, statesmen, and women have begun to replace the big men that once dominated the continent. Africa's new leaders are now serving as role models for the next generation and they are increasingly becoming partners in development through initiatives such as the Partnership for Growth.

This summer, President Obama will welcome the heads of state from across the continent to Washington, D.C., for a summit that will further strengthen U.S.-Africa ties and advance the administration's focus on trade and investment in Africa.

It will also highlight America's commitment to Africa's security, its democratic development, and its people. This is our new model for development in action.

USAID's work values partnership over patronage and innovation over convention. This approach enables us to make the greatest difference while making the most of every dollar.

And as we continue to work with Congress to achieve our shared goals, we very much look forward to a continued conversation on our priorities in Africa.

Thank you.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

[The information follows:]

**Testimony of
Earl W. Gast
Assistant Administrator for Africa
U.S. Agency for International Development
Before the
House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
April 29, 2014**

Nowhere in the world is development such an important part of U.S. engagement efforts as it is in Africa, and the changing tide on the continent requires a new style of engagement. Today, Africans are the architects of their development, not just beneficiaries. Donors support their plans, they do not dictate them. Citizens demand democracy, not autocracy, and they are seizing the opportunities that come with better education, better health, and better public services.

Taking advantage of this changing landscape requires a new model for development, one built on expanding and deepening partnerships with African governments, businesses, universities, and civil society—as well as with the new generation of African leaders, thinkers, entrepreneurs, and innovators, who are leading the transformation of their societies. This new model is at the core of USAID's approach in Africa, which seeks to end extreme poverty by investing in Africa's greatest resource—its people—to sustain and further development, opportunity, and human rights for this and future generations. Across the continent, we are implementing major initiatives to improve health, food security, electricity access, trade, and resilience that are underpinned by commitments to good governance, education, gender equity, and the environment. These programs are driven by a culture of innovation powered by efforts like USAID's Global Development Lab, which brings together a diverse set of partners to discover, test, and scale breakthrough solutions to chronic development challenges.

But Africa is not a monolith. Each of the 42 countries where USAID works is unique and requires unique support—the devastation in the Central African Republic and the rising prosperity in Tanzania; the violent political crisis in South Sudan and the peaceful political transition in Senegal; the fragility of Niger and the anchor of South Africa. While the governing principles of our work apply across the continent, our strategies are tailored to each country's singular challenges and opportunities.

We are committed to continuing to work together with Africans to advance this new model of development to realize the promise of a more peaceful, more productive, more prosperous 21st century Africa.

The total FY 2015 budget request for Africa (excluding food assistance) is \$6.717 billion, representing less than a 1 percent decrease from the FY 2013 initial actual level (\$6.762) enacted total.

- Roughly 70.5 percent (\$4.73 billion) of the request consists of bilateral assistance for 15 priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa that are critical to national security and economic trade (Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya,

Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe).

- Eighty percent of the request would go toward three of the President's global initiatives: Feed the Future (\$500.5 million), the Global Health Initiative (\$4.8 billion), and the Global Climate Change Initiative (\$88.1 million).
- The request also supports three Africa-specific initiatives—Power Africa, Trade Africa, and the Young African Leaders Initiative—that complement the global initiatives and broaden our development impact.

These overarching efforts value partnership over patronage and innovation over stagnancy. And when they are applied on a country or community level, along with the work of other U.S. Government and donor agencies, they are designed to take root and fuel real, long-term change.

Resilience and Food Security

Deep and chronic poverty is a shared characteristic of households and communities most vulnerable to climatic, social and economic shocks; it undermines even the most basic of coping strategies, leaving lives and livelihoods at risk. However, while we cannot prevent such a shock from happening, we can reduce the likelihood that it will trigger a humanitarian crisis. By supporting local and national capacities to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks, we can both protect communities and contribute to longer-term stability and growth.

This is not only the right thing to do—it is also fiscally responsible. Investing in the long-term resilience of communities in advance of a disruptive event can help minimize losses and reduce the need for immediate humanitarian aid. In fact, a recent study by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development showed that for every \$1 invested in resilience efforts, \$2.80 in benefits is gained through avoided emergency aid costs and animal losses.

A focus on resilience is being institutionalized within Feed the Future, and progress has been steady, especially in areas that recently suffered from historic drought. With the introduction of new technology in Ethiopia, nearly 140,000 people now have improved access to water (with the goal of reaching 1 million people in the next two years), which will help them better cope with future climate shocks. And the Government of Kenya through Feed the Future is equipping more than 4,000 county experts and trainers to deliver critical demonstrations on the links between agriculture and nutrition and best practices for people struggling to meet their families' nutritional needs. In turn, these workers have reached more than 40,000 households with information that can reduce chronic disease and improve food preparation.

Leveraging the solid foundation laid by Feed the Future, the President further challenged the global community to mobilize resources from the private sector for even greater impact by launching the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition at the G-8 Summit in 2012. The New Alliance aims to achieve sustained and inclusive agricultural growth to lift 50 million people out of poverty by 2022 by driving effective country-led plans and policies for food and nutrition security and leveraging the commitments of the private sector to increase investments where the conditions are right. Since the launch of the New Alliance, more than 140

companies—two-thirds of them African—have committed to responsibly invest more than \$3.7 billion in New Alliance countries. In addition, the new USAID nutrition strategy recognizes the essential role that nutrition plays in individuals' and countries' development.

This achievement is on the horizon: The number of hungry people in the world is declining and the Millennium Development Goal of halving the number of hungry people in the developing world is reachable by 2015. Now in its fourth year of implementation, Feed the Future's results are tangible. Conservation farming techniques in Senegal resulted in at least a 20 percent increase in yields of maize, millet, and sorghum between 2011 and 2012. The most dramatic results were the Fatick region's 57.3 percent increase in maize; Kédougou's 44.7 percent increase in sorghum; and Tambacounda's 43 percent increase in maize. To address malnutrition, Feed the Future promotes bio-fortified crops, including vitamin A-rich orange-fleshed sweet potato, and encourages diet diversification through household production of leafy green vegetables and small livestock. In Uganda, more than 50,000 households received inputs to grow bio-fortified crops such as iron-rich beans and orange-fleshed sweet potato.

A deeper look reveals the individual families who together make up these results: Through the Master Farmer program, farmers receive the instruction, funding and ongoing support to develop one hectare of farmland and demonstrate best practices with field crops, gardening, fruit trees, and natural resource management. One participant in the Master Farmer program not only increased his income enough to cover his children's school fees, he also trained more than 200 community members on new farming techniques. As of May 2012, this U.S. Government project had trained 32 master farmers and worked with over 30,000 people to plant over 130,000 trees and start or improve 465 gardens in Senegal.

Power Africa

Africa hosts vast reserves of natural resources, from geothermal and natural gas reserves to hydro and solar power potential. Tapping into these plentiful, sustainable resources will advance efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change, promote economic development, and improve education and healthcare. Cleaner energy and new technologies can power Africa's growth by bringing new businesses and jobs, and improving quality of life, while leapfrogging many older-generation technologies that pollute the environment and harm public health.

Power Africa is helping to make that happen through the U.S. Government's partnerships with African governments, private investors, and other development partners, which will bring sustained economic growth and benefits to the people of Africa and the United States. In six initial countries—Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Liberia, and Nigeria—the U.S. Government will work with its partners to add 10,000 MWs of new generation capacity; increase the number of electricity connections by 20 million; increase the reliability of electricity; increase the number of countries participating in regional cross-border energy trade; and enhance the resource management capabilities of selected countries, allowing them to gain greater energy security.

For USAID, Power Africa is our new model for development in action: facilitating private sector investment to advance development outcomes. By leveraging U.S. strengths in energy technology, private sector engagement, and policy and regulatory reform, Power Africa is

galvanizing collaboration, making quick-impact interventions, and driving systemic reforms to facilitate future investment. When Power Africa was launched less than a year ago, we secured partnerships with more than 35 businesses and organizations from the United States, Africa, and other regions, as well as the support of our multilateral partners – the World Bank Group and the African Development Bank – that collectively committed over \$14 billion to achieving Power Africa’s objectives. Through these partnerships, Power Africa has helped close deals that will generate 2,486 MW of electricity—25 percent of the initiative’s 10,000 MW goal—and we are in the planning stages of projects that will add 5,579 MW more.

Trade Africa

Africa is home to the most promising untapped markets in the world. Fourteen percent of the world’s population lives there, yet African products make up just 2 percent of world trade. Consumer spending is set to rise 80 percent by 2020 and Africa now has a fast-growing middle class, expected to increase from 60 million to 100 million people by 2015.

The continent’s fortune is not the result of good luck. It is the result of years of hard work and better macroeconomic management, improved economic and political governance, increasing foreign capital inflows, and improvements in the business climate. And American support for the development of Africa’s economic growth not only helps Africans translate our investments to improve living standards, but also generates new export markets for American goods and services.

Trade Africa is a partnership between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa to increase internal and regional trade within Africa, and expand trade and economic ties among Africa, the United States, and other global markets. The initiative focuses on the member states of the East African Community (EAC)—Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. An economic success story, the EAC represents a market with significant opportunity for U.S. exports and investment. The five states of the EAC, with a population of more than 130 million people, have increasingly stable and pro-business regulations. They are home to promising local enterprises that are forming creative partnerships with multinational companies. And EAC countries are benefiting from the emergence of an educated, globalized middle class. Intra-EAC trade has doubled in the past five years, and the region’s GDP has risen to more than \$80 billion.

In its initial phase, Trade Africa aims to double intra-regional trade in the EAC, increase EAC exports to the United States by 40 percent, reduce by 15 percent the average time needed to import or export a container from the ports of Mombasa or Dar es Salaam to land-locked Burundi and Rwanda in the EAC’s interior, and decrease by 30 percent the average time a truck takes to transit selected borders.

And the opportunities are evident. Last year, USAID’s East Africa Trade Hub invited representatives from the U.S.-based retailer Anthropologie to visit Kenya in an effort to bring the region’s exceptional textiles and designs to the global marketplace. The company had never before explored sourcing materials from the region, but as a result of USAID’s facilitation, Anthropologie was able to meet African designers and gain access to the marketplace. Last month, the company launched its “Legend and Song Collection,” a new line using traditional African textiles, combined with Anthropologie style, and manufactured entirely in East Africa.

Anthropologie's trust in and promotion of local African companies is a testament to the rising prominence of designers and manufacturers in East Africa. In addition, these designers now have the capacity and tools necessary to find success in the US market.

Young African Leaders Initiative

Africa's population is the youngest in the world. One in three Africans is between the ages of 10 and 24; 60 percent of Africans are below the age of 35. As the responsibility of leadership passes to the next generation, the future of Africa will come to rest on the shoulders of the youth of today. The Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders is the U.S. Government's investment in the next generation of leaders eager and able to shape Africa's future. Our sustained investment in a network of young African leaders will lead to stronger democratic institutions, spur economic growth, and cement stronger ties to the United States.

Starting this summer, the Washington Fellowship will annually bring 500 young leaders to U.S. universities and colleges for academic and leadership training in business and entrepreneurship, civic leadership, and public administration. Formal university coursework will be augmented by workshops, mentoring, and networking opportunities with leaders in each field, as well as internships across the United States. For example, U.S. agencies such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Export-Import Bank have offered to host Washington Fellows as interns to expose them to the U.S. workplace and practices, and build their technical skills. The Fellows will also have the chance to interact with the President during an annual Summit in Washington, D.C., along with other senior U.S. government, business, and civic leaders.

What sets the Washington Fellowship apart from other exchange programs is that our support will continue even after Fellows return home. Through Regional Leadership Centers throughout the continent, USAID and the State Department, in partnership with the private sector, host governments, and civil society, will offer growth opportunities in four key areas: networking, professional development, access to seed capital for entrepreneurs, and opportunities to give back to their communities. This will significantly increase opportunities for employment and accelerate professional development for leaders. The United States African Development Foundation is also supporting this program with a \$5 million entrepreneurship grants program that will include competitively awarded grants for the Fellows with innovative business ideas.

Global Health Initiative

The U.S. government's long-standing bipartisan efforts in global health are a signature of American leadership in the world. Not only do our health programs show America at its best, but they also deliver results. In the past 20 years, child mortality in Africa has dropped by nearly a third, and maternal mortality has dropped by 41 percent. The number of people newly infected with HIV is decreasing for the first time since the HIV epidemic struck, while 10 African countries have reduced the number of malaria cases and deaths by over 50 percent in the last decade.

Investments in global health strengthen fragile or failing states, promote social and economic progress, and support the rise of capable partners who can help to solve regional and global problems. The FY 2015 budget request reflects a comprehensive and integrated global health strategy toward achieving an AIDS-free generation and ending preventable child and maternal

deaths. In Africa, GHI will continue to build upon previous investments made through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), and programs addressing maternal and child health, family planning and reproductive health, tuberculosis, and neglected tropical diseases.

Through diverse partnerships, we are supporting multifaceted approaches to save women's lives. In just one year, work done under Saving Mothers, Giving Life—an intensive effort to strengthen obstetric health services during labor and delivery—resulted in a 30 percent decrease in maternal mortality in target districts of Uganda and a 35 percent reduction in target facilities in Zambia. Because significant blood loss after giving birth is a leading cause of maternal death USAID has promoted active management of the third stage of labor, which can prevent postpartum hemorrhages. With support from USAID, 31 countries have introduced the life-saving practice, including Liberia and Tanzania, where we have demonstrated how health workers can effectively and safely distribute uterotonic drugs to women to prevent bleeding to death during home births.

Gender

Although women make up 61 percent of Africa's labor force, gender gaps persist in terms of pay, labor segregation, and vulnerable work. Whereas half of all self-employed Africans are women, only a quarter of employers are women, and their firms are typically smaller and in less profitable sectors. And women comprise just 4 percent of the university staff teaching the next generation of African leaders and entrepreneurs.

Advancing the status of women and girls is a central element of U.S. foreign policy. In 2012, USAID launched its Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy to improve the lives of citizens around the world by advancing equality between females and males, and empowering women and girls to participate fully in and benefit from the development of their societies. With this policy, we aim to reduce gender disparities, reduce gender-based violence, and increase the capability of women and girls to realize their rights, determine their life outcomes, and influence decision-making across all the spheres in which they live and work. The U.S. Department of State also adopted policy guidance promoting gender equality and combating gender-based violence to achieve our national security and foreign policy objectives.

USAID has a long history of promoting inclusive economic growth around the world, and over time, we have learned that while there is no single recipe for inclusive growth that applies to every country, empowering women and youth and removing barriers to livelihoods are indispensable ingredients. The Women's Empowerment Agriculture Index launched in February 2012, tracks change in women's empowerment that occurs as a direct or indirect result of Feed the Future interventions in targeted geographic zones within the initiative's 19 focus countries. We will use the Index for impact evaluations of distinct projects to examine the effectiveness of different approaches and how they impact women and men.

Democracy and Good Governance

Advancements in gender, agriculture, trade, electricity, and health are all imperative to sustainable development. But the thread that will hold them together or let them unravel is democracy and good governance. A generation ago, the profile of Africa's leaders left much to

be desired. As recently as the early 1990s, the region was dominated by a group of so-called “big men,” many of whom came to power at the barrel of a gun rather than by the ballot box. Several were tyrants who used fear and intimidation to cling to power, and in the process, undermining their countries’ prospects for progress.

However, in recent years, skilled, civilian statesmen and women have begun to replace the “big men” and are serving as role models for a new generation of emerging leaders. Increasingly, they are becoming key partners in development through initiatives such as the Partnership for Growth whereby the leaders of Ghana and Tanzania are working hand-in-glove with the international community to identify and address key constraints to development. This summer, President Obama will welcome heads of state from across the continent to Washington, DC, for a summit that will further strengthen U.S.-Africa ties and advance the Administration’s focus on trade and investment in Africa. It will also highlight America’s commitment to Africa’s security, its democratic development, and its people.


However, it is citizen demand for change, political pluralism, checks and balances, and the rule of law that brings legitimacy to a government and which are the most vital conditions for true democratic transformation. As a result of USAID’s sustained, strategic engagement in Kenya on democracy, governance, elections, and peacebuilding issues, Kenya has made notable progress on many reforms mandated in the wake of the 2007/2008 electoral violence. USAID supported the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, the judiciary, political parties, and millions of peace-minded Kenyans, to facilitate the most complex election in Kenya’s history. The March 2013 election was free, fair, and for the most part peaceful, reflecting the will of the Kenyan people, and it paved the way for rapid implementation of a devolved government as mandated by the new Constitution. The envisioned land reforms, gender equity, electoral reforms, and the devolution of authority and budgetary resources to 47 new county-level governments will address the historical injustices that fueled violence in past elections. This new commitment to peace and national unity in Kenya will enable accelerated and inclusive economic development.

But to continue this progress, sustained, strategic engagement is required. Devolution is a fragile work in process, and the public continues to have concerns about impunity, necessitating continued work on judicial, police, and other reforms. Ensuring that Kenya remains a model in Africa for freedoms of association, assembly, and expression is a priority. And while 2013’s general elections were peaceful, elections are a cyclical process, so engagement is needed to help ensure future rounds are credible and peaceful and reflect the will of the people.

And this process can take years, if not decades. USAID helps support environments in which these conditions can emerge, but that transformation can only occur through the sustained commitment of African leaders to serve the needs of their people, and of their people to have a meaningful voice in their government and the means to hold their leaders accountable. Our programs must support African efforts to address the long-term institutional and structural weaknesses that compromise the rule of law, erode the quality of governance, and make citizens subservient to their governments, rather than the other way around. Only then can African countries begin to realize their development potential and achieve sustainable progress and growth.

These programs are our new model for development in action. Together, we are advancing human development through partnerships led by and tailored to the countries where we work. This approach enables us to make the greatest difference while making the most of every taxpayer dollar. As we continue to work with Congress to achieve our shared goals, we very much look forward to a continued conversation on USAID in Africa.

EARL W. GAST



Assistant Administrator

Earl Gast was sworn in as the Assistant Administrator for Africa in April 2012. In this capacity, he oversees a large and varied portfolio that provided \$6.4 billion in assistance to 49 African countries in 2011. He has a 21-year history working at USAID and leading meaningful development programming, especially in post-conflict and transitioning societies.

Prior to this appointment, Gast served as USAID's mission director in Afghanistan, overseeing the Agency's largest overseas program, which was providing \$4 billion in assistance to increase stability through agriculture, economic development, education and governance. After returning from Afghanistan, Gast served as acting mission director for Colombia. From 2005 to 2008, Gast was the regional mission director for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, and from 2008 to 2010 he was USAID's senior deputy assistant administrator for Africa. He served as the USAID representative to the U.N. agencies in Rome in 2004.

Gast was one of the first USAID employees stationed in Iraq, where, as the mission's deputy director from April 2003 to March 2004, he helped launch operations and manage a \$2.2 billion reconstruction program in the conflict-riddled country. He played an equally important role in developing the post-crisis strategy for Kosovo, where he served from June 2002 to April 2003 as deputy director overseeing all mission operations. From 2000 to 2002, Gast was the supervisory program officer for USAID's Caucasus regional mission, following his work assuming supervisory program officer responsibilities for USAID's Ukraine regional mission in 1996. In 1995, Gast was an advisor to the U.S. Embassy in Russia in a special office created by the U.S. Ambassador.

Gast began his career with USAID in 1990 as a project development officer for USAID/Philippines. He has received numerous awards and commendations for his dedicated service. Most prominently, he received the Agency's Award for Heroism in 2004 and, in 2003, the Distinguished Unit Award for his work in Iraq. Gast also received the C. Herbert Rees Award in 1999.

Gast received a master's degree in political science and Middle East studies in 1987 from George Washington University. He graduated summa cum laude from the University of Maryland in 1984 with a bachelor's degree in history and criminal law. He speaks Russian and Arabic in addition to his native English.

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. HERRLING

Ms. GRANGER. Ms. Herrling, you are now recognized.

Ms. HERRLING. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Granger, Ranking Member Lowey, members of the committee for inviting me here this morning.

President Obama's 2015 budget request of \$1 billion, an 11 percent increase over last year, will show MCC is continuing to deliver results for the American people, for our partner countries that share our values, and for the administration's priority, from advancing transparency to supporting open data and evidence-based programming to building new partners and markets in Africa, including through Power Africa. We will continue to work hard to keep MCC successful, and that means working hand in hand with you.

I am going to focus here on three things: what makes MCC work, what we have achieved particularly in Africa, and what is next.

MCC was created 10 years ago with the model very purposely built on the lessons others learned before us. You referred to them, Ms. Lowey, in your opening remarks. And so, as you well know, we have a singular mission: reducing poverty through economic growth.

We work with a limited number of countries, poor, but well governed, and they themselves design and implement the programs. We target our investments to programs that accelerate growth and generate a rate of return, and we evaluate every major program, sharing our results publicly, part of why MCC was ranked number one transparent agency in the world.

Now, Africa has seen the bulk of MCC's work. Some 15 of our 27 signed compacts have been with African countries, totaling close to \$6 billion, and the results are impressive. I could list numbers.

We often come up here and list numbers of kilometers of roads paved, farmers trained, land titles given particularly to women. We live by these numbers. We publish these numbers. We learn from these numbers.

But a list of numbers doesn't often tell the whole story, and we want all of these outputs to add up to economic growth and increased incomes. That is the real impact that we are working to achieve. And with your support, MCC will continue to forge successful partnerships in Africa.

Our 2015 request is slated for four African countries: Liberia, Morocco, Niger and Tanzania. Liberia and Niger are new compact partners, and it is always very exciting when new countries have worked very hard to pass our eligibility requirements and are in the investment pool.

In other cases, the data shows that the greatest opportunity for impact is deepening partnerships with countries we have worked with before, like Ghana and Lesotho. In all cases, MCC's board is looking to put hard-earned taxpayer dollars where it will deliver the maximum results.

In Africa and elsewhere, the question now is: What is next? Let me highlight three things that we would like to be working with you on over the coming year.

First, creative financing mechanisms. Pay for performance and cash on delivery could give us ways to further innovate, scale, and sustain our investments.

Second, regional impact. The port expansion program we funded in Benin, for example, has regional impact. Enhanced trade opportunities were certainly a benefit for Benin, but, also, for its landlocked neighbors. But perhaps there is more we can do on the assessment and operational front.

And, third, very importantly, fighting corruption. You can't fight corruption if you can't measure it well. And to keep our measures cutting-edge, MCC is bringing together an alliance of experts and users of governance data to see if new and improved ways of assessing a country's efforts to combat corruption can be created.

For 10 years now, you have supported MCC's work. Thank you very much for that support. It is very helpful to what we do, constantly adapting, applying, and we hope for your continued support going forward. And I am happy to answer any questions.

[The information follows:]

**Testimony of Sheila Herrling,
Acting Chief Executive Officer
Millennium Challenge Corporation
House Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations
April 29, 2014**

Thank you, Chairwoman Granger, Ranking Member Lowey and members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to discuss MCC's role in helping reduce poverty in Africa through economic growth, as well as our work to foster democracy and human rights, and create opportunities for trade and investment.

President Obama's fiscal year (FY) 2015 budget request for the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) of \$1 billion, an 11 percent increase over FY 2014 funding levels, is currently slated for four African countries: Liberia, Morocco, Niger and Tanzania. Additionally, Ghana is in the final stages of developing a proposed compact.

The President's strong request for FY 15 reflects the agency's key role in advancing the Administration's development priorities, from open data to evidence-based programming to Power Africa. The Administration is also requesting an additional \$350 million for MCC as part of the proposed Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative. These resources would further strengthen the agency's efforts to establish business-friendly environments in Africa where U.S. and other companies can compete and win.

I recognize the fiscal pressures the members of this subcommittee, in particular, face. Every account is under scrutiny, especially when there is a request for more money, and that is understandable. It is why MCC treats foreign assistance like a business, making decisions based on hard data and hard-nosed analysis. It is why we closely monitor results on the ground, and hold partner countries accountable. And it is why we share detailed information about our investments publicly. With the continued support of Congress, the agency will continue creating the conditions for a more secure and prosperous future at home and abroad.

Ten Years of Effectively Fighting Global Poverty

This year is the 10th anniversary of MCC's founding. I am especially grateful to share this milestone with this subcommittee and your colleagues, without whose support we would not be so successful. The bipartisan decision to launch MCC was a brave one, and no one knew whether the experiment would work. Was it possible to select partner countries based on solid, objective evidence of their commitment to good governance, economic freedom and investing in their people? Could you really run development like a business, using rigorous economic analysis to decide which investments in those countries would have the biggest impact – and then doing independent evaluations to find out if they really worked? And would poor countries truly be able to take ownership of these investments, and ensure the money was not wasted or diverted?

Ten years later, I am happy to report that the experiment has been a success, and that the trust you put in this new approach to aid effectiveness has paid off. Over the past decade, we have signed 27 compacts which are expected to benefit almost 174 million people worldwide. Of those 27

signed compacts, 15 have been signed with African countries, totaling close to \$6 billion. These partnerships span the continent and include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia.

Thanks to your faith in MCC, in Africa alone, over 656,000 people now have improved access to clean water, over 188,000 farmers have been trained, and close to 268,000 households now have legal protections for their land. The numbers are impressive – and, as you know, we care a lot about numbers at MCC – but they don’t begin to tell the whole story

Behind every number is a person who benefits from MCC’s investment. These include the women in Burkina Faso, Mali and Mozambique whose names can now appear on land titles, paving the way for them to be economic agents of change. These are the patients at new health clinics in Lesotho and students at schools in Ghana. And these are families with better access to clean water for drinking or irrigation for citizens of Cabo Verde, Zambia, Mozambique, Mali, Senegal and Ghana. All of these meet the agency’s strict requirements for only doing projects that promote economic growth.

And our investments have a valuable regional impact. The MCC-funded port expansion in Benin, for example, is a gateway for trade that benefits not only that country but also the land-locked neighbors of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The roads we constructed in Tanzania are improving access to the major port of Mombasa in Kenya.

In all these ways and more, the American people, through MCC, have changed the lives of the poor – in Africa and around the world -- for the better.

Advancing American Values

Fighting poverty is MCC’s central mission, but that singular focus is combined with a deep commitment to core values. Those values are reflected, above all, in our highly competitive selection process, where we evaluate potential partner countries based on third-party data indicating their commitment to such values as respect for democracy, the rule of law, equal rights, government transparency and economic freedom. By being selective, MCC has created a race to the top, with countries competing to perform best on our public scorecards. This phenomenon, dubbed the MCC Effect, has been documented by third party observers. According to one academic study¹, development experts consistently rank MCC’s scorecard as one of the most influential tools to incentivize policy reform – a remarkable achievement for a small agency that’s just been around for a decade.

The “MCC Effect” continues after selection, as we work with partner countries to reform policies, strengthen institutions and improve data quality so that our investments will succeed. And we continue to hold our partners accountable throughout the life of an investment – we will suspend or terminate a compact if a partner country does not live up to its commitment to sound political and economic governance.

Another value that MCC reinforces is respect for the rights of women. From selecting partners to developing and implementing projects to monitoring and evaluating their impact, MCC works to

remove gender and other social barriers that can limit who benefits from the economic growth our investments are designed to create. We believe that gender equality makes economic sense, and we hold our partner countries accountable for meeting key gender requirements. We even wait to disburse funds until partner countries meet our gender requirements. MCC's commitment to gender equality is an essential part of how we fight poverty and it has set a new standard in development.

One of MCC's founding values is transparency, and I am proud to report that MCC was ranked number one in the world last year on the Aid Transparency Index. By sharing information about our investments, we allow U.S. taxpayers to ensure that their dollars are being spent wisely, help businesses make sound investment decisions, allow other donors to find out which approaches are most successful, and empower citizens of our partner countries to hold their governments accountable.

Fighting Corruption

Corruption in any country is an unacceptable tax on economic growth, and an obstacle to the private sector investment needed to reduce poverty. Corruption hinders economic growth by increasing costs, lowering productivity, discouraging investment, and reducing confidence in public institutions. American businesses seeking out opportunities abroad want environments that are free from corruption and conducive to job creation. Policymakers – including this Subcommittee -- want to be sure that investments of U.S. tax dollars are not susceptible to corruption.

Fighting corruption has always been a cornerstone of MCC's approach to poverty reduction. MCC evaluates prospective partner countries based on how they perform on the agency's annual scorecards, comprising 20 third-party indicators. By requiring countries to pass the Control of Corruption indicator in order to pass our scorecard, we seek to ensure our partners share this commitment. We also work to combat corruption in our partner countries through our poverty-reduction programs, where appropriate. And we take stringent measures to prevent, detect, and respond to instances of possible corruption as our compacts are implemented. These measures have been adopted by some of our country partners in their own government procurement systems.

Our current measures to track and combat corruption are of the highest quality – and we are determined to keep them cutting edge. MCC staff are reaching out to other experts in the fields of measuring and monitoring corruption to see if, together, we can come up with new, improved ways of assessing countries' efforts to combat corruption.

We are not alone in recognizing the need for more specific, actionable measures to fight corruption and promote transparency and accountability. Earlier this month, along with Global Integrity – an organization dedicated to providing data and technology that links reformers working on open government, transparency, and accountability – and with the support of Omidyar Network and the Hewlett Foundation, MCC co-hosted a workshop with experts and data scientists. The workshop was part of MCC's ongoing efforts to ensure it uses the best governance data available to identify partner countries that share the agency's commitment to fighting corruption. The workshop marked a watershed moment for organizations intending to establish an alliance to improve the

collection and use of governance data—informally dubbed the “Governance Data Alliance.”

MCC shares with this subcommittee, a real and deep interest in improving the way the world measures corruption, and it is our goal, along with the members of the Governance Data Alliance, to ensure we are using the best governance data available to identify partner countries that share our commitment to fighting corruption. We look forward to engaging with you further as we do this.

The FY 2015 Request

MCC’s funding request for FY 2015 will allow us to achieve a more strategic and lasting impact on the economic development and public policies of countries that the United States will look to as its emerging economic, political, and security partners of the 21st century.

Power Africa

The request for funds would support the key role MCC is playing in the Administration’s Power Africa initiative. In three of the compacts in development in Africa – Ghana, Liberia and Tanzania – we have identified lack of access to affordable and reliable power as a binding constraint to growth. MCC projects will support physical assets and help to leverage financing from private investors and independent power producers. MCC may also invest in power sector governance and reform, as well as to reduce electricity distribution losses, improve reliability and access, and create an enabling environment for private investment in the sector. MCC has worked closely with private sector companies that plan to make substantial investments as a result of the policy reforms and projects contemplated under MCC’s compacts. In fact, General Electric has announced a potential \$1.5 billion, 1,000 megawatt investment in Ghana’s energy sector, and has credited MCC with paving the way for this opportunity.

In addition, the \$350 million requested for MCC as part of the Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative will enable MCC to pursue additional investment opportunities in compacts in development with Ghana, Liberia and Tanzania, and to contribute even further to Power Africa.

FY 2015 Compact Assistance Breakdown

For FY 2015, MCC would use \$766 million of our \$1 billion request for compact assistance to Liberia, Morocco, Niger, and Tanzania. All four countries are currently developing compact proposals for approval by MCC’s Board of Directors.

These countries, home to nearly 100 million people combined, are among the world’s poorest, but each has taken significant steps to improve governance and achieve eligibility for MCC compact assistance. The increase in funding will support significant compact investments in these countries to unlock key constraints to economic growth, incentivize policy and institutional reforms necessary for private investment, and improve the well-being of some of the world’s poorest people.

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Liberia is still in the early stages of compact development but initial analyses point to access to electricity and road infrastructure as binding constraints to economic growth. Liberia has the least dense road network of any country in West Africa and very high road transport costs relative to neighboring countries. Lack of access to markets hinders economic activity, connection to social services and development of the agriculture sector.

Morocco has completed preliminary consultations with the private sector and civil society and is preparing concept proposals to address identified constraints to growth. Morocco hopes to address education quality issues that currently mean more than 70 percent of students do not meet basic learning requirements, as well as significant gender and urban/rural gaps. Morocco also lacks land policy and systems in both rural and urban areas to support industrial growth and more productive agriculture.

Niger's economic analysis has shown that access to water resources for agriculture and livestock, as well as regulatory and institutional barriers to cross-border trade, are all constraints to growth there. In 2011, Niger was the first country to demonstrate that with sufficient political will countries can restore their MCC eligibility following suspension. Countries must uphold their commitment to good governance throughout our partnership and if a country demonstrates a pattern of actions inconsistent with MCC's eligibility criteria, assistance may be suspended or terminated, as it was with Niger in 2009. By holding partners accountable, MCC encourages countries to make the right decisions.

Tanzania's economic analysis has highlighted constraints to growth from the lack of reliable electricity and the limited network of market access roads. Tanzania, therefore, is exploring a compact that will improve the technical, commercial and operational viability of the public power utilities, expand access to electricity, and improve segments of their road network that will help unleash the economic potential of key agricultural regions.

Ghana, which will be funded by prior year funds, has identified the power sector as the main focus of compact development. The government has submitted project proposals, focused on power sector investment, governance, institutional and regulatory reform, reducing electricity distribution losses, improving reliability and access, and creating an enabling environment for private investment in the sector. The prospective compact in Ghana may also present some of the best opportunities for innovation in financing structures such as cash-on-delivery aid or performance-based aid mechanisms.

Additionally, in December 2013, the Board selected **Lesotho** as eligible to develop a proposal for a second compact. Lesotho successfully completed a five-year, \$363 million MCC compact in September 2013, which helped expand water supply for household and industrial use, strengthened the country's health care system and removed barriers to foreign and local private sector investment. MCC also supported the passage of landmark legislation in Lesotho that ended the second-class status of married women and granted spouses equal rights.

Conclusion

Madam Chairwoman and members of the Committee, let me end today by quoting President Obama. Speaking in Tanzania last year, the President said something with which I believe we can all agree:

“...the purpose of development should be to build capacity and to help other countries actually to stand on their own feet -- whether it's in agriculture, in health systems, in electricity. Instead of perpetual aid, development has to fuel investment and economic growth so that assistance is no longer necessary, so some of the more successful countries in Africa can start being donors instead of recipients of assistance.”

Through our investments, and through our focus on accountability, MCC is helping countries to stand on their own feet.

By adopting international standards for financial management, procurement, and social and environmental safeguards, MCC partners are ensuring that the work we do has lasting value, long after our investments end. Our partners have taken and tailored the MCC model to manage their national development strategies, strengthen their operations and sustain their own results. We can see this in countries such as Honduras, which has kept the MCA-Honduras—the local organization that implemented the compact—in place after our compact ended in order to coordinate other donor activity in the country. And we see it in Mongolia, which is adopting not only MCC's economic rates of return analyses to develop new projects, but also MCC's open procurements process when implementing those projects, as well as MCC's guidelines for gender integration, environmental and social assessment and rigorous project monitoring and evaluation. After ten years, our work may be far from done, but we have accomplished a lot.

I would like to again thank you and your colleagues for your strong support of the agency and our mission over the past ten years, and in years to come.


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¹ | Parks, B. and Rice, Z. 2013. *Measuring the Policy Influence of the Millennium Challenge Corporation: A Survey-Based Approach*. The Institute of Theory and Practice of International Relations: The College of William and Mary.



Sheila Herrling

Acting Chief Executive Officer, Millennium Challenge Corp.



Sheila Herrling is Acting Chief Executive Officer of the Millennium Challenge Corporation. She is a senior executive with more than 20 years of experience in international development and U.S. foreign policy, focused on aid innovation and effectiveness, monitoring and evaluation, and economic analysis.

Ms. Herrling also serves as MCC Vice President for the Department of Policy and Evaluation, a position she has held since 2010. In this role she is responsible for managing MCC's annual country eligibility process and directing MCC's threshold program.

As DPE vice president, she also promotes policy improvement in MCC's compact and threshold operations; manages the technical economic analysis and evaluation methods that underpin MCC's engagement with partner countries, including the development and conduct of rigorous independent evaluations of MCC programs; and advances learning and sharing of best practices internally, among U.S. Government agencies and internationally.

Before joining MCC, Ms. Herrling was a senior policy director at the Center for Global Development, an independent, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to reducing global poverty and inequality and making globalization work for the poor. She was also a co-founder of the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network project, a broad based coalition of international development and foreign policy experts and advocates helping to reform the U.S. foreign assistance program.

Ms. Herrling was an adviser on President Barack Obama's transition team. Prior to CGD, she served in senior management positions at the U.S. Department of Treasury, including deputy director of the office of development policy and adviser to the U.S. executive director of the African Development Bank.

Ms. Herrling is happily married and blessed with four amazing children.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you all very much.

I am going to start with a question and then turn to Mrs. Lowey. Conservation, of course, you know is critically important to our country's efforts. So I was very disappointed that the budget reflects for biodiversity a cut by half from the current level.

The programs are really important, and you know they are important. Deforestation, over-fishing and wildlife poaching, which has increased significantly, these needs are not decreasing.

So I would turn to Mr. Gast, please. Can you explain the proposed cuts at a time when the needs really have never been more urgent, I think especially in Africa.

Mr. GAST. Thank you for the question.

And we also take it very seriously. In fact, as I mentioned, we are looking at new models and innovations for development.

And one area that we think where new technology can play a role is in anti-poaching efforts. And, in fact, very shortly we are going to be issuing a solicitation for ideas on how we can bring technology to bear to help on anti-poaching efforts.

So, for example, very lightweight and very cost-effective, cost-efficient UAVs are being piloted in some of the parks with USAID funding.

With that, though, getting back to your question about funding, I believe the funding from fiscal year 2013 to 2015 represents a straight line and not a significant decrease, but I can say that we are looking at options on increasing the funding for this year—this current year.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

One of the programs that receives this type of funding is the Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment. USAID and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service both implement this program.

Can you explain who does what, how that is coordinated.

Mr. GAST. Certainly. And, also, the Department of State is a key partner in this as well through the use of INCLE funds.

We have a partnership with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. It also receives a direct appropriation for the CARPE program, as you mentioned.

Where we believe that we add value as a development agency is working with the communities and working with them in providing assistance in helping them themselves maintain and conserve the area of CARPE, where Fish and Wildlife Service brings its unique capacity, which is training the law enforcement side and the fish—and their counterpart, if you will, of the government enforcement agencies for conservation.

Ms. GRANGER. Good.

As you look at the technologies that you referred to, would you keep us involved and aware of what is happening?

You know, Mrs. Lowey and I have talked about this before and certainly with our staff and said, "You know, I would hate to think, as I served in Congress, that I watched those wonderful herds of elephants and rhinos disappear from wildlife."

And so we are willing to help, certainly. So keep us being involved.

Mrs. Lowey.

Mr. GAST. Thank you.

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much.

With regard to conflict mitigation and humanitarian response, Congress provided robust funding for the humanitarian accounts in the fiscal year 2014 omnibus act, yet, the fiscal year 2015 request cuts IDA by 28 percent and MRA by 33 percent from the fiscal year 2014 enacted levels.

But the number of refugees, internally displaced persons, conflict victims, other populations of concern has risen to an 18-year high with more than 45.2 million forcibly displaced predominantly due to violent conflict or more. The number is expected to grow as violent conflicts persist in the Central African Republic and South Sudan.

So would the President's proposed deep cuts to these life-saving accounts in his fiscal year budget provide your agencies the resources you need to respond adequately to humanitarian crises in Africa?

What is the best plan to utilize finite resources to address increasingly complex deteriorating crises in DRC, Central African Republic, South Sudan, the Sahel, Nigeria?

What programs in what countries would likely be cut?

And is there enough funding in the IDA/MRA accounts to respond to a new emergency in Africa?

And since we can't do it all and since our budget is decreasing, I would be very interested in having you address how you are working cooperatively with other donors so there is coordination, not repetitive efforts, and that you are accomplishing something.

And if there is time in the couple of minutes, I would be very interested to know how all this relates to the corruption.

So thank you. Maybe you can begin.

Mr. GAST. Sure. Absolutely.

And then—and, Congresswoman Lowey, let me get back to a point that you made in your opening statement, and that is that it is not the sole responsibility of the U.S.

Mrs. LOWEY. If you could answer that thoroughly.

Mr. GAST. But it is our responsibility as leaders to bring together other donors. And that, I think, is where we have been applying a lot of our effort.

Our administrator just 2 weeks ago co-hosted with Valerie Amos of the U.N. and, also, with ECHO Chairwoman Georgieva at a conference among donors here to talk about the situation in South Sudan.

And we have been very generous in using 2013 and 2014. We have provided more than \$400 million in humanitarian assistance combined.

And this was an effort to bring together all the donors and development ministers and finance ministers to talk about the crisis and, also, the urgent need for additional funding. Some made pledges there, but Norway agreed to have a donors conference later this month.

So I think that is one way that we are trying to ensure that these crises are not underfunded, just by exercising leadership and getting—and bringing in other donors.

Getting back to your point of the reduced request, even with the crises that we have and two level-three emergencies within Afri-

ca—CAR and South Sudan—we believe that we will have carryover funding on the humanitarian side to help us support humanitarian efforts in 2015.

Getting back to one other point—because you mentioned the Sahel—and that is we have the concept of resilience where we are actually marrying together our development assistance funds with humanitarian assistance so that we have a more regulated and sustained effort in supporting populations that face chronic emergencies.

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. And if I may add to Earl and agree with what he said before, we do work very, very closely with others in the donor community and we look for opportunities to find new donors as well to support our efforts.

The primary solution to all of these problems is finding a peaceful solution in the DRC. Our special envoy, Senator Feingold, has been working relentlessly with the other special envoys to—we call them the five E's—to find a solution.

We find an accord in Nairobi in December, ending the fighting in DRC with—in 2013, and we are working very closely with the Angolans to see, as chair of the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes regions, what additional role the government of Angola can play.

It is a government with a lot of money, and they have been very, very helpful in providing assistance to CAR and we think that they can do more.

On the corruption front, it is—our efforts are relentless. And I have to commend our colleagues from MCC. When I was in Liberia, the best tool that I had was the MCC indicators on corruption.

And when those numbers went down, I would take those indicators in to the President and say, “If you want an MCC compact, you need to deal with this.”

And we see that Liberia has succeeded. Corruption still is an issue there, but it is something that I think governments realize, if they are to be taken seriously, they have to address.

Ms. HERRLING. So if I could briefly, you know, our model resides on this belief that the best antidote to poverty and to instability is economic growth and opportunity in these countries.

We are in a limited set of countries, as I said in my opening remarks, but that does require the three of us to work hand in hand across those countries, most certainly to avoid duplication of effort. But in the best-case situation, we are looking to maximize impact, bringing to others comparative advantages to the situation.

Thank you, Linda, for referencing the scorecard on the corruption point.

You all know we do have a hard hurdle on control of corruption for our partners to get into our program. We take it seriously. We monitor it seriously. We message seriously, as do our counterparts.

And we have seen it have an effect, as you referenced in Liberia. So thank you for doing that.

The collaboration is both at the policy level. So on our board, we have the Secretary of State chairing, the USAID administrator. We have the Secretary of the Treasury, who covers the MDBs. We have the USTR. So all of these interests come together in a very purposeful way at the policy level.

At the operational level, we get to two brass tacks: who is doing what? So if we are building a large irrigation project in Senegal, USAID is training the farmers.

We are very purposeful in our collaboration. I think we have come a long way over the last couple of years on this front.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you for that.

Before I go to Mr. Rooney, I thought—when you said you were going to answer Mrs. Lowey's questions, I thought you were going to address the \$700,000 to educate one person.

Who could answer that question?

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I heard it and I made note of it. And I hope it is a mistake, because I know that we don't spend \$700,000 to train one person on the security front. I know that we have a limited budget and we have trained thousands of African—

Mrs. LOWEY. It is vocational training used in which program?

Mr. GAST. CVE program.

Mrs. LOWEY. CBE.

Mr. GAST. CVE.

Do you know which country? We will look into it.

Mrs. LOWEY. Okay. Yeah.

Mr. GAST. We will look into it.

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much. I was shocked when I saw that number, and I—my staff insists it wasn't a typo. Thank you very much.

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Well, I am happy to know that it is not on the security, front spending that kind of money.

Ms. GRANGER. Mr. Rooney.

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I would like to talk about an issue which, for me, is a little bit personal. I have a cousin who has actually become a famous movie star named Rooney Mara.

Before she was famous, she went to Kenya in high school to visit Kibera—what they called urban slum outside of Nairobi, and it motivated her to start a non-profit called the Uweza Aid Foundation.

And, apparently, there was a bunch of other similar-type charities that were supposed to be geared towards servicing areas like that. As you know, this slum specifically came out of Kenya's failure to recognize them as part of the country.

They are sort of like a people without a government and a country, the way that I was explained to it. So they are kind of on their own.

And one of the things that I came to learn was that they don't receive Federal funding from us. There are charities there that try to help them.

But one of the things that became disconcerting to me is there was a lot of charities, just like in anything that you see with 501(c)(3)'s, where charities are set up or groups are made to look like they are going to help a certain situation, and then, as you know, they end up not doing that.

They end up helping themselves or raising a lot of money for staff or what have you. So that was one of the reasons why she was

motivated to do something different to actually try to help these people.

So my question has to do with that, and I want to make sure that I get it right. So forgive me for reading it.

But a history of failed aid projects and forced evictions have left many of these residents that I am talking about feeling exploited by these outsiders and what has compelled my cousin to start her own non-profit in the first place.

There is a great deal of mistrust of the government and the NGOs not only in this area, which she focuses on this area called Kibera, but, arguably, a number of other urban slums just like it all across Africa.

Has State or USAID offices in Kenya implemented any programs or projects to provide either basic assistance, water sanitation, healthcare, education to the residents of Kibera?

And, also, can you address—does State or USAID do anything to sort of police or monitor these groups that are supposed to be coming in there trying to help—this might be outside of your lane; so, forgive me if I just don't know—that are just using these people to exploit for their own financial benefit?

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Let me start.

I was in Kibera on my last trip to Kenya in December, visiting a project that USAID was funding with an NGO there. And there are a number of such projects.

And not to speak on USAID's behalf, but I served in Kenya in the mid-1990s as the refugee coordinator working for PRM and working with NGOs that were working with displaced particularly Somali refugees, and part of my job there was to monitor those organizations that we were funding to provide assistance.

I don't doubt—in fact, I would say I know that there are organizations that are not reputable, are not credible, that seek funds to line their own pockets.

But I would say that any organization that we are funding would be monitored and monitored quite robustly by our people who are on the ground. And I think we take it very seriously.

That doesn't mean that there may be some that slip through the cracks, but we would be interested in knowing so we can make sure that—our job is to protect U.S. taxpayers' dollars overseas and see that the funding that is being provided is going to where it needs to go.

And, again, I saw one of the projects—and I was very impressed—that was providing water support in Kibera—in the Kibera slums.

Mr. GAST. And if I may just add, we do a very thorough vetting process of the organizations that we fund, whether they are U.S.-based or on the continent.

That doesn't mean that they don't fall down in meeting their—in meeting their requirements from time to time. But as the Assistant Secretary mentioned, we do have monitoring officers go out and monitor the impact of the work that the NGOs are performing.

One thing we do do as well is, even if we are not funding an organization, an NGO has to adhere to international standards in providing humanitarian assistance.

And if we do see NGOs falling down on the jobs, ones that we are not funding, that information is then reported to the government.

Mr. ROONEY. If I could ask a quick follow-up question.

With regard to State, how do you deal with Kenya with regard to a place like this and our affiliation or our relationship with them? How do you deal with them when they are just ignoring these type of places?

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I think that is a situation that exists across the continent of Africa, where we find people who are disenfranchised and who are not benefiting from the government services. We try to work with the government.

For example, when I went out to Kibera, we took the Minister of Education with us out there to make sure that he also saw what we saw in those—in those slums, and we tried to help them build capacity to deal with some of those issues.

But I would venture to say that Kenya is not the only one—the only country with this kind of situation. I saw similar situations in the slums of Nigeria.

And I have to commend your cousin for the work that she does, because there are a number of organizations like her organizations who are really reaching communities that nobody else cares about and they are able to provide assistance in a way that we all appreciate, and I think is a positive reflection on America as a country. So, again, I thank her.

And we do deal with these governments. We push them. But it is still a work in progress for us.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mrs. Lowey.

Mrs. LOWEY. Just briefly, I remember taking—I just wanted to associate myself with the remarks of my colleague. I remember I led—I think it was 2003 a trip to Kibera. And I was so angry at the mud and the filth and the fact that the council people were coming in and all taking their share.

We met with people who were doing micro-enterprise, and the local gang, supposedly, elected officials, were taking their share. And I just felt we were facilitating this mess.

I said as long as I had something to do with it, I don't want to give a dime—I said this to the housing administrator, that, "I don't want to give a dime to you or anyone here unless you mow this down and build another housing complex."

So I just really want to associate myself with your remarks. And we just can't keep doing this kind of thing and perpetuating these conditions—were you on that trip, Barb?

Ms. LEE. Yes.

Mrs. LOWEY. Oh. That is right.

Ms. LEE. Yes. I remember it very well.

Mrs. LOWEY. I remember we got so angry there. And I don't remember the name of the housing administrator, but it was just the government was collecting from these people. They were living in inhumane conditions.

And I am not saying that this is unique, and you are saying there are other places like that. But I remember talking to the

U.N. staff. I said, "Why are you here? You are just encouraging this whole way of life."

So I think there is a real question. I would like to continue that discussion. What are we doing? Maybe our money would be better used just building another decent housing settlement for these people, but keeping them in this abject poverty with filth and mud—was very upsetting to us. I think we are all making that point.

I don't want to take up more time at this hearing. Many of my colleagues haven't spoken. But I thank you for bringing up Kibera again.

And because there are so many other challenges, Barbara, I don't think we have talked about Kibera recently, but I would like to have a discussion with you.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mr. Schiff.

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Madam Chair.

There are so many issues to go over. Let me just throw out a few and then see if you can respond to as many as you are able to with the time.

Can you tell us the status of the peacekeeping operation in Central African Republic (CAR), which the U.N. Security Council voted to deploy April 10th.

Also, can you tell us what efforts we are making to address the violence in South Sudan.

And then I wanted to ask you about Ethiopia. Nine bloggers and journalists were arrested in—out of Saboba last week, just days before Secretary Kerry's anticipated visit. Six bloggers for Zone 9 and Amharic-language website whose writers have criticized the government, and three freelance journalists were arrested. No formal charges have yet been filed.

This is just the latest episode in an all-too-familiar pattern of harassment of journalists in Ethiopia, throughout all of Africa and, unfortunately, in all too many places around the world.

I hope the Secretary will raise the issue of press freedom in his meetings, and I wish you could update us on the current situation with the nine specifically and more generally about the department's efforts to promote press freedom in Africa.

Finally, on the issue of the LGBT attacks in Uganda, according to the Associated Press earlier this month, Ugandan police raided the offices of a U.S.-funded project. The Makerere University-Walter Reed project in Kampala was targeted for training youths in homosexuality, supposedly, said a government spokesman.

The project later suspended its activities in Uganda after one of its staff, a Ugandan citizen, was arrested and briefly detained by police on Thursday. Now, this is a program that is funded through PEPFAR.

I applaud the government—our government for its recent action to divert money away from the Ugandan Government and to NGOs.

But if the Ugandan Government continues to harass health workers serving LGBT patients, it will be nearly impossible for LGBT patients to get access to appropriate healthcare.

What are we prepared to do to ensure that U.S.-funded HIV-related health services in Uganda and elsewhere are comprehensive and inclusive?

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you. Let me start, and I will go as long as you allow me to go.

Let me start with CAR and the peacekeeping operations there. I was in CAR a few weeks ago with Ambassador Power and I was also there with her in December. And we continue to be very deeply concerned about the situation there.

The U.N. did pass a resolution on April 10th for a PKO operation that will start in September of this year. But between now and September, we need to work with the African Union troops to ensure that they have what they need in terms of equipment and authority to address the ongoing violence in that country.

I saw yesterday that the U.N. had moved 1300 Muslims out of Bangui to another area of the country. And from December to our visit a few weeks ago, the Muslim population has almost completely left Bangui because of the violence there.

The situation, again, continues to be very, very troubling for us as well as for the French, who have troops on the ground, the African Union with troops on the ground.

Part of what the Secretary will be doing on his trip to the region is meeting with the Angolan Government, as well as with the U.N., to talk about how we can more robustly address the security issues that exist in CAR.

On the humanitarian side, I will leave that to Earl to talk about, but we have also been robustly involved with trying to provide humanitarian assistance to the government.

On the situation in South Sudan, again, this is something that is high on the Secretary's agenda for our trip leaving tonight.

He will be in Addis, meeting with the IGAD negotiators as well as the IGAD foreign ministers to talk about the way forward for South Sudan. And then he is going into South Sudan to meet with Salva Kiir and will be making contacts with Riek Machar as well.

The violence there has led to thousands of deaths, and we have been working with both the A.U. as well as IGAD to address some of those concerns.

Former President Obasanjo was in South Sudan last week. I spoke to him. He is chairing—heading the Commission of Inquiry for the A.U. to look at the atrocities that have been committed so that we have some record to hold people accountable for the actions that have occurred there. And, as you know, the President signed an executive order to provide sanctions on those people.

On Ethiopia, we were very disappointed to hear once again that Ethiopian bloggers were arrested. They are added to the others who have also been arrested.

And we continue to raise this on a regular basis with the Ethiopian Government and it is on the agenda for the Secretary to raise when he meets with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister while he is in Addis this week.

And, finally, on the LGBT, we are very, very concerned about the increase in anti-LGBT legislation that has been proposed on the continent of Africa and elsewhere in the world. The legislation in Uganda has led to renewed violence against the LGBT community.

As you know, the President announced that what has happened in Uganda will complicate our relationship. We are in the process of reviewing that relationship and our funding to see where changes can be made and, in particular, changes that will take funding away from those organizations and entities that discriminate against the LGBT community.

This is still a work in progress. We are quietly working with other governments that may be considering such legislation and discouraging those governments from taking actions that might discriminate against the LGBT community.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mr. Diaz-Balart.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

I first apologize because, as you know, we have—

Ms. GRANGER. Absolutely.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART [continuing]. Conflicting hearings at the same time.

Ms. GRANGER. Right.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Luckily, a few of them are right across the hall. And I—again, I apologize if this has already been touched on.

But dealing a little bit with the increase of China's activity throughout, frankly, the world, the past decade or so has seen a huge increase in Chinese aid and development projects throughout Africa. It is apparent the regime's so-called charm offensive is intended to secure political and economic influence throughout the continent.

And, the Chinese have also been on this unrelenting quest for natural resources, and we see that wherever they are, including rare earth elements. They bring in, as you know, Chinese labor and equipment without transferring those skills and technology to the local level.

It is also pretty clear that they are not, frankly, in the business of exporting, western values, like democracy and the rule of law and human rights.

So how—are we using and what can we do—what can the United States do to use our considerable influence to counter and contain some of those actions that China is pursuing rather aggressively?

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you for that question.

And I see this in two aspects. We talk about the fact that some of the problems that we are dealing with in Africa are not just U.S. problems.

Interestingly, on South Sudan, we have been working with the Chinese, and they have come onboard with the special envoys to push for an end to the violence in South Sudan.

And so I see that our work is partially to encourage change on how the Chinese approach Africa and encourage the Chinese economic activities in Africa to complement what other governments and donors are doing to the best interests of African countries.

However, it is our view that a lot of the foreign investment that is going into Africa that the Chinese are providing does not support our values of good governance and transparency and responsible management of natural resources.

And we have regular dialogue with African governments to encourage that they also understand why it is so important as they

are dealing with the Chinese to have the Chinese take into account issues that are related to human rights and political freedoms and press freedoms.

When I was in Liberia—and I use that as an example a lot because I know Mrs. Lowey knows Liberia quite well—the Chinese provided some very useful development projects to Liberia.

And so I encouraged the government to make sure that they were getting the best out of those development projects to ensure that the Chinese used local labor as we would use local labor and that they abided by the same transparency rules that we abided by.

Again, it is going to be up to African countries to negotiate the best deals for themselves, but we also have a responsibility to ensure that there is a level playing field for American companies that are going into Africa and competing with Chinese companies.

So this is something that we are very conscious of, and we continue to work with both governments as well as the Chinese to ensure that their relationships with Africa are not just extractive, but they also contribute to their growth.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Madam Chairwoman, I see that the light is turning yellow; so, I will be very well behaved today. And I yield back.

Ms. GRANGER. I am astounded and pleased. Thank you very much.

Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. It would be the first time.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and thank all of our witnesses.

And let me—

Mr. CUELLAR. Second time, 2 weeks ago.

Ms. LEE. I especially thank you, Madam Chair, and our Ranking Member for this hearing, because I want to follow up on what my colleague just mentioned with regard to China.

Part of the issue is the void that has been left as a result of the lack of focus of the United States as it relates to Africa, and I know that. I was on the authorizing committee for 8 years. I have been very involved on African issues since the 1970s.

And so I am really pleased that we are having this hearing today, and I am pleased that Secretary Kerry is going to the continent, pleased about the President's visits, because it was only when we started working with President Bush on PEPFAR that, really, Africa became a focus of most members of Congress. And so it is really important to understand that history and where we are now.

Not only China, but Brazil and India are making strategic gains in Africa. And very recently I was there, and part of the issue of promoting American values is a very delicate issue because Africans want to develop their continent and their countries in the way that they see fit, recognizing, though, we have to ensure democracy programs and insistence on the human rights standards and what have you, but we have to be very careful when we do this. And so thank you very much for that.

As it relates to—the other thing I wanted to mention is the African heads of state meeting that is taking place here. Thank you

very much for that. I want to commend the President and Secretary for this meeting. And I hope that you engage members of Congress in early August in participating in that meeting because that is going to be a very important meeting.

Ms. LEE. LGBT issues, you have raised most of the answers to the questions, but we haven't received a formal response. I just want to say, the members of the Congressional Black Caucus, each and every member—unprecedented, historical—wrote to Secretary Kerry to ask exactly what Adam Schiff just mentioned, in terms of how we are going to ensure that comprehensive services are delivered and that people do not lose these lifesaving drugs as it relates to HIV and AIDS, but how we do this through NGOs. And so, we would like to have a formal response to our letter.

I wanted to ask you, how are we addressing the issue of these laws in terms of encouraging African governments to look at these laws and how they violate, actually, international standards of human rights, understanding the issues of sovereignty?

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you for that question.

And this is something that we in the Department and across the interagency have been engaged on in an intense way since the passing of these two recent laws in Nigeria and in Uganda, but we were engaged even before that. We were working very, very robustly with both the Nigerians and Ugandan President to discourage them from signing these laws. We clearly failed, but it was not from lack of trying, in terms of our engagement with them. We are engaged with other countries, as well, and we have had some success in discouraging them from passing these laws.

This is a huge, huge problem for us. And I have constantly said it is not just an African problem, it is a global problem that we face. I have the issue of dealing with it on the African continent, but I want to make sure that Africans understand this is not just us against them.

Ms. LEE. There are about 70 countries, right, throughout the world?

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Eighty.

Ms. LEE. Eighty countries. Okay.

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Yeah, 80 countries throughout the world, 30-some of them in Africa.

A lot of the legislation is old legislation. It is not being enforced. Even Nigeria and Uganda had old legislation that they were not enforcing. This new legislation, however, is much more restrictive in terms of the abilities to associate.

So we are continuing to engage with these governments. We are engaging with the LGBT community in both countries, as well as in other countries, to find out from them what they want us to do to assist them.

But our policy has been to, in terms of our dialogue with Africans, is to say to them, this is a human right. This is not just about LGBT; it is about how you treat your people across the board. And they have all signed on to human rights agreements, and we are pushing and encouraging them at every level to honor those agreements as it relates to their LGBT community.

Ms. LEE. Okay.

Just a closing comment—and we are going to have a second go-around, Madam Chair?

I serve on the U.N. Commission on HIV and the Law. And while we didn't specifically look at discriminatory laws as it relates to the LGBT community, we looked at the laws which criminalize those living with HIV and the virus. Guess who one of the worst actors is? The United States. We have, I think, 32 States, 2 territories which have criminalization laws on the books.

And I want to thank the administration. I have legislation to begin to work with the States to get rid of these laws, because they, once again, are very dangerous and were put on the books in the early 1980s here.

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. And they make it hard for us when we are fighting these issues overseas, because they throw this back at us, that you have not resolved your issues in the United States and you are telling us what to do. And my response is, we are trying to help you avoid the mistakes that we made and do it in a much more efficient fashion.

So, again, I do realize that we are still working this issue in the United States, and we will continue to work this issue on the continent of Africa.

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mr. Dent.

Mr. DENT. Thanks, Madam Chair.

Good morning.

A few issues. Last summer, some of us visited Ethiopia with the Aspen Institute, and one issue that came up repeatedly was the matter of accountability of foreign assistance and, I should say, probably the lack of flexibility in our ability, or your ability, to move funds from one area to another. As an example, you may have more funds than you can utilize in a particular country for HIV/AIDS, but malaria or TB or fistula might be a bigger issue.

Do you see this as a big problem, this lack of flexibility to move money between accounts in some of these countries where you are oversubscribed in some accounts but undersubscribed in others?

I don't know who wants to take this question.

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Back to you.

Mr. GAST. Sure, absolutely.

So the way we receive our money is through initiatives and earmarks, and then we apply those funds to countries that meet the requirements for receiving funds.

So I would say that the programming of the funds is done on a needs basis, but once the money is in country, it is very difficult to move the money into other areas. Within health, it is easier, but from health to other sectors, it is much more difficult.

Mr. DENT. Yes, from health to agriculture, for example, that was an issue.

Mr. GAST. Yes.

Mr. DENT. That is just something we might want to consider as a committee at some point, to provide that level of flexibility.

Another issue, too. We visited, actually, the Oprah Winfrey clinic, the fistula clinic, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. As you know, it is a very horrible, debilitating condition.

What impediments do you see for the clinics working on these fistula treatments?

I thought that was a very impressive facility we saw there. And it is a condition that in this country I guess we more or less dealt with last in the 19th century, but in Africa it is still very real and very problematic.

Mr. GAST. Well, two issues I see, Congressman: One is, it requires a high level of training for doctors to treat fistula. And then the second one is, often, women who suffer from it are treated as pariahs. And so that is also very difficult.

We have focused our efforts on about 45 locations on the continent. Many of those locations are in conflict-prone zones where often rape and other crimes of war take place, causing fistula. And so we feel that we have a very targeted approach to dealing with it.

Mr. DENT. Are there barriers to utilizing U.S. Funding for this fistula work that you are aware of?

Mr. GAST. No, there are no barriers. We program annually about \$11 million to support fistula and fistula repair, and we believe that that is adequate.

Mr. DENT. Thank you.

The yellow light is on. I am yielding back.

Ms. GRANGER. Great. Thank you.

Mr. Cuellar.

Mr. CUELLAR. Madam Chair, thank you so much.

And thank you all for being here.

What I want to do is ask you all some questions on performance. As you know, back in 2010, we passed the modernization of GPRA, the Performance Accountability Act. And there, we asked for certain things to be done, and especially to go more into the performance. Because if we are going to appropriate billions of dollars, we expect to measure those documents.

Last year, in the appropriation omnibus bill, we added more specific instructions for you all to follow. I have looked up in performance.gov, where you all have so many performance measures, and I would ask you, if we appropriate X amount of dollars, are these the right measures for us to look at and the public to look at as to your outcomes—you know, we are looking more for results-oriented, but there are different types of measures: outcomes, outputs; efficiency matters, which is what the ranking member mentioned a few minutes ago, how much money you are spending per unit; and, of course, a little bit on customer service.

But let me just look at a couple things that you all list and ask your thoughts about this. Under the goal of priority—one of your priority goals, food security, I believe one of the first measures you put in is the amount of Feed the Future funds disbursed since 2010. What does that measure, how much money we have put in in the last 3 or 4 years? Number one.

And I am just picking just a few. Another priority goal, global health. As a performance indicator you have percent of shipments

of contraceptive commodities that are on time. Okay, whether those contraceptives get there on time.

And I can go on. Another one that you have under the USAID procurement reform, another performance measure you have is the percent of Office of Acquisitions and Assistance series 1102 and BS 93 positions filled. Okay. And I can go on, but I think you get the gist of it.

If we are supposed to provide oversight and we are supposed to look at your performance measures, or the taxpayers are supposed to look at the performance measures—and, remember, there are already two. There is the GPRA of 2010 Modernization Act; there is the language we added in the omnibus bill. What are we supposed to get from these performance measures? I mean, what do we get for the dollars? What are the results that we are supposed to get? And I believe these are your measures on performance.gov. Give me your thoughts on this.

Mr. GAST. So, allow me to give you my thoughts, Congressman. And you raise very good questions.

I think when one looks at the performance measures in isolation that it is not telling the complete story. And so we look at both performance indicators that are related to management actions and then also outcome indicators.

And so some of the ones that you mentioned, for example, the amount of money disbursed or the number of agriculture officers that we have in the field, they relate more to management. Are we moving our resources quickly enough so that we can have the impact that we expect for our programming?

But let me also address some of the things that we are doing as an agency—

Mr. CUELLAR. Are contraceptives getting in on time, is that a measure we should be looking at?

Mr. GAST. I believe so, yes. Contraceptives arriving on time or antiretrovirals arriving on time, but—because logistics, especially in Africa, logistical systems aren't always the strongest.

Mr. CUELLAR. Right.

And I would ask you—and I am sure there are other performance measures. I am just going on performance.gov.

Mr. GAST. Sure.

Mr. CUELLAR. I am sure that what we want to look at is performance measures that measure results. And there are internal measures for management. I understand all that. But I would ask you that. If you are going to put certain things in public for legislators or for the taxpayers to look at, that you should put certain measures that are a little bit more—

Mr. GAST. Results oriented.

Mr. CUELLAR. But, again, I appreciate it.

Madam Chair, I will yield the balance of my time to Representative Mario Diaz-Balart because I am sure he has some other questions. I am just kidding. Just kidding. I yield back.

Ms. GRANGER. I knew you were.

Mr. CUELLAR. The balance of my time.

Ms. GRANGER. I knew you were just kidding.

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you so much.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Ms. Wasserman Schultz.

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I want to ask about maternal and child health and the progress on addressing malnutrition. Because I think it goes without saying that we have made some substantial progress; there has been a sustained commitment to it, largely thanks to the leadership of our country. And this committee and our chair and ranking member have both personally been involved in this issue, legislatively.

But we are still seeing newborn deaths increasing in some developing countries, you know, even as other indicators are improving. So what do you—and this is probably for USAID or the Millennium Challenge Corporation. To what do you attribute that glaring statistic? And what specifically are you doing to ensure that childhood mortality is declining in all under-5 subgroups?

Mr. GAST. I will start.

You raised a very good point, Congresswoman, about malnutrition. And, you know, when we look at malnutrition, it is one of the causes of roughly 47 percent of the under-5 deaths. So it is a major contributor to child death, early child deaths, and it is something that we take very seriously. And that is why it is also a tenet of the Feed the Future strategy, where we were focused on the first 1,000 days, from pregnancy to age 2, to address nutrition issues.

Where—

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. You probably know that Congressman Diaz-Balart and I were the sponsors of the 1,000-days resolution.

Mr. GAST. Thank you.

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. You are welcome.

Mr. GAST. We are beginning to focus on areas in countries where we have not been able to move the needle. And so that means a concerted effort in working with governments and working with development partners in countries like South Sudan, like Ethiopia, Nigeria, and the DRC.

Together, the three—DRC, Nigeria, and Ethiopia—account for about 27 percent of under-5 deaths globally. And so we are working—Ethiopia has made substantial progress, but we are putting more effort into both DRC and into Nigeria, supporting the governments' program.

We have just undergone a significant review over the past year with the governments in Nigeria and DRC to make sure that our programs are supporting the governments' strategies, that we are geographically targeted, and that we are using the right interventions to address under-5 death.

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you.

Ms. HERRLING. So, if I could quickly, as you know, we have a model that we let the data take us to where the binding constraints to growth are in a country. And sometimes that is, in fact, things like stunting in Indonesia. It is incredible, right, it is such a severe problem that it is constraining growth and private investment in a country. And so we will invest in those particular cases.

More broadly, I would say our greatest contribution to this space is that we are very purposefully looking to position women as economic agents of change in our countries. So everything we do, starting with that scorecard that is our first interaction with our partners, we are saying, "We expect you to educate your girls."

And 3 years ago, we added—we were so thrilled to have an indicator in the global community that measures women's access to the economy. So we are asking our partners, do your women have the right to file for a passport? Can they file as head of household? Can they own a business? Can they sign a contract?

This is the dialogue we want to have with our partner countries, and these are the kinds of partners that we end up having. Basically, we believe if women are greater components of the economy, the growth is going to go faster and fairer. And so that is the kind of policy aspect we have.

On the operational one, as you know—you have been following our work—we do gender assessments and social assessments of all of our investments. Why? Because we want to make sure, if we can, in design, purposefully look at how to make sure the benefits are shared. We design it that way.

Thank you so much for your support in this space, and we look forward to continuing to work on this very important issue.

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Me, too. Thank you very much.

I will continue the tradition of the yellow light. Yield back.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Since we have been so efficient in the use of time, if we do that the second round, everybody will get another question. And I think that would be great because this is a very active subcommittee.

Let me ask you, Ms. Herrling, about something we talked about earlier today. Recently, I read a draft report discussing with MCC the practice of having a compact and then a second round, and had this discussion. And it made some very good points about the second round and what is happening with those countries.

Could you address that?

Ms. HERRLING. Well, I look forward to seeing the report you are talking about.

Look, I appreciate the dialogue we have been having on this issue. You know that we agree that we want time-limited relationships with our countries. We are not looking to be there 20, 30, 40 years. That is not our model.

I also appreciate, though, the foresight that this committee had when it established the MCC to recognize that development is a complex business and that, particularly with an agency like ours, where we are constantly looking at where to get the most return on American taxpayer dollars, sometimes that greatest opportunity is, in fact, with countries we have already worked with. And so you will find us there—not always, not in entitlements. The vast majority of our existing compact partners have not gotten second compacts.

But I know this is an issue you care about deeply. I think there is lots of common ground. And I hope we can continue the dialogue on this issue.

Ms. GRANGER. One of the points that was made is what a country learns in that first round and then to take them to the second round, then they are practicing what they have learned through that. So it was very compelling.

Ms. HERRLING. No, it is true. There is a lot of attention focused on what is called the “MCC effect” related to reforms countries are willing to take to get in, so our scorecard. But there is this whole

other space of “MCC effect” on the operational front. So we see countries embracing U.S. procurement standards, environmental standards, design standards, and just implementation. It is quite amazing that these countries can do these large-scale infrastructure projects in 5 years. It is amazing.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mrs. LOWEY.

Mrs. LOWEY. I have so many other questions, but in the limited time, because the Congressman was kind enough to bring up this issue of Kibera again. And, as you know and I think all of you know, there are probably many Kiberas around the world and many areas where women and children are just struggling to survive every day. I have visited many, but this was among the worst.

And I really wonder, in situations like this—are we just perpetuating this, are we facilitating this, and is the U.N. facilitating it. And I wonder, in your interaction with officials who have the power to do something about it, do you have the power and determination to say, “Enough”?

Because this has been here—my staff corrected me, I was there in 2008, but it has been there a long time. No toilets, holes in the ground; government officials collecting money; the inability of micro-enterprise to thrive because they go around and collect from all the women.

To what extent do you just, after seeing so much horror, do you get numb by it? Or is there any effort to talk tough to the leaders and say, rather than put another dime in here, we are going to build decent housing? Otherwise, we are just carrying on a situation that is not really living. It is intolerable.

I just wonder if you get numbed by it.

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. You don’t get numbed by it. I—

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, what can you do?

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD [continuing]. I was there in December, and I was just horrified. And I was there the last time in 1996, and it hadn’t changed. So you are not numbed by it, and you look for solutions. But you can’t walk away from it. Because if you walk—

Mrs. LOWEY. No, no, I am not saying we should walk away. But I remember, we spoke with the housing minister and others. So, obviously, we had no impact, because it is still there.

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. There are some new houses that are being built away from Kibera, in the same vicinity, but away. But it is such a huge problem, housing across Africa. And sometimes what we will see happening is the government will go and plow down the place, but they are not able to provide alternative housing in an efficient enough fashion for people to have an alternative place to live, so they end up going back into the slums. Or as they push people out of the slums, maybe into decent housing, new people move into those slums.

So it is an intractable problem that I think we all feel frustrated by. And we are all looking to work with governments to find solutions, because they have to find the solution. We can’t do it on our own. We can’t impose the solution on them.

Mrs. LOWEY. What if we cut off all the money? I guess it would be even more miserable.

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. That is the walking away, and that is the hard part.

Mr. GAST. May I add just a few points, Congresswoman?

I agree, no one is numbed by it.

The trend in Africa is toward urbanization. And so, if families are moving out of slums or if one slum is destroyed, another one comes up, because that is how rapid the urbanization is. And people are leaving the rural areas because they are going to the cities, where they feel there are opportunities.

And so one of the things that we are doing through our development programs, certainly Feed the Future is trying to keep people in rural areas to work on farms, to find agriculture as a profession, rather than just subsistence farming. I think it takes a lot of efforts from multiple—from governments, from donor agencies, as well, to resolve this problem.

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, let me just close. You were there in 1996; I was there in 2008. It is just getting worse. What do you feel you have accomplished there? How much money have we put into Kibera, and what can you say as you look in the mirror and say, well, what have we accomplished? Could we have done it differently?

I just feel we are facilitating this horror, and I guess it is hard for me to adjust to this. What do you feel you have accomplished there? Just kept people alive in this existence that is really not an existence?

Mr. GAST. Education opportunities, health—

Mrs. LOWEY. You are cutting education, so that is not a priority, but it is my priority. Yes?

Mr. GAST. It certainly is a priority. Opportunity, micro-enterprise, focusing on women who are living—

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, I could say that, too, but, you know, they—I just think this is worth discussion again at some point. Because for those of us who have visited this and seen the corruption and the government involved in the corruption and the women barely struggling to feed their families, I just wonder whether we couldn't do it any differently.

But thank you very much—

Ms. HERRLING. Well, and I think we would all agree on focusing on the results of our efforts, and we are all trying to tell those stories. And so keeping us accountable to what we are actually delivering is an important thing. And we all have a conversation about, is it value for money? I think we all agree to that, and we all are producing those numbers.

Mrs. LOWEY. But you notice, when I said, what have you accomplished since 1996, pretty silent here, other than facilitating, perpetuating—well, I—

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mrs. LOWEY [continuing]. Have taken enough time on that one. Thank you.

Ms. GRANGER. We will call on Mr. Diaz-Balart and then Ms. Lee, and then we will close.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Yes. Thank you.

I just want to mention what Mrs. Lowey was just saying. This is the group of the strongest supporters that exists in Congress.

And if those concerns are here, and they are—and I think she speaks for all of us—imagine how they are outside of this room. And so it is an issue that we need to continue to address, and thank you for bringing that up.

My understanding is that USAID provides obviously not only TB resources for tuberculosis but also it is critical in technical assistance to countries with the highest TB burden. Also, USAID also plays a vital role, in my understanding, in TB research, including developing fast-reacting medications, et cetera.

Now, my understanding is that the administration's budget proposal dramatically reduces TB spending through USAID by 19 percent. And so this is at a time when drug resistance is spreading. And so here is my question: Can USAID absorb a cut of this magnitude and still carry out its vital mission?

Mr. GAST. The short answer is that the President's budget for 2015 recognizes that TB is a problem that needs to be resolved and, also, that there are multidrug-resistant strains of TB that are moving from country to country. But we feel, with the cut, that it can sustain the effort that we currently have.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. All right.

And since I still have a little bit of time, let me kind of switch gears here. And, obviously, you know, this group is a strong supporter of these specific funding issues, because they play a key role in expanding not only, obviously, in the humanitarian assistance, health programs, the national security implications, but also that it can hopefully also expand our trading partners and our markets in future years.

And I know that, you know, I have heard of anecdotes of U.S. Government-funded projects being awarded to non-U.S. business firms. And there was that picture of a sign posted outside on the Chinese-built storage facility project in Uganda that says it is funded by USAID.

And so how are our embassies or the Department of State, what are we doing to help ensure as much as we can that sales of U.S. products and services have the best chance of competing abroad and that our funding is hopefully being used by—you know, that we are also going to be helping our domestic economy here? I mean, what are we doing? Are there specific programs to do that?

Because, obviously, when you see something like a sign like that, you imagine what that does out there as far as people's perceptions, and, potentially, the reality.

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Let me just start on the broader point, and that is that we need to do a better job of supporting American companies operating overseas. In many locations where we are in Africa, there may not be the American companies to bid on projects, and we need, again, to ensure that that happens.

We have gotten a tremendous amount of support on getting more commercial officers in the field who are qualified and can help us in encouraging and supporting American companies.

So that would be the first point of action for us.

And then I will turn to my colleagues.

Mr. GAST. Very good points, Congressman. Three of the President's initiatives focus on a better trade partnership with Africa: Trade Africa, certainly; Power Africa; as well as Feed the Future.

One thing that we are doing, with Congress' support, is transforming our trade hubs. And we have three trade hubs that are on the continent. They were designed originally for African companies to take advantage of AGOA. What we are doing now is transforming them into trade and investment centers, where there is a better marrying of U.S. companies with African companies and associations. And we are beginning to see signs of good progress in enticing and encouraging U.S. companies to either invest or to sell equipment in Africa.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Ms. GRANGER. Just to add on to that, in discussing your successes, most of the successes involve a high level of collaboration with each other and with the countries. And so to keep that as a best practice, I think, would be very appropriate.

Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much. I will follow up on a couple of these issues.

First of all, I am glad Mr. Diaz-Balart brought up the whole issue of investment and trade. And I want to ask you—and I was glad to see MCC's breakdown as it relates to the involvement of women-owned, minority-owned companies. I would like to ask you, did this aggregate that? I would like to see African-American, Latino, and Asian-Pacific American companies, how they break down.

One of the issues, though, I just have to say, especially as it relates to—and I am not saying this is factual yet, but I am looking into it. Many of these trade missions that are led by Secretaries to Africa, to the continent, very few minority-owned companies are on these trade missions. I am not sure what the reason is, but I have heard it over and over and over again, to the point where I am going to take my own. Because businesses, black, Hispanic, Asian-Pacific American companies, deserve the opportunities to participate on these trade missions and go over.

For example, I want to ask you about Power Africa. How are small, minority-owned businesses, how are they able to get involved and participate in Power Africa?

Secondly, following up from Congresswomen Lowey and Granger's question on Kiberia, one of the issues I think that we saw and that I noticed by talking to people who live there is the policies that we support aren't necessarily policies that help them transition from living in such squalor into decent housing. But one of the issues is the economic and social system that has been developed through their lifetime in these slums. If you just build a house and say, "Move," well, what is going to happen to their business? What is going to happen to the benefits that they see by living there?

And so I think you have to have, or we have to look at a comprehensive approach and maybe make some suggestions as to how to restructure what we are doing there so that people have that social and economic network as they move forward. Because some people felt they would be abandoned and would not have those structures in place. We definitely need to do something and look at that very, very closely.

And, thirdly, as it relates to South Sudan, I don't know what is happening in Darfur because of the atrocities now taking place in

South Sudan, but I hope that the Secretary and you all will engage in a sustained effort after his visit to try to really help reduce the violence and help South Sudan get back on course. And that is going to be very important, because if he goes and looks at it, talks to people, comes back, and nothing happens, then, you know, nothing happens.

And so thank you again, Madam Chair. But I think Kiberia, all the issues we are talking about, we are talking about today is because there has been a void; we haven't really focused. And this hearing is one of the few that we have begun to focus on what is taking place in Africa. So thank you.

Ms. HERRLING. Quickly, on the MCC point, I know how much you care about minority businesses having access to our investments. And I hope the fact that we have exceeded the Federal targets on this issue, as well as our own agency targets, is testament to how much we care, as well.

When you have a model that is driven around increasing economic growth, you have to know what private sector is identifying as the binding constraints to why they are not investing in these countries. And we seek purposely to unlock those constraints. So it requires us to be in quite careful coordination with the private sector, minority and otherwise, and we do that.

So please keep us informed, and we will continue to send data to you. We are always looking for opportunities to gather private sectors together around our compacts, both at the identification-of-constraints stage and, as well, as the specific operations stage.

As well, this data alliance that we are forming includes private sector because they, too, want to understand corruption in country, how it is playing out, what they have to be aware of, create an integrity screen, if you will, for their own investments. So there are many, many layers for interaction in our space.

Ms. LEE. Darfur and South Sudan?

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Let me take that question.

As you know, Ambassador Booth, our Special Envoy, has been working around the clock. We just got a message from him. He is in Addis now. He was having meetings all day related to Darfur and to the situation in Sudan. So he has not neglected to continue to work on that.

But our highest priority right now is cessation, a real cessation, of hostilities between the two sides. They have signed an agreement, and they have continued to fight. And people are continuing to die, and the humanitarian situation is getting worse.

The Secretary is going with the goal of bringing about a solution to ending the violence. And that is our hope as we go into a series of meetings not just with the negotiators and the envoys but with the parties to the violence inside of Sudan. And we will be meeting with civil society there, as well, to talk to them about where they see the possibilities.

Ms. LEE. Can we—Power Africa, very quickly, Madam Chair? Thank you very much.

Mr. GAST. On opportunities for minority businesses, we recently, in the Africa Bureau—in fact, it was just last week—hosted a session with minority-owned businesses on ways that they can cooperate and work with AID, to include on Power Africa.

We as an agency have exceeded our goal. We want to do better, but we are very pleased with the results that we have had.

Ms. LEE. Okay. We will follow up with you on——

Mr. GAST. And, also, you mentioned——

Ms. LEE [continuing]. That.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. GRANGER. Certainly.

Mr. GAST. May I on trade missions? We work very closely with Corporate Council on Africa, and so we can raise that issue with them. They are frequently sponsoring trade missions.

Ms. LEE. I appreciate that very much.

Ms. GRANGER. Before I turn to Ms. Lowey, when we are talking about Kiberia, one of the things that was very apparent was how important it is for us to see what you are doing and see what the needs are.

I didn't know. I have never been there. I did not picture 2.5 million people, which is what Mrs. Lowey was showing me, which means if you took the citizens from all three of the Members of Congress's districts here, it is more than that. So it is really important that we go out on the ground and see things.

Mrs. Lowey.

Mrs. LOWEY. Yes. As we close, first of all, I want to thank our distinguished chairwoman for having this hearing and having you here today.

And we appreciate Secretary Kerry focusing on Africa, and we do wish him success in ending the violence and finding solutions.

As we focus on some of the terrible tragedies, I think it is important to end the hearing and congratulate all of us again on 6 million people on HIV treatment, advancement in child mortality rates due to improved access to vaccines, treatment for deadly illnesses—malaria, pneumonia. We have made progress.

And I think it is very important as we put our budgets together—and we know the money is not enough to do what we have to do and face the challenges. Working with the Gates Foundation has proved enormously successful. I do hope that there are increased efforts to reach out to other donors, to the U.N., to make sure we are all working together, because we know the challenges are huge.

So thank you. Thank you for all your work. We have a lot more work to do.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

I thank the witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today.

Members may submit any additional questions for the record.

Ms. GRANGER. The committee will also accept additional statements for the record from other agencies.

[The information follows:]

U.S. AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION

Statement of
U. S. African Development Foundation President and CEO, Shari Berenbach
House Appropriations Committee: Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs
May 2, 2014

Thank you for the opportunity to provide written testimony on U.S. African Development Foundation (USADF) priorities in Africa for FY 2015. Many regard USADF as the U.S. government's best kept secret of a unique and effective approach to economic development in Africa. We would like to share with you the USADF FY 2015 priorities in Africa, and ways that USADF efforts are making a difference for more than 1.5 million people across 18 countries.

About USADF

USADF was founded by an Act of Congress in 1980 as a Federally-funded, public corporation promoting economic development among marginalized populations in Sub-Saharan Africa. USADF's mission is to support African-led development that grows community enterprises by providing seed capital and technical support. This empowers those who are least served by existing markets or assistance programs to become a part of Africa's growth story.

Its innovative and targeted grants program (less than \$250,000 per grant) supports sustainable African-originated business solutions that improve food security, generate jobs, and increase family incomes. In addition to economic impacts to rural populations, USADF programs are at the forefront of creating a network of in-country technical service providers with expertise critical to advancing Africa's long-term development needs.

USADF, as the sole USG agency focused exclusively on Africa, has an ever-increasing role to play on the continent. USADF operates in 18 countries in Africa, with an emphasis in the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa, where we are supporting underserved communities to foster resilience and new economic opportunities, critical for restoring peace, stability, and economic independence. What is most satisfying about USADF's approach is it is working where the need is the greatest. USADF works in areas where 60% of the African population resides and accounts for 70% of Africa's poverty.

About Africa

Today's Africa is different than it was 30 years ago. It has made significant progress in many areas, yet not all people and countries are benefiting equally from Africa's growth. Despite the gains, there remain millions of people living in extreme poverty and suffering from lack of basic food security and stable incomes. And despite the global public and private emphasis on development in Africa, the reality is that many of the people in the most desperate need receive the least amount of development support. And even if there is the interest to help, too often larger public and private donors lack quality opportunities to invest in the extremely poor. Impact investors and large scale development efforts work with more

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sophisticated small and medium sized businesses, but have limited experience and success in working with the smallholder farmer and less sophisticated rural cooperatives.

USADF recognizes this dilemma and focuses its limited resources specifically on those areas of need and opportunity in a particular country or region in Africa. USADF's development model also recognizes that most people in need have the critical assets necessary to move up to a new level of greater prosperity and simply need an opportunity to get started. USADF provides that opportunity through its grants program. USADF finds lower capacity community enterprises and help them create a sustainable path to economic growth. Some of these enterprises will mature to the next stage where impact investors or traditional capital markets can help them continue to grow. Thus, USADF plays a vital role in helping rural enterprises move up the economic and capital value chain to access additional resources.

USADF's Role and Priorities in Africa

USADF furthers U.S. priorities by directing small amounts of development resources to disenfranchised groups in hard to reach, sensitive regions across Africa. USADF ensures that critical U.S. development initiatives such as Feed the Future, Power Africa, and the Young African Leaders Initiative reach beyond urban areas to Africa's underserved rural populations. USADF operates in Africa using a cost-effective African led and managed development model that "right sizes" efforts, directing development resources to rural areas of greatest need and potential for impact. USADF programs also leverage funds from other donors. By matching U.S. Government funds with those from host African governments and/or other private sector foundations, USADF increases the development impact of each tax dollar appropriated. USADF's size and lower-cost operating model makes it a highly flexible, innovative, and effective foreign assistance provider to Africa. USADF priorities for FY 2015 focus on five core areas:

Advance National Security: Hunger and lack of economic opportunities are primary drivers of political instability. USADF programs help offset these destabilizing forces by putting youth into jobs and creating new economic opportunities for smallholder farmers and communities in places of strategic importance to the U.S. Because our programs are African led and managed, we have the ability to go directly to hard to reach communities beyond Africa's growth frontier (e.g. the Sahel regions of Mali, Niger, and Senegal, Nigeria's Delta/North, the Turkana area in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Somalia).

Create Sustainable Solutions: USADF achieves sustained development success by finding producer groups with potential, linking them with local technical partners, and funding their proposed solutions. This combination acts as a catalyst to transform underachieving producer groups into thriving business-oriented enterprises. The technical partners assist groups to design their own action plan and provide on-going implementation support. The technical partners also become a long term asset within each country to support and lead ongoing economic development efforts.

- **Align Key Initiatives and Missed Populations:** USADF ensures special foreign assistance initiatives reach Africa's underserved. USADF focuses its limited resources on community enterprise groups often left out of Africa's growth and development efforts. These groups are mostly smallholder farmers, youth, people re-building from conflict, and women and girls. More than 60% of Africa's population are rural based, small-holder farmers and account for 70% of Africa's

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extremely poor population. While needy, many groups have access to valuable and potentially highly productive, pesticide free, arable land masses. USADF grants help these communities unlock the potential of this valuable asset. USADF's primary target population is the extreme poor, living on less than \$1.25 per day. USADF grants help these communities overcome the challenges of extreme poverty by generating millions dollars of new local economic activities that produce stable jobs and better incomes. People in turn use this increased income to access more food, make improvements to their housing, and provide greater educational opportunities and basic healthcare for their children.

- **Feed the Future** – The majority of USADF grants impact small-holder farmers, increasing food security among vulnerable households otherwise missed by large top-down efforts. USADF programs are involved directly in ten of the twelve Feed the Future focus countries in Africa. Food security grants support improved agricultural productivity by providing access to better inputs such as seeds, animal feed, fertilizer, machinery, and irrigation systems. These grants also provide access to improved farming knowledge, training in financial and resource management, support for improved transportation systems, enhanced product storage facilities, better approaches for distribution and marketing systems, and improved access to commercial markets and market information. These activities and investments result in people having better access to reliable food sources and a greater ability to purchase food through higher incomes and sustainable jobs.
- **Young African Leaders Initiative** – In FY 2014, USADF is contributing to the White House's "Young African Leaders Initiative" (YALI) by establishing the USADF-YALI Entrepreneurship Grants Program. YALI seeks to empower the next generation of African leadership to spur economic growth, advance peace, and promote opportunity. USADF will competitively award grants to young Africans taking part in the program, to pursue their business or social entrepreneurship ventures in their home countries. USADF will support the young leaders with both financial seed capital and with technical assistance. The business know-how support will be integrated with our implementing partners and a network of other YALI participants and African entrepreneurs.
- **Power Africa** – Also new in FY 2014 is USADF's promotion and support of innovative approaches to providing off-grid electricity solutions in rural areas. Power Africa, the Administration's new initiative, will drive growth by increasing access to reliable, affordable, and sustainable power and helping to ensure responsible, transparent and effective management of energy resources. USADF is awarding grants to Africans developing cost effective, sustainable business models to bring power to remote places in Africa. Through a grants challenge program, USADF is awarding financing and project support for off-grid solutions, renewable energy plans, and other innovations to address the energy gap among rural and marginalized communities in Africa.

Increase Return on Taxpayer Dollars: USADF programs leverage other donors' funds. By matching USG funds with African government and/or private sectors funds, the taxpayer gets increased impact for its dollar. Over \$25 million of matching donations have been used in the past 10 years.

Operate with Speed, Scale and Results: Because of its size, USADF has the flexibility to be highly responsive and agile in establishing targeted development programs in Africa. USADF can begin new programs in months rather than years. Further, due to our local, in-country African based operating

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model, USADF can rapidly scale operations as funds are available to effectively complement the programs of other larger USG foreign assistance programs. USADF leads with results. Effectiveness is determined by measurable impact and tracked twice a year to inform and guide future programs.

Conclusion

USADF programs deliver results that improve local food production, increase income levels, create jobs, and address social needs. As such, funding for USADF helps ensure that thousands of people in the most underserved communities in Africa are given a real opportunity to improve the quality of their lives. USADF's mission is to help ensure that grassroots communities have a chance to engage in and benefit from the new era of accelerated economic growth in Africa. By working in regions often missed by others, USADF generates goodwill and a path towards prosperity for many, vital to furthering US national interests. We look forward to your support and guidance as we seek to maintain and expand the impact of this unique foreign assistance program.

Thank you for your continued support for USADF's development work in Africa in FY 2015.

Ms. GRANGER. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs stands adjourned.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary of State Linda Thomas-Greenfield and
USAID Assistant Administrator Earl Gast by
Chairwoman Kay Granger
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
April 29, 2014**

Question:

What threat does the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) pose to the region?

Answer:

Though the LRA has been severely weakened by the efforts of the U.S.-supported African Union Regional Task Force (AU-RTF), members of the group continue to attack civilian populations resulting in abductions, casualties and displaced persons.

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Question:

What progress has been made on the Counter-LRA Strategy?

Answer:

Consistent with the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act passed by Congress in 2010, the United States continues to pursue a comprehensive strategy to help the governments and people of central Africa in their efforts to end the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army and address the impacts of the LRA's atrocities. We are pursuing this strategy in close partnership with the African Union, the United Nations, and other international partners to maximize our collective efforts. This is a multilateral effort.

With U.S. support, regional forces under the African Union Regional Task Force (AU-RTF) have significantly degraded the LRA's numbers and capacity, while communities have increased their resilience and ability to protect civilians. The AU-RTF forces have removed two of the LRA's top five commanders from the battlefield, and we have credible reporting that a third, Okot Odhiambo – the LRA's second-in-command and International Criminal Court indictee – was killed late last year. According to reporting by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the number of people killed by LRA attacks dropped by approximately 75

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percent from 2010 to 2013. During the same period, abductions by the LRA dropped by 50 percent, and defections and releases from the LRA have also significantly increased. According to UN reporting, the estimated number of people displaced by the LRA threat has dropped to 160,000, compared to 420,000 just over a year ago.

USAID and State Department humanitarian assistance continues to support LRA-affected populations, both in areas that continue to experience prominent LRA attacks, such as the Central African Republic, and areas that have seen a significant decline in LRA-related needs, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This assistance is currently providing health, psychosocial, food and food security, and economic recovery support to more than 100,000 individuals affected by LRA activities. As a part of this effort, under the Rewards for Justice program, the Secretary of State has authorized rewards of up to \$5 million for information leading to the arrest of top LRA leaders Joseph Kony, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen.

UNCLASSIFIED-4-**Question:**

What role does Joseph Kony play in ending the conflict and what is being done to capture or remove him from the battlefield?

Answer:

Joseph Kony is assessed to remain the leader of the LRA, even as LRA groups have grown fewer in number and smaller. His removal from the battlefield remains one of our priorities, as it is believed in doing so, other LRA members may be more heavily persuaded to defect from the group. The apprehension or removal of Joseph Kony and other senior LRA commanders from the battlefield remains one of the four strategic objectives of our counter-LRA strategy. Since 2012, several top LRA commanders have been captured or killed, and we are supporting efforts by AU-RTF forces to find and apprehend Kony and the remaining commanders. The other three objectives of our strategy to end the LRA threat are the increased protection of civilians, the promotion of defections and support for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters, and the provision of humanitarian relief to LRA-affected populations.

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Question:

What level and type of resources are needed in fiscal year 2015 to bring an end to the conflict?

Answer:

Despite the progress noted above, regional forces still face significant challenges in pursuing Joseph Kony and small LRA groups across a wide swath of one of the world's poorest, least governed, and most remote regions. Airlift, with the necessary range and speed, remains the greatest limiting factor for AU-RTF operations, and we continue to look at how we can help overcome that challenge using available assets. In March, President Obama announced that the United States will periodically deploy a limited number of Ospreys, refueling aircraft, and associated support personnel for short periods of time to support AU-RTF operations. The LRA has also become increasingly involved in the illicit economy of elephant poaching and ivory smuggling. We are stepping up efforts to combat wildlife trafficking, and we continue to work closely with the African Union to promote regional cooperation and deny the LRA any safe havens. As the LRA threat recedes, we are exploring ways that we can support early recovery projects for LRA-affected communities. In the Central African Republic, USAID is supporting communities to develop

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protection plans and better utilize communications infrastructure and technology to enhance their security. USAID and the Department of State also continue to provide humanitarian assistance to individuals impacted by LRA violence. The United States is working closely with the European Union, the World Bank, and other international donors through the International Working Group on the LRA to build support for the recovery of LRA-affected communities, in conjunction with broader regional efforts to promote stability and development throughout central Africa.

Budget Hearing – United States Assistance in Africa
Questions for the Record
Submitted by Chairwoman Kay Granger
for Acting CEO Sheila Herrling, Millennium Challenge Corporation

How is MCC coordinating its efforts in health with USAID, OGAC, CDC, and the other predominant US Government agencies engaged in global health issues in compact-eligible countries? How do you ensure that health components in MCC compacts support and are supported by ongoing programs being funded by USAID, OGAC, and other US funding agencies?

Economic evidence shows there is a clear link between poor health and poor economic productivity. Thus, investing in improving health is a critical component of enhancing economic productivity and is incorporated in MCC's selection indicators and investment portfolio.

As part of MCC's annual selection process, the "Investing in People" category of indicators on country scorecards helps the MCC Board of Directors identify those countries most committed to policies that support the well-being of their citizens, and helps to incentivize improvements in these areas. As part of this process, MCC looks at whether countries perform in the upper half of their income peers in areas such as health expenditures, child health, and access to critical childhood immunizations.

MCC's current portfolio includes health-focused projects such as community-based nutrition; water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); and health system strengthening interventions, with projects in Indonesia, Zambia, Cabo Verde, Jordan, and potentially in other countries that are early in the compact development process. MCC's prior work in the health sector includes a project on decreasing the burden of non-communicable diseases in Mongolia and overall health system strengthening in Lesotho. And, efforts are underway at MCC to enhance the consideration of health as a binding constraint to economic growth by strengthening the tools and processes used to determine these constraints.

MCC actively coordinates with USAID and other USG agencies in many ways and at a variety of levels. MCC's CEO is in regular communication with the members of its Board of Directors, which include the Secretary of State as the Chair of the MCC Board, as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator. Additionally, MCC's Practice Leader for Health and Community Development serves on several U.S. government (USG) health-focused interagency committees and working groups.

Further, there is ongoing MCC collaboration among staff at MCC, MCAs - our country partners who implement MCC compacts - and other USG agencies, both in Washington, DC and in country, including on project due diligence.

MCC's program in Lesotho offers a concrete example of in-country coordination: MCC's infrastructure, e-health, and health systems strengthening investments were closely coordinated with USAID, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). While MCC provided new blood transfusion infrastructure and equipment, CDC provided technical assistance and support. In human resources for health, USAID efforts through PEPFAR will directly leverage MCC investments in policy reform to provide Lesotho's health ministry further ability to train and retain nurses. Over the past 18 months, MCC and OGAC have mutually benefited from deeper engagement with each other on many fronts including leveraging the health impact, expenditures and quality data from PEPFAR to inform compact discussions when applicable. Both CDC and the Department of Veterans Affairs were able to provide specific expertise to support the compact in medical waste and e-health systems respectively.

**Question for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Linda Thomas- Greenfield by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart
House Appropriations Committee,
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
And Related Programs
April 29, 2014**

Question:

In August, President Obama is hosting a U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, focused on “investing in the next generation”. While a number of countries in Africa have managed to reduce the rate of child deaths, the risk of a child dying before five in Africa is about 6 times higher than in the Americas. Considering the U.S. goals of ending preventable maternal and child death in a generation, how will the U.S. Government use the US-Africa Leaders Summit this summer to advance this agenda? What are the expected goals and outcomes of the Summit?

Answer:

The U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, with its theme of “Investing in the Next Generation,” presents a historic opportunity to advance our relations with Africa across a range of sectors. We already have significant involvement on the continent, including in the field of public health generally and child and maternal health specifically, and the Summit will present many opportunities for the deepening and expansion of our engagement.

The Summit will aim to discuss key issues of mutual interest to the U.S. and Africa and have concrete outcomes in five areas: peace and security; trade

and investment; good governance and transparency; inclusive growth and sustainable development; and engaging young leaders. Portions of the Summit related to inclusive sustainable development may include a focus on registering even greater gains on health and health systems. Specific discussion topics for Leader-level dialogue in this area may also cover global health, food security, safeguarding resources, and infrastructure expansion, all of which contribute to reduced maternal and child mortality.

For each of these discussions, the Summit will build on the United States' long-standing commitment to a range of development strategies designed to improve public health, including through reduced maternal, newborn and child mortality, in Africa. The PEPFAR program has made sizeable contributions to reducing under-five and under-one mortality in many African countries. USAID has for decades focused on early interventions including vaccinations, antibiotics, antenatal care, attendance at birth by skilled practitioners, and increased access to emergency care for newborns. Given that 45 per cent of child deaths are linked to malnutrition, USAID has also prioritized early childhood feeding programs, which reached 12 million children under five in 2012.

As you are aware, the 2015 UN's Millennium Development Goals involved specific commitments from African leaders to prioritize facilitating international support for critical health systems, and encouraging girls to complete their educations, as part of the process of endorsing the MDG process. We believe that African leaders' own knowledge that progress on improving infant and maternal health is essential to development, coupled with longstanding U.S. involvement in assisting with these goals on the continent, will make for highly productive sessions at the Summit.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Former Acting Assistant Secretary Uzra Zeya by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart (#2)
House Appropriations Subcommittee on State/Foreign Operations
February 26, 2014**

Question:

What are USAID and State/DRL doing right now to support democracy and governance in Venezuela given the arrests, violent crackdowns on protesters, and further restrictions on independent media?

Answer:

The United States remains deeply concerned by the Venezuelan government's arbitrary detention and excessive use of force against peaceful protesters and journalists, continued restrictions on independent media and manipulation of news and information, and lack of due process. Civil society organizations are under continual threat from the government, and the government severely limits the ability of people in Venezuela more generally to exercise freedoms of peaceful assembly and expression.

USAID and State/DRL programs in Venezuela provide critical assistance to a wide range of civil society organizations that promote and defend fundamental freedoms, democratic processes, and non-violent advocacy by promoting public access to information, pressing for

transparency and accountability, supporting peaceful, fact-based debate, and augmenting awareness of human rights issues.

The Department will continue to respond to the needs of Venezuelan citizens and civil society, and will stay in close touch with Congress. We believe U.S. assistance, including in challenging environments, advances U.S. goals to further human rights and democratic freedoms.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Former Assistant Secretary Uzra Zeya by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart (3)
House Appropriations Subcommittee on State/Foreign Operations
February 26, 2014**

Question:

We have heard reports of complaints from some local civil society organizations in Nicaragua that USAID is not providing sufficient support for traditional democracy and governance programs. How is USAID using democracy and governance funds currently in Nicaragua? Has the USAID Mission in Nicaragua experienced any pushback or pressure from the Government of Nicaragua to support D&G programs? If so, how has our embassy responded?

Answer:

Approximately sixty percent of USAID/Nicaragua's FY 13 operating year budget of \$8.599M directly supports democracy, human rights and governance (DRG) objectives and the remaining forty percent directly complements these efforts. U.S. DRG programming in Nicaragua targets three subsectors: 1) local level governance, 2) civil society, and 3) media.

USAID's local governance program works through local CSOs that are deeply rooted in the communities and are best equipped to execute program activities. This program provides organizational strengthening to local partners to increase organizational sustainability through improved planning, resource mobilization, stakeholder engagement and outreach. Due

to the Government of Nicaragua's lack of transparency, USAID does not work directly with government counterparts.

U.S. support for civil society groups and independent media strives to ensure a greater competition of ideas, improved dialogue and advocacy for policy reform, and more effective, independent oversight of government institutions. USAID strengthens the technical and financial capabilities of key independent CSOs, allowing them to engage in civic dialogue and advocacy, regarding public access to information, accountability and governance, and citizen participation. The recently awarded media program will work with local media to ensure that citizens have access to a diversity of opinions.

Finally, as part of its youth leadership program, USAID supports capacity development of youth involved in civil society and political parties to promote pluralism and defend democracy by helping increase the organization and advocacy skills of a generation of emerging young democratic leaders from across the country. Together, these programs intend to increase citizen participation and to improve government accountability to citizen needs.

USAID's education and citizen security work on Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast complements the Mission's DRG work by promoting education and crime prevention, working with at risk youth to help them improve reading skills, stay in school, make better choices regarding their livelihoods, and become more involved in their communities. USAID's program also works with youth on vocational education to give them skills so that they can find jobs and are not lured into the narcotics trade. This work directly complements the DRG portfolio by promoting citizenship and security.

The Government of Nicaragua regularly expresses their preference for USAID assistance to pass directly through the Government of Nicaragua. USAID has determined that such an approach would negatively impact the intended outcomes of the programs and thus does not provide any funding directly to the government. To date the Government of Nicaragua has not directly impeded the implementation of any of our programs.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Former Assistant Secretary Uzra Zeya by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart (5)
House Appropriations Subcommittee on State/Foreign Operations
February 26, 2014**

Question:

Since previously in Bolivia, Russia, and now in Ecuador, the host governments have blocked and/or expelled USAID Missions, which funds democracy and governance programs from within the country. What is USAID's plan to support civil society and democracy in those countries from "off shore?" Is State/DRL or NED in a better position to fund activities in these countries where USAID has been targeted? Will the budget request ask for an increase for programs that promote democracy and human rights, and strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law?

Answer:

The closure of a USAID Mission does not mean an end to our support to democracy, human rights, and governance in that country. It may mean a change in approach, such as moving to new platforms to support civil society, or virtual and third-country training instead of in-country.

The U.S. Government's commitment to engaging Russian civil society remains firm despite the enactment of laws and practices in Russia that restrict their fundamental freedoms and ability to receive international support. Although the traditional routes for supporting these groups have been challenged, Russian organizations continue to express a desire to

engage with the United States. The USAID mission in Moscow closed on October 1, 2012, and is no longer managing programs in Russia. The Administration will continue to consult key Congressional Committees on further efforts to engage civil society.

In Ecuador, USAID is committed to continuing to support civil society and USAID intends to do so moving forward using the best possible mechanisms.

With all our programs, we coordinate as closely as possible between USAID, State, and the NED, as well as with U.S.-based private philanthropic efforts around the world. With limited resources for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance programs, it is imperative that there be coordination wherever possible to ensure that the global community of interested voices in this field is collectively engaging in the most effective and efficient manner possible. Within the U.S. government, the combination of mutually reinforcing programs between USAID and the Department of State make our interventions more flexible and therefore more powerful.

There is no-one-size-fits-all approach to these countries. Sometimes the best actor depends on the country context. In some countries, USAID funds larger longer-term grants, and DRL and NED fund smaller grants on a shorter timeline. Continued coordination, information sharing, and flexibility are essential to the success of these programs. Which agency is best positioned to support which program is determined on a case-by-case basis, with the safety of the individual grantee as the paramount consideration. Our experience has also taught us that multi-donor support for local organizations shields those organizations from being targeted or closed down.

USAID strengths include: 1) Field-based country and regional Missions which cultivate long-standing relationships with independent civil society groups; 2) a corps of over 400 officers around the world who are specifically trained in the promotion of democracy, human rights and governance and long-term strategic planning; 3) a DRG Center of Excellence with technical experts in civil society strengthening, legal frameworks for civil society, media development, Internet Freedom, labor rights, atrocity prevention, indigenous peoples rights, anti-trafficking in persons, rule of law, governance, and elections and political processes; 4)

fast, flexible procurement mechanisms and country strategies in our Office of Transition Initiative and the DRG Center that are able to respond in real-time to changing situations; and 5) an emphasis on learning and evaluation to understand the impact of our programming.

The FY15 budget request in *Latin America* includes a 22 percent increase from FY13 levels and we remain committed to promoting democracy and supporting civil society throughout the region.

USAID's *Europe and Eurasia* (E&E) Bureau continues to prioritize and focus funding for Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) to those countries in the region that remain strategic priorities for support to democratic reformers. Even though the overall DRG levels have decreased in FY13-FY15 (request) this is due to the overall decrease in ESF funding levels in the E&E region and does not reflect a lack of priority for GJD programs.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Former Acting Assistant Secretary Uzra Zeya by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart (#6)
House Appropriations Subcommittee on State/Foreign Operations
February 26, 2014**

Question:

Given the increasing erosion of democracy, human rights, civil society, and freedom of the press – or in some cases a total lack of – in places like Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, China, Russia, will the forthcoming budget request make democracy and governance a priority? How will D&G be made a priority? Do expect to see any new programs or initiatives aimed at enhancing D&G programming?

Answer:

The President's budget request for Fiscal Year 2015 contains \$2.427 billion for democracy, human rights and governance programs. While some of that funding is proposed for centrally-managed programs, particularly through State/DRL and USAID/DCHA, over 90% is spread among 73 countries.

The Department and USAID will continue to work in close partnership on democracy, human rights, and governance programs. We monitor events and circumstances around the world closely while pursuing innovative and practical mechanisms for providing civil society organizations with technical and financial support. We are committed to a multi-year effort to improve the policy environment for civil society organizations, including those working for freedom of the press, around the

world and coordinate diplomatic actions in response to restrictions on civil society. For example, the Department and USAID look forward to establishing new programs on human rights, media freedom, internet freedom, civil society, and strengthening democratic institutions.

Promoting and protecting democracy, human rights, the fundamental freedoms of religion, expression, association, peaceful assembly, and the press, and strengthening democratic institutions is a priority for this Administration and a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. As reaffirmed in President Obama's Stand with Civil Society agenda, it is the policy of the United States to support unequivocally civil society around the world.

Budget Hearing – United States Assistance in Africa
Questions for the Record
Submitted by Congressman Mario Diaz-Balart
for Acting CEO Sheila Herrling, Millennium Challenge Corporation

MCC's FY15 proposes three compacts for development in Africa – Ghana, Liberia, and Tanzania — that have identified lack of affordable and reliable power as a binding constraint to growth, and each of these compacts aims to improve access to electricity. How will these compacts leverage additional private sector funds to expand access to electricity and spur economic growth? What kind of catalyst do you expect these compacts to become? How is MCC working with USAID and State to coordinate and implement the Power Africa Initiative?

Of the six initial Power Africa countries, three - Ghana, Liberia and Tanzania - are MCC partners. In all three countries, economic analysis has identified access to power (including unreliable power availability) as a binding constraint to economic growth.

Because of this, MCC expects to commit approximately \$1 billion for power projects in Power Africa countries. Power Africa will build the capacity of partner governments to develop, finance and ultimately bring power projects online. MCC will continue working with its partners to help increase technical skills and accelerate energy sector regulatory, market structure and enabling environment reforms that are critical to the sustainability of projects and the sector, all of which will contribute to the success of Power Africa while increasing economic growth.

The compact proposal from Ghana is in the final stages of preparation. It is an ambitious program that would begin the process of turning around the Ghanaian electric distribution system. It would also include infrastructure investments to ensure more reliable and expanded access to power by its users, and policy improvements in the generation sector. Together, these investments would, over time, contribute to profound changes in the Ghanaian power sector, making it more attractive to, and serving as a catalyst for, private sector investment and, consistent with the vision for Power Africa, possibly set a powerful example for the region. MCC has worked closely with private sector enterprises that plan to make substantial investments as a result of the policy reforms and investments contemplated under MCC's planned compacts. In fact, General Electric (GE) has announced a \$1.5 billion, 1000 megawatt investment in Ghana's energy sector, and has credited MCC with paving the way for this investment.

MCC is also working with the Tanzanian government to identify potential projects to address inadequate and unreliable power supply; such projects could include reforms to the energy sector and its electric utility to pave the way for private investment and growth.

Liberia is still in the early stages of developing its compact. Energy was identified as a key constraint to growth. We are working with Liberia to define the most opportune program concepts.

With regard to coordination amongst U.S. government (USG) agencies, MCC participates in the regular meetings of the Power Africa Working Group (PAWG) convened by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which includes representatives from the Department of State, Department of Energy, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Export-Import Bank (EXIM), and other USG agencies, and of the Interagency Policy Committee on Power Africa that are convened by the National Security Council. These regular touch points in Washington help to ensure close coordination between MCC and USG partners at the headquarters level.

In each of Ghana, Tanzania, and Liberia, there is close coordination between MCC country team staff, the U.S. Embassy, the USAID Mission, and other USG Power Africa stakeholders so that MCC's efforts are consistent with the Power Africa strategy and so that our investments are complementary to ongoing and future activities by other USG agencies at the country level.

USG funding for global health programs has grown quickly in the last decade. Poor health experienced by children is especially harmful to economies and I am glad to see that health has remained a centerpiece of both the MCC's country indicators and many of the programs supported by MCC funding. How is MCC coordinating its efforts in health with USAID, OGAC, CDC, and the other predominant US Government agencies engaged in global health issues in compact-eligible countries? How do you ensure that health components in MCC compacts support and are supported by ongoing programs being funded by USAID, OGAC, and other US funding agencies?

Economic evidence shows there is a clear link between poor health and poor economic productivity. Thus, investing in improving health is a critical component of enhancing economic productivity and is incorporated in MCC's selection indicators and investment portfolio.

As part of MCC's annual selection process, the "Investing in People" category of indicators on country scorecards helps the MCC Board of Directors identify those countries most committed to policies that support the well-being of their citizens, and helps to incentivize improvements in these areas. As part of this process, MCC looks at whether countries perform in the upper half of their income peers in areas such as health expenditures, child health, and access to critical childhood immunizations.

MCC's current portfolio includes health-focused projects such as community-based nutrition; water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); and health system strengthening interventions, with projects in Indonesia, Zambia, Cabo Verde, Jordan, and potentially in other countries that are early in the compact development process. MCC's prior work in the health sector includes a project on decreasing the burden of non-communicable diseases in Mongolia and overall health system strengthening in Lesotho. And, efforts are underway at MCC to enhance the

consideration of health as a binding constraint to economic growth by strengthening the tools and processes used to determine these constraints.

MCC actively coordinates with USAID and other USG agencies in many ways and at a variety of levels. MCC's CEO is in regular communication with the members of its Board of Directors, which include the Secretary of State as the Chair of the MCC Board, as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator. Additionally, MCC's Practice Leader for Health and Community Development serves on several U.S. government (USG) health-focused interagency committees and working groups.

Further, there is ongoing MCC collaboration among staff at MCC, MCAs - our country partners who implement MCC compacts - and other USG agencies, both in Washington, DC and in country, including on project due diligence.

MCC's program in Lesotho offers a concrete example of in-country coordination: MCC's infrastructure, e-health, and health systems strengthening investments were closely coordinated with USAID, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). While MCC provided new blood transfusion infrastructure and equipment, CDC provided technical assistance and support. In human resources for health, USAID efforts through PEPFAR will directly leverage MCC investments in policy reform to provide Lesotho's health ministry further ability to train and retain nurses. Over the past 18 months, MCC and OGAC have mutually benefited from deeper engagement with each other on many fronts including leveraging the health impact, expenditures and quality data from PEPFAR to inform compact discussions when applicable. Both CDC and the Department of Veterans Affairs were able to provide specific expertise to support the compact in medical waste and e-health systems respectively.

Does MCC have a plan to incorporate efforts similar to USAID/ANSI Standards Alliance in to its works with compact nations in order to help further develop key sectors like electricity, water and sanitation while at the same time removing potential technical barriers to trade in those sectors for years to come?

MCC makes an assessment during the due diligence stage of compact development of the adequacy and suitability of the country's design and implementation standards for the type of project that MCC intends to fund. If our diligence finds that the country's standards are inadequate or below par, we regularly use U.S. or regional standards.

If U.S. or other international standards were used exclusively however, local conditions may not be addressed adequately and sufficiently. Further the MCAs may not be able to take advantage of locally sourced materials, which could lead to higher cost and adverse environmental impacts from transporting large quantities of materials. Introducing design standards on MCC-funded projects that are different than those applicable to similar assets in the country could also mean higher maintenance costs.

In almost all cases, MCC uses a blend of standards because we find that some of the country's standards are adequate and acceptable, and we intentionally introduce U.S. standards in some aspects of the design where performance and sustainability are improved. For example, local or regional standards are often used as the basis for infrastructure design work, but are modified to suit local conditions (seismic activity, soil characteristics, topology, etc.), weather patterns, local or regional material availability, and maintainability. For MCC's program in the Philippines, for example, a blend of local and U.S. standards was used for our infrastructure investments.

Budget Hearing – United States Assistance in Africa
Questions for the Record
Submitted by Congressman Ander Crenshaw
for Acting CEO Sheila Herrling, Millennium Challenge Corporation

An article this month in Reuters highlighted the current attempt through the Government Data Alliance to improve data on worldwide governance and corruption indicators by creating a marketplace for improvements to this data, used by many aid agencies, including MCC. We know that this data is the best available but still can be perceptions-based and incomplete. Since MCC is co-hosting this event, Ms. Herrling, I would like for you to tell me more about how improved data on corruption and governance would affect the way MCC conducts its compact process? And since we are here discussing our aid to Africa, what is the prevalence of corruption in Africa of the MCC compact aid? This article references the fact that Western-based institutions are not always trusted on the ground, and tying the data to more fact-based indicators would enhance the trust and improve the governance and corruption data. What, if any, problems in delivery and implementation of development aid are created by this lack of trust in Western-based institutions?

MCC is fundamentally committed to combatting corruption. Corruption is an obstacle to economic growth by increasing costs, lowering productivity, discouraging private sector investment, and reducing confidence in public institutions. American businesses seeking out opportunities abroad want environments that are free from corruption and conducive to job creation.

Because corruption is an unacceptable tax on economic growth, fighting it has always been a cornerstone of MCC's approach to poverty reduction. There are three key ways MCC fights corruption. The first is by selecting country partners that pass the Worldwide Governance Indicator's "Control of Corruption" indicator, one of 20 indicators on MCC's scorecard. The second is by protecting compact funds through strong anti-corruption systems and policies. The third is by monitoring corruption in our partner countries and taking action when we see a pattern of actions suggesting a deterioration in the country's commitment to fighting corruption.

To provide more detail on the first step, in order to pass MCC's scorecard, countries must perform in the top half of their income peers (low income countries or lower-middle income countries) on the "Control of Corruption" indicator. This helps ensure that MCC only invests in the relatively best-governed developing countries. The Worldwide Governance Indicator's (WGI) "Control of Corruption" indicator covers all developing countries; it is updated annually; and it analyzes many different aspects of corruption, from bribery to grand corruption to citizens' and firms' perception of corruption. Because of this, it remains the best available data for MCC's scorecard purposes. However, it also relies heavily perceptions-based data, which can make the indicator difficult to tie directly to government actions. Some sub-sources of this indicator do not publish their rationales or evidence for their scores. Finally, there is a 1 to 2 year lag in reporting, which means the most recent reforms are not captured in the annual data. Together, this can make it difficult to know whether small movements in the data are related to actual changes in policy performance.

With more robust, evidence-based data, MCC would be better positioned to select partners that are standing up to corruption, and to incentivize other countries to improve their anti-corruption efforts. The challenge lies in measuring countries' efforts to fight corruption. The very nature of corruption—hidden, illegal and unrecorded—makes it extremely difficult to measure. While MCC uses the best data available to measure and track corruption, and because we are committed to continuing our hard requirements on control of corruption, MCC is committed to doing even better. That is why MCC is working to encourage the production of new or improved data that measure a country government's specific efforts to combat corruption and improve its governance.

In April 2014, MCC took the initiative to partner directly with experts from civil society, the development and philanthropic communities and the private sector to co-lead the establishment of what is being hailed as a first-of-its-kind Governance Data Alliance.

The Governance Data Alliance has the potential to fill the gaps for measuring governance, uncovering the best data available for identifying countries that share a real commitment to fighting corruption. This data will be useful not just for MCC, but also for the private sector, civil society, development organizations, other government agencies, lawmakers, and anyone with an interest in fighting corruption. To be clear, MCC's current approach of requiring strong performance on Control of Corruption will remain; the Alliance is simply a way to strengthen that approach further. MCC is excited to continue playing a leading role in improving governance, promoting transparency and helping to ensure that U.S. development assistance goes to countries that share its values.

If improved data on corruption were available to inform MCC's selection decisions, MCC would be better positioned to select partners that are standing up to corruption. While the addition of new data would have an important impact on how MCC selects partners and invests its limited resources in the best governed countries, it would not likely change compact development or compact implementation. MCC has separate systems in place to fight corruption of our compact funds during compact development and implementation.

MCC safeguards against corruption in compact programs through multiple channels, including fiscal controls, procurement requirements, training for local Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) entities (the country unit implementing the MCC program), and referral of fraud and corruption allegations to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of the Inspector General (OIG). MCC ensures that procurements are open, fair, and competitive through its Program Procurement Guidelines, expert review of procurement documents, and oversight of the procurement process, including review of selection methods, assessment of bidding documents, and bid evaluations.

On a quarterly basis, MCC approves the use of funds, thereby supporting effective financial management and providing additional protection against fraud and corruption. Most MCA invoices are paid from the United States, minimizing the risk of corruption, and in-country accounts have strict controls on payment approvals that are transparent and accountable. Additionally, all MCAs are required to hire outside auditors, whose reports are reviewed by both MCC staff and USAID OIG. Further, the permanent presence of MCC staff in resident country

missions provides on-the-ground support to and oversight of compact activities procured and implemented by the MCAs. Training on awareness and prevention of fraud and corruption has been provided to the MCAs of all six African countries currently implementing compacts, as well as in all four African countries in which compacts were closed out in 2013.

MCC's Policy on Preventing, Detecting, and Remediating Corruption and Fraud in MCC Operations (Anti-Fraud and Corruption Policy) includes actions to enhance MCC's capacity to prevent, detect, and remediate instances of fraud and corruption, including assessments developed to identify specific risks of fraud and corruption for each compact based on the unique projects, institutional, and country contexts. MCAs design action plans for controlling corruption, based on the risk assessments, which are approved and monitored by MCC. The policy provides guidance to MCC and MCA staff on methods and strategies to prevent fraud and corruption and clear and responsive mechanisms to respond to allegations of fraud or corruption in compacts.

MCC also established an anti-fraud and corruption team (AFC Team) to intake and address allegations of fraud and corruption submitted to MCC. Allegations can be submitted confidentially through MCC's website; by e-mail to members of the AFC Team; or directly to the USAID OIG, which is notified of all allegations. The AFC Team coordinates closely with USAID OIG on appropriate follow-up and meets regularly with OIG to discuss open allegations and to agree on when and under what circumstance allegations should be closed.

MCC selects indicators for its scorecard that have robust methodologies and are published by globally-respected institutions such as the World Health Organization, UNESCO, IMF, IFC, and others. While some of the indicator institutions are based in the West, most are collecting their data in developing countries. When it comes to the Control of Corruption indicator, the lack of publicly available evidence or explanations for sub-source scores can sometimes lead to questions – or even mistrust – as to the credibility of the scores. This is why MCC is working with the Governance Data Alliance and indicator institutions to encourage increased transparency in methodologies and scoring. The more we know about why countries are assessed as they are, the more we can encourage governments to tackle the main sources of corruption in their countries. Finally, MCC has not experienced problems with compact implementation in Africa due to a lack of trust in Western-based institutions.



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

February 26, 2014

Contact: [Steve Dutton](#) | (202) 225-5071

**GRANGER OPENING STATEMENT: HEARING ON U.S. ASSISTANCE
TO PROMOTE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY IN COUNTRIES WITH
REPRESSIVE ENVIRONMENTS**

The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related programs will come to order.

Today we will hear from the panel before us about a topic that is a high priority for this subcommittee – democracy promotion.

Members will find in front of you a tentative list of hearings planned from now until the April district work period. Staff will let you know when times and locations are confirmed and if other hearings and briefings are scheduled.

I know scheduling is always a challenge so I will try to give as much advance notice as possible. Today we have three other subcommittee hearings happening at the same time and Mr. Wolf and Mr. Crenshaw are unable to attend because they are chairing their own hearings.

I would also like to welcome our witnesses: acting Assistant Secretary Zeya, Deputy Assistant Administrator Mendelson, and Director Mendes. Thank you all for being with us today.

This subcommittee provides more than a billion dollars a year to promote democracy and good governance around the world. This funding supports a broad range of activities – it strengthens civil society, improves electoral systems, develops political parties, increases access to news and information, and builds transparency within foreign governments.

Today's hearing will focus on some of the countries where democracy promotion is most challenging.

In the past few years in countries such as Russia, Venezuela, and Ecuador, we have seen democracy under threat as those governments clamp down on fundamental freedoms.

We remain concerned about countries that have oppressed their people for decades - such as North Korea, Iran, and Cuba. And there are many more countries that are reaching a crossroads as they decide how to govern.

We want to hear more about the work of each of the agencies represented here today so we can understand how the United States can promote democracy and freedom in some of these very difficult places.

We have also seen troubling trends that make the operating environment for democracy programs much more difficult.

These include - but are not limited to - the N.G.O. laws that are pending or have passed in certain countries, as well as entire USAID missions being closed down because governments do not support U.S.-funded democracy promotion activities.

We also know it is common practice for repressive governments to stay one step ahead of technology by blocking Internet connections and radio broadcasts, in an attempt to suppress dissent, free speech, and unbiased information on current events.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how the U.S. government is adjusting to these tactics, and I hope they will also address how we can ensure that the people carrying out these programs remain safe.

As President Reagan said, “freedom is never more than a generation from extinction. We didn’t pass it to our children in our bloodstream. It must be fought for, protected, and handed on for them to do the same.”

This subcommittee can play a role in advancing freedom through programs we fund in the bill. I hope today’s hearing will give us a chance to talk openly about the challenges the U.S. faces in countries that repress the rights and freedoms of their people.

In a moment, I will turn to Mrs. Lowey for her opening remarks, but before I do, I have a few reminders:

First, I would ask the witnesses to please indicate when you are discussing classified information.

Second, I want to ask Members to keep your questions brief to allow the witnesses’ time to respond. If questions and answers are kept to five minutes, hopefully we can get in a second round of questions.

Finally, since it is our first hearing of the year, I want to remind members that I am going to use the same procedure as I have in the past to recognize members. I will call on you based on seniority of Members in attendance when the hearing was gavelled in. I will then call on members who arrive after the start.

I will now turn to Mrs. Lowey for her opening remarks.

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**TESTIMONY OF ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY UZRA ZEYA
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR**

**Before the
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND
RELATED PROGRAMS SUBCOMMITTEE**

February 26, 2014

Chairwoman Granger, Ranking Member Lowey, and Members of this Committee, thank you for inviting me to this important hearing to discuss how the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) works as part of broader U.S. efforts to support freedom in closed societies. This hearing is very timely as Secretary Kerry will release the annual *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* tomorrow, which, through our rigorous monitoring and reporting, serves as an accurate, objective assessment of human rights conditions in countries around the world.

In the past two years alone, we have seen more than 50 new laws proposed or enacted to restrict freedom of association, peaceful assembly, and expression, both online and offline. Last year, the *UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association* released a troubling report on negative trends affecting civil society, stating that NGOs worldwide face “increased control and undue restrictions” on both foreign and local funding, measures designed to “silence the voices of dissent and critics.” In many countries independent media are also under siege. Prosecution for alleged extremism or libel, economic pressure from the state, and physical threats to journalists/editors reporting on corruption or other abuses are on the rise. Many governments have new laws that allow authorities to block websites for vague and broadly defined prohibited material.

But there is a way forward. American efforts to advance human rights can make a difference in the lives of millions and in encouraging stability around the world – even in repressive environments. In closed societies, for example, one of our strategies is to provide citizens who want to exercise their human rights, and those who defend them, with the tools and capacity to communicate securely and freely with one another and the outside world. As governments in countries such

as China, Cuba, Iran, and Russia devise new ways of tracking and blocking online expression, we support programs that adapt, update, and innovate to effectively assist those seeking to exercise their rights online and through new technologies.

The majority of DRL programming is implemented in repressive, authoritarian or transitioning countries, including where the United States has no diplomatic presence. In repressive environments, our partnerships empower local NGOs and citizens to press for reforms and build foundations for accountable governance. We support the efforts of human rights activists as they work to build democratic institutions, support access to justice, create independent media, and document human rights abuses. Our programs help populations-at-risk, and advance international religious freedom, labor and disability rights, and transitional justice. We promote religious freedom and counter religious intolerance, anti-Semitism, and violent extremism. In the face of increasingly sophisticated tactics for disrupting activism online, our programs protect users, help activists obtain independent information, and support policy/advocacy projects in countries seeking to restrict Internet freedom. We support those promoting freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining.

DRL's mechanism to support this work is the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF). Since its creation fifteen years ago, the Fund has grown from a mere \$8 million in FY1998 to \$70.5 million in FY2014. Together with ESF transfers, this past year we managed nearly 350 grants totaling over \$500 million that benefit civil society and activists around the world in their struggle to live in freedom and with dignity. We are grateful for the continued support from this Committee; support that makes HRDF programming possible.

HRDF functions like a "venture capital fund for freedom," enabling us to respond quickly and flexibly to changing needs and opportunities to promote human rights. DRL is able to administer programs in ways that allow the HRDF to be flexible, adaptable and responsive to complex and changing situations on the ground, while mitigating risk to both our implementing partners and local beneficiaries. Thanks to the effectiveness of our programs, I am pleased to note that 30 other governments and private sector donors are helping to fund some of our signature human rights initiatives, from aiding embattled NGOs on the frontlines to countering cyber-attacks on activists and assisting vulnerable populations. These unique public-private and multilateral partnerships mean that we are able to leverage our funds to extend the reach of our work in supporting freedom in tough environments abroad. We also make sure that our programs are well coordinated with USAID, and NED, and would note that AID participates in DRL's proposal review panels.

One of our most innovative and effective HRDF areas of programming has been Internet freedom. Our Internet freedom programs have helped millions around the world. DRL's approach to Internet freedom is derived from our unique democracy and human rights mandate, which guides us to strategically target our Internet freedom funding to strengthen the exercise of freedom of expression online. We work to increase the free flow of information and to deny a government's ability to perpetuate human rights abuses by tracking, censoring, and disrupting communications. This approach also helps to hold accountable those who perpetrate and facilitate abusive activities. We support technology that provides uncensored access to content, tools that promote the digital security of activists and vulnerable populations, strategic advocacy resources for human rights defenders, and advances research on where and how Internet controls are being applied. Over the past six years, DRL has provided more than \$120 million in support for Internet freedom technologies and organizations. Rand Corporation conducted an independent evaluation to assess the efficacy of DRL's comprehensive program strategy, including DRL investments in technology development, advocacy, digital safety training, and research. Rand concluded that DRL's Internet Freedom portfolio is well balanced in that it goes beyond just focusing on the problem of circumventing firewalls. Rand noted that DRL's investment allocation and the range of geographic and political focus of grants contributes to its success.

Our approach to designing effective assistance programs can be considered in three categories: non-permissive environments; countries of such regional significance that their backsliding would have a contagion effect; and countries recently emerging from conflict or authoritarianism with an uncertain future. We must sustain efforts in all these environments.

In the face of growing restrictions, DRL remains undeterred. We are using our diplomacy and our foreign assistance to mitigate risk while sustaining vital support. In non-permissive environments, we directly reach out to and support civil society and activists. In the wake of ongoing repression of civil society worldwide, DRL has adjusted operating procedures and applied lessons-learned to our approach. Doing so has enabled us to continue our work even in the least hospitable environments by employing methods aimed at protecting the identity of our beneficiaries, reducing the risk of exposure to oppressive governments. Let me be clear on this. Our programs are overt, are notified to Congress, and we acknowledge them publicly. But what we try to avoid is doing anything that would help an authoritarian government take repressive actions against or punish our partners.

Beyond adapting our processes, we have vastly expanded our capacity to assist threatened human rights activists and organizations by providing them small infusions of support -- real-time help to allow them to continue their work in safety. DRL's signature efforts provide emergency assistance to human rights activists attacked or under threat. One program delivers direct assistance -- such as medical, legal, psychosocial, and other support services -- to human rights defenders, so that they can continue their work. Since 2007, DRL has provided assistance to 1,336 defenders in 84 countries and territories. Three years ago we launched the *Lifeline: Embattled Civil Society Organizations Assistance Fund* to offer emergency grants to civil society organizations advancing human rights, including the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, women, and people with disabilities. Sixteen other governments and two foundations have since joined this unique global effort that has so far assisted 299 civil society organizations in more than 74 countries. We have since created similar programs to directly assist victims of religious persecution and anti-LGBT violence and discrimination.

In China, the human rights environment continues to deteriorate. Although the Communist party's monopoly on power remains absolute, growing numbers of citizens seek justice, an accountable and transparent government, and the ability to express themselves freely and peacefully assemble and associate. The Chinese government has cracked down on rights lawyers, civil society activists, friends and associates of activists, and everyday citizens expressing themselves online or seeking to practice their faith free of state control. Authorities also target civil society groups critical of the government, including the New Citizens Movement, a group that has urged the government to increase transparency and combat corruption. In Tibetan and Uighur areas, authorities have increased restrictions on fundamental freedoms.

DRL funds target projects that will have a direct and lasting effect by promoting reforms and bolstering civil society to improve respect for human rights in China. Program activities seek to promote the rule of law, expand public participation in governance, and create space for religious freedom. For example, one DRL-funded program supports the implementation of legal reform in the criminal justice system, and builds the capacity of public interest lawyers. Other programs work to protect vulnerable populations such as religious and ethnic minorities and persons with disabilities, and encourage government adherence to international human rights norms. DRL programs also build the capacity of grassroots civil society groups, and take advantage of technological developments to enable greater freedom of expression.

United States commitment to engaging Russian civil society remains firm despite the enactment of laws and practices in Russia that restrict fundamental freedoms and ability of local and civil society organizations to receive international support. The United States has and continues to make our concerns about restrictions known to the Russian government. We convey support for a legal framework that does not restrict fundamental freedoms, and underscore that a vibrant civil society is essential to Russia's development. Although the traditional routes for supporting these groups have been challenged, Russian organizations continue to express a desire to engage with the United States. As a result, the Administration is developing new ways to increase direct interactions between Russians and Americans, including by establishing peer-to-peer and other regional programs that support exchanges of best practices on civil society development. We remain committed to supporting the people of Russia in their pursuit of democratic, justice, and human rights objectives, including those related to fighting corruption and creating a more pluralistic and participatory society with viable, independent, and accountable institutions.

DRL programs in Cuba support the people's desire to freely determine their own future by advancing democratic values, promoting human rights, facilitating the flow of uncensored information, and strengthening independent civil society. Although Cuban government restrictions on civil and political rights -- including the freedoms of expression, association and assembly -- increase the degree of difficulty of program implementation, DRL has been able to sustain support to Cuban civil society.

In a highly restrictive environment like Iran, we speak in support of Iranians' human rights and fundamental freedoms as we test the potential for a diplomatic resolution of the nuclear issue. We led efforts to establish and extend the mandate of the *UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Iran* at the UN Human Rights Council. Our "Faces of Iran" campaign on HumanRights.gov and the Virtual Embassy Tehran website highlights the plight of Iranians unjustly imprisoned for political or religious reasons, garnering strong support from Iranian citizens and human rights activists. We continue to press for the immediate release and safe return of dual U.S.-Iranian citizen pastor Saeed Abedini, whom Iranian authorities sentenced to eight years in prison on charges related to his religious beliefs. We are committed to doing all we can to ensure Mr. Abedini's safe return to his family, as we are doing for Amir Hekmati and Robert Levinson.

As evidenced in the landmark *UN Commission of Inquiry* report issued on February 17, North Korea has committed and continues to commit systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations. The government is responsible for

extrajudicial killings, disappearances, arbitrary arrests, detention, and torture. A vast network of political prison camps indefinitely holds an estimated 80,000-120,000 people in harsh and life-threatening conditions, including family members of the accused. Through the Human Right Democracy Fund programming, we have been able to assist with the credible documentation of these atrocities, and will continue to do so. The regime continued to control almost all aspects of citizens' lives, denying freedoms of expression, religion, association, and peaceful assembly. It also continues to tightly control all forms of media, severely restricts freedom of movement, and subject its citizens to forced labor. We remain steadfast in support of the free flow of objective information in and out of North Korea, including through independent radio broadcasting by North Koreans who escaped.

Looking beyond closed societies, DRL is also sustaining support in countries emerging from conflict or where democratic institutions have never had an opportunity to flourish, and we can point to areas of impact and progress. In Iraq, DRL's work to protect and promote the rights of members of vulnerable populations has included programs to combat gender-based violence (GBV) and to support Iraq's minority communities, especially Christians and Yezidis. DRL supported the formation of the Alliance of Iraqi Minorities, comprised of ethnic and religious minority leaders, enhancing their advocacy for the inclusion of minority groups and the rights of their members within Iraqi law and society. In Ninewa province, one of Iraq's most volatile areas, a DRL program supported minority leaders to review the provincial budget by engaging community leaders and the provincial council. The mediation process led not only to a more equitable allocation of provincial funds, but to a shift in the community's perception of Christians and other minorities. Now they are seen as members of Iraqi society working for the good of the whole community, rather than being seen as apart from mainstream society. We also facilitated the GBV legislation that condemned female genital mutilation in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, with the success of reaching a 35 percent reduction in female genital mutilation in the provinces reached by our programming.

Pakistan is another country where sustained U.S. engagement remains crucial to maintain momentum after the recent transition between civilian governments, especially in ensuring accountability. Thus, we support the efforts of courageous journalists who work in the tribal areas, where the most extreme militants are active. Our program has trained journalists, who are in danger every day, on how to report credible investigations of issues related to national security, while at the same time enhancing their security. We have provided them with production grants, mentoring, and tools to report their stories. In addition, we have

been able to help local human rights organizations expand their documentation of egregious human rights abuses by security forces. As a result of our efforts, local efforts to hold Pakistan security forces accountable for human rights violations stand on firmer ground.

Supporting democrats and human rights activists in closed societies is a long-term investment that pays significant dividends. Burma is a country where I would like to highlight the value of consistent and sustained engagement in bringing about democratic change. For more than 20 years, the United States supported those willing to risk severe prison sentences to hand out copies of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, provide information about the rights of workers, share how citizens in other autocratic countries peacefully demanded changes to the social contract, and attend trainings on democratic principles and civic activism. The U.S. government's leadership; its provision of safe access to the Internet and other information resources; and, its support for bloggers, journalists, artists, monks, students, lawyers, rights activists, and opposition political parties – have all made a critical difference.

The United States policy of principled engagement in Burma encouraged and supported leaders in the Government of Burma to undertake democratic reforms and create opportunities for the people of Burma to demand their rights. We cannot ignore that the most significant, lasting changes in repressive countries come from domestic champions who dedicate and often risk their lives to win freedom. The Burmese activists who are instrumental in developing and reforming their country and creating a strong and vibrant civil society would be the first to tell you that human rights and democracy have a long way to go in Burma. But activists are better able to continue that struggle because of the solidarity the United States and others have shown in their cause. I believe that further reform is possible because civil society in Burma now has the space and capacity to push for further changes. A strong, diverse and vibrant civil society must serve as Burma's moral compass as the country confronts challenges of bigotry and prejudice. We are confident these lessons apply to other authoritarian environments, where dividends from our investments may not show immediately, but can deliver meaningful long-term change.

The focus of this hearing is programming, however in closing I want to emphasize that our assistance, policy and diplomacy are mutually reinforcing. And on behalf of the Secretary and together with colleagues across the Department of State and USAID, DRL is hard at work using a range of diplomatic tools to advance freedom and human rights. We oppose NGO laws by governments that unduly constrain civil society. We make the case that countries become more

prosperous and stable as a result of unfettered freedom of expression, assembly and association. We raise these issues in bilateral discourse, human rights and legal experts dialogues, and in regional and multilateral fora. We meet with minority groups who feel isolated and endangered, and partner with civil society organizations. We raise human rights cases bilaterally and multilaterally, publicly and privately. We monitor and attend trials of political dissidents, and work quietly and publicly for the release of those unjustly imprisoned. We work to strengthen the rule of law, judicial independence, and democratic institutions. We promote political pluralism and fair electoral processes. In sum, DRL is engaged in wide range of activities to advance freedom, and we work collaboratively with our colleagues at State, USAID, Justice, Labor, Defense, and other Departments, to advance human rights, in line with the President's National Security Strategy and Stand with Civil Society.

The work of securing freedoms where they are threatened or denied is never-ending. We cannot waver in our commitment to supporting struggles for freedom because a more just and rights-respecting world means less conflict, fewer transnational threats, and more stable and effective partners for the United States. The continued active involvement of this Committee in supporting democracy, freedom, and human rights around the world is essential. We appreciate your attention to these important issues. Thank you again for the invitation to testify. I am happy to answer any questions.

Uzra Zeya



Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

Term of Appointment: 03/08/2013 to present

Uzra Zeya became Acting Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor on March 8, 2013.

Ms. Zeya joined the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary on September 24, 2012. Ms. Zeya's responsibilities for DRL Bureau include oversight of operations and programs, and ensuring that the bureau's diplomacy, public outreach, and foreign assistance efforts support the President's and Secretary's foreign policy goals.

Ms. Zeya has over two decades of policy experience in the Department, where she has focused on the Near East and South Asia regions and multilateral affairs. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1990, Ms. Zeya's overseas assignments have included Paris, Muscat, Damascus, Cairo, and Kingston. Ms. Zeya served most recently as Chief of Staff to Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns, where she supported a range of policy initiatives, ranging from the U.S. response to transitions in the Middle East to deepening engagement with emerging global powers. Prior to that, Ms. Zeya served as Minister Counselor for Political Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi. In Washington, she served as a Deputy Executive Secretary to Secretaries Rice and Clinton, as Director of the Executive Secretariat Staff, and as UNGA coordinator for the International Organizations bureau.

Dr. Sarah E. Mendelson
Deputy Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
U.S. Agency for International Development

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Subcommittee
February 26, 2014

**“U.S. Assistance to Promote Freedom and Democracy
in Countries with Repressive Environments”**

Chairwoman Granger, Ranking Member Lowey and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify on U.S. assistance to promote freedom and democracy in countries with repressive environments. I appreciate the Subcommittee’s attention to this issue—one that I have written about as a scholar, championed as an activist, and focused on very closely for the last four years at USAID. Thank you also for your continued support for USAID’s democracy, conflict and humanitarian assistance programs around the world.

Introduction

For several decades now, the U.S. government has promoted democracy, human rights and governance (DRG) as an integral part of development. As the first and the largest global, bilateral donor supporting this sector, USAID has helped millions of people in their quest for dignity, freedom, and rights. We have done this in a way that has over time adapted to changing conditions around the world. For example, two years ago, we stood up a new Center of Excellence on DRG at USAID in order to lead this community in understanding what works, where, and why. We have enhanced our focus on innovation and 21st century technology, and the role they play in advancing DRG. Last year, USAID launched a new articulation of our overall strategy for how we support DRG around the world. And just last month, USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah announced the Agency’s new Mission statement, which highlights how, in our global era, poverty reduction, economic growth, democracy, and national security are inextricably intertwined: “We partner to end extreme poverty and promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity.”

USAID programs the majority of U.S. foreign assistance promoting democracy, human rights and governance, working with our cadre of over 400 Foreign Service Officers and host-country nationals. We partner with civil society organizations, journalists, human rights activists, legislators, judges, electoral officials, mayors, and governors around the world to support their efforts to protect, advance and advocate for open and free societies. Because we see democracy, human rights, and governance as the foundation for future development gains regardless of regime type and in pursuit of our development mission, USAID works in all types of contexts. This includes in authoritarian states, where basic freedoms do not exist; transitioning states, emerging from conflict or moving toward political openings; and, increasingly, in “backsliding” states whose governments have become more sophisticated in their repression, specifically targeting civil society organizations through laws that restrict freedoms of association and peaceful assembly in the name of their national security. We know that democracy, human rights and

governance are critical foundations for achieving and sustaining development goals. Absent inclusion and political freedom, we see development in reverse.

Today I would like to cover three key areas: first, the growing, global trend toward greater repression of civil society; second, the U.S. Government's broad response to the issue, with a focus on USAID's approaches and lessons learned; and finally, our plans for future work.

The Backlash

This hearing is about closing and closed political space. But I want to first talk briefly about *opening space*; I believe these phenomena are inter-related. Twenty-first century DRG development is happening in a dynamic environment characterized by game-changing, affordable information and communication technologies. These tools allow people to self-organize and connect with one another like never before.

As a result, in many countries, regular citizens—whether as part of formal civil society organizations, or as bloggers, citizen journalists, or human rights activists—are flourishing and lending talent and expertise to drive political, social, and economic development. USAID is leveraging this wave of new communications technologies in its programming around the globe, fostering improved access to information for citizens even in the most repressive countries.

These rapid and dramatic advances in technology are fundamentally changing how people in societies interact, citizen-to-citizen and citizen-to-government. People are using new tools to hold their government accountable. In Kenya, Indonesia, South Africa, and elsewhere in the Global South, citizens are demanding and receiving more and better information about how government delivers (or does not deliver) services to their citizens. They use technology to talk about and monitor corruption, such as the “I Paid a Bribe” movement that moved from India to Kenya to Ukraine. They use technology to track fraud in voting, as we have witnessed in Russia and many other countries.

As citizen voices have grown stronger, we have also seen a backlash. Specifically, what we are seeing is a response (in part) to technological innovations that have eroded or softened states' ability to control information, thereby infuriating authoritarians. Evidence suggests that the backlash is contagious and growing in intensity across the globe. According to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, at least 50 new laws restricting freedoms of association, peaceful assembly, and expression have been proposed in the last two years alone—with about 20 of them already enacted into law.

As citizens find new ways to organize, assemble, and express themselves, autocratic governments have found new ways to restrict public political space, suppress information, and label anything that they do not like as “foreign.” It is not an exaggeration to say that this counter-movement is affecting not just the work of USAID or the U.S. Government but that of the entire global community involved in advancing democracy and human rights. We are seeing a new wave of repression in the draconian laws that are affecting the rights of members of the LGBT population in many parts of the world as well as a closing of freedom of expression globally, with 211 journalists jailed in 2013 and 70 killed for their work.

USAID's work has been fundamentally affected by this backlash; our Agency has been on the frontlines as our civil society partners have been shuttered, our U.S. funding vilified, and in some cases our Missions closed. Indeed, the distinction between “closed” countries like Belarus and Uzbekistan and “closing” countries like Russia, Zimbabwe, Ecuador, and Nicaragua is beginning to blur. Closed and

closing political spaces are part of the same phenomenon, and a development challenge that is a growing trend in more and more countries. This trend is dangerous because without a robust civil society, there is no democracy or effective, sustainable development.

For the past two years, USAID has systematically sought to identify lessons and to refine our own policies supporting civil society in restrictive environments and closed societies. We looked across our programs—both in Missions and in Washington—and consulted with staff in the field on their experiences with rapidly shrinking public political space.

We found challenges to the legal registration of civil society organizations in Uzbekistan, Zambia and elsewhere. We found, increasingly, laws restricting all foreign funding—not just from Western governments, but also from private donors—in Russia, Ethiopia, and possibly Kenya (where restrictive legislative amendments could likely be re-introduced in parliament this year). We found, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, a trend of government efforts to restrict freedoms of association and peaceful assembly, such as in Cameroon. We found governments attempting to manage civil society organizations or to restrict sources of funding (Venezuela). We found civil society groups defamed by government-owned media and denounced as Western spies or traitors (Ecuador) and as foreign agents (Russia). And we found dangerous threats to both the physical and cyber security of journalists and civil society activists in too many countries: Zimbabwe, Syria, Russia, and Sri Lanka, to name only a few. But we also found our Missions were finding creative ways to continue to support these courageous women and men working to protect human rights and advance democracy and good governance, all in the pursuit of advancing our mission of development.

The USG Approach

The White House has recognized this threat to freedom and in September 2013 President Obama launched a new effort that coincided with the U.N. General Assembly. The President called on the entire U.S. Government—not only State and USAID, but also the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Department of Treasury, and others—to make standing with civil society a whole-of-government priority.

We have embarked on a year-long process around four goals: 1). Improve the domestic policy environment for civil society by strengthening countries' adherence to international norms and promoting best practices for government and civil society engagement, such as through the Open Government Partnership; 2). Coordinate multilateral, diplomatic pressure to roll back restrictions and prevent new restrictions from being enacted, such as through the Community of Democracies; 3). Identify new and innovative ways of providing technical and financial support to civil society, such as considering how we can use technology to help civil society connect more robustly with fellow citizens and gain resilience against this pernicious epidemic of restrictive laws; and 4). Strengthen our internal U.S. Government processes to improve coordination and ensure we are using all of our levers of influence to combat the closing space issue.

USAID is integrally involved in all four of these areas. We provide core support to the Secretariat of the Open Government Partnership, which now includes 63 countries as well as civil society and private sector partners, all committed to meeting global challenges related to transparency, participation and accountability.

In 2012, USAID launched “Making All Voices Count: A Grand Challenge for Development,” a \$55 million public-private partnership with UKAID, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Omidyar Network and the Open Society Foundations to support innovation and research that will enable citizens to engage with their governments and improve the ability of governments to listen and respond to their citizens. The first round of challenge grants received over 500 applications proposing innovative ways to use technology to enable citizens to better use public information. We are working closely with our colleagues at the State Department to support local civil society efforts to prevent new restrictions from being enacted. And we are leading a process, together with other governments, private donors, and non-governmental organizations to explore new innovative ways to support civil society around the world.

The political trajectory of a country is ultimately a U.S. national security issue, and as such, we are intimately involved in advancing U.S. national security interests. Several of the countries we will discuss today are of high national security interest to the United States, and they are also in the category of requiring very long-term democracy efforts.

Accordingly, the investments we make in these closed societies will pay dividends in the future. We know this to be true in many countries where we have worked, where institutions and processes we supported became leading elements ushering in more democratic and accountable governments. That is the story of millions of dollars of USAID investments in Serbia, Georgia, and now Burma. And we believe that those we support in today’s most closed societies will also one day have their voices clearly heard, with the ability to freely assemble.

Based on our comparative analysis of what works across countries, we have developed several approaches to the closing space phenomenon. Most important, we are focused on prevention, including monitoring legal developments aimed at restricting civil society. By tracking the legal enabling environment, we can develop real-time diplomatic and programmatic responses to threats to civil society.

USAID’s flagship \$3.5 million rapid-response program on laws restricting civil society provides timely legal analysis for policymakers and local non-governmental organizations to mobilize quickly when restrictive legislation is proposed. These efforts, when coordinated with like-minded governments, other donors, international financial institutions, and civil society partners themselves, have been effective in reshaping, mitigating, and rolling back restrictive laws. We have seen this approach produce results in Kyrgyzstan, Honduras, and most recently in Kenya. But we also must recognize that victories can be short-lived.

This preventive approach has also been beneficial in cases of opening space. Thanks to USAID’s rapid-response capability on civil society laws, we were able to take advantage of political openings in Libya, Tunisia and Burma to encourage early reformers to adopt consultative government-civil society processes that have led to much-improved civil society legislation, which in turn will pave the way for further political opening.

Specifically, in Tunisia, years of hostile conditions for civil society had negatively affected the ability of civil society organizations to function, let alone advocate. However, the Arab Spring presented an opportunity to create a fundamentally better civil society environment. USAID, starting in early 2011, was able to offer both government and civil society leaders technical assistance on civil society

organization law, plus encouragement to the government to take up the issue on its legislative agenda. The new law passed as a result of a consultative government-civil society process and is now considered a model for the region; the new Libyan draft civil society organization law is based on peer consultations with Tunisians on their law.

The policy of the Obama administration is that we continue supporting civil society – even where space is severely restricted – often through regional platforms, third-country actors, and virtual platforms, and with a focus on information and physical security. This is how we support democratic actors in many of the countries of interest in this hearing. Venezuela is in today’s headlines: USAID continues to support leading human rights organizations to advocate for improved human rights, document human rights abuses, and train civil society associations with diverse specializations to incorporate freedom of association and freedom of speech into their work.

Drawing on these and other examples, we have generated internal guidance on how to best approach our democracy programs in restrictive environments—guidance that is relevant not only to programs in the most closed countries, but to those facing the threat of closing space. For example, we created communication protocols to ensure that beneficiary information is protected. We work with our security officers on risk assessments and vetting of prospective grantees to ensure that programs are not compromised. We build more flexibility into our grants to allow our partners to better react to changing and difficult environments. We work closely with our implementing partners to ensure that they put in place sufficient digital security protocols. Finally, we have developed creative monitoring and evaluation approaches, including phone and third-party surveys, and we use cutting-edge data analytic tools to track programs with a virtual component.

Lessons about closing space have especially influenced our work on Internet Freedom. USAID early on made the decision to focus not on developing tools but instead on formulating principles of design. Specifically, we seek to understand how journalists and civil society activists use technology, what specific risks they face by working online, and then developing sustainable ways to mitigate those risks.

Our Information Safety and Capacity (ISC) program works directly with democracy and human rights activists in countries where governments monitor and/or attack via the Internet and provide them with long-term mentoring to help them develop safe communication protocols. One-off trainings on Internet Freedom are simply not enough; we know that our partner organizations need longer-term support to ensure that they can both understand their risks and manage them effectively and sustainably.

For example, in some regions, we have provided the resources to keep important human rights organizations’ websites functional in the face of distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks. In places of great violence, we are helping influential bloggers stay safe. Our work on Internet Freedom is now a fundamental pillar of all of our democracy and human rights work in closing societies, and we build into all of our civil society programs the need to keep information safe online.

What Next?

We know that autocratic governments are engaged in lateral learning—watching for whatever consequences arise due to the adoption of restrictive laws. Ethiopia’s draconian civil society law was copied by Kenya and considered by its Parliament in December 2013. While the legislation was not

passed, trends in Kenya as they relate to respect for civil society operating space suggest that the legislation could likely be re-introduced this year. Adoption of such a law would mark an enormous setback for democracy in Kenya and beyond. Russia's foreign funding restrictions were mirrored in Azerbaijan's laws. States in Central Asia monitor closely the Russian laws and use a range of similar repressive measures to constrict the activities of civil society. We must face what amounts to a contagion head-on.

We know that authoritarian governments are on a cynical quest that involves the exploitation of nationalist sentiment masked as hyper-sovereignty: they label ideas and funding as "foreign" and question the legitimacy of civil society organizations and news outlets (particularly ones that work on democratic reforms, anti-corruption, and human rights), and they denounce such organizations as traitors or puppets of Western donors.

While possible antidotes to the current contagion must be specific to each country, no one size fits all. We believe that solutions will involve several common elements that we are already implementing. For example, USAID is working closely with other governments, and we hope soon to be collaborating with some in the technology industry, to think creatively about new ways to support democratic actors and help develop or encourage domestic sources of philanthropy. We are also looking at helping civil society organizations better connect to their constituents and considering how to lessen the over-reliance of organizations on external sources of funding. We recognize that we will need to adapt and work nimbly, addressing the lateral learning that we witness from authoritarian regimes around the world.

We know that part of the answer will involve working regionally or transnationally. USAID's field presence—with literally hundreds of democracy officers in Missions—is an important and unique American strength, giving us a better ability to design programs tailored to country context, and to monitor and evaluate our work for results. So building out those regional platforms will be important.

Another aspect of the solution will likely lie in using technology and peer-to-peer learning to help better connect civil society, journalists, and democracy activists to innovations that are being pioneered elsewhere around the world. And yet another means or redress will involve the enabling of democracy and human rights activists to better and more robustly connect their work to the concerns of everyday people. Over the coming months, we will be reaching out to civil society actors around the world to better understand whom they connect with, and how they do so.

Conclusion

Our support to advance freedom in closed societies is a long-term endeavor. Indeed, I have been involved in this work virtually my entire professional career. As a scholar, implementer, activist, and now as an official of the Obama Administration, I have always been humbled by how hard this work is, and how brave our colleagues are who risk their lives on the front lines of freedom and democracy every day.

This work is a reflection not only of American values but also of universal values. We are at a pivotal moment in the struggle to advance democracy and human rights around the world.

As the backlash grows, it has never been more important that we work in a coordinated manner inside the U.S. Government as well as with like-minded governments, the private sector, and civil society partners

to support efforts to keep political space open. We need your continued support to be able to do this work—work that is not only in our national interest, but that is fundamentally the right thing to do.

With all our programs, we coordinate as closely as possible with the U.S. Department of State and the National Endowment for Democracy, as well as with private philanthropies. With limited resources for this sector, we find coordination essential to ensure that we are as effective and efficient as possible.


Due to the sensitive nature of our work in these repressive countries and the importance we place on the physical security and protection of our partners, this testimony does not detail country specifics. I look forward to providing more information in the hearing.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.



BIOGRAPHY

Sarah Mendelson
Deputy Assistant Administrator,
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict,
and Humanitarian Assistance



Sarah E. Mendelson currently serves as Deputy Assistant Administrator in USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance responsible for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance. She is also the Agency lead on combatting human trafficking. She joined the Obama administration in May 2010.

At USAID, she directs a staff of nearly 100 with an annual budget of approximately \$110 million. She has led a number of initiatives at the Agency to elevate and refocus work on democracy, human rights and governance, including the new USAID Policy on C-TIP and the Campus Challenge on CTIP; "the Tech Challenge," a public-private partnership with Humanity United announced by the President of the United States in April 2012, "Making All Voices Count: A Grand Challenge for Development" a \$55 million public-private partnership with DFID, Omidyar Network, SIDA and Open Society Foundations.

Prior to her current position, Dr. Mendelson was the Director of the Human Rights and Security Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She has worked for nearly two decades on a wide variety of issues related to human rights and democracy including in Moscow as a program officer with the National Democratic Institute in 1994 and 1995. Before CSIS, she was a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. At CSIS, she conducted over a dozen public opinion surveys in Russia, tracking views on Chechnya, military and police abuse, as well as knowledge and experiences with human trafficking. She has researched the links between human trafficking and peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, and her work helped shape U.S. legislation and policies at NATO on this issue.

She received her B.A. in history from Yale University and her Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. Prior to joining the Administration, she served on the advisory committee for the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. A frequent contributor to the media, she has authored over 70 scholarly and public policy publications.

**Testimony of André Mendes, Director of Global Operations
Broadcasting Board of Governors**

**Oversight Hearing - United States Assistance to Promote Freedom and
Democracy in Countries with Repressive Environments
House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs**

February 26, 2014

Chairwoman Granger, Ranking Member Lowey, members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here on behalf of the Broadcasting Board of Governors to address our agency's work via broadcasting and the Internet to promote freedom and democracy in some of the most closed societies on the planet.

BBG programs reach more than 206 million people per week in 61 languages. We present reliable news and information for people in places where unbiased and up-to-the-minute reports on current events are a rare commodity, whether due to autocratic regimes, conflict or natural disaster. Our journalists adhere to the most rigorous standards of professional independence and objectivity, providing people who live in places without free media a much-needed window on the world, as well as news from their own countries and regions.

This includes large audiences in countries that are strategically critical for U.S. foreign policy. The 206 million weekly audience figure reflects the combined TV, radio, Internet, and mobile audiences of five networks: Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio and TV Martí, Radio Free Asia and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (comprised of Alhurra TV and Radio Sawa). And this audience reach is a net increase of nearly 31 million from last year's total. For the first time, our TV audiences have surpassed radio, with the TV audience measuring 110 million and radio reaching 109 million people per week. The Internet audience has grown substantially from last year, with 22 million reached online. The BBG's largest audiences are in Indonesia, Nigeria, Mexico, and Iran.

With respect to promoting Internet freedom, the BBG has a robust program, with a current budget of \$25.5 million per year due to an increased mandate in the Fiscal Year 2014 omnibus appropriations bill. Consistent with this requirement, the BBG will continue to expand its complementary and collaborative approach among all the BBG networks in order to leverage their Internet freedom work.

The BBG's IAC Division, which is an office within the federal agency, and RFA's Open Technology Fund provide a variety of tools to improve access to the Internet for citizens of countries whose governments censor the Web, and they help educate these audiences about how to navigate the Internet safely.

Addressing government-imposed censorship of news and information on the Web requires a high level of agility. In the past three years, given additional support first from the State Department and then directly from Congress, our Internet freedom program has undergone a major period of growth to focus as well on mobile and satellite platforms. We have also expanded research and development, analysis, and the creation and implementation of tools that address audience needs for access, security and anonymity. The BBG collaborates with other Internet freedom projects to achieve these aims.

With its newly-expanded Internet freedom funding in the Fiscal Year 2014 budget, the BBG expects to continue research on such topics as how interference in modern Internet data networks occurs; development of technologies to promote Internet freedom and increase communication safety; and the implementation of tools and education programs. It is also expected that the BBG will continue to improve and deploy tools to establish Virtual Private Networks, protect information about URLs visited on mobile devices, and optimize traffic routing through peer-to-peer networks.

The subcommittee has asked the BBG to address how we reach people via broadcasting and our Internet freedom programs in seven countries in particular. I will begin closest to home, with Cuba.

Cuba

Our Office of Cuba Broadcasting is the home of Radio and TV Martí and the website martinoticias.com – collectively, they are known as the Martí's. The Martí's are a multimedia hub of news, information and analysis that provide the people of Cuba with interactive programs seven days a week through satellite television, shortwave and AM radio, as well as through flash drives, email, DVDs, and SMS text. This is a one-of-a-kind service that provides unbiased, objective information.

The Martí's face distribution challenges in Cuba. The Cuban government attempts with some success to jam our broadcast signals, and it places prohibitions on satellite dish ownership. It monitors use of the Internet and restricts bandwidth.

There is a well-established market for DVDs and flash drives with material from outside the island; we have testimony and photos from activists in Cuba demonstrating that programs produced by the Martí's are watched on these media. OCB has also set up an SMS-based social media network called Piramideo that users in Cuba access by cell phone. It allows users to connect via text messaging within the island. And the BBG uses an anti-censorship tool to provide web proxies for access to the Internet, along with a suite of software apps that counter the censors' filters.

OCB works with dissidents in Cuba, the blogging community, and civil activists to improve access to the Internet and information in Cuba, which is considered one of the least connected countries in the Western hemisphere.

Connectivity to the Internet is a new frontier in the Martí's' work. It will dramatically increase the free flow of information on the island. The goal is for citizen journalism to trump the governments' efforts to censor information.

North Korea

The BBG has enhanced broadcasts to North Korea by focusing on improved programming, increased original broadcast hours, and multiple avenues of signal transmission. The current 10-hours-per-day coordinated stream of VOA and RFA programming to North Korea uses BBG programming and transmission resources in the best strategic manner. The services broadcast on medium wave and shortwave frequencies and maintain Korean-language websites.

Officially, citizens of the DPRK are permitted only to tune to official stations, and radios are locked to those frequencies. Against these enormous risks, though, independent research indicates that North Koreans are listening to BBG-supported broadcasts on black market radios. Although the BBG is not able to survey audiences inside the DPRK, interviews of North Korean defectors allow us to make certain assumptions about listening habits. Recent refugee surveys reveal that 18.4 percent of those surveyed listen to BBG programming on a weekly basis.

Based on audience research on North Korean listener habits, the BBG has developed a broadcast schedule during the hours which provide for the greatest potential audience reach.

The BBG carefully monitors these broadcast transmissions on a daily basis for signal quality and indications of jamming, and we adjust technical parameters as resources permit to achieve the best possible quality. VOA and RFA Korean transmissions have been jammed in the past – but only sporadically and not very effectively. To combat shortwave jamming and to provide reliable reception over a target area, the BBG uses multiple simultaneous shortwave transmissions on different frequencies from different locations. To improve medium wave signals, the BBG looks for available time on medium wave transmitters close to the DPRK.

In addition, the growing number of mobile phone users in North Korea offers the BBG new opportunities to use mobile technology as a future alternative, effective means to reach the North Korean audience. An RFA iPhone app that plays RFA Korean's most current programming has been available since 2011, and VOA's Korean Service launched a new mobile site in April 2013.

Iran

The BBG has developed multiple avenues to reach the Iranian people because for a number of years, Iran jammed satellite transponders, which the BBG joined other broadcasters in protesting. Television, social media and mobile phones appear to be the most effective means for program delivery to Iran.

Satellite television dominates the Iranian media market. According to surveys that we have done with Gallup, almost all Iranians (98.2%) report watching TV in the past week. VOA Persian targets the 26.4% of the Iranian population who say they have a satellite dish at home, along with the 32.7% who say they had watched satellite television in the past week. Forty-four percent of VOA's viewers are in the prime 15-34 year old demographic.

RFE/RL's Radio Farda is a 24/7 Farsi-language news station broadcasting independent and unbiased information to Iran on multiple shortwave frequencies and one cross-border AM station, making it available virtually at all times.

U.S. international media reach more Iranians on a weekly basis through television, radio and the Internet than does the British Broadcasting Corporation, or BBC, although the audiences are different.

Iranian authorities continue to aggressively block our broadcasts via localized jamming of satellite TV, shortwave, and medium wave radio signals within Iran.

Additionally, Facebook is a popular platform within Iran as well as among the diaspora population. There are 960,000 fans on the main Radio Farda Facebook page, operated by RFE/RL. This Facebook presence is hugely important for distributing content and interacting with audiences. When the United States returned an ancient artifact to Iran last year during President Rouhani's visit to the United Nations, 205,000 Iranians read the news on Radio Farda's Facebook page. A report about the former Shah of Iran 35 years after his downfall was read by more than 350,000 people and shared more than 20,000 times. VOA received more than 1,000 comments sent on Facebook during a half-hour interactive TV program last November on news about the Iran Joint Plan of Action Agreement hammered out in Geneva.

We also provide satellite transmissions with related on-screen text and audio services for both VOA and Radio Farda, which has proven an effective means since satellite dish ownership, while illegal in Iran, is widespread.

Similar to the Martí's service to Cuba, the BBG currently uses desktop tools to promote access to communication services to Iran. Every month, users from Iran log on to Radio Farda's page via these tools more than 11 million times.

Russia

The BBG, like all international broadcasters, has faced a special challenge in Russia due to a law that went into effect in late 2012 restricting the ability of Russian broadcasters to carry programming from abroad. Both VOA and RFE/RL continue to produce audio and video programs that can be aired on affiliate stations, but are mostly seen and heard on the Web. VOA's Russian Service produces a 30-minute weekday audio podcast that is available online and broadcast on Moscow's 810 AM frequency via a contract with Voice of Russia, and it offers popular video products including daily reports from the New York Stock Exchange at the opening and closing bell. It also produces an hour-long program aired on satellite and cable channel Top Secret on weekdays, as well as maintaining a partnership on content exchange with the remaining independent media such as radio station *Ekho Moskvy* and the newspaper *Novaya Gazeta*.

In spite of the Russian government's efforts to restrict the delivery means for Radio Svoboda, it is seen by the human rights and NGO communities in Russia as a source of support and one of the few media that promote the coverage of civil

society and human rights activity in the country. Last year, the service launched a joint Internet page with the leading human rights group "Memorial."

Last month, the BBG and Gallup released study results on media consumption habits in Russia and the rapid growth of Internet use. The data from the survey show that there is dissatisfaction among Russians with the limited news and opinion offerings of major Russian media. Thirty percent of adults said that Russian media do not offer enough variety in perspectives on current events and issues. A 2013 Gallup World Poll survey of Russia found that only 48% of respondents felt that media in Russia was free, and Freedom House ranked Russia 176 out of 196 countries for press freedom in 2013.

The Internet, by contrast, is one of the more promising avenues for news and information in Russia. The survey results show that as more Russians get Internet access – seven in 10 have access at home in 2013 – more of them are getting their news online. A majority of Russians (56.4%) said they receive their news from the Internet at least once a week. The Internet outdistances traditional media such as newspapers and magazines (49.8%) and radio (43.8%) as a source for weekly news. With this increasingly Internet-savvy audience that expects on-demand, personalized news, a robust Internet strategy is key to engaging younger, digital audiences and expanding reach in Russia.

China

Our networks have been on the forefront of reporting on breaking news and exclusive stories from inside China. Their coverage includes topics that are restricted in the Chinese press, such as unrest in Tibet, human trafficking, government corruption, tensions in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and crackdowns on house churches. This coverage provides audiences with an honest look at some of the most politically sensitive and heavily censored issues in China.

Due to severe restrictions on international broadcasting in China and intensive jamming of radio transmissions -- preventing our broadcasts from being heard and, in some cases, substituting them with Chinese state-run radio programs -- the BBG attempts to reach audiences simultaneously through diverse methods ranging from traditional shortwave broadcasts to more modern Internet proxy services that reach tech-savvy, urban news-seekers on the mainland. Since China has a very robust Internet censorship program as well as popular national social networks that are carefully monitored by the authorities, our Internet freedom program in China

includes the use of newsletters that are sent via e-mail using proprietary software that helps them reach their audience in the face of censorship efforts.

Satellite television presents a promising area for growth for the BBG in China. Dishes as small as 10 inches in diameter are popular in many parts of the country due to their reliability and capabilities.

In terms of total broadcast hours to China, the BBG has ample offerings: VOA's Mandarin service produces 63 hours of radio per week, and 14 hours of TV. The Cantonese service produces two hours of news radio programming, as well as a weekly TV feature on American life. Both the Mandarin and Cantonese services operate websites with popular programs, as well as social media sites with unique content that is not available on-air. VOA Tibetan reaches its target audience on television, radio and the internet with uncensored news that is unavailable to Tibetans through state-controlled Chinese media. RFA Mandarin broadcasts 43 hours of radio each week and eight webcasts. RFA's Tibetan service has broken new ground repeatedly in covering the stories of unrest in that region and is the first to report on many of the self-immolations among Tibetans protesting Beijing's rule. RFA's Uyghur service has been closely covering the tightening of restrictions and targeting of China's mostly Muslim Uyghurs, as well as the ethnic violence that is pervasive in western China. RFA's multi-media website delivers daily news through proxies and other counter-censorship tools and through republication by a broad network of in-country celebrity bloggers. RFA maintains an active social media presence on Twitter, Weibo, Youku, YouTube and blogs.

VOA's daily programming includes international, China, and U.S. news; features on topics such as legal issues, media on China, human rights, and U.S.-China relations; talk shows featuring debates and call-ins; and English teaching. RFA's programming includes newscasts, call-in programs, news features, cultural programming, and talk shows. RFA also plays a vital role in building Chinese civil society by modeling free press and by bringing to light the work of indigenous civil society groups. RFA promotes freedom and democratic values through its coverage for China's underserved communities – including migrant workers, those in remote areas, and those with no access to the Web – along with land grabs, the rule of law, and the millions suffering under religious repression.

Burma

VOA and RFA have two different yet complementary roles to play in a country where democratic reforms are still fragile and are threatened by increasing

religious, racial and ethnic tensions that domestic media have difficulty covering. RFA's goal is to provide surrogate indigenous free press until robust and sustainable indigenous free press exists in Burma. Once this goal is achieved, RFA will withdraw from Burma. VOA fosters the growth of indigenous free press, as well, but it serves to accurately represent American policies and views. Established in 1943, VOA Burmese has broadcast consistently since 1951 presenting U.S. regional and political interests. As long as there is a gap in knowledge about the United States and its values, or broadcasting in Burma that misrepresents America, there will be a need for VOA in that country.

Audience research indicates that the vast majority of VOA's audience listens to RFA and vice versa. Given the large number of dual listeners, we infer that the respective products of VOA and RFA are not duplicative, but rather both valuable in the lives of the listeners.

VOA and RFA programs together create for the BBG the most popular international broadcasting service in the country with a weekly audience share of 28.4 percent, or approximately 15.33 million adults. Media consumption has been largely via radio (61% report listening to radio; 58% use radio for news) – and predominantly on the shortwave band, but FM listenership is growing.

Both RFA and VOA offer original programming on popular and emerging platforms. Together, they provide five and a half hours of original, daily radio content and one hour of original television programming six days a week. RFA and VOA are each building unique social media audiences with breaking news updates on the Internet and mobile devices in anticipation of significant penetration of these media in the country.

RFA is focused on reporting domestic news from the far corners of the country, with offices in Rangoon and Naypitaw, as well as reporters stationed in other states. It reports in seven ethnic languages about what is happening on the ground and how people's lives are being affected by legacy problems and the challenges associated with a transitioning democracy. RFA also reports on the solutions that individuals, the government, the private sector, and NGOs are adopting as the landscape continues to evolve. RFA produces a bi-monthly program with Aung San Suu Kyi, "The Hard Road to Democracy," in which she discusses current democratization efforts and issues.

VOA provides a unique American perspective on events in Burma through coverage of national, regional, U.S., and international news and events. This

includes first-hand reporting on issues such as U.S.-Burmese relations, the U.S. role in Southeast Asia, Burmese relations with China and North Korea, Constitutional Reform, and Buddhist-Muslim communal tensions.

Two significant things occurred in recent months creating new and unique opportunities for VOA Burmese. First, the Burmese government accorded VOA official press accreditation. Second, the 2014 budget proposal includes a \$200,000 investment for VOA Burmese television and digital efforts. VOA will use these opportunities in carrying out its mission, serving as a model of good journalism and providing media training to local Burmese outlets.

Finally, VOA will continue to exploit the strong appetite for English Learning materials. VOA already provides Learning English products for placement on State Radio and Television and Shwe FM.

During the past two years, the BBG has been able to pursue affiliate relationships for the first time in Burma, and has signed both radio and direct-to-home satellite agreements with partners placing programs inside Burma.

Zimbabwe

VOA remains the only Western station broadcasting into Zimbabwe full time in Shona and Ndebele, filling a niche for Zimbabweans seeking news in their own languages that is unfiltered by the state. VOA programs are distributed via shortwave and medium wave frequencies, stereo audio via satellite, the Internet (with downloadable links for all shows), and radio on TV.

The most popular VOA program in Zimbabwe is *Studio 7*, which is in Shona, Ndebele and English. Broadcast each weekday, the 2 1/2-hour program consists of three 30 minute news shows followed by 60 minutes of entertainment. *Live Talk*, an hour-long call-in program introduced in December 2013, consists of three 20-minute shows presented in Shona, English, and Ndebele. It airs on shortwave and medium wave and the livestream is available for viewing online.

According to data collected by Gallup in January, about three fourths of VOA's total weekly audience continues to access the network's programming via its three shortwave frequencies, while 15.3% listen via AM frequencies. However, growing use of satellite television and the Internet in Zimbabwe represent opportunities to expand VOA's reach in the country. Internet use will rise as the population continues to urbanize; in 2013, 46% of city dwellers went online weekly for news.

VOA Zimbabwe's Internet presence includes comprehensive websites in English, Shona and Ndebele, each with streaming audio and a Studio 7 Facebook page.

The prevalence of mobile phones continues to grow rapidly, particularly in rural areas; eight in ten Zimbabweans now have their own phone. As the country's wireless infrastructure expands and the cost of wireless data service and low end Internet-capable phones continues to fall, this will develop as an important distribution channel for VOA and other international media. About one-fifth of the country's mobile phone owners (22%) currently listen to the radio on their phones at least weekly (most likely via the built-in FM receiver) with a substantial proportion of these also able to access the Internet on their phones. As Internet radio becomes more accessible, it will become an increasingly viable alternative to shortwave and a way to reach Zimbabwean radio listeners.

Conclusion

Over the years, the BBG's networks have played a critical role in promoting freedom and democracy by exemplifying free expression by a free press. They are able to report on issues that indigenous media cannot or will not cover, such as official corruption, religious and political persecution, and human rights violations and abuses. In addition, the networks have developed greater global understanding by engaging their audiences on the issues of importance to them, and by providing trusted news and information.

By organizing town hall-style forums with opposition and independent candidates, providing thorough election coverage for countries where democracy is under threat, and letting audiences engage knowledgeable experts on issues such as rule of law, democracy, human rights, and rights under domestic laws, our networks function as open forums and platforms advancing the progress of democracy and civil society.


In a prolonged period of declining press freedom, our journalists have faced numerous threats. In spite of these hazardous conditions, the BBG's networks have met critical strategic challenges with special programming and broadcasts in response to the war in Syria, democratic transitions in Egypt and Iraq, the rise of Islamist fundamentalism in Mali and northern Nigeria, the political opening in Burma, and unrest and protests in Tibet.

We are grateful to Congress for the support and the resources entrusted to us to achieve this critical mission. I look forward to answering your questions.

André Mendes

Director of Global Operations

Broadcasting Board of Governors



As Director of Global Operations, André Mendes manages, supervises and directs the IBB Chief of Staff, the Office of Technology, Services and Innovation (TSI) and serves as program administrator for the grants made to the BBG-sponsored grantees.

Prior to this role, Mendes served as the Director of the Office of Technology, Services and Innovation, providing executive leadership in the planning, development, and operation of all the engineering and technical systems necessary to communicate with the people of the world by radio, TV, and the Internet, including a world-wide satellite and transmitting station network, as well as planning for the use of new technological improvements and efficiencies.

André Mendes most recently served as senior vice president, strategic planning and global CIO, for Special Olympics International, managing the organization's global technology infrastructure, the development of the 2011-2015 Special Olympics Strategic Plan and administering the Christmas Record Trust Fund. Previously he served as Chief Technology Integration Officer for the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), where he was responsible for both Information Technology and Broadcast Engineering during the Service's \$1.8 billion transition to digital television and managed PBS' migration from a legacy tape-based environment to a ground breaking, entirely file-driven content workflow.

André has received numerous industry awards for his work, including one of the 2008 MIT Awards for IT Innovation.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Former Acting Assistant Secretary Uzra Zeya by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart
House Appropriations Subcommittee on State/Foreign Operations
February 26, 2014**

Question:

What are USAID and State/DRL doing right now to support democracy and governance in Venezuela given the arrests, violent crackdowns on protesters, and further restrictions on independent media?

Answer:

The United States remains deeply concerned by the Venezuelan government's arbitrary detention and excessive use of force against peaceful protesters and journalists, continued restrictions on independent media and manipulation of news and information, and lack of due process. Civil society organizations are under continual threat from the government, and the government severely limits the ability of people in Venezuela more generally to exercise freedoms of peaceful assembly and expression.

USAID and State/DRL programs in Venezuela provide critical assistance to a wide range of civil society organizations that promote and defend fundamental freedoms, democratic processes, and non-violent advocacy by promoting public access to information, pressing for

transparency and accountability, supporting peaceful, fact-based debate, and augmenting awareness of human rights issues.

The Department will continue to respond to the needs of Venezuelan citizens and civil society, and will stay in close touch with Congress. We believe U.S. assistance, including in challenging environments, advances U.S. goals to further human rights and democratic freedoms.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Former Assistant Secretary Uzra Zeya by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart
House Appropriations Subcommittee on State/Foreign Operations
February 26, 2014**

Question:

We have heard reports of complaints from some local civil society organizations in Nicaragua that USAID is not providing sufficient support for traditional democracy and governance programs. How is USAID using democracy and governance funds currently in Nicaragua? Has the USAID Mission in Nicaragua experienced any pushback or pressure from the Government of Nicaragua to support D&G programs? If so, how has our embassy responded?

Answer:

Approximately sixty percent of USAID/Nicaragua's FY 13 operating year budget of \$8.599M directly supports democracy, human rights and governance (DRG) objectives and the remaining forty percent directly complements these efforts. U.S. DRG programming in Nicaragua targets three subsectors: 1) local level governance, 2) civil society, and 3) media.

USAID's local governance program works through local CSOs that are deeply rooted in the communities and are best equipped to execute program activities. This program provides organizational strengthening to local partners to increase organizational sustainability through improved planning, resource mobilization, stakeholder engagement and outreach. Due

to the Government of Nicaragua's lack of transparency, USAID does not work directly with government counterparts.

U.S. support for civil society groups and independent media strives to ensure a greater competition of ideas, improved dialogue and advocacy for policy reform, and more effective, independent oversight of government institutions. USAID strengthens the technical and financial capabilities of key independent CSOs, allowing them to engage in civic dialogue and advocacy, regarding public access to information, accountability and governance, and citizen participation. The recently awarded media program will work with local media to ensure that citizens have access to a diversity of opinions.

Finally, as part of its youth leadership program, USAID supports capacity development of youth involved in civil society and political parties to promote pluralism and defend democracy by helping increase the organization and advocacy skills of a generation of emerging young democratic leaders from across the country. Together, these programs intend to increase citizen participation and to improve government accountability to citizen needs.

USAID's education and citizen security work on Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast complements the Mission's DRG work by promoting education and crime prevention, working with at risk youth to help them improve reading skills, stay in school, make better choices regarding their livelihoods, and become more involved in their communities. USAID's program also works with youth on vocational education to give them skills so that they can find jobs and are not lured into the narcotics trade. This work directly complements the DRG portfolio by promoting citizenship and security.

The Government of Nicaragua regularly expresses their preference for USAID assistance to pass directly through the Government of Nicaragua. USAID has determined that such an approach would negatively impact the intended outcomes of the programs and thus does not provide any funding directly to the government. To date the Government of Nicaragua has not directly impeded the implementation of any of our programs.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Former Assistant Secretary Uzra Zeya by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart
House Appropriations Subcommittee on State/Foreign Operations
February 26, 2014**

Question:

Since previously in Bolivia, Russia, and now in Ecuador, the host governments have blocked and/or expelled USAID Missions, which funds democracy and governance programs from within the country. What is USAID's plan to support civil society and democracy in those countries from "off shore?" Is State/DRL or NED in a better position to fund activities in these countries where USAID has been targeted? Will the budget request ask for an increase for programs that promote democracy and human rights, and strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law?

Answer:

The closure of a USAID Mission does not mean an end to our support to democracy, human rights, and governance in that country. It may mean a change in approach, such as moving to new platforms to support civil society, or virtual and third-country training instead of in-country.

The U.S. Government's commitment to engaging Russian civil society remains firm despite the enactment of laws and practices in Russia that restrict their fundamental freedoms and ability to receive international support. Although the traditional routes for supporting these groups have been challenged, Russian organizations continue to express a desire to

engage with the United States. The USAID mission in Moscow closed on October 1, 2012, and is no longer managing programs in Russia. The Administration will continue to consult key Congressional Committees on further efforts to engage civil society.

In Ecuador, USAID is committed to continuing to support civil society and USAID intends to do so moving forward using the best possible mechanisms.

With all our programs, we coordinate as closely as possible between USAID, State, and the NED, as well as with U.S.-based private philanthropic efforts around the world. With limited resources for Democracy, Human Rights and Governance programs, it is imperative that there be coordination wherever possible to ensure that the global community of interested voices in this field is collectively engaging in the most effective and efficient manner possible. Within the U.S. government, the combination of mutually reinforcing programs between USAID and the Department of State make our interventions more flexible and therefore more powerful.

There is no-one-size-fits-all approach to these countries. Sometimes the best actor depends on the country context. In some countries, USAID funds larger longer-term grants, and DRL and NED fund smaller grants on a shorter timeline. Continued coordination, information sharing, and flexibility are essential to the success of these programs. Which agency is best positioned to support which program is determined on a case-by-case basis, with the safety of the individual grantee as the paramount consideration. Our experience has also taught us that multi-donor support for local organizations shields those organizations from being targeted or closed down.

USAID strengths include: 1) Field-based country and regional Missions which cultivate long-standing relationships with independent civil society groups; 2) a corps of over 400 officers around the world who are specifically trained in the promotion of democracy, human rights and governance and long-term strategic planning; 3) a DRG Center of Excellence with technical experts in civil society strengthening, legal frameworks for civil society, media development, Internet Freedom, labor rights, atrocity prevention, indigenous peoples rights, anti-trafficking in persons, rule of law, governance, and elections and political processes; 4)

fast, flexible procurement mechanisms and country strategies in our Office of Transition Initiative and the DRG Center that are able to respond in real-time to changing situations; and 5) an emphasis on learning and evaluation to understand the impact of our programming.

The FY15 budget request in *Latin America* includes a 22 percent increase from FY13 levels and we remain committed to promoting democracy and supporting civil society throughout the region.

USAID's *Europe and Eurasia* (E&E) Bureau continues to prioritize and focus funding for Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) to those countries in the region that remain strategic priorities for support to democratic reformers. Even though the overall DRG levels have decreased in FY13-FY15 (request) this is due to the overall decrease in ESF funding levels in the E&E region and does not reflect a lack of priority for GJD programs.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Former Acting Assistant Secretary Uzra Zeya by
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House Appropriations Subcommittee on State/Foreign Operations
February 26, 2014**

Question:

Given the increasing erosion of democracy, human rights, civil society, and freedom of the press – or in some cases a total lack of – in places like Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, China, Russia, will the forthcoming budget request make democracy and governance a priority? How will D&G be made a priority? Do expect to see any new programs or initiatives aimed at enhancing D&G programming?

Answer:

The President's budget request for Fiscal Year 2015 contains \$2.427 billion for democracy, human rights and governance programs. While some of that funding is proposed for centrally-managed programs, particularly through State/DRL and USAID/DCHA, over 90% is spread among 73 countries.

The Department and USAID will continue to work in close partnership on democracy, human rights, and governance programs. We monitor events and circumstances around the world closely while pursuing innovative and practical mechanisms for providing civil society organizations with technical and financial support. We are committed to a multi-year effort to improve the policy environment for civil society organizations, including those working for freedom of the press, around the

world and coordinate diplomatic actions in response to restrictions on civil society. For example, the Department and USAID look forward to establishing new programs on human rights, media freedom, internet freedom, civil society, and strengthening democratic institutions.

Promoting and protecting democracy, human rights, the fundamental freedoms of religion, expression, association, peaceful assembly, and the press, and strengthening democratic institutions is a priority for this Administration and a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. As reaffirmed in President Obama's Stand with Civil Society agenda, it is the policy of the United States to support unequivocally civil society around the world.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to Director of Global Operations,
Broadcast Board of Governor Andre Mendes by
Representative Mario Diaz-Balart
House Appropriations Committee on State, Foreign Operations
February 26, 2014**

Question:

In light of the ongoing crisis in Venezuela and given the increasing challenges to democracy in the Americas, what efforts are the BBG and VOA doing to give the region the highest priority? Regarding BBG's coverage of Venezuela, what are the present funding and resources available and what are the plans moving forward? Are there plans to enhance efforts? What is the strategy of the BBG for Latin America? Is Latin America a priority for the BBG?

Answer:

Despite the Venezuelan government's ongoing threats to international media, the Voice of America and the Martí, which are operated by the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), are providing unvarnished information about the persisting unrest, had these efforts have been stepped up in recent weeks. These services are funded under the BBG's International Broadcasting Operations (IBO) appropriation.

The budget for OCB for FY 2014 is more than \$27 million. For the rest of Latin America, the BBG spends \$565,000 per year on satellite transmissions for television and radio affiliates, and \$2,958,000 for the VOA Latin America Division to cover employee and contractor salaries, payment for stringers, and other expenses. These figures do not include the cost of marketing to reach agreement with regional affiliates, studio use and equipment, legal and administrative support, and numerous other functions that are part of the agency's overall budget and not dedicated to any one region of the world.

Coverage and programming

The crisis in Venezuela continues to be the leading story for VOA Spanish, and it is being covered from a variety of angles: news events inside the country; statements from President Barack Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry, other White House and State Department officials, as well as numerous Congressional calls for President Maduro to respect human rights and the rule of law; reactions from the Venezuelan diaspora in the United States, and wide-ranging condemnation from international organizations and prominent figures in politics, academia, the arts, and the diaspora community.

VOA's Spanish Service, which is under the Latin America Division, produces 45.14 hours of original radio and five hours of original television each week. Radio products include daily live reports to affiliates in the region, daily packages for placement in affiliate newscasts, and news briefs and long format programming for affiliate placement. The staff totals 14 full time employees, and 14 contractors.

Currently VOA Spanish has three stringers covering Venezuela: one television stringer at \$78,000 per year, one long-time radio stringer at \$13,000 per year; and a stringer added since the crisis began, at a cost of \$5,000 per month.

VOA Spanish Television produces a daily half hour television newscast for affiliate placement, a one hour news magazine for affiliate placement as well as eight daily television packages for affiliate placement. In addition Spanish Television staff participates in live programming on affiliate stations.

As part of its coverage of events in Venezuela, the Spanish Service produced 60 television packages, 50 radio packages, more than 70 interviews, and 150 web stories between February 12 and March 25th.

An indication of the high interest in the reporting is the amount of sharing of VOA Spanish reports on social media. Speaking recently to VOA's reporter in Caracas, Lillian Tintori, wife of jailed opposition leader Leopoldo López, thanked VOA and spoke of its vital role in keeping Venezuelans informed. Her video interview with VOA was not only seen through affiliate stations from Mexico to the Southern Cone, was picked up by media in Venezuela and the region, it had more than 800 retweets within a few hours of posting on voanoticias.com.

In Cuba, audiences rely on the Martí for accurate information on developments in Venezuela with reports in the weekday TV news program *Antena Live* and with one-hour specials. Coverage includes daily updates from Caracas, reaction from international and regional leadership, and high-profile interviews with opposition leaders such as Maria Corina and retired General Angel Vivas who made international headlines by arming and entrenching himself in his house to avoid arrest. Martinocias.com has devoted a special section to coverage of the crisis, with a compilation of video, audio and text.

Unbiased updates on the crisis are particularly difficult to find in Cuba, given the close alliance between the Castro and Maduro administrations. In Cuban government controlled news reports, the protests have been described as “disturbances by fascists.” State-run media have concentrated coverage on last week’s visit by Raul Castro to Caracas and the anniversary of the death of Hugo Chavez.

Internet Freedom / Anti-Censorship

In addition to attacks on traditional print and broadcast media, the Venezuelan government is increasingly going after Internet-based providers and sources of information. Prominent Twitter accounts have been hacked, while Internet service has been either slowed down or flat-out interrupted in several areas: the province of Tachira has been without any access at all for more than two weeks. To combat this, the VOA Spanish Service is taking advantage of the BBG’s robust Internet anti-censorship portfolio. It is collaborating closely with Radio Free Asia’s Open Technology Fund to expand access to the Internet, and offer citizen and professional journalists the tools to communicate and report safely without detection by government surveillance. For example, affiliates in Venezuela started using Red Phone, an Android app that provides end-to-end encryption for phone calls that ensures nobody will listen in, after VOA provided

information about the service via Twitter. Tools also allow Internet users to keep the government from tracking what they are reading. VOA is now working with the leading online media organizations in Venezuela in this effort, including *El Universal*, the leading newspaper in the country and *La Patilla*, a VOA online affiliate and the most visited news website in Venezuela. VOA and RFA work with their webmasters, advising them on circumvention tools.

Current Delivery

The VOA affiliate network in Venezuela currently comprises some two dozen radio and TV signals, one cable TV system, and several prominent news websites. VOA does not pay for any of these affiliations, which is a testament to the high quality of the journalism and the value that audiences and affiliates place on VOA content. In addition, VOA just recently signed an affiliation agreement with *Radio FM Center*, the largest private radio network in Venezuela with 64 FM and AM radio stations that cover the country. It also has a strong presence online with an internet-based radio station.

The Spanish Service has focused on its roster of “core” affiliates—large media players with whom interactive collaboration is routine. However, VOA is reaching out to other Venezuela contacts—many of them in political exile but still involved directly in the national media. In addition, the BBG has worked on dozens of newly identified candidates for collaboration. To accommodate affiliate requests for increased access to VOA coverage of the crisis, a new satellite delivery schedule repeats *El Mundo al Dia* and *Foro Interamericano* several times during the day.

VOA is also working closely with affiliates outside of Venezuela. Repeated requests for news from Venezuela from networks as large as *Clarín's Artear TV* in Argentina, *ATV* in Peru, *Canal 15* in Nicaragua, and *Cablenoticias* in Colombia, among others, testify to the urgency for VOA to fill an important gap in news coverage and analysis, and point to new placement opportunities.

Plans Moving Forward

The BBG is working to provide a more comprehensive response to the ongoing crisis in Venezuela. Additional resources would allow the VOA Spanish Service to immediately hire and equip more on-the-ground reporters and significantly improve its online presence in Washington. Support of these initiatives would ensure that the BBG is able to produce as much content as possible for its affiliate network throughout Latin America. Plans are under way to augment VOA Spanish with additional reporting and editing staff and equipment.

VOA's Latin America Division, along with the BBG Office of Strategy and Development, have proposed a crisis plan that will be presented to State Department in an attempt to secure additional funding for Venezuelan programming.

Latin America strategy

Latin America is a priority for the BBG, and recent audience gains in the region have validated the strategy that we have pursued for several years: a “U.S. Bureau” model that is client-based,

focusing on continued association with leading media organizations. VOA's Spanish Service has successfully integrated content development and marketing strategy, building a strong multimedia brand that offers unique value, defining content to secure the greatest impact across a large market of possible clients.

High-value media partnerships have been leveraged, taking advantage of our unique position in Washington, DC and our capacity to deliver content from multiple locations in the United States.

The primary target market for the service is affiliate television and FM radio stations, who are the gatekeepers to local distribution. Online, we have the ability to reach additional audiences and to deepen our relationships with broadcast audiences through the expanding market for online, social media, and mobile products.

With respect to Venezuela in particular, the BBG has these objectives:

1. Create and distribute content that adds unique value in the market because it is of a type that local media are unable or unwilling to create for political reasons.
2. Cover news events inside Venezuela for local affiliates—many stories have been relayed live by a Caracas-based reporter for distribution to affiliates inside Venezuela.
3. Report the complex, unfolding story of social unrest to the other sixteen Latin American countries whose Spanish-speaking audiences have a stake in following it closely.
4. Explain and discuss U.S. policy toward Venezuela and the region including statements from the White House, State Department, and Congress. Coverage of the U.S. angle has given the Voice of America a unique value to affiliates in Venezuela and the region.
5. Provide information on the reactions of the Venezuelan diaspora in the United States.
6. Cover the wide-ranging condemnation from international organizations such as NGOs, and prominent figures in politics, academia, and the arts.
7. Provide the tools and techniques necessary to allow Venezuelans to avoid any attempted restrictions to internet access.
8. Identify new, local candidates for collaboration.
9. Cover the prominent role of youth activists, whether as commentators, interviews or participants in public debate. (The protests were initiated by students, and young people have taken a leading role shaping activism, placing demands, organizing, mobilizing and engaging.)

Question:

What is the current plan for OCB/Radio and TV Marti broadcasting priorities (i.e., the breakdown of funding for: overall budget for Radio Marti, overall budget for TV Marti, the funding for actual broadcasting, funding for the internet, funding for social media, and funding for new technology)? For the next fiscal year?

Answer:

Office of Cuba Broadcasting¹²	FY 2013 Program Plan	FY 2014 Program Plan³	FY 2015 Request
	Numbers in thousands	Numbers in thousands	Numbers in thousands
OCB Directorate and Advisory Board	774	892	1,171
Administration	3,689	3,735	3,647
Radio Marti	5,295	5,322	3,509
New Media	1,001	1,333	1,199
Central News	4,881	4,509	3,754
TV Marti	4,780	4,591	3,899
Technical Operations	4,466	3,205	2,925
Greenville Transmitting Station	-	2,447	2,360
Computer Services	1,407	1,009	666
Total, Office of Cuba Broadcasting	26,293	27,043	23,130

In addition to the funding shown on the table above, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting may also be receiving additional funding from the Broadcasting Board of Governors under the Internet Anti- Censorship (IAC) funding program for internet, social media, new technology, and other internet anti- censorship activities including e-mail blasts and SMS text messaging. The final amount of IAC funding to be received by OCB in FY 2014 will be determined once the overall IAC funding plan for FY 2014 has been developed by the BBG in coordination with the State Department, in keeping with the Omnibus appropriation passed in January 2014, and will be included in a subsequent report to the Congress.

¹ The BBG anticipates OCB may receive up to \$5 million in transfers from the Economic Support Fund to support programs and activities allowed in accordance with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996.

² In FY 2013 the Greenville Transmitting Station was reported under the Office of Technology, Services, and Innovation.

³ The Program Plan is as of a point in time and could vary as executed in FY 2014.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Acting Assistant Secretary Uzra Zeya by
Representative Kevin Yoder (1)
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Appropriations
February 26, 2014**

Question:

In the midst of concerns by our allies and perception in the Middle East that the United States is reducing involvement in that region, do you feel that the U.S. Government is using the appropriate amount of engagement with governmental and non-governmental agencies to provide access to high integrity news, including those presenting positive messages about the U.S. and our ideals? Can you compare your efforts regarding working with U.S. run channels versus indigenous outlets?

Answer:

All of our Embassies and Consulates in the Middle East engage directly with the local press through their respective Public Affairs sections. Press officers overseas also manage the Missions' social media platforms, which are increasingly becoming the primary source of information especially among the young audiences in the region. In addition to the Embassies and Consulates, the State Department has two Arabic media hubs: the Dubai hub, managed by the Department's Arabic language spokesperson who engages the major pan-Arab television news channels like Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya whose defacto headquarters are in Dubai, and the London hub, which focuses on the pan-Arab daily newspapers like Al-Hayat

and Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. The Dubai hub also manages the Department's official Arabic language twitter feed. From Washington, the State Department spokespersons actively engage with the resident Arab press corps, either by directly communicating our official policy and providing daily commentary on developing events, or by providing access to policymakers who inform the opinions of Arab journalists through on-the-record and background interviews.

The media landscape in the Middle East has changed dramatically over the past few years, and active, effective engagement remains a challenge. One of the biggest differences between working with American or Western versus Arabic news outlets is the degree to which outlets will rely on under-sourced or un-sourced reporting. State-owned and privately held news outlets alike remain rampant with inaccuracies and false reporting attributed to US officials.

In addition to actively communicating our policy messages and pushing back on false narratives, our greatest value added is in public diplomacy programs that provide promising Arab journalists with professional training. Some of these programs include the International

Visitors Leadership (IVLP) Edward R. Murrow Program for Journalists brings 20 – 30 emerging leaders in the field of journalism from NEA Posts to examine journalistic practices in the United States, as well as a TV/Radio Co-operative (Co-op) program, a tremendous opportunity to train foreign broadcast journalists in original content production while exposing them and their viewing audience to the United States.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Acting Assistant Secretary Uzra Zeya
Representative Kevin Yoder (#2)
House Appropriations Committee-Subcommittee on State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs
February 26, 2014**

Question:

Do you think the United States Government is tapping the expertise and experience of our private sector and Non-Governmental Organizations in support of our public diplomacy? Can more be done to promote public-private partnerships in Democracy Promotion?

Answer:

The Department of State has been actively reaching out to expand the range of private sector and non-governmental organizations in support of U.S. public diplomacy. Public-Private Partnerships focused on the strengthening and development of civil society have been identified as one of the key pillars in partnership strategy at the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs (ECA), which has the lead in this area. This pillar focuses on tapping into private sector expertise and knowledge for programs that enhance women's rights, the rule of law, freedom of expression and accessible education.

But certainly more can be done. The Department, including ECA and my bureau, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, will continue to seek out and develop partnerships that promote democratic values and provide opportunities to youth, women, minorities and underserved communities.

In an increasingly networked world, effectively forging partnerships to leverage the expertise and experience of the private sector and NGO community is an essential part of supporting public diplomacy and meeting global challenges.

To date, the Department has tripled growth in partnerships that leverage the knowledge, skills and expertise of companies, start-ups, non-governmental organizations, foundations, universities, research centers and civil society groups. ECA has harnessed the expertise of the private sector through over 40 ongoing partnerships that impact over 100 countries, strengthening our programs and engaging the American private sector and civil society in people-to-people exchanges.

Through partnerships with technology companies and universities we have expanded the reach of our programs via mobile technology and Massive Open Online Courses. As a result, over 2 million pages of content have been read and over 4 million users have accessed our interactive English resources. We are working with American mentors from leading technology, sports and Fortune 500 companies. As a result, women entrepreneurs and girls from around the globe have directly benefited from the expertise of the American private sector, with many alumni returning home ready to lead mentorship activities in their communities or develop businesses to support their families and boost economic growth. Partnerships with media companies, NGOs and journalism schools bring new tools and access to civil society leaders around the globe, supporting the independence of non-governmental institutions and individuals and promoting democratic values. We have also enhanced established partnerships in support of youth, women and other underserved audiences; economic issues; and to facilitate exchanges in countries where the United States has no or strained relations. These partnerships facilitate deeper linkages with counterparts abroad and bring financial resources, skills, technology, and expertise to amplify the expanse and reach of State Department programs.

The Department's Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) houses the U.S. Speaker Program which conducts over 600 programs each year that directly utilize the expertise of individuals from NGOs or the private sector in the support of Public Diplomacy. This includes over 600 traveling programs and virtual programs that enable these U.S. citizen experts to share their knowledge, experience and informed opinions through direct engagement with key foreign audiences.

Programs promoting Democracy and Civil Society have always been key to the Public Diplomacy work of the U.S. Speaker Program. We will continue our ongoing efforts to develop relationships with NGO and private sector experts in order to identify the best quality experts in areas such as rule of law, free and fair elections, freedom of the press, human rights, the role of NGOs and volunteerism, and civic education.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 7, 2014

**UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO COMBAT
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME**

WITNESSES

AMBASSADOR WILLIAM BROWNFIELD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR LUIS CDEBACA, OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN GRANGER

Ms. GRANGER. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs will come to order.

Today's hearing is on U.S. assistance to combat transnational crime. I would like to welcome our two witnesses from the Department of State, Ambassador Brownfield, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and Ambassador CdeBaca, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large to Combat Trafficking in Persons.

Today's hearing will address many of the subcommittee's priorities, such as combating human trafficking, countering the flow of illegal drugs, addressing the wildlife poaching crisis, and stopping the funding that supports terrorist activities. Many of us follow these issues for humanitarian reasons, public safety, or the cause of conservation. But these issues are all directly related to the security and stability in the countries we provide assistance to, as well as our own national security.

The outrageous actions of Boko Haram abducting hundreds of girls and claiming to sell them as slaves should remind us all how very real these threats are. This case is also an example of how these issues are linked. Boko Haram is a terrorist organization, and there are reports in the press that some of its members have profited from poaching elephants for their ivory.

Boko Haram has been terrorizing the Nigerian people for years, and now they are involved in this horrific case of human trafficking. We want to hear about how the funding this subcommittee provides is being used to confront these types of issues and what is needed for the next fiscal year.

Transnational crimes share common traits. The sex and slave trade as well as the demand for animal parts and drugs drives the trafficking problem. Weak government institutions and corruption facilitate the criminal networks, and current laws and law enforcement are not effectively deterring the perpetrators.

We would like to hear how these criminal enterprises are related and whether resources can be used to solve more than just one problem. We hope the agencies we fund are coordinating and apply-

ing these lessons learned from decades of counternarcotics and anti-trafficking work to other areas of transnational crime.

We also want to be sure the funding we provide around the world to improve governance and reduce corruption is focused on addressing transnational crime. This subcommittee included funding in the Fiscal Year 2014 Appropriations Act for programs to combat human trafficking and also for the first time directed funds to address wildlife trafficking. I would like to know more about how those funds will be used, and what has been accomplished to date.

In addition to the funding, I would like to hear what new technologies, partnerships, and diplomatic efforts are being used to address these challenges. I was pleased to see the budget request for fiscal year 2015 increased funding to combat trafficking in persons. We know the need is tremendous.

The most recent human trafficking report concludes that 40,000 trafficking victims were identified in the last year, and there are some estimates that as many as 27 million men, women, and children are trafficking victims at any given time.

Turning to wildlife trafficking, I was disappointed to see the request is down more than 50 percent from what we had included in last year's bill. I should also note that I had to ask for that funding to be provided because it was not included in any of the budget materials. Secretary Kerry has said this issue is a priority, but that is not what was reflected in the budget.

In 2013, over 1,000 rhinos were poached in South Africa. This was an all-time high. Cutting the funding in half does not seem like an appropriate response. I would like you both to discuss your plans for fiscal year 2015, including how the funding this subcommittee provides will address the most urgent needs.

I will now turn to my ranking member, Mrs. Lowey, for her opening remarks.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRWOMAN LOWEY

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Assistant Secretary Brownfield, Ambassador CdeBaca, I join the chair in welcoming you and thank you for your service.

Transnational criminal enterprises have grown in size and strength, aggressively intimidating and overwhelming government institutions. Transnational criminal syndicates, insurgent groups, and terrorist organizations are now joining forces in collaborative efforts. Reports show that transnational criminal and financial networks have become increasingly sophisticated and exploit countries and regions with weak governance and rule of law.

The kidnapping of the schoolgirls in Nigeria is the latest and most glaring example of the nexus between lawlessness, terrorism, and human trafficking. I hope you will begin your testimonies by updating the subcommittee on what we are doing to assist the Nigerian government to find and free these girls. This is a time when we must advocate our values and do more to defend the defenseless.

I know we agree that the practice of human trafficking and enslavement is abhorrent. Yet it continues unabated in many regions. Whether for forced sex or labor, estimates suggest that between 2 million to 4 million people, mostly women and children, are traf-

ficked every year. And between 21 million to 29 million people are enslaved. This is appalling.

Poaching and wildlife trafficking have also escalated. According to environmental groups, an estimated 30,000 African elephants were killed in 2012. Nonstate armed groups and militias from Congo, Uganda, and Sudan, in addition to terrorist groups such as the Sudanese Janjaweed and al-Shabaab, profit from this horrific exploitation.

While I commend the administration for its efforts to combat poaching and wildlife trafficking and the national strategy to combat wildlife trafficking, I am interested to learn what you are doing to address the seemingly insatiable demand for ivory in China and other East Asian countries, which is fueling the ruthless destruction of African wildlife and providing a financing source for terrorists. Have we sought cooperation with China to curb the demand? And what has been the response to date?

I am also concerned about the continued reports of violence and abuses perpetrated by police and military units under the pretense of counternarcotics tactics in many Latin American countries. As you know, corruption, weak governance, lack of strong judicial institutions, all exacerbate the potential for systemic abuses of power.

The President's strategy to combat transnational organized crime acknowledges that transnational crime cannot be solved through police and military actions alone, a principle I have strongly advocated in my years in leadership on this subcommittee. Our chances for success are greatly improved when, in addition to enforcement capacity, security forces institutionalize mechanisms to ensure transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights and the rule of law.

We must continue to work with partner governments to address the underlying poverty and lack of opportunity which criminal organizations use to gain power and influence. More must be done to invest in alternative livelihoods, education, job opportunities for youth. I will continue to insist that any United States programs and funding to fight transnational criminal activities emphasize these tenets.

Therefore, I hope to get a greater insight into the administration's objectives and strategies to combat these crimes and threats to international security. I would like the panel to assess the following key issues.

What effect has the funding we have provided had on the activities of transnational criminal organizations? How do we break the power and impunity of criminal organizations? Is our policy overly dominated by a counternarcotics agenda while underestimating corruption and human rights concerns?

Does the State Department overly rely on interdiction, eradication, training, and equipping law enforcement? How do we improve the capacity of justice systems to protect the rights of citizens? Can we do more to disrupt criminal financing networks? What type of coordination is necessary to succeed? And what challenges are not yet being addressed?

Thank you for your testimony.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Before I call on the witnesses, I want to thank all the subcommittee members and tell the witnesses that we are having so many hearings to get our appropriations process finished that the Members are going from one to another, and that is what they have to do. So there will be people coming and going.

I now call on the witnesses to give their opening statements. I would encourage each of you to summarize your remarks so we can leave enough time for questions and answers. Your full written statements will be placed in the record, and we will begin with Ambassador Brownfield.

OPENING STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR BROWNFIELD

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Lowey, members of the subcommittee. Thank you all for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss INL efforts against transnational organized crime.

I have a formal statement that, with your permission, I will submit for the record and summarize it orally.

I have appeared before Congress many times to discuss trafficking in drugs, firearms, and persons, corruption, financial crime, and rule of law. I have never before testified on efforts to combat illegal wildlife trafficking. And while I am here to address any matter involving transnational organized crime, I would like to focus my oral remarks today on wildlife trafficking.

Our information is anecdotal, but we estimate that the wildlife trafficking industry earns between \$8 billion and \$10 billion in illegal revenue every year. A kilo of rhino horn may sell for more than a kilo of cocaine or heroin. And unlike their drug colleagues, wildlife traffickers are exterminating entire species.

Last July, the White House released a new national strategy for combating wildlife trafficking. It directed greater efforts to strengthen enforcement, reduce demand, and build international cooperation.

Members of the subcommittee, I do not claim the expertise of the conservation community whose noble work has led global efforts to protect wildlife for more than a century. But I do know something about criminal trafficking. I know that all trafficking has elements in common.

Demand for the product creates a market, and the market is supplied by criminals growing, manufacturing, or butchering the product. Sophisticated logistics networks move the product to market by corruption and manipulation. An illegal retail system distributes the product to purchasers, and financial systems are corrupted to launder revenues into usable commodities.

With strong leadership and support from this subcommittee, the INL bureau has developed a four-pillar strategy to combat this industry. First, we strengthen legislative frameworks so wildlife trafficking is, in fact, a crime around the world. Second, we work to improve law enforcement and investigative capabilities through training and support. Third, we build prosecutorial and judicial capacity to try these crimes. And finally, we enhance cross-border cooperation through wildlife enforcement networks.

We have some progress and success to report. In April of last year at our instigation, the U.N. Crime Commission declared wildlife trafficking to be a "serious crime," the most serious category they have. Last November, Secretary Kerry announced the first reward offer of up to \$1 million under our new Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program against the world's largest illegal wildlife trafficking organization, the Laos-based Xaysavang network.

And in February of this year, law enforcement from 28 different nations joined together in a month-long coordinated operation called Cobra II, resulting in more than 400 arrests and 350 major illegal wildlife seizures worldwide.

Members of the subcommittee, I acknowledge that global law enforcement has been slow to add wildlife trafficking to our list of high priorities. We still have much to learn, but we are here now, and we intend to make an impact.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Mrs. Lowey, members of the subcommittee. I look forward to your questions and your guidance.
[The information follows:]



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS

Prepared Statement of:

Ambassador William R. Brownfield
Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics & Law Enforcement Affairs

Hearing Before the:

**House Appropriations Subcommittee on
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs**

“United States Assistance to Combat Transnational Crime”

Wednesday, May 7, 2014

Chairwoman Granger, Ranking Member Lowey, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to discuss the evolving threat of transnational organized crime and the efforts of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to address it.

If I were sitting before you 35 years ago, when the predecessor to INL—the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters—was first established and you asked me what transnational organized crime would look like in the year 2014, I might have informed you of the violent and hierarchical structure of the drug cartels and various mafias and have foretold the success of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Colombia or the expansion of our anti-drug trafficking efforts worldwide. I might have accurately predicted the efforts of some cartels to move across the Caribbean and destabilize communities across the hemisphere. I might have surmised that, criminals being opportunists, they would diversify and seek out not only new markets but also new forms of criminality with minimal risk and high rewards. And I would have assumed—accurately—that certain elements of illicit trafficking would remain the same regardless of the product being trafficking: demand for the product, which produces a market; a producer at the source; the need for a logistics network to move the product across international borders, a system to market or distribute the product at its destination, and the need to convert the product into cash or some other marketable commodity usable in the licit market. But I could not have predicted the extent to which globalization, coupled with dramatic improvements in technology, would turn criminal organizations that had once had only a domestic or regional impact into networked enterprises posing threats to our and our partners interests across the globe.

Today’s reality is that criminal and illicit networks have expanded their tentacles to all parts of the world, corrupting public and market-based institutions alike. Their activities threaten not only the interdependent commercial, transportation, and transactional systems that facilitate free trade and the movement of people throughout the global economy, but are jeopardizing governance structures, economic development, security, and supply chain integrity. Their penetration of state institutions and financial and security sectors is particularly concerning.

Recognizing the expanding size, scope, and influence of transnational organized crime and its impact on U.S. and international security and governance, in July 2011, the White House released the *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime*. The Strategy calls on all departments and agencies to “build, balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat transnational

organized crime...and urge our foreign partners to do the same.” The Strategy also calls for the U.S. government and our international partners to work together to combat transnational illicit networks, and take that fight to the next level by breaking their corruptive power, attacking their financial underpinnings, stripping them of their illicit wealth, and severing their access to the financial system.

With our diplomatic reach and foreign assistance authorities, INL is strengthening partner nation capacity to deal with these emerging transnational criminal threats including by combating corruption and targeting the illicit wealth of criminal entrepreneurs. INL’s programs promote regional capacity-building to mitigate the famous “balloon effect” we saw in South America in the 1980s and 1990s, whereby criminal groups jump from one country to another as pressure was applied. Through the Central America Regional Security Initiative, the Merida Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, the West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative, and other programs you have supported, we are focused on coordinating investigations, supporting prosecutions, and facilitating the sharing of information across borders.

Many of the approaches and methods we have refined over the past three decades to reduce the harm of narcotics trafficking are transferable to new and urgent threats – and I will focus on one such threat today -- wildlife trafficking. It is fueled by high demand for wildlife products, high profits -- an ounce of rhino horn is worth more than gold, cocaine, or heroin in weight -- and low risk for detection or meaningful punishment. Its impact on the planet’s natural resources is as obvious as it is devastating – entire animal species are at risk. But even setting aside the risk to wildlife, the United States has cause to be seriously concerned about this criminal enterprise: the corruption that it both encourages and benefits from undermines good governance, the rule of law, and citizens’ confidence in their government institutions; the high tech weaponry and aggressive tactics used by poachers and the syndicates and corrupt officials that support them threaten civilian populations; the crime creates and exacerbates border insecurity; wildlife trafficking can weaken financial stability and economic growth, particularly in countries for which tourism is a major revenue source; and we have seen some evidence of involvement by terrorist entities and armed groups.

For these reasons, we need to address wildlife trafficking not only as a conservation issue but also a national security issue. The President issued an Executive Order calling for a whole of government response to combat wildlife trafficking on July 1, 2013 and on February, 11, 2014, the White House released a *National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking*. The Strategy calls on

agencies and departments to strengthen domestic and global enforcement, reduce demand for illegal wildlife products, and build international cooperation and public-private partnerships.

INL is playing a significant programmatic and diplomatic role in implementing the National Strategy. For over a decade, we have provided wildlife investigative training delivered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service as part of our International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) program. Within the last year, with strong support of this Committee and this Congress, we have begun to greatly expand our assistance, drawing on our experience in addressing other forms of transnational criminal activity. We have organized our work abroad around four key areas that support the enforcement and international cooperation goals of the National Strategy.

First, we will strengthen legislative frameworks to make wildlife trafficking a serious crime with strong penalties to give investigators and prosecutors the legal tools they need to put the traffickers behind bars.

Second, we will improve law enforcement and investigative capabilities -- including intelligence, evidence collection and analysis, investigative skills and methods, and collaboration across agencies and governments -- to promote intelligence-led investigations and operations that strive not simply to pick up individual poachers but rather to better understand and begin to dismantle the organizations for which they work.

Third, we will build prosecutorial and judicial capacities. As we have learned, rangers and police will not continue to pick up the bad guys if they believe prosecutors or judges will just let them go so, as we improve legislative frameworks and offer up new tools, we need to ensure prosecutors and judges know how to use those tools effectively and creatively.

And fourth, we will enhance cross-border law enforcement cooperation, particularly by working with the regional Wildlife Enforcement Networks (WENs). There is much that we do not know about how wildlife trafficking organizations operate -- but we do know that illegal wildlife products often make their way through multiple transit points as they move from supply -- or "range" -- states to demand markets. So we need to build alliances and processes across borders for sharing information and intelligence and collaborating on operations.

Our work in these areas will be done on a bilateral basis. A portion of our overall assistance is dedicated towards our programming in Kenya (\$3 million in FY13) and South Africa (\$3M in FY 2013); regionally in Africa (\$4 million in FY 2013) and Asia (\$1.45 million in FY 2012); and globally (\$4.3 million in FY 2012) through organizations including INTERPOL, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the World Customs Organizations, who are part of the International Consortium for Combating Wildlife Crime (ICWC). Using \$15 million in FY 2014 funds, we will expand efforts begun or piloted using prior year resources, such as training for customs officers at ports of entry, prosecutorial training, and joint capacity building-operational exercises across continents.

INL is also approaching the wildlife trafficking problem in new ways. We are using new tools such as the Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program, which Congress, with your support, authorized in 2013. In November 2013, Secretary Kerry announced the first reward offer under the program of up to \$1 million for information leading to the dismantling of the Xaysavang Network. The Xaysavang Network, based in Laos and operating across Africa and Asia, facilitates the illegal trade of endangered elephants, rhinos, and other species. This reward offer provides us with an additional tool to dismantle wildlife trafficking networks and bring its leaders and members to justice.

We are also using our diplomatic tools to build an international consensus around the importance of dismantling wildlife trafficking networks. For example, at the UN Crime Commission in April 2013, the United States introduced a successful joint resolution with Peru encouraging governments around the world to treat wildlife trafficking as a “serious crime” pursuant to the U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Making it a serious crime unlocks new opportunities for international law enforcement cooperation, provided under the Convention, including mutual legal assistance, asset seizure and forfeiture, extradition, and other tools to hold criminals accountable for wildlife crime. The U.N. Economic and Social Council adopted the resolution in July 2013, further elevating wildlife trafficking as a major concern for the United Nations. These measures provide the mandate that we need, as members of a larger body of concerned nations, to harness our collective capabilities to learn more about these trafficking networks, share information, and collaborate on plans and programs that will undermine them.

The resolution was one of several early successes to which we can point. Another is a month-long global law enforcement cooperative effort that we helped to support in February known as “Cobra II.” Participants from 28 countries,

including representatives from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Department of Justice, executed a global operation to combat wildlife trafficking and poaching that resulted in more than 400 arrests and 350 major seizures of wildlife and wildlife products across Africa and Asia and the U.S.

Although we have more to learn about the links that exist between wildlife trafficking organizations and other transnational criminal groups, we do know that wildlife traffickers do not operate in a vacuum. Like any legal enterprise that seeks to diversify its portfolio, criminal organizations tend to use the same routes and shipping methods as smugglers of weapons, drugs, and counterfeits. They bribe the same customs officials. They deploy poachers in the same restive regions where terrorists and other criminals may sow instability and conflict and exploit weak institutions and porous borders. Money and corruption are common denominators of all forms of transnational organized crime, and wildlife trafficking is no exception.

Corruption greases the wheels of illicit trade in everything from counterfeits to ivory. In the Sahel-Sahara region of Africa, for example, collusion between smugglers and state officials has eroded state authority and created lucrative funding channels for terrorists, militias, and criminal groups. INL is looking at ways to link up our anti-corruption and unit vetting programs used effectively in narcotics-producing regions, to support willing governments afflicted by illicit wildlife trade.

Following the money is equally important. All illicit criminal networks need money to finance their activities and as illicit funds move through the international financial system, they can be detected and monitored. In addition to exercising leadership within the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), we are promoting and applying tools like asset recovery and forfeiture to combat transnational organized crime and money laundering. Through the FATF style regional body for Eastern and Southern Africa, we are working with international partners to uncover and counter money laundering and other illicit financial flows related to wildlife trafficking. When it is finished, our capacity building projects will address the gaps identified.

Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Lowey, and distinguished Members, there is no doubt that transnational organized crime presents a growing and profound threat to international security. Illicit networks undercut the ability of law enforcement to protect citizens, deprive the state of vital revenues, promote corruption, and both thrive on and contribute to bad governance. But as organized

crime has evolved and diversified, so has INL. Our programs are both tailored to specific threats, such as wildlife trafficking, and cross-cutting, to target the common facilitators of all types of crime.

Thank you, Chairwoman Granger and Ranking Member Lowey. I welcome your questions.

Ms. GRANGER. And thank you very much.
Ambassador CdeBaca, you are now recognized.

OPENING STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR CDEBACA

Ambassador CDEBACA. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member Lowey, and members of the subcommittee. We appreciate your support and your ongoing commitment to this fight against modern slavery. And I use the term “slaver” purposefully.

We use “human trafficking” as an umbrella term. It is all of the conduct involved in reducing a person to or holding them in a state of compelled service, whether for labor or commercial sex. Movement may sometimes occur, but it is not a necessary element, but rather a common vulnerability.

The common thread in these cases is the deprivation of one person’s freedom by another. That is why it is fitting to say slavery, especially this week.

Our moral obligation against this crime is clear, but it is also a strategic imperative. Modern slavery undermines the rule of law, it feeds instability, breeds corruption, fuels transnational crime, and taints supply chains that drive the global economy.

As you mentioned, Madam Chair, the events of the last week have demonstrated these interrelationships, and we must address it but also must pause to think about the victims, to think about the girls who don’t know if someone is looking for them. And we have to answer, yes, we are.

And so, I would like to talk about two major functions of our office. First, the annual Trafficking in Persons Report, which measures governments’ efforts to fight trafficking. Every year, we look at each country, and we put them on one of four tiers as to what they are doing.

The tier ranking system has been extremely effective in motivating governments to combat trafficking, and it has enabled them to more effectively fight this crime. Time and again, we have seen governments change course, often dramatically, when faced with a potential downgrade or confronted by a tough assessment. Time and time again, political leaders and advocates and academics have credited the report with spurring action.

And so, in only about a decade, 159 countries have become parties to the United Nations trafficking protocol, modern anti-trafficking laws, specialized law enforcement units, victim assistance mechanisms, public awareness campaigns. And here at home, cutting-edge new laws in every State and almost every territory, again in just a little more than a decade.

Now what is important, though, is not to simply think of this as a policy priority, but to think about the people. At the end of the day, the trafficking report doesn’t just shine a light on what countries are doing. It is not just a name and shame exercise. Hopefully, at its best, it shines a light on the victims, on the responsibility toward the survivors, on the responsibility of all of us to stamp out slavery once and for all.

It also guides our foreign assistance, and that is the second issue I would like to highlight. Since 2002, my office has funded 835 projects around the world worth over \$216 million.

Every year, because the need so far exceeds the approximately \$19 million we have to spend each year in programming funds, we innovate. We identify and we disseminate best practices. We maintain and set the international norms.

And knowing that sometimes it will only happen if America does it, we fund support and services to trafficking victims—not to labels, not to classifications, to people like the women victimized by modern slavery in Sierra Leone who now have access to shelter services for the first time, thanks to one of our grantees. The men who are now recognized as victims of trafficking and receive assistance in Bangladesh through one of our projects.

Prior to the work of those organizations and those projects, these underserved populations had no access to service, had no voice. Like the South and Southeast Asian and increasingly African women who find themselves enslaved as domestic servants in the Middle East, the children in West Africa forced to beg on the city streets, and yes, the children, men, and women forced into prostitution and forced labor here at home in the United States.

As you said, up to 29 million people, and yet only about 40,000 victims have been identified last year. But because of our trainings, the laws we are helping to write, the service providers and NGOs that we support, and the standards that the TIP report is solidifying around the world, this is changing.

In the last year, we have seen countries with their first convictions ever. Countries which once denied having a trafficking problem at all are now proud to work under the three P paradigm of prevention, protection, and prosecution, with robust interagency activities and good cops and social workers on the front lines.

These are victories. And with every victory, with every law, with every liberation, with every trafficker brought to justice, we grow nearer to our shared vision, a world free from slavery.

Thank you, and I am happy to answer any questions.

[The information follows:]

Funding from the Affordable Care Act to HHS OpDivs 2012-2015 (millions)/ 1

	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014 (estimate)	FY 2015 (estimate)
HRSA				
Health Centers	1,200	1,465	2,145	3,600
School Based Health Centers	50	47	-	-
Family to Family	5	-	-	-
National Health Service Corps	285	285	283	310
Home Visiting	350	380	371	-
Prevention and Public Health Fund	37	2	-	-
CDC				
Early Detection of Certain Medical Conditions Related to Environmental Health Hazards	-	-	-	20
Prevention and Public Health Fund	809	463	831	810
SAMHSA				
Prevention and Public Health Fund	92	15	62	58
AHRQ				
Prevention and Public Health Fund	12	6	7	-
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund	24	58	93	106
CMS				
Affordable Insurance Exchange Grants	1,655	2,148	1,319	836
Consumer Operated and Oriented Program Contingency Fund	-	253	-	-
Consumer Operated and Oriented Program (CO-OP)	(400)	(2,279)	-	-
Adult Health Quality Measures	60	60	60	-
Quality Measurement	20	20	20	-
Independence At Home Demonstration	5	5	5	5
Graduate Nurse Education	50	50	50	50
Prevention and Public Health Fund	-	454	-	-
Health Care Fraud Waste and Abuse Program (HCFAC) ACA funding /2	65	40	40	30
<i>Offsetting Collections</i>				
Risk Adjustment	-	-	-	3,378
Exchange User Fee	-	-	200	1,159
Risk Adjustment User Fee	-	-	-	20
Risk Corridors	-	-	-	5,450

Reinsurance Administrative Collections	-	-	-	20
Transitional Reinsurance	-	-	-	10,000
ACA Provider Enrollment User Fee	30	25	28	28
ACF				
Health Profession Opportunity Grants	85	81	79	-
Personal Responsibility Education	75	71	70	-
Abstinence Education	50	47	46	-
ACL				
Aging and Disability Resource Centers	10	9	9	-
Prevention and Public Health Fund	20	9	28	28
State Health Insurance Programs	15	-	-	-
Outreach and Assistance for Low-Income Programs				
<i>National Center for Benefits Outreach and Enrollment</i>	5	-	-	-
<i>Aging and Disability Resource Centers</i>	10	-	-	-
<i>Area Agencies on Aging</i>	15	-	-	-
OS				
Pregnancy Assistance Fund	25	24	23	25
Prevention and Public Health Fund	30	-	-	105
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund	6	14	23	26
				854

1/ The FY 2013 and FY 2014 levels reflect levels post-sequestration.
2/ In addition to new funds appropriated to the HCFAC program for CMS displayed in this table, the ACA also included an inflation adjustment to the HCFAC mandatory base funds.

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Ms. GRANGER. Thank you so much.

I serve as a co-chair of the human trafficking caucus and started before I ever came on this subcommittee. And I am really glad, Ambassador, that you talked about parents who never know what happened to their children or children who wonder if their parents know what happened to them and where they are.

And I know that technology—has a huge impact on law enforcement, especially forensics. And I believe that we should be using just every tool we have. I understand the State Department and USAID support programs that use DNA technology for general forensic law enforcement. Are any of these programs focused on preventing human trafficking? Are you considering using DNA technology?

Ambassador CDEBACA. We have to some degree. It is something that we look at. I think that what we have seen, though, is with the crushing need to address the people who are identified and identifiable and in weighing the scarce resources against the cost of DNA testing and those large programs, we have instead put most of our eggs in the law enforcement training, victim identification, and national referral mechanisms, so that victims can get up and over to social services.

But I do know this is something that a number of folks are working on, especially Interpol, with the notion of DNA testing. And we think it is an arrow in the quiver.

Ms. GRANGER. Good. I had heard about a concept where people are being trafficked across borders, and the DNA technology could be used to identify where they came from. So I would like to talk to you at another date about some of that technology.

Ambassador CDEBACA. I think that, but as well the notion of some of the even more rudimentary technology, like X-ray analysis of bones. So that we can see whether the person who has perhaps been liberated in a brothel raid is actually a child rather than an adult, given that a lot of these victims may not even know their own age.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mrs. Lowey.

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you very much.

I want to thank you, Mr. Ambassador and Assistant Secretary Brownfield, for your testimony. We know how difficult this work is, and we are all here in the United States listening to the horrors every day.

And this last event in Nigeria is so shocking and so disturbing to all of us, and you very eloquently, Mr. Ambassador, listed all the things you are doing. Sometimes I wonder what can we really do?

On the same news program we hear about the \$23 million that has been invested in President Zuma's home. The corruption in Kenya, the corruption everywhere is so widespread.

Maybe I will begin by starting with Assistant Secretary Brownfield. How do we actually break the power and impunity of criminal organizations and urge governments to do more to stop transnational crime? How do you measure or evaluate success?

I was pleased, Ambassador CdeBaca, you mentioned some examples of success. What percentage of the total incidents you have been able to declare victory?

But Assistant Secretary Brownfield, how do you measure or evaluate success, and how do we actually urge governments to do more to stop transnational crime?

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Sure. Thank you, Mrs. Lowey.

May I offer three observations, and these are based upon an inordinate number of years in this business where I have been serving either in INL or elsewhere in the Department of State.

First observation, in order to have an impact on a criminal trafficking enterprise, we have to address all elements of the enterprise. We learned the hard way in past decades that if you just attack interdiction or you just attack production, it will not succeed.

You have to hit every element. You may prioritize some over others, but you cannot ignore one to the exclusion of all of the others.

Second, you must approach from a regional perspective. No country manages or is responsible for a transnational criminal trafficking enterprise on its own. Using Nigeria as an example, Nigeria is in a trafficking sense, in a transnational criminal sense, part of the larger West African region.

We have been engaged for the past 3 years in what we call the West Africa Cooperative Security Initiative, linking together all 15 nations of West Africa in a common strategy that deals with Coast Guard capabilities, corrections capabilities, police training capabilities, prosecutorial capabilities across the board in a regional context.

Third, you have correctly laid out a lesson that it took us probably 30 years to learn, and that is we must have specific criteria that we are measuring to determine how successful the program or the effort is. From the '70s through the '90s, our approach was to measure input. How many aircraft, how many vehicles, how many people did we push through a training program?

We need to go, obviously, to the next step. Perhaps we are measuring homicide rate. Perhaps we are measuring number of individuals who are successfully prosecuted. Perhaps we are measuring number of victims of crime in whatever category, something that tells us in the long term what is our systemic impact.

Finally, Congresswoman, if you would permit me, I am going to add a little response to what the chairwoman asked about technology.

Madam Chairwoman, we have kind of a cool DNA program on wildlife trafficking as well. I signed off on it this morning. What we are doing is taking samples from the crushed ivory from throughout the world, doing the DNA on that, and using it to map where elephants and rhinos are most being impacted to allow us to focus our efforts.

I am sorry, Mrs. Lowey. I took advantage of those 30 seconds to answer a question that was not yours.

Mrs. LOWEY. First of all, the red light is on, and I know we both have many questions. So we will have another turn, I am sure. And we share the concerns. So I appreciate your responding to the chairwoman.

Thank you.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

I will now call on Members, alternating between majority and minority based on seniority of those present when the hearing was called to order.

I will remind Members you have 5 minutes for your questions and responses from the witness. A yellow light on your timer will appear when you have 2 minutes remaining. If time will permit, and I think it will, we will have a second round.

And now I will call on Mr. Crenshaw.

Mr. CRENSHAW. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

And thank you all for being here today.

You know, you sit here and you listen. We have got a war against illicit drugs. We have got a war against illicit wildlife trafficking. We have got a war against human trafficking. And you always have to wonder, are we winning the war?

And I want to focus on human trafficking because I know in Nigeria everything comes to the forefront. It is just awful. You can't find words to describe it. But that brings a lot of visibility. But the sad thing is every day, all around the world, this kind of activity is taking place.

And quite frankly, sometimes when I travel internationally, I would ask the leaders of the country about the TIP sheet, the TIP list. And my impression is that they didn't know a whole lot about it.

They would always say, "Yes, we are level 1. We are level 2." And you say, "What are you doing about it?" And they would say, "We are working on it."

But it seems to me that we have got that TIP sheet, and you talked about some good things that are going on. But I really wonder what is your view of how we are doing worldwide?

If 20 million people are part of this—and we don't do a very good job in the U.S. I understand that as well. Florida is probably one of the worst places. You get \$20 million, \$19 million, and you mentioned you had 800 projects or some number and you have spent a lot of money. Are we really winning or is it getting worse? Is it getting better?

Because sometimes I get the impression that nobody cares. There is no visibility. Every now and then some wild, awful, terrible thing happened, and we say that is terrible. You take 300 women and say you are going to sell them. But that is going on every day, and it seems like in the shadows that people don't care about, A, how are we doing, and B, what can we do better? How can we help you do a better job of bringing awareness of this and win that war?

Ambassador CDEBACA. I think you are spot on as far as no matter how many zeroes were to be added to the money that we spend, we are still playing catch-up against something that is both cultural as well as criminal. And it is something that only can change if there is political will to change it.

You would see a cascade effect on the issues of corruption. The policemen who take bribes to cover this up or even own the bars or the brothels where the women are being held.

You know, for me, one of the things that it comes back to is trying to break our own internal U.S. cycle. If you look at the last 250 years, you will have an administration that looks at this and that focuses heavily on it, and then the following administration will

drop off. The good work that was being done, frankly, in Florida by the first Roosevelt administration dropped off.

Now part of that could have been that we needed the pitch and the turpentine that was being made in the forests by people in debt bondage. We needed them for the war effort in World War I. But it dropped off.

One of the things that we have seen in the modern era is this handing off of this issue from President Clinton to President Bush to President Obama, and instead of dropping off, we have seen an intensification. I think that that is where political will comes in, not just as far as the presidency, but as far as the Congress.

One of the things that Secretary Kerry challenged all of us to do a few weeks ago at one of the staff meetings was to think about how we bring this up more in our travels. Not just me. Of course, I am going to bring this up everywhere I go. That is my job. But the notion of the regional Assistant Secretaries, the notion of himself when he is talking to Kuwait or someone in the Gulf to raise those issues.

So I think part of it is raising it. Part of it is when you are out there, you continuing to raise it. But at the end of the day, I think that some of the things that we are seeing is the notion of how do we make that bigger systemic cultural change? To reject the notion that governments would buy products made with forced labor. To reject the notion that when our folks are on travel that they might, you know, go to prostitutes or engage in things that create the demand.

So I think it is as much the cultural as it is the programs. Now, clearly, we are going to try to design our programs well, and we are going to try to disseminate the best practices as much as we can, but we need your help to create the political will.

Mr. CRENSHAW. Again, I just hope that we, in our country are not immune to this. We need to raise the visibility, and I am not blaming other countries any more than I am blaming ourselves. But I just don't think people focus on this.

I mean, this is awful. We all sit here and say how bad it is, but somehow it doesn't get the visibility that it deserves. It needs to be stopped.

Thank you.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mr. Cuellar.

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Madam Chair.

And thank you to both of the witnesses, Ambassador CdeBaca and, of course, Mr. Secretary, also, Brownfield. Good seeing you.

Let me, first of all, I also want to record my support on what you are all doing for the young girls in the situation in Nigeria there with the Boko Haram. As the father of two young girls, I think it is just horrible that parents and the kids have to go through that particular ugly, ugly, ugly situation.

I know that 3 weeks have gone by. That is a lot of time, you know, for law enforcement and military. But hopefully, you all can follow up on those leads, and I would also ask you all to keep us informed instead of us reading this in the media.

Number two, let me direct my attention to south of our border with the traffic in Mexico. A couple of issues, Mr. Secretary. One

is, as you know, the Mexican federal government and the state government deal with human traffic, and there is a lot of inconsistencies between the states and the federal government.

I would ask you what are you all doing to help coordinate that across the 32 states and, of course, the federal government? What sort of united front are we looking at?

The second thing has to do with the judiciary system, prosecutors, et cetera. As you know, a fraction of human sex trafficking is being reported in Mexico, and less than 2 percent are being convicted. You know their conviction rates, generally speaking, are pretty bad.

And tied into that, I know your boss, Secretary Kerry, and I disagree with him. I think he is talking about cutting 49 percent of the aid to Mexico. There are some countries that get over \$1 billion, and they are able to have "the capacity to handle that." But for some reason, Mexico doesn't have the capacity to do that.

And again, I say that simply because we have got a 2,000-mile border, and we spend billions of dollars on the U.S. side. So I would ask you to, you know, if you can address those questions itself and comment on the last one.

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Sure. Let me start, Congressman, and then I will defer to Ambassador CdeBaca, if he has any trafficking in persons specific comments. And I will give more of the Merida Initiative approach.

First, the importance of state and local engagement in Mexico. It is a theme that we have been hammering in our dialogue, narrative, and engagement with the federal government of Mexico now for more than 2 years. Both the current administration and, in its last year, the previous administration endorsed the concept.

We had about a year during which time, as is to some extent normal, when a new administration comes to office, most new programs were paused under Merida. Beginning with the start of this calendar year, January of 2014, programs have, in fact, begun again with endorsement and support and agreement by the national government of Mexico, and a substantial percentage of those, about 25 percent, are focused on the state and local municipal institutions in Mexico.

About one quarter are also focused on the office of the attorney general, the PGR, in the Mexican government as well, 85 million out of 350 million so far agreed to this year. And that is indicative, I hope, of a commitment, as well as a realization that prosecutors and a court structure and administration must be part of any long-term progress in terms of our cooperation with and engagement in Mexico.

Finally, Congressman, I, of course, will have to start any commentary in terms of budget requests for support for the Merida Initiative by saying as a member of the Article II branch of Government, that, of course, I support the President's budget request for fiscal year 2015. I, too, noticed that the request level is 45 percent less than it was last year.

I will work to ensure maximum effectiveness and value of whatever budget this body, the United States Congress, chooses to appropriate and make available to us. But, yes, I, too, noticed that the request level is 45 percent less than it was for the year before.

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you for your great job, Mr. Secretary. Appreciate it.

Ms. GRANGER. Mr. Dent. Mr. Dent is not here.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. I am sorry.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Does that mean that I can have his time?

Ms. GRANGER. No, it does not mean that.

Mr. CUELLAR. And I didn't yield any time to him.

[Laughter.]

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for this, frankly, very, very important hearing.

And again, thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country.

Secretary Brownfield, I remember that I had the pleasure of welcoming you to Miami last summer when the INL and the Port of Miami signed this Memorandum of Understanding expanding security collaboration at ports throughout the Caribbean. And it is an initiative that shares—again, it shares security threats and strengthens safety.

And because of your efforts, sir, the Miami-Dade Police Department has trained and graduated members of anti-narcotics units in the national—in the Haitian National Police, something that you were trying to get done and you got done, and obviously without your leadership would have not happened.

I mention that, Madam Chairwoman, because last month I had the opportunity to visit Haiti with some of my colleagues, and we met, among others, with the members of the Haitian National Police Academy. And there, we saw firsthand those efforts, how members of the Haitian National Police have been training with the Miami-Dade Police Departments.

We also, by the way, met a group of I think it was 18 women, Haitian National Police cadets, who had just gotten back from, I think, 9 months of training in Colombia. So I tell you that, Mr. Secretary, because your efforts and your leadership have made a huge difference. And I was able to witness it firsthand in Haiti and also again seeing the efforts that Colombia, and you were a big part of those efforts when you were Ambassador there.

So, again, congratulations on a job well done, and it is great to see.

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Thank you, Congressman.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Let me go a little bit to the issue of a lot of the violence and the human trafficking, as we all know, can be attributed to organized crime. And it is also the gang-related violence or drug smuggling operations that are also involved in human trafficking.

And according to INL's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 86 percent of the cocaine trafficked to the United States first transits through Mexico and the Central American corridor, to you, Mr. Cuellar's point. It goes through there first. About 75 percent of all cocaine goes, is smuggled through flights departing South America that first land in Honduras.

Now strictly on a budgetary issue, Mr. Secretary, the fiscal year 2015 base budget request for your bureau includes an overall cut of \$284 million, 28 percent. And again, specifically for the Western Hemisphere, where we have these issues, that request includes a reduction of \$135 million.

So given the increase of violence in Latin America, and we are seeing what goes on in Latin America with the violence and drug trafficking and obviously the proximity to the United States, let me have your comments as to the realistic—is that funding realistic? Can we really deal, seriously deal with the challenges that we face in our region with those levels of reductions in funding?

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Thank you, Congressman. And sincerely thank you for your remarks in terms of our efforts to engage both State and local law enforcement in the United States, as well as regional efforts in the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico in our efforts to address and make progress on drug trafficking and other law enforcement issues.

Congressman, you put me in a position where once again I will preface my remarks by saying that I, of course, support and endorse the President's fiscal year 2015 budget request.

You are correct in your math. The total budget request for international narcotics control and law enforcement is nearly 30 percent reduced from last year's budget request, and you could even do the assessment, which I will not do for you here, as to what the overall State Department budget request has happened to it between 2014 and 2015. You have those figures before you already.

I did my own arithmetic while—while listening to you. Our Colombia budget request is, in fact, down 30 percent. Our Mexico budget request is down 45 percent. Our CARSI, Central America budget request is down 30 percent.

I believe we are doing good, important, and necessary work in each of those budget accounts. I believe they deliver real value for the American people. I believe we are, in fact, delivering on each of those program areas. But I, of course, support and endorse the President's fiscal year 2015 budget request.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mr. Yoder.

Mr. YODER. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today. A wide variety of topics that I know you are working on, and we certainly appreciate your service.

I wanted to ask you a couple of follow-up questions related to human trafficking, and particularly human trafficking into the United States. Do we have an idea of how many people are brought into the United States in a form of either work or sex slavery or some form of human trafficking into the United States each year?

How are they most likely to come into the United States; by what means do they get here? What is their easiest form of access? Where are they most likely to be from, how we—where their point of origin is?

And then, just with what basic information, as we debate solutions to our national immigration challenges in this country, what components of immigration reform should we look towards that would help your efforts to combat human trafficking into the United States?

Ambassador CDEBACA. Thank you, Mr. Yoder, for that question. I think that it shows the interplay between migration and human trafficking very well.

Clearly, we have seen over the last 35 years or so, 35 or 40 years, a changing in the percentage of foreign victims of involuntary servitude and slavery as African-American communities have had other opportunities and have no longer been in the fields, on farms and homes around the country. And that has been replaced by—in many ways by foreign workers, often from Latin America, but not always.

The vulnerabilities, the previous vulnerabilities of social exclusion of the black community have been replaced by the particular vulnerabilities of the immigrant community. Not having their legal status, not having policing that really is able to talk to them, the language barriers, the cultural barriers. Maybe coming from a place where peonage and debt bondage was the norm, and so they don't even necessarily know that there is not a difference here in the United States.

The numbers are tough. The United States, for the last 10-plus years, has chosen not to necessarily try to look at the numbers of who is coming in. The folks over at the Joint Intel Center, the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, are doing some work on prevalence issues by now looking at it not as what percentage of border crossers subsequently become enslaved, but rather looking at the very questions that you were asking.

Of the people who we have rescued, of the people who have come forward who are getting victim benefits from the government or from the nongovernmental organizations that we fund through HHS and others, what was their story? And by learning from them, by learning from the survivors, I think that we are actually getting a little bit better idea than in the early part of the last decade when there was some preliminary research that didn't really have a strong basis that was talking about 18,000 people a year.

Rather, one of the things that we are seeing is what do the victims need, and where are they coming from? Every year, a large percentage of the foreign victims who are enslaved in the United States are from Mexico. Other countries such as Thailand, China, et cetera, kind of rise and fall, depending on the year, depending on the situation.

We have seen more people entering through either work-based visas or other legal means than simply coming over the southern border, although either way the vulnerabilities are present. And interestingly enough, one of the things that we have been able to glean from the survivors is that even if they were here illegally—excuse me, even if they were here legally on a visa category, the threat of being turned over to the immigration, even if they didn't do anything wrong, is enough sometimes to make them submit to the traffickers.

You asked about components of immigration reform, and I think that is one of the things that we certainly have looked at. And as you know, the United States has been included now in the trafficking report for the last few years, and one of the things that consistently is brought to our attention and that we report on as one of their particular vulnerabilities is the fear of the immigrants in going forward to the local police.

Instead of thinking of the local police as being someone who you can go to for help to get out of a brothel, that you can go to for

help when you have been beaten up in the field or the house that you work in, rather there is that fear. And whether it is under 287(g), whether it is under Secure Communities, whatever we call it, as long as those people are afraid and in the shadows, somebody is going to take advantage of them.

Mr. YODER. Just so I understand your testimony, is it the majority or a portion? How many of these folks are here under some sort of legal status, but yet they are being corralled in a way that are allowing them to be enslaved in some way?

Ambassador CDEBACA. You know, I would have to check in with the folks over at the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center. I know that they have been trying to suss out those numbers. That is something that we can get with them and try to circle back to you.

Mr. YODER. I just think for all of us to understand how this is occurring, how they are getting into the country—Are they being smuggled in? Are they here legal status?—that has an impact on how we decide our efforts, where we put our resources to try to fix the problem.

So thanks for your testimony.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ambassador CDEBACA. Thank you, Mr. Yoder.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much.

We will have time and make a second round. I will say I want to associate myself with the concerns on both sides of the aisle on the President's funding request on issues that that truly are a crisis. The number of humans trafficked is just enormous, and then on the poaching situation, I can't even remember how many meetings I have been to talking about that situation.

So I won't ask you the question, Ambassador, about wildlife trafficking, which is less than half of what the Congress provided in 2014 on this issue. But I will ask you about the rangers and law enforcement officials. Do they have the training and the equipment they need to respond?

I know we have talked about—the equipment, the funding that came from this subcommittee on poaching at one time really had to do a lot with education, how important it is. And now it turned to criminal behavior. And so, it has been directed more to crime fighting because it is a crime.

And so, the equipment that is needed is very different. Are they getting the equipment they need?

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. I am going to give you a yes and a no answer, Madam Chairwoman.

We have concluded that given the amount of resources that we have available to us, that we get greater value by focusing, at least initially, in training and capacity building. The argument being that if you give them equipment, but they don't have the capability, the experience, the understanding in terms of how to use it effectively, you get very little value from your equipment. Whereas, if you train them, even if they are lightly equipped, you get value, and as you can then process or feed equipment in, they are able to use it more effectively.

We also have to deal with the fact that wildlife—illegal wildlife trafficking is broadly dispersed, particularly in Southern and Cen-

tral Africa. And in order to have an impact throughout the region from an equipment perspective, it would come with a price tag that is enormous. I mean, that would dwarf any amount of money that this subcommittee has so far thought about to dedicate to the wildlife trafficking issue.

We are trying to compensate to a certain extent for that by using international organization partners. There is the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC, which has taken on illegal wildlife trafficking as a priority issue. And there is a consortium of international organizations that goes by the acronym I-C-C-W-C, or ICCWC, which tries to bring all of the international organizations together to work in a coherent manner on illegal wildlife trafficking.

And we believe we can get at least a greater range and scope for our efforts and our support by using, particularly in the Africa context, those international organizations.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mr. CUELLAR. Oh, I am sorry. Mrs. Lowey.

Mrs. LOWEY. Go ahead. No, you go right ahead.

Mr. CUELLAR. Oh, no, no. No. Ranking Member?

Mrs. LOWEY. First of all, before I ask a question on another topic, I want to say bravo. Because my mantra has been "coordination, coordination, coordination." And when we visit countries, the various people don't even know each other that we meet at the Ambassador's house.

Thank you. I hope this will be effective.

I also want to say this is one area where there is such great cooperation between the chair and the ranking member, between Republicans and Democrats, to increase money for a particular account, I also want to say bravo. I hope you take that message back.

I also want to make another quick statement that I was in Kenya several years ago, I think it was 2007, and the Secretary gave an extraordinary speech on corruption. The country is just as corrupt as it was in 2007. So we still have a lot of work to do in that regard.

But, Mr. Ambassador, I want to focus on children in adversity and the Action Plan for Children in Adversity to help increase coordination between 7 agencies, 30 offices on international programs working with children. The three primary objectives of APCA are strong beginnings for infants and young children, a family for every child, protection of children from abuse, exploitation, violence, and neglect.

Now I know this program is basically USAID. So I would like to know, since it is a USAID program, what oversight does your office have on USAID's implementation, and how are you and the Special Adviser for Children in Adversity coordinating to reach the intended outcomes of this interagency action plan?

Thank you.

Ambassador CDEBACA. We have been—as you know, there have been a few changes over at USAID as far as some of the personnel around that. So that has been one of the things that we have had to meet that challenge. But I think that what we have seen is that the action plan and the coming together as the task force on chil-

dren in adversity has given a good platform to really start to front these issues and look at kind of a coordinated strategy.

Obviously, each of us has our own statutory mandates, and we have to bring those to bear. But I think that even just the fact of the working groups, the fact of our staff. The person who I put on it, I am proud to say, is one of the folks who started the modern U.S. victim rights movement back in the 1980s and 1990s, a psychologist by training, somebody who is very familiar with this.

And I think that what this structure has allowed us to do is identify those people within our own organizations who have the best insights into the needs of the children in adversity and come together that way and harness that. So I think it is something that is really hitting its stride.

Right now, I don't think that we can necessarily say that there is a project out there that is a specific children in adversity project that has gone through the entire pipeline. But I think that we are certainly seeing exactly what you suggested, which is through this coordination, through this complementariness between us and USAID, it really is what we have been striving to do on all of our programs, whether it is trafficking persons where we have the lead, whether it is them having the lead on the child protection issues.

Mrs. LOWEY. Just in conclusion, because I don't know that we are going to have another round, I just want to repeat again my view from the work that we have done together. The American people are good people. We have a philanthropic sector that is—frankly, it is not comparable to any other philanthropic sector anywhere in the world that I have seen.

So I am very pleased, Assistant Secretary Brownfield, that you talked about the coordination. But as money is tight and as budgets are going down, and we can mention this area that was discussed today or other areas, it is so important for you to share with us your successes. Because there are too many people who have been our friends, who have been our advocates, that will tell me, well, what can you really do? Where is this money really going? We need the money here at home. What are we doing to accomplish our goals?

So the more you can coordinate and the more you can share with us your successes, the better the chair and I and the good members of this committee can back up the importance of this committee and the work we can do on a whole range of issues.

Ambassador CDEBACA. And ma'am, the notion of the money that you provide, we are trying to use that as seed money. So if you look, for instance, at one of our projects in India through International Justice Mission, so successful in getting people out of debt bondage that now Google Philanthropy and other philanthropic organizations are picking up that funding and running with it.

So we were able to fund proof of concept. We were able to get it off the ground and really act as an angel investor. I think that is the future of how we tie in that type of partnership. So it is not just intergovernmental coordination, but it is with the philanthropic community as well.

Mrs. LOWEY. And with the philanthropic community with deep pockets, I think it is going to be more important for us than ever before to coordinate and emphasize what the government money is

doing. We have to get that message out because not everyone in the Congress are believers as we have here on this committee.

So thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mr. Diaz-Balart.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Let me shift a little bit now to Venezuela, if I may? INL's 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report lists Venezuela as both a major money laundering country and a major drug transit country. The report goes on to say that in 2013 Venezuela and U.S. counternarcotics authorities increased regular communications and some case-by-case cooperation. But the fact remains that Venezuela is a major, major—again, as I just mentioned, we have a major problem with Venezuela.

Despite the fact that on the surface, there would seem to be some bilateral communications, Venezuela is also listed as a Tier 2 watch list country. And according to State's Trafficking in Persons report, Venezuela is a source of transit, a destination country for men, women, and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor.

We have seen in the past, and I don't have to get into details, but we have seen in the past how the Venezuelan military has been a part of the problem there. So let me ask you gentlemen, with the—again, the report talks about a porous border with Colombia, the fact the FARC next door, the proximity to the Caribbean. What role is now, if any that you can tell us, does the Venezuelan military play in the drug trade, also in the human trafficking trade?

If you want to talk about that, and also is drug trafficking and human trafficking a revenue source for the Venezuelan government? If you could just comment on both those issues, all those issues?

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Shall I start, Lu? Congressman, in about the year 2005, 2006, during the tenure of an obviously very unsuccessful United States Ambassador to Venezuela, the government at that time elected to cease direct cooperation with United States Government on drug trafficking issues and, in a natural process of attrition, eventually attrited down the U.S. presence at the embassy through DEA to support drug trafficking. I think they hit bottom at a number of one, leading the then-subsequent Ambassador never to allow that poor rascal ever to leave country for fear that he would never be allowed back in.

As a consequence, we, on an interagency basis and an international basis, developed a strategy, which I guess I call the periphery strategy, and that is operate on the assumption that you do not have cooperation from the government itself and try to address the problem through partners that surround that particular country. And it produced some results, I would argue. Certainly better than not doing anything at all. And every other government of every other country that surrounds Venezuela did cooperate in this effort.

As our INCS report for 2012–2013 notes, sometime in the course of the year 2013, for the first time in like 6 or 7 years, there was

evidence of some effort on the part of the government to address drug trafficking. Your guess is as good as mine as to why.

Was it because they realized that the amount of product that was transiting through Venezuela had exploded by a factor of 10 between roughly 2004 and 2010? Was it because they realized that their own institutions were being hollowed out and corrupted by billions and billions of dollars of illicit revenue? Or was it a power struggle within—within and between members of the government itself?

I don't know for sure. We did acknowledge there were some steps. There was some communication, and quite frankly, there was evidence of a reduction in the amount of air traffic that was flowing from Venezuela north through the Central America-Mexico corridor.

We still have a challenge there. There still is an estimated 200 tons of cocaine that processes, in our judgment, through Venezuela every year, compared to an estimated 15 to 20 tons 10 years ago. We still have a challenge. I believe it is only right that I acknowledge those areas of progress while at the same time state we clearly have a challenge remaining to address.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Madam Chairman, it is yellow, but if later on, you want to also deal with Ecuador, speaking of Ecuador, of a problem where they expelled 20 civilian military DoD employees. And that is another area.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mr. Cuellar.

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Let me direct your attention back to transnational crime in Mexico since we got a 1,954-mile border with Mexico. We were in Mexico City with some members of the Appropriations, including Chairman Rogers, a couple of weeks ago. One of the things we spoke about in our discussion with President Pena Nieto and some of the Mexican officials was the southern border, and the three-ring strategy.

So I would like to get your thoughts on the three-ring strategy on the southern border, which includes Guatemala and Belize. Number one, your thoughts on that to help stop some of the drugs and people coming in from Central and South America.

Number two, I wish Mexico would establish—I know there is a pilot program, a small pilot program on having joint border patrol work together on the U.S. and Mexican side. I wish they would do that for the whole northern border.

And then the third thing is what caught my attention since Texas has allied with Tamaulipas, and you know the state of Tamaulipas, where it is Matamoros or Reynosa or Nuevo Laredo, those areas, I mean, that state is in very, very difficult, very violent situation. The Mexicans at least in Mexico City said they are going to start sending reinforcements. When, how much, I know their resources are being stretched so many ways, but I wish they would do that because that ties in directly to our border there.

So your thoughts on a joint Mexican border patrol; two, the southern border; and number three, Tamaulipas.

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Sure. Thanks, Congressman.

May I suggest, since I am not unaware of the fact that there are at least three Texans sitting in the room right now—two sitting on the panel up there and one sitting at the table right here—you make a good point when you remind us and we remind ourselves that when we say southern border, we are thinking one thing. When citizens of Mexico say southern border, they are thinking another thing. But the truth of the matter is we actually have interest in cooperating at both of those borders.

I do not have the figures with me right now, although I suspect I could get them within about an hour. But at this point, the overwhelming majority of those entering the United States without proper documentation across our border are, in fact, not citizens of Mexico. They are citizens of, for the most part, Central American countries.

Mr. CUELLAR. By 53 percent.

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. And in order to enter through the U.S. Southwest border, they obviously must have a process through Mexico. And if there were a stronger, more modern, more effective system of controls along Mexico's southern border, that would actually have a positive impact for the United States of America as well.

So we have signaled, we have said, and I do intend to support efforts to work with, cooperate with, the government of Mexico in their efforts to strengthen and modernize their own border. A much less complicated process, for reasons of geography. Our border, up between Mexico and the U.S., as you point out, is about 2,000-plus miles long. The border between them and Central America is about 1/10th of that length.

Joint patrols. I would—I would say to you we have been working on this issue with the government of Mexico for a number of years. There are sensitivities that you, more so probably than anyone in this room, Congressman, are aware of in terms of Mexican willingness to work jointly with uniformed members of the United States Government or, for that matter, the State governments of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California.

I believe we are making progress in that area. We should do it, in my opinion, one step at a time, and we should be careful not to talk too much about it, at least in the early stages, for fear of spooking those that are carefully trying to do such patrolling in the border regions between the United States and Mexico.

Third—fire away.

Ambassador CDEBACA. I am going to take this as Secretary Brownfield's third, if I might? One of the things that we have seen that has been very effective on the anti-trafficking front is not joint patrol at the border patrol level, but with interior enforcement. And we have been able to work with the Mexican government now in the last few years so that they can come to the United States, take affidavits from the victims in the U.S. that they can use in court in Mexico.

Saves the wear and tear on the victims. They can be interviewed in a responsible way. It doesn't retraumatize them. It is allowing us to share our skills with our Mexican counterparts, and it is one of the first times that we have actually seen that notion of joint law enforcement really working.

And I think that it is because we see it as a shared responsibility toward those Mexican citizens who found themselves enslaved, whether it was in Mexico or here. It is allowing us to trace the networks all the way from New York City down to a small town in Tlaxcala. And if it wasn't for that kind of cooperation between the two police forces, it wouldn't be happening.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. Some Members have one last question, and then I will wrap up.

Mr. Diaz-Balart.

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Just if you gentlemen want to, you know, Mr. Secretary, you talked about in the case of Venezuela you look at other partners. Now, for example, Ecuador is now a serious problem. If you want to just briefly touch on your thoughts on that?

And lastly, we heard recently, and I think he also testified to the fact, but General John F. Kelly, who is the commander of USSOUTHCOM, stated that—and let me just make sure that I get this right—because of asset shortfalls that, in essence, we are unable to get after 74 percent of suspected maritime drug smuggling. He went on to say that a much larger amount of drugs will flow up from Latin America and that he believes that U.S. authorities only seize about 20 percent of the narcotics in transit to the United States.

And a lot of times, by the way, he sees them coming up, but he doesn't have the assets. This is the United States of America we are talking about, in our hemisphere doesn't have the assets to go after them. So it would seem to me that that would be probably one of the most cost-effective ways to deal with that.

Now, gentlemen, do you agree with General Kelly's assessment that we are basically only seizing about 20 percent of the narcotics heading to the United States? And again, we have to remember that the same folks that are responsible for drug trafficking, these organized crime groups, tend to be a lot of the same folks who do human trafficking, that do a lot of other—frankly, you know, commit a lot of other atrocities.

So let me just kind of throw those both open-ended questions to you to finalize.

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Congressman, may I take your first question first? In some ways, that is the easiest one, and that is the state of play in our cooperation with and engagement in Ecuador.

There has been public and press play on the fact that the government of Ecuador has announced their intention that the United States military group will close down and depart Ecuador. They have not announced, but I am quite prepared to acknowledge it right now, the INL section, which has been in Ecuador now for more than 30 years, is also going to close up shop, and we will have them all out by the end of September of this year.

There, I think, is going to be one program that extends into the next fiscal year, but you may assume that that decision reflects the reality of the nature of the cooperation that we have with that government as well. And I am not trying to make a political point. I am merely acknowledging where things stand right now in that regard.

Your second, larger question, the simplest answer, of course, is I would never disagree with General Kelly. He is much bigger than I am and, quite frankly, I suspect could wipe the floor with me at any time he might choose to do so. But I do not disagree in this particular instance because he is in a position to offer a fairly accurate assessment of what, in his judgment, is getting through, to use kind of a simple term.

And it allows me to make a point that I would have made to Mrs. Lowey had time not run out, and that is the challenge that we now confront, ladies and gentlemen of the subcommittee, is we do not have the sorts of budget and resources that we have had in past years. We do have to figure out, to use the truism, how to do more with less.

We have got to explore things such as how to work in the inter-agency community to find out if other parts of the United States Government can perform missions that we previously were doing, but that are roughly consistent with what they are going to be doing anyway. What can we do with international organizations that we haven't done in the past? What can we squeeze out of other potential donors?

Because one of the things that is happening on the drug front, Congressman, is much of that cocaine, which, for the last 50 years, flowed from the South to North America, is now flowing east-west. It is flowing from South America to West Africa and Europe or to East Asia. Might we find greater cooperation and willingness to participate by some of them as donors?

And finally, even in my line of work, what philanthropic organizations would be prepared to support us? There are very few that work with law enforcement entities, but there are those that do demand and—drug demand reduction, that do treatment and rehabilitation. I believe that is our challenge in this front for the years to come.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

Mrs. Lowey.

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, in closing, one comment and then a question. I have enormous respect, as you can see, for both Assistant Secretary Brownfield and Ambassador CdeBaca, but neither of you have addressed what you are going to do, what are you doing with regard to this—there aren't even words to express what just happened in Nigeria and Boko Haram. So I may give you the opportunity if the red light—you can think about it, the red light doesn't go on.

But I also want to ask you a more general question. Natural disasters, such as the earthquake in Haiti or the hurricane in the Philippines, or manmade disasters, such as the civil war in Syria, cause massive movements of people and are fertile ground for transnational criminal organizations.

Each year, millions of people are also affected by smaller disasters—floods, droughts—many of which go unreported are recurring and destroy livelihoods. These small-scale chronic disasters roll back development gains, trap people in cycles of poverty, and make them vulnerable to abuse, exploitation, and violence.

So are there lessons that you have learned from the conflicts in Syria, the massive movements of people? How can we mitigate the exploitation of these refugees and displaced persons?

In your opinion, what is preventing the U.S. Government and the international community from disrupting and dismantling current transnational crime? Is there a need to expand or adjust existing congressional authorities to combat the combined transnational crime threats? Are the available U.S. foreign policy tools sufficient to meet today's challenges? And are such tools effectively implemented? If not, what can we improve?

And I want to go back to that first comment I made, Assistant Secretary Brownfield. You may be getting cuts, but there is still a lot of money out there. We are still the most generous nation in the world, and I hate to say this as a Democrat, but we can't always be asking for more money.

We have to constantly look at how we are coordinating, how we are using the money. So perhaps you can respond to these root causes of transnational crime and what you are doing about it?

Ambassador CDEBACA. One of the things that we have really been looking at over the last few years, the Haiti earthquake I think brought it home to us, but it is something that we had always been focused on. And frankly, with the help of our colleagues at PRM, we are all part of the now what we are calling the "J enterprise." We all report to the same Under Secretary.

And Under Secretary Sewall I think is keenly interested in figuring out how she can leverage all of our synergies together so that we don't have me working on one thing, Ambassador Brownfield working on something else, Anne Richard in PRM going in a different direction. And I think that Haiti really showed us the necessity for that.

As is often the case, the first response is going to be something that USAID and often the military commands are in charge of. PRM is often going to be coming in very quickly thereafter, using its implementing partners like the International Organization for Migration and others to try to set up shelters, to try to set up the refugee camps and other things.

But then we have recognized, and we are thinking that it is about a 6- to 9-month lag time that the traffickers then start coming. They start coming to the refugee camps. People start leaving the refugee camps because they are not feeling that their needs are being met, and they are vulnerable to the allure of the traffickers. And not just the sex traffickers who are almost overtly kidnapping, but even the labor recruiters saying come up and we will see something somewhere else.

One of the things that we have heard from the International Organization for Migration, who is the holder of our emergency services contract, is that they are starting to see women now in the Angeles City and Manila area who are coming up from the typhoon damage. That hadn't been happening, but because we use them for anti-trafficking work as well as PRM using them to try to come in and set up shelter and emergency camps and things like that, we think that we have got a bit of an early warning system through the IOM.

I do think that there continues to be a challenge, though, because the response is often let us just get the pallets of order in, and we will deal with the Mafia later. But the Mafia guys are already starting to preposition their responses, and we have seen that in southeastern Europe with the Bulgarians coming around where the new Syrian refugees are, just as much as we are seeing it in the Philippines.

And I would be happy to address the Nigeria situation as well, depending on how much time.

Mrs. LOWEY. Maybe because it is the end and because I know how passionately our chair is concerned, we can let you respond to Nigeria as well. Is that okay?

Ms. GRANGER. Sure. Absolutely.

Ambassador CDEBACA. One of the things that we have seen in Nigeria over the last few years is the power of innovation, the National Agency for the Prevention of Trafficking, or it is called NAPTIP, which is atypical for its nimbleness in perhaps the Nigerian government, especially on the security side, is a small group that is doing some very good things.

We have not yet been able to get in touch with them as far as the situation because I think it is largely being dealt with as a security issue. Certainly the United States help that you may have heard about, which Secretary Kerry offered and that President Jonathan welcomed yesterday, is more operational than it is programmatic.

And so, I think that what we will be doing with the NAPTIP, the National Agency to Prevent Trafficking in Persons, is to follow up with our counterparts and our colleagues then to try to make sure that their expertise is actually brought to bear. They are unique in Africa in that they are not simply a police force. They are a combination of police, prosecutors, and social workers because they realize that you have to think about the psychosocial response and the victim care once you are dealing with a trafficking case.

This is something—this situation is something that is going to dwarf them as far as what they have done in a given year in the past if, indeed, they are brought in to bear. And we want to make sure that we are as supportive of our colleagues as possible.

And I think it is that kind of follow-up, and I know that Assistant Secretary Brownfield has been looking at various policing support as well, and I don't know, Bill, if you want to?

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Sure, I can give it just 30 seconds, Madam Chairwoman. I mean, as—

Mrs. LOWEY. We got the okay.

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Our assessment right now is that there is an urgent crisis in Nigeria. It is an operational crisis, and that is to say to rescue some 300 girls who have been kidnapped and are being, at a minimum, misused, if not worse, in terms of what Boko Haram is doing. That is an operational issue. That is a security issue. And the people from the United States Government that are now in the lead are AFRICOM and the Department of Defense and the FBI representing the Federal law enforcement community.

That is not a foreign assistance issue. That is an operational issue. It is a foreign assistance issue for which I will be held ac-

countable for us to try to develop programs, equipment, training, capacity building, exchanges that will actually improve the capabilities of Nigerian law enforcement to prevent this from happening again and to be more effective and more responsive against those that would attempt to repeat this sort of thing.

And that is our challenge, to be able to take on that activity without undercutting the immediate urgent requirement to put 100 percent of all available assets on the mission of rescuing these girls.

Mrs. LOWEY. As you know, and Madam Chair and I have talked about this, in Nigeria the government has not responded. And we are dealing with governments that are in too many places corrupt and do not respond.

We keep hearing, for example, in Haiti that there are 10,000 NGOs, and I am sure they are all doing good work. We have sent billions of dollars, as have others, but there may be questions about the government in Haiti as to their effectiveness, their efficiency, and their concern about doing the right thing.

So we know the challenges that you have, and I know that you have a great deal of support from all of us, and we look forward to continuing to work with you to make sure that all our assets, all the good people like yourselves that are working on these issues are coordinated as effectively as we can, despite failings in government leadership in too many parts of the world.

And I thank you. Turn it back to the chair. Thank you very much.

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you.

I just have just three brief not questions, just comments as we went through this. One of them had just what Mrs. Lowey was talking about, the coordination.

Before I even came on the subcommittee, I was asked by the State Department to take a delegation to look at human trafficking. And I remember we had a meeting, and I was asked, you know, when you think about human trafficking, where do you think it is the most prevalent? And I was wrong on every count.

And it is sometimes countries that we don't expect. And so, there has to be a better awareness. And on this trip that we took, we went to donor countries. Moldova was one of them. And recipient. And Greece was one of them. And I think about when we are—when we are working, we, as the United States, there may be less funding, but there is not less attention and not less leadership. And that is what has to occur.

In this case, in Moldova, met personally and helped a young woman who had been kidnapped, and she was in Turkey and she tried to escape. She crawled out a window of a seven-story building because the entire building was filled with people who had been trafficked.

She fell to the sidewalk. The police found her, found that she was—what happened to her, and gave her back to the people that were trafficking her. And I know you see that still today. And she finally escaped another time, but at great cost to her.

So we know so much. There is just so far we can go with how we identify more. We need to attack the problem, and it is just horrendous.

The other thing has to do with the use of technologies, and I think about all the improvements and what we know about DNA. And I just think it is a real opportunity in making sure we are using the technologies today in trafficking.

In Africa, where—and I think it made a huge difference when I saw it, and it is more attention now, but identifying where they are truly killing whole herds, poisoning the water, all that is happening. And the use of drones to see where are they when it is happening I think we need to certainly—and that we would certainly consider. And that is a coordination situation again, and we just have to do it the very best we can.

I appreciate the work both of you have done and continue to do. And please keep us involved. Obviously, we are passionate about this.

I thank you for appearing before this subcommittee today. Members may submit any additional questions for the record.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador William Brownfield and
Ambassador Luis CdeBaca by
Representative Ander Crenshaw
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
Committee on Appropriations
May 7, 2014**

Question:

I believe that several years ago the State Department granted a non-profit organization called WildAid with a small amount of money to be used to combat the demand for illegal wildlife, which is the mission of that organization. That grant allowed them to produce four media messages that were released in 70 countries and are still being shown today. This group uses donated media time, donated celebrity appearances, and donated production costs to produce media messages aimed at educating populations by reaching the people in a format they are acquainted with. Today, they receive small grants from US Fish and Wildlife to carry on their mission. Recently, WildAid's China program was audited and determined to have received \$165 million in value for a \$2.5 million production to combat the consumption of shark fin. And now shark fin is considered to be down 50-75%, no doubt in part to WildAid. What I want to know, Ambassadors, is: Has the U.S. been funding projects aimed at combating demand for illegal wildlife? Have you been solely focused on combating the supply of illegal wildlife rather than on tackling the demand? Will combating demand be a part of the plan to use the \$45 million from FY14 Omnibus?

Answer:

Combating demand for illegal wildlife and illegal wildlife products is a critical component of the Administration's efforts to curb wildlife trafficking. In fact, one of the three strategic priorities set out in the *National Strategy to Combat Wildlife Trafficking* released in February is

reducing demand for illegally traded wildlife products, both at home and abroad.

State and USAID have long recognized that efforts to reduce the supply side of this pernicious trade will have only limited effect unless we work simultaneously to address the persistent market demand that drives the trade. As such, we have been actively engaged in global demand reduction efforts through public outreach and education activities, funded in whole or in part by State and USAID. At the root of demand reduction is influencing consumer behavior and consumption patterns. This is why we have engaged those with expertise, including foreign government partners, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector, and other elements of civil society. Work in this area includes successful media campaigns undertaken with NGOs, such as WildAid, and a more recent PSA done in partnership with the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, which featured Chinese actress Li Bing Bing.

We have also hosted activities at our Embassies and Missions abroad to raise public awareness of the devastating effects of wildlife trafficking. Public outreach includes activities undertaken by more than 54 U.S. Missions on December 4, 2012, in commemoration of “Wildlife Conservation Day” and on March 3, 2014, to commemorate the first ever

“World Wildlife Day.” These activities included roundtable discussions with NGOs and subject matter experts, Ambassadorial opinion pieces in key newspapers, online quizzes and poster/art competitions for school-aged children.

Additionally, as part of USAID’s “Asia Regional Response to Endangered Species Trafficking” (ARREST) project, which goes through 2016, we have launched a series of strategically connected, host government-endorsed demand reduction campaigns. These campaigns operate in Asia’s three biggest wildlife market and transit countries.

While progress has been made, it is not enough to just increase public awareness. In order to end wildlife trafficking, the buying must stop. As we look at how to best utilize FY 2014 funds directed for combatting wildlife trafficking, demand reduction efforts will be an important component. We will apply the lessons learned from past campaigns, such as what messages and activities are effective in certain regions, and we will continue to work closely with our governmental partners, NGOs, and the private sector, including airlines, cruise ships, hotels, and the antique sector to leverage their expertise. We appreciate the leadership Congress has shown on this issue and we look forward to working with you as we move forward on implementation.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador William R. Brownfield and
Ambassador Luis CdeBaca by
Representative Ander Crenshaw
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
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May 7, 2014**

Question:

As we are all aware, the wildlife poaching and trafficking crisis has become an international problem and might lead to the extinction of many species, as well as increasing the power and wealth of international crime organizations that also traffic humans, drugs, and arms. As someone who supports a strong national defense and international conservation, this situation has my attention. From what I have learned about this crisis, the poachers are part of highly sophisticated criminal networks with dangerous weapons that the local communities and governments cannot combat alone. I know that the Department of Defense participates on the Taskforce on Combating Wildlife Trafficking. Based on the sophistication of the crime units, do both the U.S. military and the local militaries need to be more involved to end the crisis? How is the Department of Defense contributing to the Task Force? Are there barriers to utilizing the militaries in more prominent and effective ways? Where do you believe is the line between what INL and Department of State does and what the DoD currently does and what can it do in the future?

Answer:

Wildlife trafficking is a multi-billion dollar criminal enterprise that promotes corruption and threatens security and stability. Combatting it is a central component of U.S. foreign policy. With the release of the President's National Strategy for Combatting Wildlife Trafficking, the Department of State continues to coordinate with the Department of Defense (DOD) on wildlife trafficking through the Presidential Task Force. DOD

can play a supporting role in the fight against wildlife trafficking through logistical and long range communications in support of U.S. Chiefs of Mission. I defer to the Department of Defense for further details on the allocation and impact of directing such resources to combat wildlife trafficking.

Through diplomatic and foreign assistance initiatives, the Department of State has a leading role in all three key areas of the National Strategy. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is engaged primarily in the enforcement and international cooperation pillars of the strategy both through capacity building to assist police, park rangers, customs officials, the courts and others and diplomatic initiatives to garner international support and build cooperative initiatives to fight wildlife trafficking.

In fiscal year 2013, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs notified to Congress \$500,000 in Africa Regional Peacekeeping Operations funds to support efforts by the military and ministry of environment personnel in Cameroon and Chad, respectively, to address elephant poaching along the Northern Cameroon-Southern Chad border. We continue to coordinate with the many stakeholders within the U.S. government who are part of the Task Force to end this illicit criminal enterprise.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Ambassador William R. Brownfield and
Ambassador Luis CdeBaca by
Representative Ander Crenshaw
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations
Committee on Appropriations
May 7, 2014**

Question:

Last week in an article for the Washington Times, DEA Spokesman Rusty Payne discussed the connection between the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan and the increased poppy production in the country that is funding terrorist networks like the Taliban. Afghan poppy, used to make heroin, may never make it to the United States, but the money earned from production is enriching warlords and terrorists, a huge national security concern. As someone who is highly concerned with our national security, this has me alarmed. What are INL and the Department of State doing to counteract this growing trend, specifically in Afghanistan? In relation to the increasing drug trade, how are we preparing for the drawdown of troops? How is INL enlisting the U.S. military, DEA, or military forces of the international community to combat this growing problem?

Answer:

Supporting the Afghan government as it continues to strengthen its counternarcotics (CN) capabilities and institutions will remain a priority and will continue past the drawdown of troops. Our experience in other parts of the world has shown that successful CN efforts require a long-term, multi-faceted approach that is well-integrated with broader efforts to support good governance and economic growth.

Afghan insurgents benefit materially from Afghanistan's illicit

narcotics economy, making it an impediment to U.S. goals in Afghanistan and the region. The United Nations estimates that the insurgency receives \$100-150 million annually from narcotics-related activities including taxation, protection, and extortion. Insurgent attacks against Afghan government-led CN programs like eradication demonstrate the importance insurgents place on revenues from the poppy trade.

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has supported the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)-mentored vetted units of the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) from their very beginning in 2004, and will continue to do so. These specialized units, which include the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) and the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), now have the capability to independently develop intelligence packages, garner warrants, and plan and lead interdiction operations. The SIU and NIU benefit from extensive, high-level training provided by our implementing partners and DEA, including training in financial investigations.

INL's broader CN efforts in Afghanistan are focused on building host-nation capacity, including for poppy eradication, alternative development, and the "demand reduction" side: public information, drug treatment, and preventive education. The United States is the single largest funder of CN

assistance programs in Afghanistan, and our efforts are directed primarily toward building the capacity of the Afghan government to independently tackle the narcotics trade over the long term.

While the United States (including INL- and Department of Defense-funded CN programs) and United Kingdom have made the largest investments in Afghan CN efforts, other countries have participated as well. For example, from 2007 to 2013, the international community has pledged approximately \$136 million to all United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime programs that operate in Afghanistan, with major donors including Canada, Japan, Finland, Italy, and Germany.

Ms. GRANGER. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs stands adjourned.

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